According to Mixue Group's latest financial report, as of December 31, 2025, Mixue Bingcheng had 59,823 stores globally, including 55,356 in mainland China and 4,467 overseas, covering 13 countries.

By store count, it surpasses Starbucks and McDonald's to become the world's largest freshly made beverage chain.

Stores are the carrier, but the supply chain is the real business

Understanding Mixue Bingcheng's overseas expansion requires a key premise. Mixue Bingcheng is not a company that makes money by selling milk tea. Over 90% of its revenue comes from selling ingredients, packaging, and equipment to franchisees. In one sentence: Mixue Bingcheng is a supply chain company disguised as a retailer; stores are the touchpoints, but selling ingredients is the real business. This model has an inherent logic: Franchisees must be profitable for the headquarters to be profitable. This deep binding forces Mixue Bingcheng to control costs to the extreme—because its revenue comes from franchisee purchases, and franchisee purchases depend on whether stores are doing well. This logic explains the characteristics of Mixue Bingcheng's overseas expansion. Why build density in Southeast Asia? Because the denser the stores, the more efficient the supply chain, the lower the cost of delivering ingredients and packaging to franchisees, and the more the entire system can operate. Why can prices be pushed to the limit—ice cream in Indonesia equivalent to RMB 3 yuan, and pearl milk tea in Vietnam under 5 yuan? Because it has five major production bases and over 70 intelligent production lines in China, with 100% self-production of core beverage ingredients, and logistics costs accounting for only 3.8%, far below the industry average of 7%. Why prioritize Indonesia and Vietnam over other markets? Because these two countries have low consumption levels, similar tea-drinking culture, and low franchise thresholds, making them the easiest places for this supply chain system to take root. From this perspective, looking at the construction of overseas supply chains becomes clearer. Currently, Mixue Bingcheng has established localized warehousing systems in 4 Southeast Asian countries, with 7 self-operated warehouses totaling approximately 69,000 square meters, and an overseas distribution network covering over 560 cities, capable of delivering coconut jelly from the Chengdu production base to Jakarta stores within 48 hours. This is not a supporting action for store expansion; this is the core infrastructure of expansion. Compared with Miniso's 3,583 overseas stores spread across five continents, with layouts in Europe, America, and Asia, and Pop Mart's 208 stores in 20 countries, focusing on locations like Oxford Street and the Louvre, Mixue Bingcheng's 4,500 overseas stores are highly concentrated in Southeast Asia, and within Southeast Asia, highly concentrated in two countries. According to the September 2024 prospectus data, Indonesia had 2,667 stores and Vietnam had 1,304 stores, together accounting for nearly 90% of the overseas total. This shape directly illustrates its expansion logic: it does not pursue "entering more countries," but rather "becoming impenetrable in the markets it has entered." A joke circulates on Indonesian social media: "You must keep an eye on any vacant space near your home, because it will soon become a new Mixue Bingcheng store." This popular saying, once used by Indonesia's largest English-language newspaper, The Jakarta Post, vividly depicts the active performance of Chinese new consumer brands overseas. This is not mockery; it is a true reflection. Density is the core keyword of this network.

Mixue Bingcheng's Overseas Expansion:

From 4 Million RMB to 4,500 Stores

2018–2020: Starting in Vietnam, Validating Product and Price Range The starting point of Mixue Bingcheng's overseas expansion is more low-key than many imagine. In 2018, because the Chengdu branch's store capacity in the southwest region was nearing saturation, several middle managers decided to go south. The headquarters gave 4 million RMB in startup funds, basically a hands-off approach, and did not expect to make money overseas at the time. In September 2018, Mixue Bingcheng's first overseas store opened in Hanoi, Vietnam. In the first two years in Vietnam, Mixue Bingcheng was feeling its way. Initially, when it started recruiting franchisees, the first batch had 12 franchisees, 6 of whom were Chinese. The local market was hard to break into, and the response was direct: significantly lower the franchise threshold, with total costs of only about RMB 180,000–200,000, minimum store area of 30 square meters, and aggressive policies such as waiving franchise fees and discounting management fees. Once policies were relaxed, franchisees flooded in. By the second half of 2020, Vietnam had over 200 stores, with up to 20 franchise applications per month, growing organically through word of mouth, and the increment was already considerable. Vietnam's price range was also validated during this phase: pearl milk tea at about RMB 5 yuan, ice cream at about 3 yuan, similar to pricing in China's lower-tier markets, but forming a clear price advantage locally—30%–50% cheaper than Taiwanese brands Gong Cha and CoCo. Two years in Vietnam accomplished the most critical thing: proving that Mixue Bingcheng's model of extreme cost-effectiveness plus low-threshold franchising can be replicated in overseas markets. 2020–2022: Leveraging Indonesia, Rapid Expansion with the OV System After Vietnam succeeded, Indonesia's approach was more aggressive and more interesting. In 2020, Mixue Bingcheng opened its first store in Bandung, Indonesia. Indonesia is the most populous country in Southeast Asia, with 270 million people and a huge consumption base, but Mixue Bingcheng had no foundation there at all. Startup funds were still tight, and how to quickly find local franchisees willing to invest in opening stores became the key issue. The breakthrough Mixue Bingcheng found was to leverage the OV system—the dealer network of OPPO and vivo in Indonesia. At that time, OPPO had 27,000 retail stores and over 20,000 employees in Indonesia, and vivo held a 27.4% market share, ranking first in Indonesia's mobile phone market. These mobile phone dealers had ample funds, widespread local outlets, and rich experience in site selection and foot traffic, which highly aligned with the business logic of beverage franchising. Some dealers even converted space next to their mobile phone retail stores into Mixue Bingcheng stores, or placed stores side by side with mobile phone retail. This path was extremely fast. Indonesia, which entered two years later than Vietnam, had already surpassed Vietnam in store count by March 2022, with 317 stores versus 249. Growth continued thereafter, eventually exceeding 2,600 stores, making it the market with the most stores in a single overseas country for Mixue Bingcheng, and also making Mixue Bingcheng the largest freshly made tea brand in Indonesia. Indonesia's experience also distilled a playbook that could be replicated in other markets: when entering an unfamiliar market, you cannot rely solely on your own efforts; you need to find local "big legs" that have already established trust and networks, leveraging their channels and endorsement to quickly open up the situation. 2022–2024: Extending Outward, Exporting Southeast Asian Experience to More Markets From 2022, Mixue Bingcheng began to extend outward. Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos were entered successively; in the same year, stores opened in Seoul, South Korea, and Omotesando, Tokyo, Japan; in February 2023, it entered Australia, landing simultaneously in Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne. At this stage, Southeast Asia remained the absolute main body, but the boundaries of the territory had clearly expanded. By September 2024, Mixue Bingcheng had over 4,800 overseas stores, covering 11 countries. In 6 years, it went from one store in Hanoi, Vietnam, to a network of nearly 5,000 stores spanning Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. Looking at the entire timeline, the path is clear: Vietnam served as a prototype to validate the model, Indonesia leveraged partnerships for explosive growth, and then gradually replicated and exported to surrounding markets. At each step, it did not rely on high-end flagship stores to build brand awareness, but on density and a replicable franchise system to achieve scale.

Stores are the surface, supply chain is the core

Understanding Mixue Bingcheng's overseas expansion requires a key premise that must be clarified first. Mixue Bingcheng is not a company that makes money by selling milk tea. According to the 2024 financial report, revenue from goods and equipment sales was RMB 24.2 billion, accounting for 97.5% of total revenue, derived from selling ingredients, packaging, and equipment to franchisees; franchise fee revenue was only RMB 620 million, accounting for 2.5%. Over 97% of revenue comes from selling ingredients to B-end franchisees, not from C-end consumers buying milk tea. In one sentence: Mixue Bingcheng is a supply chain company disguised as a retailer; stores are the touchpoints, but selling ingredients is the real business. This business model has an inherent constraint: franchisees must make money for the headquarters to make money. The purchase volume of franchisees directly determines Mixue Bingcheng's revenue scale. This deep binding forces Mixue Bingcheng to control costs to the extreme, ensuring that every franchise store truly thrives. This logic explains all the characteristics of Mixue Bingcheng's overseas expansion. Why build density in Southeast Asia? Because the denser the stores, the higher the warehousing and distribution efficiency, the lower the unit cost of supplying franchisees, and the more the entire system can operate. In supply chain economics, density itself is competitiveness.

  • Why can prices be pushed to the limit? Ice cream in Indonesia is about RMB 3 yuan, and pearl milk tea in Vietnam is under 5 yuan—behind this are five major production bases and over 70 intelligent production lines in China, with 100% self-production of core beverage ingredients, and logistics costs accounting for only 3.8%, far below the industry average of 7%. The larger the scale of self-production, the lower the unit cost, allowing front-end prices to remain at this level.
  • Why prioritize Indonesia and Vietnam over other markets? Because these two countries have consumption levels close to China's lower-tier markets, similar tea-drinking habits, and low franchise thresholds, making them the easiest places for this supply chain system to take root. The logistics link from Southeast Asia to China is also relatively mature; from the Chengdu production base, coconut jelly can be delivered to Jakarta stores within 48 hours. From the perspective of supply chain construction, the scale of infrastructure Mixue Bingcheng has established in Southeast Asia has long exceeded the scope of "supporting facilities." As of the end of 2025, it has established localized warehousing systems and distribution networks in 8 overseas countries, with 7 self-operated warehouses in 4 core Southeast Asian countries, totaling approximately 69,000 square meters, and a distribution network covering over 560 cities. This is not a supporting action for store expansion; this is the underlying infrastructure of expansion itself. A comparison makes it clearer. Miniso opens flagship stores to endorse the brand with location; Pop Mart enters Oxford Street to add weight to the brand with landmarks; Mixue Bingcheng builds warehouses and distribution networks in Southeast Asia to lay the foundation for franchisee survival with supply chain. Three paths, completely different directions. In 2025, Mixue Bingcheng's overseas stores saw a net decrease of 428—the first full-year net contraction since it went overseas 7 years ago. According to Mixue Group's announcement, as of the end of 2025, the company had 4,467 stores outside mainland China, a decrease of 428 from 4,895 at the end of 2024; the company also mentioned that in Indonesia and Vietnam, it focused on operational adjustments and optimization of existing stores, and the number of stores in these two markets decreased. The contraction is concentrated in Indonesia and Vietnam, the two markets with the most stores and the earliest layouts. Mixue Group's Chief Supply Officer Cai Weimiao said at the results meeting: "When we first entered these two countries, our overall overseas operation system was not mature, and we took some detours in both opening and managing stores. At this stage, we focus more on refined operations and improving the quality of single-store operations. After relocation, the average daily turnover of stores in Indonesia and Vietnam increased by more than 50%." Closing 428 inefficient stores while increasing the efficiency of remaining stores by 50%—this is an active choice to trade quantity for quality, not a passive retreat. This signal indicates that the Southeast Asian base has entered a new phase: extensive store expansion has completed its mission, and refined operations are the core proposition going forward. This change cannot be simply understood as "setbacks in going overseas." More accurately, it indicates that Mixue Bingcheng's overseas business has entered a new stage: In the early stage, it needed to prove it could open and replicate; now it needs to prove whether it can sustain operations and improve single-store quality. For the franchise model, rapid store opening is not the only goal. If store locations are unreasonable, franchisee capabilities are insufficient, and regional management lags, short-term numbers will rise, but long-term it will drag down system efficiency. Especially in markets like Indonesia and Vietnam, where scale has already been achieved, blindly continuing to expand stores may not be the optimal choice. Instead, closing inefficient stores, adjusting store locations, and optimizing the franchisee structure may better align with the development requirements of the next phase. This is also a signal that Mixue Bingcheng's overseas business is shifting from "scale expansion" to "quality management." Just as Southeast Asia contracted, Mixue Bingcheng continued to move further afield.

In April 2025, the first store in Almaty, Kazakhstan, opened, with first-month revenue exceeding RMB 430,000;

On December 20, 2025, the first US store officially opened on the Hollywood Walk of Fame in Los Angeles;

In early 2026, the first store in Mexico opened at the Zócalo in Mexico City;

São Paulo, Brazil, was also entered in April 2026. The Hollywood store deserves special mention. Its location is fundamentally different from those 30-square-meter corner stores at university town gates in Southeast Asia. It serves the function of brand exposure and market testing. The labor costs, rent structure, supply chain conditions, and franchise ecosystem in the US are fundamentally different from Southeast Asia, and the playbook that worked in Indonesia cannot be directly transplanted. There is a deep issue here worth continuous attention: Mixue Bingcheng's core competitiveness comes from the scale effects and cost control of its domestic supply chain. This advantage can be transferred to Southeast Asia because logistics distances are manageable, consumption levels are similar, and the franchise system can be replicated. But in the US, selling the same $1.99 lemonade involves a completely different supply chain cost structure. According to a previous report by The Economist, about 90% of raw materials for Mixue Bingcheng's Indonesian stores are still produced and imported from Chinese factories. This proportion is barely sustainable in Southeast Asia; in the Americas, logistics costs would become a fatal pressure. Whether Mixue Bingcheng can find a suitable local operating model in the Americas remains an open question. In 2025, Mixue Bingcheng optimized existing stores in Indonesia and Vietnam while entering new markets such as Kazakhstan and the US. The official announcement also mentioned that the Mixue Bingcheng brand entered the Kazakhstan and US markets during the reporting period. This indicates that it is not stopping its overseas expansion but advancing in layers: the Southeast Asian base is entering refined operations, while markets like Central Asia and the US take on new market testing functions. But the difficulty in new markets will be significantly higher. Southeast Asia is suitable for Mixue Bingcheng because consumption levels, climate, beverage habits, logistics distances, and the franchise environment are all relatively favorable for its low-price model to take root. In the US, Central Asia, and even more developed markets in the future, labor, rent, supply chain, and compliance costs will all change. In these markets, whether Mixue Bingcheng can maintain its "high quality, low price" cost advantage remains to be observed.

Final Thoughts

Mixue Bingcheng's overseas store story takes a different path from Miniso and Pop Mart.

Miniso spreads a store network globally, and now its focus shifts to flagship stores in key markets;

Pop Mart continuously adds weight to the brand with high-energy locations; Oxford Street, the Louvre, Sydney Airport—every point speaks for the brand;

Mixue Bingcheng follows another logic: with extremely low franchise thresholds and extreme cost-effectiveness, it packages and exports the supply chain system validated domestically, rapidly replicating density in markets with similar consumption levels. In the first phase, it solved the question of "can it go out." Markets like Vietnam and Indonesia validated its product price range, franchise model, and store replication capability. At this stage, store count growth is the most important signal. In the second phase, it solved the question of "can it become dense." Store densification in key Southeast Asian markets allowed warehousing, distribution, and franchise management to begin forming scale effects. At this stage, density is more important than single-point entry. In the third phase, it needs to solve the question of "can it run long-term." The contraction of overseas stores in 2025 indicates that Mixue Bingcheng has begun to address the problems left by early expansion. Going forward, single-store efficiency, franchisee quality, regional supply chains, and localized operational capabilities will be more important than the speed of store opening. This is also why Mixue Bingcheng's overseas expansion cannot be understood merely as "a tea brand going overseas." It is more like rebuilding an offline consumer network overseas. The front end of this network is thousands of stores selling ice cream, lemonade, and milk tea; the back end is central factories, overseas warehousing, regional distribution, franchise training, and digital operations. Stores are the surface, supply chain is the core. If you only look at store count, Mixue Bingcheng is already a special sample among Chinese consumer brands going overseas. A low-price tea brand, how it brings China's highly mature supply chain efficiency and franchise system to overseas markets. This is very inspiring for subsequent Chinese consumer brands going overseas. Going overseas is not simply selling products abroad, nor is it opening a few flagship stores overseas. The real difficulty is: as the number of stores increases, can the backend system keep up; as the markets entered become farther away, can the original cost advantage continue to hold; as the number of franchisees increases, can the headquarters maintain standardization and operational quality.