Source | Lingshou Learning from Pangdonglai Wumart has changed its face again. On one hand, Wumart is actively learning from Pangdonglai as an apprentice, absorbing the business philosophy of "love and warmth." The recent renovation of the Xueqing Road store is a representative work of this strategy. In the generally sluggish environment of traditional supermarkets, this store's performance has been seen by outsiders as a sample of "reversal" in the retail industry. Data speaks volumes. After the reopening of the Xueqing Road store, sales during the May Day holiday increased by about 190% compared to the same period in 2024, transaction count rose by about 95% year-on-year, and average transaction value increased by about 50 percentage points. These impressive results, to some extent, demonstrate the effectiveness of Wumart's transformation. But looking deeper, this "high-scoring answer sheet" actually relies heavily on copying the Pangdonglai model. According to Wumart, over 70% of the products in the store are new additions, and the overall product structure is up to 90% similar to Pangdonglai. In other words, the success of the adjustment is more due to deep borrowing from the "teacher's" textbook than to Wumart's own independent breakthroughs in product strength or supply chain capabilities. In fact, the Wumart team paid meticulous attention to details during the adjustment process, sending employees to Xuchang in batches for learning, and consulting the Pangdonglai team multiple times on store design, striving to replicate every detail. While the outside world focuses on Wumart's "apprentice" model, on the other hand, Wumart has also announced its re-entry into the fierce discount store market. On May 27, Wumart announced on social media that it would close and adjust six stores in Beijing. This time, Wumart is not replicating Pangdonglai's model but transforming all six stores into a new discount store brand, "Wumart Super Value." According to the announcement, the Zhongxincheng, Xishan Fenglin, Lizeqiao, Langqingyuan, Heping Xincheng, and Fengtai Xinye Plaza stores will be closed for renovation from June 3 to July 24, and will reopen on July 25. In a previous article, I analyzed that Wumart had tried discount stores in 2022, opening "Meitao Discount Store" in Mentougou, Beijing. But at that time, "Meitao" was more like a pool for digesting internal inventory, with a single supply chain and lacking fresh produce categories, eventually quietly exiting the market. Now, Wumart is returning with the "Wumart Super Value" discount store format, proposing the slogan "direct sourcing from origin, good own-brand products," seemingly attempting to break away from the clearance model and move toward hard discount. Compared to the past, if Wumart wants to succeed, it must establish a more complete supply chain system and more competitive private labels, rather than just changing the brand name. It is worth noting that in the model store on Xueqing Road, Wumart's private label products were not prominently displayed but were discreetly distributed among shelves, mixed with other products. This approach seems to be a choice that respects the market, but it also reflects Wumart's lack of confidence in its private label development. In the current hard discount competition, private label capability has become a core element, and Wumart's "stealth" strategy may affect its subsequent performance in the discount format. It can be said that Wumart's adjustment path is already very clear. On one hand, by creating a "Pangdonglai-style" model store, it enhances brand premium and customer experience, which is an idealistic route of "doing addition"; on the other hand, it actively lays out discount formats, pursuing the ultimate in cost and efficiency, which is a realistic choice of "doing subtraction." Wumart's Copycat Adjustment The success of Wumart's Xueqing Road store has accelerated Wumart's adjustment, inspiring an optimistic sentiment: as long as the right "prescription" is found, traditional retail can also "come back to life." If we zoom out and look at the whole "Pangdonglai fever," we will find that the surface prosperity masks a more complex reality. In fact, former retail giants such as Yonghui, Bubugao, and Zhongbai have all become "apprentices" of Pangdonglai, carrying out "explosive renovations" on some stores. These stores almost without exception created impressive performance in the early days of opening. For example, Yonghui's first store in Zhengzhou renovated by Pangdonglai achieved sales of 1.88 million yuan on the first day of reopening, nearly 14 times the previous daily average; its self-adjusted store in Beijing also saw first-day sales more than six times the past. The explosive growth fully confirms the effect of the Pangdonglai model in quickly attracting traffic and creating buzz in the short term. But after the initial "fever," the problem of "puffiness" in enterprises has not been truly solved. Over time, the performance miracles of these renovated stores are hard to sustain, and overall operations will gradually stabilize. Data shows that Yonghui Superstores had a net loss of 1.329 billion yuan in 2023, and in 2024, the net loss was still 1.465 billion yuan, expanding by 10.26% year-on-year. The company also admitted that the transformation brought pain. Zhongbai Group's financial reports also show further expansion of losses. Although Bubugao is expected to turn around, its non-GAAP net profit is still negative. These data reveal a reality: between the explosive renovation of stores and the reversal of the overall fate of a listed company, there are many obstacles. And in-depth analysis finds that Pangdonglai is difficult to replicate because its success model is locked by two "gene locks." First, Pangdonglai's core competitiveness lies in refined management, which is highly dependent on controllable small scale. Yu Donglai himself even actively brakes on enterprise expansion. In contrast, for chain giants with hundreds or even thousands of stores, their organizational structure and management processes are inherently designed for scale replication. To use an analogy, letting an "elephant" accustomed to galloping on the grassland learn to be as agile as a rabbit in a small space is itself a conflict at the genetic level. Second, another pillar of Pangdonglai is the complete subversion of the traditional supply chain model. It abandoned the "entry fee" model and instead had professional buyers select products and develop private labels. Some industry insiders comment that this is essentially a shift from "commercial real estate" logic to "product manager" logic. For these "apprentices," to fully replicate this model means not only giving up relatively stable backend profits but also investing huge funds to reshape the supply chain and bearing the high risks of private label development. Therefore, whether imitating Sam's Club or Pangdonglai, the key lies in whether the enterprise can combine its own reality to create a unique offline operation system and differentiated supply chain, and the shaping of corporate culture cannot be copied. Based on this, further analysis of the "success" of Wumart's Xueqing Road store is more thought-provoking. On one hand, while affirming the achievements, it is also necessary to rationally analyze the special conditions behind it. It is reported that the renovation investment for this store was not small, and if employee benefits are included, costs will rise further. Looking at the store's location, it is at the intersection of multiple communities such as Zhongguancun and Wudaokou, with about 400,000 residents within a three-kilometer radius, mainly young, high-income, highly educated consumers. This group is less price-sensitive but pays more attention to product quality, shopping experience, and emotional connection. This raises a core question: how replicable and universal is the experience of the Xueqing Road store? When this "high investment for high experience" model is promoted to community stores with more ordinary consumption capacity and customer composition, can it still achieve equally significant results? Can the high renovation and operation costs be effectively covered in traditional stores with limited sales per square meter and profits? These are the questions Wumart needs to carefully consider and gradually solve as it plans to complete the adjustment of more than 30 stores nationwide by 2025. Wumart's Dilemma In fact, Wumart's current "two-front battle" is not entirely a voluntary choice but is influenced by multiple real factors. First, the continuous shrinkage of the hypermarket format is an industry trend that all traditional supermarkets cannot avoid; no one can stay immune. Wumart has fallen into the "asset gravity trap" accumulated during the hypermarket era. What was once a moat has now become a speed bump on the road ahead. High rents, depreciation, and operating costs continue to erode profit margins in an era of increasingly thin industry profits. At the same time, the "commercial real estate" mindset makes enterprises overly dependent on "rent collection" rather than "operation" for profit, and this inertia greatly hinders the transformation to high-efficiency, fast-turnover retail models. Moreover, a large amount of heavy assets not only locks up the company's funds and management energy but also makes every strategic shift extremely difficult, making "turning the elephant" a realistic portrayal. Therefore, exploring new formats such as discount stores with light assets and high sales per square meter has become a choice for Wumart to hedge against heavy asset pressure. Wumart's dual exploration is also a form of self-rescue. However, the difficulty behind it is not small, requiring Wumart's management to coordinate the tension between ideals and reality in resource allocation, organizational culture, brand positioning, and other aspects, and make precise strategic choices. Looking at the current industry, the "Pangdonglai siege" phenomenon is the most realistic portrayal of the retail industry. It reflects the collective anxiety of the industry and also indicates future differentiation. But Pangdonglai's success is not about creating some mysterious magic; it is about returning to the most simple common sense of retail in an almost ascetic way—respecting people and respecting goods. Even so, common sense is often the hardest to replicate. Of course, true redemption never lies elsewhere but within oneself. Starting with imitation and ending with transcendence, the end of all change is to become a better self.🔺 Details of the 7th China FMCG Conference Scan the code for ticket consultation