Let's start with a set of data: In 2021, Walmart China's total sales were 99.04 billion yuan, RT-Mart (Gaoxin Retail) and Yonghui Superstores were 98.01 billion and 98.97 billion respectively. Some media made the following trend chart. You can calculate how big the difference is among the three. The author looked at it and found that the three giants were almost squeezed on one line, and some people even found it hard to see who was ahead. But if you look back at this table now, you might be a bit confused. In 2024, Walmart was 158.8 billion, RT-Mart 76.4 billion, and Yonghui 73.2 billion. The three small points that were once squeezed together have now stretched into a diagonal line: one is running upward, and the other two are falling. What makes us feel uncomfortable is actually the subsequent trends of the three.
Transforming Yonghui
In five years, Yonghui lost over 12 billion yuan, that's 12 billion plus! In 2021, it lost 3.9 billion, and then it kept "losing wildly," in 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025, Yonghui lost 2.7 billion, 1.3 billion, 1.4 billion, and 2.5 billion respectively. This gives us the feeling that a person falls down while walking, gets up and continues, then falls again, and so on. Is there anything more serious than losing money? Perhaps: closing stores. At the end of 2024, Yonghui still had 775 stores, but by the first quarter of 2026, only 392 were still operating. This store closure intensity is quite fierce. As of Q1 2026, Yonghui had cumulatively closed 394 stores, while only 11 new ones were opened. This stark contrast is mainly due to Yonghui's transformation and reform. In recent years, the most lively thing about Yonghui is probably learning from Pang Donglai. In May 2024, Yonghui apprenticed to Yu Donglai, and then vigorously carried out "Pang reform": removing 70% of SKUs, waiving entry fees for second- and third-tier brands, and replacing them with Pang Donglai's DL series. Also, employee wages increased from 3,000 to 4,500, even 5,000; shelves were lowered to 1.6 meters, and aisles widened to 3 meters... Objectively speaking, such adjusted stores do have some positive changes. For example, the Zhengzhou Xinwan Plaza store, after adjustment, sold 1.88 million on the first day. By March 2025, 41 steady-state adjusted stores could earn 14.7 million in one month. This shows that the idea of adjustment is correct. But the exposed problems cannot be avoided: the investment in adjustment is huge. Adjusted stores need a lot of financial support, and closing stores also costs money, including asset write-offs, employee compensation, breach of contract compensation, etc. After Ye Guofu of Miniso took charge, he became more determined to carry out the adjustment to the end. But is the result of adjustment necessarily good? In Q1 2026, Yonghui finally turned losses into profits, 287 million, up 94% year-on-year. But after carefully reading the financial report, the author found that its revenue is still declining. The main reason for the revenue decline should be the closure of many stores. Whether the profitability in Q1 2026 can be sustained is the key for Yonghui going forward, because Yonghui's debt is already quite high. If you have friends in finance, you can look at the following set of numbers: asset-liability ratio 93.9%, short-term debt 3.6 billion, cash on hand 2.9 billion, and the financial pressure is very high.
A word about Pang Donglai
In 2024, Pang Donglai Group's 13 stores sold a total of 16.964 billion yuan for the year, of which the supermarket segment sold 8.094 billion, with an average of 623 million per store. After comparison, everyone may have a more specific understanding of the above numbers: Walmart's average per store (including hypermarkets and Sam's Club) is about 480 million (mainly driven by Sam's Club), and Yonghui's per store is less than 100 million. This makes it easy to see that Pang Donglai's per-store efficiency is indeed impressive. But if you let Yonghui learn from Pang Donglai, the result may not be as ideal as imagined. Pang Donglai is deeply rooted in Xuchang and Xinxiang, where it has a home-field advantage, with supply chain, reputation, and employee relations built over more than 20 years. Yonghui, on the other hand, operates nationwide, where competition patterns, rent structures, and consumption habits vary. If you move Pang Donglai's shelves to Shanghai, the effect may not be the same. However, Pang reform is indeed a suitable path for Yonghui, and there are not many options to choose from, but the final result of Pang reform depends on timing, location, and people.
Now let's look at RT-Mart
Compared with Yonghui, RT-Mart did not fall in a straight line; it fluctuated. In fiscal year 2025, RT-Mart finally turned losses into profits, earning 386 million. But just as everyone breathed a sigh of relief, it forecast a loss of 300 to 350 million in the middle of fiscal year 2026. The reason is not complicated: profitability mainly relies on cost reduction, not revenue increase, with both average items per transaction and average price declining, and the store street cannot be rented out. The store street model used to be a gold mine for RT-Mart: renting out space in the supermarket to milk tea shops, glasses shops, mobile phone repair shops, and earning rental income effortlessly. Now no one goes to the mall, and the store street cannot collect rent. This is not RT-Mart's own problem; it's a change in the entire offline business ecosystem. Here, it should be mentioned that RT-Mart has done a few right things. First, direct supply chain procurement. Previously, pork went from farmers to wholesale markets to supermarkets, with several middlemen. Now it has launched self-operated pork national joint procurement, going to the source itself. With this move alone, the gross margin for the pork category increased by 4% in September. It can be said that these 4 points are an excellent achievement in the retail industry. Second, trying front warehouses. In Jinan, Shanghai, and other places, RT-Mart's model is "hypermarket + front warehouse." When we order online, RT-Mart ships from the nearest store, and within a 3-kilometer radius, it can be delivered within an hour. This logic is actually fine, using physical stores is cost-effective. But running this path requires funds and time. Although RT-Mart still has 11.9 billion in its account, the market is unpredictable and doesn't give you time to grind. The author noticed a detail: RT-Mart closed 6 hypermarkets in half a year. Six is not too many, but it represents that some unprofitable stores, if kept, are just internal friction. Compared with Yonghui, RT-Mart's losses are smaller, but Yonghui's adjustment has basically been completed, while RT-Mart's transformation journey is not over. The direction and effect of RT-Mart's next transformation are the fundamental issue for the future.
Walmart: Not in the Same Arena
Why say not in the same arena? Let's look at the numbers: 158.8 billion in 2024, nearly 170 billion in 2025; Walmart's market share increased from 5.3% a year ago to 7.4%. Compared with the previous two, Walmart's curve is steadily rising. It is worth noting that Walmart's growth secret is not in those hypermarkets, because its hypermarkets have been closing, from over 300 to 280. What really supports the scene is Sam's Club. Currently, Sam's has opened 63 stores, with over 10 million paying members. Membership fee income grows by more than 35% a year. If we want to buy something at Sam's, we pay 260 yuan at the door, and this money is already profit before touching the goods. So, what is Sam's logic? Curated SKUs: a store only carries about 5,000 items, which is 1/5 to 1/10 of a traditional supermarket. This means it makes choices for consumers, telling us that the things inside are worth buying. This set works well for the middle class, especially for those who don't have time to pick items. The store has chosen for them, and their trust in the store naturally grows. Sam's private brand Member's Mark covers about 1,000 SKUs, accounting for 40% of sales. A piece of Australian wagyu beef and a box of Chilean cherries may not be available elsewhere, or may be more expensive, which is the difference. Another data point worth looking at: Walmart China's e-commerce net sales increased by 32%, accounting for more than half of total sales. And nearly 80% of digital orders can be delivered within an hour. What problem can we see from this? It is no longer a supermarket company; it is an instant retail company, just with its warehouses in physical stores. For example, if we suddenly crave Swiss rolls at 8 p.m., we can order on our phone, and Sam's will deliver within an hour. Once this becomes a habit, it's not easy to drive to the supermarket, find parking, and queue to check out. Some may ask: How did the three lines converge in 2021? Actually, the convergence was a coincidence. Walmart's hypermarkets were declining, but Sam's was ramping up; RT-Mart was still living on its past glory, and Yonghui still had the halo of China's first fresh food stock. Thus, the three lines came from different directions to the same altitude, but the foundations underneath were completely different. Looking back now, the author has a feeling that the convergence line was like an illusion. How to say it? We thought they were on the same starting line, but in reality, some wore running shoes, and some were barefoot. The capital market sees it clearly. Since 2025, Walmart's stock price has risen 19%, Gaoxin Retail has fallen 40%, and Yonghui has fallen 36.75%.
A few more "transfer student" data
Hema sold 75 billion in 2024, entering the top three for the first time, up 10% year-on-year, with 420 stores (2025 sales should exceed 100 billion). This puts Hema's average revenue per store at about 179 million, which is a good result. Also, note that its growth rate is double-digit. Costco has only 7 stores, selling 8.7 billion, with 1.24 billion per store; Sam's per store is about 2.2 billion. These two have per-store revenue more than ten times that of traditional supermarkets. Now look at Biyoute, a name many haven't heard of. In 2023, it ranked 27th, and in 2024, it rose to 22nd, with sales increasing from 5.4 billion to 7.35 billion, a growth of 36%. It is deeply rooted in the Northeast, not expanding nationwide, just focusing on its own small area and doing it thoroughly. These "transfer students" tell us one thing: it's not that supermarkets are failing, but that those supermarkets that "sell everything, are not good at anything, have no price advantage, and have no service features" are failing.
A few words of cold water on the "adjustment fever"
In 2024, the industry set off a wave of learning from Pang Donglai. Bubugao learned, Yonghui learned, and it is said that even China Resources Vanguard went to learn. CCFA data says that 3/4 of supermarket companies tried adjustment, and 75% of them achieved growth. Adjustment has three costs, and many people can't calculate the account. The first is real money investment: renovation, shelves, employee salary increases; the second is store closure losses: those judged as "tail stores," closing them costs money, not closing them loses money, a dilemma; the third is opportunity cost: management's time and energy are all devoted to adjustment, so other things may be neglected. Yonghui is a typical case. Its adjusted stores are indeed effective, but how many adjusted stores can the market accommodate? With so many supermarkets adjusting, what is the final efficiency?
"The subsequent trend is eye-catching," where is it eye-catching?
It's eye-catching in the divergence: in the same industry, facing the same consumers, in the same economic environment, some go up, some go down, with no intersection in between. Walmart's trend is locked by Sam's Club and one-hour delivery; as long as it doesn't make major mistakes, it will continue to take a share of the middle class's wallet. RT-Mart's trend is volatile recovery; finding the right direction is most important for it. Yonghui has chosen its path and needs to see its future performance. But one number impressed me deeply: in 2024, the total number of stores in the TOP100 supermarkets decreased by 9.8%, while sales slightly increased by 0.3%. This shows that the entire industry may need to start accepting a fact: opening more may not be as good as opening better, and having many stores may not be a glory; sales per square foot is what matters.