Thirteen years after the group buying war subsided, it has reignited due to Douyin's entry. Wang Xing once said in 2013 that attention to group buying would decline not because it became less important, but because it became ubiquitous and increasingly a normal part of consumption. At Meituan, group buying gradually became a basic utility-like business, a key component of its in-store business, reflected as online marketing revenue in financial statements. However, its strategic importance has been overshadowed in recent years by home delivery services like food delivery, flash purchasing, and grocery shopping. The situation changed as Douyin aggressively entered local life services. This short-video giant chose low-price group buying as its breakthrough point, precisely what Meituan had long neglected. Meituan did not respond immediately, but as Douyin captured user mindshare and price comparison trends resurfaced, Meituan was forced to revive group buying starting in March this year, launching 'Special Price Group Buying' and 'Group Buying Delivery'. This marks Meituan's return to its home turf of group buying. Wang Xing explained in Meituan's Q1 analyst call this year: 'A few months ago, we started new marketing formats for our food delivery and in-store businesses, using live streaming, short videos, and special-price group buying to drive traffic, directing it to products merchants want to promote, helping them create bestsellers. This is an important supplement to our original marketing formats to meet merchants' complex marketing needs.' Group buying is no longer a new species, but in 2023 it remains a sharp tool for platforms to enter local life services. Consumers still buy into this model, essentially due to the irresistible allure of low prices. But thirteen years on, group buying has taken on new meaning. Meituan Forced to Revive Group Buying It took Douyin five years to go from testing group buying to full-scale implementation. During this period, Meituan's attitude shifted from neglect to cooperation, observation, attention, and emergency response. Initially, Meituan had no specific reaction, and even in 2020, when Douyin's group buying was in its early stages, Meituan held a 'cooperative' attitude. A detail: that year, Meituan conducted live commerce for local life categories on Douyin. An industry insider noted, 'Any restaurant heavily promoted by Douyin's traffic would see its search volume on Meituan peak.' Douyin's traffic spilled over to Meituan, where users were 'planted' on Douyin and 'harvested' on Meituan (Dianping). This year, Meituan finally took substantive action, reviving its group buying business. Since March, 'Special Price Group Buying' has reappeared in the prime position on Meituan's app homepage, a dedicated low-price group buying zone targeting Douyin. Food delivery is Meituan's foundation; group buying is its living water. Like Douyin, Meituan is engaging in price wars for low-price group buying. An insider revealed that Meituan's budget is tilted toward the top 50 brands covered by Douyin, with the goal of offering lower prices than Douyin for the same brands, with budgets applied for monthly. In terms of subsidies, Meituan focuses on the comprehensive services that Douyin has taken away, followed by dining and hotel/travel. Additionally, to secure low prices from merchants, Meituan may offer advertising slots or reduce commissions. According to information from Meituan insiders reported by 36Kr Future Consumption, this round of subsidies will last at least 3 to 6 months, with real-time adjustments based on POI (Point of Interest) output. It's just the beginning. On the evening of June 8, New Berry daybreak entered Meituan's Special Price Group Buying zone, where the top banner 'Limited-time subsidy, lowest price across the web' was highly visible. The zone was divided into 'New Product Trial' and 'Limited-time Hot Deals' sections, with new product trials capped at 9.9 yuan. Subsidies in the new product trial area are substantial. A three-layer chocolate DQ ice cream, originally 15 yuan, sells for 7.9 yuan after Meituan's subsidy; a cup of Bianlifeng self-service coffee, originally 12 yuan, sells for only 5.9 yuan after subsidy. These in-store vouchers are valid across multiple stores, refundable anytime, and auto-refunded upon expiration. Notably, this new product trial is only available on the latest version of Meituan's mobile app. This also signifies Meituan's emphasis on special-price group buying—placing this campaign on the main site with higher traffic, rather than on Dianping. A month after launching special-price group buying, Meituan followed up with the group buying delivery feature, which is Douyin's 'food delivery service' launched in 2022. Baobian quoted a person close to Meituan as saying that after Douyin launched group buying delivery, it invaded Meituan's stronghold, and Meituan's follow-up is a counterattack. Although this may not increase Meituan's order volume, it can improve group buying redemption rates to some extent. For Meituan, the 'Group Buying Delivery' feature only requires opening the platform's technical interface to third-party service providers, helping merchants add delivery services to existing group buying. These technical adjustments are not complex and have low trial-and-error costs. In June, service providers connected to Meituan's open platform to complete the delivery loop. Thirteen years after the 'Thousand Group Buying War,' Meituan is forced back to the group buying battlefield. Both the heavily subsidized 'Special Price Group Buying' and the hastily followed 'Group Buying Delivery' are Meituan's tactical counterattacks out of necessity. Douyin Sparks a New Group Buying War Douyin entered local life services through group buying in 2018, and its later home delivery business—group buying delivery—was also derived from in-store group buying. Initially, industry analysis of Douyin's in-store business was that, similar to live commerce, live streaming/short video recommendations for local life mainly stimulate users' potential needs, while Meituan's more explicit planned consumption serves different user segments, representing differentiated competition. But over time, people began to think this wasn't so absolute. Douyin's investment in local life, besides satisfying its own commercialization needs like e-commerce, is clearly aimed at building user mindshare as a 'content + consumption platform.' One key metric is that users compare prices between Meituan and Douyin before making consumption decisions. As early as the first half of 2020, merchants told us they received several sales calls from Douyin daily, hoping they would invest in short-video marketing. At that time, these merchants reported that video creation costs were high and operations difficult, 'As long as you invest, views increase; if not, they don't.' And inviting influencers for store visits was not only expensive but also had unsatisfactory redemption rates. At that time, many merchants were unsure whether short videos could bring new customer traffic. Most merchants willing to cooperate with Douyin treated it as an additional channel for seeding and investment, as long as group buying didn't lose money. But two years later, merchants' attitudes toward short-video seeding have quietly changed. This year, the owner of a Beijing barbecue restaurant told us that Douyin has become an online customer acquisition channel on par with Dianping, with almost identical in-store redemption rates, each accounting for 50%. Another owner of a script murder store offering light and shadow experiences in Beijing also believes Douyin is a brand content promotion platform and sales channel that cannot be ignored. Douyin is gradually becoming one of the core battlegrounds for life service merchants. Data from the Ocean Engine City Research Institute shows that in January 2023, the number of comprehensive industry merchants that had received orders on Douyin increased by more than 6 times year-on-year, and total order volume grew by more than three times year-on-year. Not only is merchant enthusiasm rising, but users are increasingly accepting short-video content seeding. The '2023 Douyin Life Services Comprehensive Industry Insight White Paper' notes that young users aged 18-30 are more likely to say they are 'gradually being planted by content.' By age distribution, younger users are more receptive to 'content seeding.' Douyin's significant progress in local life is due to its high emphasis on 'life services' in the intervening year (2021), making it a first-level department and bringing in more professional service providers to build the 'infrastructure.' That year, with the carpet-bombing efforts of over 10,000 Douyin field promoters, a large number of merchants were attracted to join Douyin under the policy of 'zero commission, zero points,' and Douyin's local group buying business flourished. Finally, in 2022, Douyin's local life group buying business continued to advance by leaps and bounds. 36Kr previously disclosed that in the first half of 2022, Douyin's local life GTV reached 22 billion yuan, a huge improvement compared to less than 10 billion yuan for the whole of 2021. In 2023, group buying has become the industry's darling. Besides Meituan's renewed attention, just before May Day this year, Xiaohongshu also joined the group buying war by launching its group buying feature. Even Channels (WeChat's video account) proposed doing local life business at the WeChat Open Class in March. Kuaishou is not far behind. This year, it bypassed Meituan and directly tested the transaction chain of its official mini-program for local life, inviting chain brands in catering and tea drinks to join. When users purchase group buying products on Kuaishou's mini-program, they will no longer be redirected to third-party merchant mini-programs. Douyin, Xiaohongshu, Channels, and Kuaishou all have traffic as their common strength, so 'group buying links' and 'pulsed' local life live streams can rise rapidly in the traffic field. However, their common weakness is that delivery and fulfillment are problematic, requiring third-party intervention. Meituan has been deeply involved in local life for over a decade, with a heavier model, excelling in instant transactions with fewer intermediate links. Its disadvantage is a lack of traffic, and content seeding is also a weak point. Its only content card is Dianping, which has been revamped at least six times since 2018, even imitating Douyin and Xiaohongshu's information flow distribution for images and text, but to no fundamental change. New Meaning of Group Buying Compared to the thousand-group-buying war years ago, this round of group buying war has more new meanings. In early 2010, group buying promotion had a simple business model. Meituan simply helped local small and medium merchants better promote themselves on portal sites and search engines, driving in-store consumption. This model succeeded because merchants were willing to offer deep discount coupons, saving on advertising costs while still earning some profit. Meituan was willing to build the intermediary platform because it could earn a margin. Multiple parties benefited. After Douyin entered local life, the boundaries of group buying expanded significantly. It's not just for in-store; group buying can also be delivered to homes in the form of food delivery. Previously, group buying vouchers could only be purchased on group buying websites or dedicated apps; now, top streamers can sell hotel and travel group buying vouchers in their live rooms. Before Douyin's intervention, group buying vouchers were almost exclusively for in-store consumption. After Douyin's entry, not only did the delivery function change the in-store nature of group buying, but live streaming also made group buying vouchers more e-commerce-like. Short videos with group buying links give vouchers a seeding gene. Long Peng, co-founder of Xiangkucun, a service provider interviewed by Zhibo, said that many local life products now are actually more e-commerce in form, such as hotels, travel, and the physical examination cards sold in Luo Yonghao's live room. They just have stores locally, but the products themselves have strong e-commerce attributes. They can reach users nationwide and are available on Taobao and JD.com, which is the e-commerce attribute. True local life products are based on geographic location, with limited user reach. For example, foot massage shops and restaurants. But the more stores a chain brand has, the stronger its e-commerce attributes. But no matter how the boundaries of group buying expand, what remains unchanged is the price of group buying vouchers. Both in-store consumption group buying and delivery-to-home group buying are high-ticket group meals costing hundreds of yuan. This time, Douyin entered group buying with 'low-price bestsellers,' Meituan also launched 'Special Price Group Buying' with heavy subsidies, and Xiaohongshu, following suit, has to play the low-price card. Long Peng said, 'Xiaohongshu doesn't have to do low prices, but it must not be higher than other platforms; that's a point it must grasp.' Although low prices are a universal weapon, for local life, this is unsustainable. Platforms do not want low prices to become the norm, lest consumers get the impression that the entire web is full of low-price group buying, cultivating wrong consumption habits. Merchants are even more unwilling to have users come only for group buying; once discounts stop, they become deserted. For various group buying platforms, group buying has always been a sharp tool to enter local life. But for each platform, the significance of group buying differs. For Meituan, group buying is a standard feature to consolidate its local life foundation. For Douyin, group buying is a strategic means to build in-store and home delivery. Xiaohongshu and Kuaishou view group buying as a monetization channel for content seeding. For Channels, group buying can help WeChat's private domain generate explosive group orders. Different platforms have different feelings, but one thing is certain: the war has reignited, and the outcome is unknown.