Source | Lingshou Why did the "run" happen? From "strategic renewal" to questioned trust "Run." When asked what exactly happened at Meituhao Supermarket, Chu Dequn, chairman of Shanxi Meituhao Chain Supermarket, described it this way. On December 11, Zhao Shiquan, chairman of Lecuntao Specialty Products, released a video on his WeChat channel "Lecuntao Brother Bald" featuring a face-to-face conversation with Chu Dequn. Chu said the "run" has lasted for more than three months. In the past, Meituhao sold a large number of prepaid cards. Recently, consumers have been concentrated on shopping, basically using "shopping cards." Over three months, the amount "run" through prepaid cards has reached about 1.1-1.2 billion yuan, with peak daily purchases via prepaid cards close to 20 million yuan. Retail enterprises ultimately live on cash flow. "If every day we receive stored-value cards and no cash comes in, the cash flow breaks. Rent, utilities, employee wages, taxes, social insurance, supplier payments—all require cash," Chu said. "Meituhao has held on until today; it's really very difficult." As for why the "run" happened and spread rapidly, Chu attributed it to "internet public opinion." In reality, public opinion was just the trigger and accelerator, not the only cause. The most direct cause began with Meituhao's store closures. In fact, Meituhao had already been closing stores at the beginning of this year. At that time, closures were gradual and small-scale, not publicized, so the market reaction was minimal. But later, concentrated closures brought the problem to light. On October 14, 2025, Meituhao issued an announcement. It stated that Meituhao launched a "dual-brand strategy": upgrading four large Meituhao stores to "Happy Gathering Membership Stores," creating a "localized Sam's Club"; meanwhile, transforming over a hundred supermarkets into "Meituhao Fresh Supermarkets," focusing on family daily meals. Additionally, Meituhao said that to concentrate resources, it had closed 14 stores that "did not meet new store standards" around October 8. Meituhao called this a "renewal upgrade," but the market interpreted it differently. Due to insufficient advance notice before closures, some consumers began to worry about "deteriorating business operations," and stored-value card holders rushed to spend to cut losses, leading to short-term stockouts in some stores. On the same day, Meituhao issued a clarification announcement saying, "Store closures are proactive strategic adjustments, not operational pressure," attempting to stabilize market confidence, but it was too late. Consumers still had doubts about whether "stored-value cards can be used normally" and "whether more stores will close." Subsequently, stockouts worsened. Many operating stores saw large areas of empty shelves, delayed replenishment, and shortages of daily necessities, further amplifying consumer panic. On the afternoon of October 15, five departments, including the Shanxi Provincial and Taiyuan Municipal Market Supervision Administrations and Consumer Associations, summoned Meituhao at the Taiyuan Fuxi Street office area, explicitly requiring Meituhao to rectify immediately, fulfill operator obligations under the Consumer Rights Protection Law and other regulations, and ensure normal and convenient consumption for consumers. They also set clear requirements for supply, card refunds, and store closures. For example, consumers must be able to refund cards smoothly; if more stores close, consumers must be informed at least 30 days in advance as per regulations. Meituhao promised to "file prepaid card insurance and guarantee refunds," but in subsequent implementation, many stores privately added refund thresholds, requiring additional "original payment vouchers," leaving most consumers unable to refund. This further exacerbated consumer distrust in Meituhao. On November 4, Meituhao released the "2025-2026 New Store Opening + Renovation Plan" and announced 25 specific stores to be renovated, but did not mention funding difficulties or solutions. The "run" crisis fully erupted. Rumors such as "store closure wave," "business deterioration," "Meituhao is going bankrupt," and "they're going to flee" spread on platforms like Douyin, WeChat Channels, Xiaohongshu, and WeChat groups, rapidly escalating. "These words can't be true, but they dare to say them. Then people started shouting to come and redeem cards to cut losses!" Chu said. "Later, we found things even more wrong—scalpers appeared." Scalpers bought prepaid cards at 30-40% of face value and rushed to buy goods. "If you stock milk, they buy out the milk; if you stock soy sauce, they buy out the soy sauce." Then, short videos of empty shelves and out-of-stock goods emerged. "How panicked does that image make customers? With more videos, traffic rises. Customers panic and all come to buy," Chu said. "As a result, goods are bought out as soon as they hit the shelves. We can't restock in time, so employees panic, suppliers panic, but I have to hold the line here and not let it collapse." As time passed, more "negative" situations were widely spread. The most direct impression for consumers: store shelves were empty, some stores restricted stored-value card use citing "network failures," and refunds required "original payment vouchers." Once a crack of trust appears, it spreads at an alarming speed. Because of concentrated store closures, "communication was insufficient, employees were not appeased, and arrangements were not in place. Some employees worked in a store for ten or twenty years; it's normal to have emotions," Chu admitted. "But when these emotions are posted online, they are exploited." Empty shelves and crowded crowds became traffic passwords. Stores fell into a vicious cycle of "stockout → panic buying → supply cutoff → more stockouts." On December 10, Chu lamented on his Moments: "Public opinion sets the pace; the run has lasted over 3 months, and the cash flow crisis is very severe." He also thanked suppliers for their loyalty and urged prepaid card holders not to buy goods they don't need for now, and not to sell cards at a discount to scalpers, so Meituhao can recover some cash to survive and create value to repay everyone. On December 11, Meituhao released the "Business Adjustment and Rights Protection Statement," clarifying that 5 directly-operated stores (Happy Gathering Binhe Store, Meituhao Kangning Street Store, etc.) support stored-value card consumption, while 29 franchise stores do not; it also promised to "protect employee rights and continue operations." But the surge in customer traffic overwhelmed stores, leading to stockouts and crowd control issues, further intensifying consumer dissatisfaction. Meituhao continues to face pressure. But facing such a severe cash flow crisis, many people wonder: where did Meituhao's prepaid card money go? The Crisis of "Short-term Borrowing, Long-term Investment" In recent years, Meituhao has not "lain flat" but attempted transformation, doing many things that look "advanced" in the industry: First, investing about 660 million yuan to build the "Youxian Duoge" central kitchen factory; Second, promoting "dining-supermarket integration," increasing freshly made and freshly sold items; Third, officially launching the "Happy Gathering Membership Store" in 2025, aiming to create a "localized Sam's Club with a lively atmosphere." So why did Meituhao need to transform? In fact, Meituhao's predicament is not a day in the making, because it is "too old." Reading the growth history of this enterprise is like reading the evolution history of Shanxi retail: In 1993, Chu Dequn founded Taiyuan's first chain supermarket, "Golden Coast"; in 1998, it transformed into a warehouse-style supermarket and renamed it Meituhao; at its peak, it had nearly 200 stores, nearly 10,000 employees, annual sales of 8.5 billion yuan, ranking among the top 30 in China's retail top 100. But times have changed. In recent years, Meituhao has faced multiple pressures: online e-commerce and community group buying divert customers; national brands like Yonghui and RT-Mart expand downward; Hema announced entry into the Shanxi market; local emerging brands like Yijiaqin rise with more flexible community store models. Transformation has become a life-or-death choice. Meituhao chose the "heavy asset" path, building the "Youxian Duoge" central kitchen factory to create a "from farm to table" supply chain; launching the "Happy Gathering" new format with a single store area of 20,000 square meters, integrating dining, retail, and regional culture, positioned as a "high-quality food mall + city living room" to differentiate from competitors. In business logic, this choice is not unreasonable. Because retail has long passed the era of competing on store count; supply chain and experience are the core competitiveness. But the problem is: strategy takes time to deliver, and market patience is limited. These investments are also heavy assets with slow returns. The first "Happy Gathering" store opened on September 27, 2025, with impressive initial performance: daily revenue exceeded one million yuan, more than three times that of traditional stores. Seeing hope, it was not unreasonable to invest more resources into the new format. However, Meituhao failed to balance the relationship between the new format and existing old stores. When problems like stockouts and "runs" occurred, it failed to take effective measures promptly, further expanding the negative effects. Meituhao has much to reflect on. As "Happy Gathering" started high and rose, hidden dangers gradually emerged. For example, consumers complained about high prices; the heavy asset model caused huge cost pressure; meanwhile, adjustments to old stores triggered a chain reaction. Store closures, stockouts, and card usage restrictions—these actions in consumers' eyes are not "strategic adjustments" but signals of "business deterioration." When enterprises pour resources into the future, they neglect maintaining the foundation of trust in the present. This is a typical time mismatch: long-term investment in transformation meets a short-term collapse in market confidence. "Looking back now, we made a big taboo—short-term borrowing for long-term investment. I should have connected directly with big capital like internet giants, but I didn't raise funds," Chu said. Chu explained, "At that time, I felt that assets were there, core competitiveness was there, the operations team was there, and the 'Happy Gathering' business model had been proven. I had resources everywhere. What I lacked was only working capital. Then we encountered this run." At the same time, Chu emphasized, "This is not Meituhao's decline; on the contrary, we are transforming and upgrading, pursuing a business model with the right direction, improving efficiency and supply chain." Now with economic downturn and consumption downgrade, many enterprises are struggling. Chu believes Meituhao's predicament is essentially a cash flow run. Common Challenges for Regional Retail Enterprises Meituhao's story is not an isolated case. On the map of China's retail industry, countless regional chains are experiencing similar pains. They once built solid moats in their regions with local advantages, but facing invasions from national chains, e-commerce impacts, and changing consumption habits, this moat is narrowing. First, prepaid cards are a typical double-edged sword. Stored-value cards are particularly common in regional retail enterprises. They were once a tool to lock in customers and improve cash flow, but during a trust crisis, they become the trigger for a "run." Meituhao is not the first enterprise to fall into trouble because of this, nor will it be the last. The core of the problem: many enterprises treat prepaid funds as "sinking funds" for expansion or investment, but fail to prepare for concentrated redemptions. Once any disturbance occurs, the risk of cash flow rupture amplifies exponentially. Second, the trap of transformation pace. Regional enterprises often face the dilemma of "a big ship is hard to turn." Old formats see declining profits, new formats require heavy investment; balancing the two tests management wisdom. Meituhao's lesson: transformation actions were too concentrated, and communication lagged severely. Consumers saw not "orderly transition" but "sudden closure." The information vacuum was quickly filled with suspicion, and social media accelerated the spread of panic. Third, fragile supply chain alliances. Regional retail enterprises rely heavily on local supplier networks. This is an advantage—shorter supply chains, more flexible responses. But when enterprises face funding tensions, this dependence becomes a weakness. In the Meituhao incident, suppliers reduced or stopped supply due to concerns about payment, directly causing store stockouts and intensifying consumer panic. The supply chain is not a cold chain but a symbiotic relationship built on long-term trust. Once trust is damaged, repair costs are extremely high. Meituhao has been persisting, but this storm leaves deep thoughts for the industry. For enterprises in similar difficulties, the urgent task is to stop the bleeding. First, cash is king. Prioritize ensuring supply to core stores, communicate honestly with key suppliers, and strive for credit term support or temporary supply agreements. If necessary, introduce strategic investors or seek local government coordination for short-term financing. Second, establish transparent communication mechanisms. Set up a 24-hour customer service hotline, publish daily lists of operating stores, product supply status, and card refund progress. Through live streams, official accounts, and other channels, have enterprise leaders directly dialogue with consumers and respond to concerns. Finally, simplify the card refund process. Remove unreasonable refund thresholds and establish a special refund fund. Cooperate with regulatory authorities to publicize the refund process and timeline, subject to social supervision. Of course, from a longer-term perspective, retail enterprises also need to build systematic capabilities to enhance their resilience. But regardless, this storm has left an important page in China's retail history: it records the transformation pain of a regional leader and reflects the common difficulties and choices of countless local retail brands in an era. The essence of retail is always the connection between people. Beyond algorithms and traffic, the ancient business principles of trust, responsibility, and symbiosis have never been outdated. Winter has arrived, and spring may still be on the way. For those regional retail enterprises still holding on, the only certainty is that this road is destined to be bumpy. [Moving Toward the C-End] The 11th China FMCG Conference Time: March 16-18, 2026 Location: Chengdu, China