A couple of days ago, I had a phone call with Meng Fanzhong, chairman of Biut Commercial Group & Zhenshimei Supply Chain. Originally, it was to prepare content for the March 18 CEO Decision Meeting. But as we talked, one sentence made me pause— "If chain supermarkets all die, do brands have a better position?" The person saying this had just completed Biut's "Double Hundred Goal"—100 stores and 10 billion in sales by 2025. He also manages Zhenshimei, a supply chain platform covering 50 billion in retail scale. Behind this sentence is a judgment he has validated over six years since 2019.

What Did Biut Do Right?

Biut grew from 1.3 billion in 2015 to over 10 billion in fiscal 2025, with a compound annual growth rate of 22.6%. This happened against the backdrop of many chain supermarkets in Northeast China retreating collectively during the same period—Walmart, Yonghui, and Hualian were all shrinking. Why did Biut survive and thrive? The core lies in two things. First, in 2019: adjusting supply prices. In 2019, after six consecutive months of losses, Biut made a seemingly simple but decisive move: requiring distributors to offer supply prices to supermarkets no higher than those to small shops, and adjusting retail prices accordingly, not higher than small shops. "This single change kept Biut alive." Second, in 2023: replacing distributors. Not eliminating distributors, but replacing small distributors who added 20 percentage points with large distributors who added only 5 percentage points. Zhenshimei was born from this logic of "replacing distributors." What kind of entity is Zhenshimei? In March 2023, Meng Fanzhong proposed the idea of implementing the Zhenshimei supply chain at a meeting of Nanjing Baoting Commercial Union. At that time, opinions varied; some tried, some waited. The first to implement was Jinan Zhenshimei. More than two years later, similar projects in other regions that had discussed the idea did not take off. Meng Fanzhong put it bluntly: if you just want to make some money here, it won't work; if you only serve your own small circle, you can't achieve scale. After Jinan succeeded, Zhenshimei began to replicate. Next were Shenyang and Harbin, then Zhenjiang and Chongqing; currently there are 5 regional warehouses. As of today, Zhenshimei covers 87 regional chain systems, 1,713 stores, spanning 14 provinces/municipalities/autonomous regions, with an overall retail scale of 50 billion. In 2026, Henan Dazhang, Northeast Biut, Hunan Jiahui, Henan Wandelong, and Jiangsu Jia Defu will jointly establish a parent company, and Zhenshimei will enter a faster development track. It is growing rapidly, but the industry is not clear what kind of entity Zhenshimei is. In Meng Fanzhong's own words, it is a "distributor that understands retail." The logic of traditional distributors is distribution: obtain agency rights, push into channels, complete tasks. Zhenshimei's logic is sell-through: behind it is a real retail network of 87 regional chain systems and 1,713 stores. What it can provide is real terminal sales data, regional supply coordination capabilities, and a review mechanism centered on sell-through results. This is the fundamental difference between Zhenshimei and traditional distributors.

What Concerns Do Brands Have?

But this logic may not be accepted by brands. At least, not initially. Mr. Meng told me a practical situation: many first- and second-tier brands, after granting Zhenshimei agency rights, attach a condition: it can only supply to Biut, not to other warehouse-entering enterprises. Behind Zhenshimei is a 50-billion retail system, but brand policies treat it as a small distributor serving a single customer. The reason is not hard to understand. Brands have their existing distributor systems. Once Zhenshimei can supply to all warehouse-entering enterprises, those old distributors will complain. Maintaining the stability of the old system limits the growth of the new system. Meng Fanzhong made a comparison: when e-commerce impacted offline channels, brands had objections but eventually accepted it. But that was forced, and while e-commerce platforms helped brands sell, they also squeezed brands' profit margins. Zhenshimei is different; it does not squeeze. It only requires: give me the agency rights, and I will bring you certain incremental growth. Over the past two years, Zhenshimei has cooperated with more than 800 brands, advancing while respecting brands' existing rules. The depth of cooperation varies. Some brands have only opened Biut as the sole warehouse-entering enterprise; others have gradually opened up, allowing Zhenshimei to supply to more warehouse-entering enterprises. But first- and second-tier brands are generally conservative; cooperation exists but is not truly open, remaining at a shallow level. Meng Fanzhong understands this concern. Touching the existing distributor system affects the whole. So he proposed another path: customizing exclusive SKUs. Without touching existing channel permissions, directly customize categories for the Zhenshimei system, use new products to start co-creation, and bypass the deadlock. "We can't stay deadlocked. If development is booming and you insist on blocking it—aren't you fighting against the market and the future?" In Meng Fanzhong's view, regional supermarkets and first- and second-tier brands are never opposed but allies. "If chain supermarkets all die, then brands' markets would be gone too." Getting excited, he even made this exclamation. Behind this judgment is a more urgent reality.

Where Is the Main Battlefield for Brand Standard Products?

Over the past 10 years, China's FMCG retail sales have been growing every year except for a dip in 2018; in 2024, it was still +11% year-on-year. Demand is not dead, but why is it increasingly competitive? Because supply is growing faster. From 2018 to 2024, individual businesses grew by nearly 40%, and the number of stores of the top 100 chains increased by 86%. But the total sales scale of these 100 chains decreased by 11%. More stores, less sales. Meanwhile, the channel landscape is also accelerating restructuring. Sam's Club strengthens membership exclusivity; Yonghui and Bubugao are doing "Pang reform"; Hema focuses on bakery and private brands. These formats share a common direction: the share of processed and private brands expands, standard product space is compressed, and first- and second-tier brands' role on shelves shifts from "protagonist" to "supplement and decoration." "Previously, processed goods accounted for no more than 10%, with the rest being fresh and standard products. Once processed and PB share expands, standard product share is squeezed, and first- and second-tier brands find it hard to even show their faces." The dispute between Sam's Club and Orion ended with the brand being delisted. The signal of this event is far greater than the event itself. In membership store systems, brands may even lose the qualification to be listed. Channels are restructuring, and traffic is migrating. The bargaining power of first- and second-tier brands in "strong channels" is systematically shrinking. The regional chain system represented by Zhenshimei is exactly the opposite: here, shelves are still the home of standard products; here, consumers still pay for brands. What Zhenshimei can provide is what brands are losing in other strong channels: a cooperative system with brands as the main stage, oriented toward sell-through, with data, feedback, and review. This is the real common interest between brands and Zhenshimei. It is not sentiment; it is business logic.

The Window Will Not Stay Open Forever

In a rapidly changing market, supermarkets are promoting wide categories with narrow product ranges. Zhenshimei must keep up. In 2026, Zhenshimei has a clear action: focus on core brands and core big single products. The past two years were about validating the model; next is concentrating resources, creating benchmarks, and promoting scaled replication. But in past cooperation, Zhenshimei found a recurring obstacle: it is not that brands are unwilling to cooperate, but that the cognition and mechanisms on both sides are not aligned. Brand decision-makers lack a systematic understanding of "new-type distributors/regional retail supply chains" and still manage Zhenshimei with the logic of managing traditional distributors; and traditional manufacturer-distributor cooperation mechanisms—such as stocking pressure, rebates, and payment terms—are fundamentally misaligned with Zhenshimei's retail coordination logic centered on sell-through. The result: cooperation that should advance moves slowly, permissions that should be opened are not, and co-created products that should start are delayed. What Zhenshimei, as a new-type distributor, can provide is certain sell-through—helping brands validate new products faster and obtain replicable, scaled growth. But if cognition is not aligned and mechanisms do not match, this window will not stay open forever.

March 18, Chengdu

This is the origin of the CEO Decision Meeting. During the CFC2026 FMCG Conference, Zhenshimei × New Distribution will co-host a closed-door meeting: "CEO Decision Meeting: Zhenshimei × Brands—Strategic Partnership Plan." This meeting has one purpose: to determine the first batch of "10-million-yuan single-product co-creation" partner brands for 2026, align cooperation boundaries, resource investment, and review mechanisms at the CEO level, and initiate long-term strategic partnership building. Why require decision-makers to attend? Because this is not a problem that can be solved at the business level. Cognitive misalignment occurs at the decision-making level, and mechanism restructuring must also start from the decision-making level. No matter how many rounds business-level talks have, if the top-level logic is not aligned, cooperation will always be consumed in internal friction. Both sides attending are decision-makers: brand presidents/GMs/national sales directors, and core management of regional supermarkets behind Zhenshimei. By targeted invitation only, no observer seats. The agenda has only three items: industry consensus, co-creation plan release, and closed-door dialogue. Yili, Mengniu, Yihai Kerry, Tsingtao Beer, Seamild, Totole, Lee Kum Kee, COFCO, Uni-President, Genki Forest, Bottle Planet, General Mills, Hengan, Unilever (Knorr), Haolai, Hsu Fu Chi, Wuqiong Food, Wang Xiao Lu, Shinho, Haidilao, Wujiang, Qianhe, Li Ziqi, Luhua, Wudeli, Haohuanluo, Chen Keming, Dayao, Yangmu Dairy, Miaojie, C&S, Vinda, Liby, Bluemoon, Vaily, Ganyuan, Jiaodian Wipes... Northeast Biut, Chaoyang Jiahui, Aike Tiantian, Cangzhou Baihui, Chengde Baile Youxian, Chifeng Zhiguo, Dandong Jiahe Yibai, Dezhou Haoyunlai, Dongfang Lengku, Gu'an County Huiduoduo, Haoyouduo, Henan Wanguoyuan, Jiahe Supermarket, Jiangsu Yajiale, Jindu Department Store, Laiwu Yinghao, Longkou Boshan, Pule Supermarket, Qinhuangdao Jiajia, Rizhao Xinshiji, Senfa Supermarket, Shandong Shengdemei, Shenyang Jiameilong, Suihua Yigou, Tai'an Qianyitang, Weifang Yibaijia, Xianghe Hualian, Yucheng Yihuilian, Yuan Kelong, Yueshenghuo, Juancheng Fumeilai, Changbai Fulilong, Zhejiang Wankeyuan, Zhucheng Baisheng, Zhuanghe Huayang... China's FMCG industry has built a distribution system centered on distribution over thirty years. This system was extremely efficient in the era of growth, but in the era of surplus, it is becoming a shackle for everyone. The next paradigm is already growing. Its underlying logic is not controlling channels but coordinating sell-through; not stocking pressure games but co-creation around real consumer needs. March 18 is not a business negotiation but a redefinition of the manufacturer-distributor cooperation paradigm.