Recently, criticizing Evergrande Spring Water seems to have become fashionable. It is true that Evergrande Spring Water has not performed well, but I have yet to see a critique that truly convinces me. Correct reflection is important. If you do something wrong and then reflect on it incorrectly, wouldn't that be adding error to error? Some say Evergrande Spring Water's pricing was chaotic. The retail price was 4 yuan, but some were selling at 1 yuan. Chaotic pricing is a fact, but this is reversing cause and effect. It's not because of chaotic pricing that sales were poor, but because sales were poor that pricing became chaotic. So, chaotic pricing is not the cause but the result. Others say there was a positioning problem. Evergrande's positioning was quite clear; strictly speaking, it was mid-range water, neither high nor low. Many domestic waters priced higher than it, some far less well-known, are still selling. Few people say Evergrande's product had issues. From packaging to taste, overall it's not bad. From a marketing perspective, its positioning, planning, and promotion were commendable. Finding faults beforehand would have been difficult. Hindsight is always 20/20, isn't it? If it weren't for the current problems, based on its marketing, we would hardly have predicted its current outcome. If the outcome is bad, there must be a problem. So, where did Evergrande Spring Water go wrong? How Big Is the High-End Market? In the past two years, I have been advocating for "mainstream shifting," adjusting product structure, moving from "double low" products to mid-to-high-end. It should be said that Evergrande Spring Water aligns with the direction I've been advocating. However, this does not mean the "double low" market has disappeared, nor that everything has shifted to mid-to-high-end. Three years ago, when a certain brand's bottled water retail price adjusted from 1.5 yuan to 2 yuan, some county-level markets in the north were lost, indicating that many consumers are price-sensitive. I believe the current consumer mindset is: although tired of "double low" products, the mainstream consumption is still "double low." They are beginning to try mid-to-high-end, but it's not yet regular consumption. This is a typical transition period. The mid-to-high-end market has formed and is in a high-growth phase, but the total market capacity is not very large. Evergrande Spring Water's approach undoubtedly overestimated the capacity of the mid-to-high-end market. I think Evergrande's mistake started with this assumption. At least from their actions, this assumption is implicit. Rhythm, Rhythm, and Rhythm "Double low" products are "rigid demand," basic consumption. The market capacity for "double low" can explode and be quickly cultivated. China's current industry leaders, in their early rise, adopted similar approaches to Evergrande, using large-scale investment to quickly awaken a huge market. The capacity of this market supports massive investment. The term "double low" is a post-maturity description; initially, it wasn't low, but because "double low" is the baseline and "rigid demand," once awakened, the market is huge. "Mainstream shifting" is different. The mid-to-high-end product market forms slowly; it's not awakened but results from gradual upgrading of purchasing power and consumption taste. Uni-President's approach with its mid-to-high-end product "Tomado" can serve as a reference for companies undergoing "mainstream shifting." When Uni-President launched its old pickle noodle in 2008, it also introduced a new product, Tomado. The old pickle noodle was a traditional staple, priced low. Tomado was priced at 7.5 yuan, absolutely high at that time, almost double the price of the old pickle noodle. After Tomado's launch, sales were minimal, with almost no market impact, but Uni-President persisted. They insisted on not lowering the price and on maintaining shelf displays at retail points; for every two facings of old pickle noodles, there was one facing of Tomado. For five years, Tomado showed little movement. However, in 2015, Tomado jumped to 500 million yuan in sales, entering the ranks of major products and firmly holding the top position in the high-end segment. The formation of the mid-to-high-end market has a rhythm; it cannot be forced through marketing investment. If market capacity grows gradually, then marketing rhythm must align with that growth rhythm. If the rhythm is disrupted, everything is disrupted. Undoubtedly, Evergrande was too aggressive, overexerting itself. Evergrande Spring Water Has the Highest Sales Why Is It Criticized the Most? Evergrande was not the first to enter the mid-to-high-end water market; earlier entrants include Ganten, Kunlun, and Aikua. In terms of sales, they are not as good as Evergrande Spring Water, so why is everyone criticizing Evergrande while ignoring the others? Take Uni-President's "Aikua" water, for example. It is also a 4-yuan retail product, with almost no promotion, and sales are much smaller than Evergrande Spring Water. With this water, Uni-President exited the low-end mineral water market. Mid-to-high-end water basically adopts a "penetration strategy," slowly participating in cultivating a market. When distributing, they first target mid-to-high-end channels. Customer repurchase is due to product recognition. From my observation, mid-to-high-end water is currently mainly sold in special channels, such as airports, high-speed rail stations, and supermarkets, far from widespread distribution in small shops. These mid-to-high-end brands adopt a gradual strategy, growing with the market, with modest investment. In contrast, Evergrande Spring Water made a one-time massive investment, mobilizing distributors and achieving high distribution rates and volumes, but mid-to-high-end consumers are very rational. The two issues Evergrande Spring Water is widely criticized for now: First, chaotic terminal pricing. I think this is due to improper terminal distribution, over-distribution, and price reductions on near-expiry products. Second, Evergrande invested too much, resulting in huge losses. Neither of these issues is fatal. Evergrande Spring Water, You Were Too Impatient Distributing a mid-to-high-end water product everywhere, did you think China as a whole had entered the mid-to-high-end market? Evergrande Spring Water's biggest mistake was being "too impatient." The market isn't that big, but Evergrande's marketing was so massive—that's impatience. Too impatient to occupy the market, too impatient to build brand power through heavy investment and excessive communication, too impatient to distribute everywhere, too impatient to let all consumers drink good water. Too impatient, and the rhythm was disrupted. Too impatient, and the input-output ratio became disproportionate. During "mainstream shifting," companies often fall into a dilemma: doing it too early, the market is too small, seemingly not worth it; doing it too late, the market is occupied by others. If Evergrande Spring Water gives us any reflection, I would say the following five sentences: Mainstream shifting is a trend; face the trend with cautious positivity; penetrate early when the trend emerges; quietly cultivate consumers along with the trend; and when it explodes, ride the wave. Evergrande Spring Water still has time. As long as it distributes with restraint, stops heavy investment, and waits patiently, this market can still be Evergrande's.