Source | Lingshou On the morning of May 26, Wanchen Group (300972.SZ) announced that its chairman, Wang Jiankun, had been released from detention and returned to his duties. This seemingly ordinary morning news, to industry insiders, was like a stone thrown into a lake, causing ripples and interrupting the brief calm in the snack industry. Of course, what splashed up might not just be ripples, but the entire undercurrent of the industry landscape. Not long ago, Wanchen Group had just delivered an impressive Q1 2025 report: revenue of 10.821 billion yuan, up 124.02% year-on-year; net profit of 215 million yuan, up a staggering 3344.13% year-on-year. This is undoubtedly another charge sounded by Wanchen on the snack battlefield. Another leading bulk snack brand, Hunan Mingming Henmang Commercial Chain Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Mingming Henmang"), had already submitted a listing application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at the end of April. According to the prospectus, Mingming Henmang's 2024 store retail sales (GMV) reached 55.5 billion yuan, with over 1.6 billion transactions throughout the year. Bulk snack is booming, but competition has become fierce, with players trying new strategies to seek new growth points. At the same time, snack companies' performance shows unprecedented polarization. In Q1 this year, the performance of snack companies also showed that the strong get stronger, and the weak get weaker. In Q1 2025, Liangpin Shop, once the "snack leader," lost 36 million yuan. Revenue was 1.732 billion yuan, down 29.34%, and net profit decreased by 157.85% year-on-year. From growth in both revenue and profit to "store impairment and brand devaluation," Liangpin Shop took only three years. Three Squirrels saw a slight revenue increase of 2.13% to 3.723 billion yuan, seemingly stable, but net profit fell 22.46% year-on-year, with profitability wavering, trapped in the awkward situation of "increasing revenue without increasing profit." Lai Yifen's revenue fell 1.23%, and net profit plummeted nearly 80%. Its East China stronghold was "lost," and stores are shrinking, which may become a turning point. Relatively stable are Yanjin Shop and Haoxiangni. The former achieved 25% growth through bulk channels, with a steady and resilient style; the latter, despite a 16% revenue decline, saw net profit increase by 216%, relying on profit repair after product structure adjustment. The spring and autumn of the snack industry have come faster and more fiercely than imagined. These changes share a common background: the entire food and beverage industry is recovering, but not all snack companies can "enjoy the spring." According to relevant media statistics, among 73 listed food companies, 55 saw performance declines, with dairy products being the hardest hit, while snack companies are increasingly diverging—"top students" can still dance, while "middle players" are starting to fall behind. The snack track has entered elimination mode. The most fundamental divide in this performance divergence is not brand or category, but channel model. From another perspective, channels have become the biggest decisive factor. Behind this "ice and fire" situation is a channel revolution. Bulk snack—this new species born from third- and fourth-tier cities, county towns, and community entrances—does not rely on advertising or IP, but only on "extreme cost-effectiveness" and "explosive SKU growth," rewriting the snack industry from scratch. In other words, whoever embraced bulk snacks then got the chance to turn the tide. From starting with "Lu Xiaochuan" to unifying the brand "Haoxianglai," Wanchen Group took less than three years to elevate its bulk business from annual revenue of 60 million yuan to over 30 billion yuan, and in Q1 2025 achieved 10.8 billion yuan in revenue and 200 million yuan in profit, a "good start." Mingming Henmang is equally aggressive. In 2024, its annual revenue was 39.3 billion yuan, with GMV exceeding 55.5 billion. As of December 31, 2024, Mingming Henmang had 14,394 stores, covering 28 provinces and all city tiers, with about 58% located in county towns and townships, deeply penetrating lower-tier markets. There is also Yanjin Shop, known as the "big winner behind bulk snacks." In Q1 2025, revenue was 1.537 billion yuan, with net profit up 11.64%. In 2024, about 25% of its sales came from bulk channels, directly benefiting from the explosive store growth. But as competition in bulk snacks intensifies, the top two players, after reaching over 10,000 stores, are looking for a second growth curve. Many snack companies have chosen a "supermarketization" path. Starting in 2024, a new battle quietly began: bulk snacks are upgrading from "snack collection stores" to "money-saving supermarkets" and even "wholesale supermarkets." In June 2024, "Liangpin Youming" opened its first "wholesale supermarket" in Chengdu. By December, the number of Liangpin Youming wholesale supermarket stores nationwide exceeded 1,000, making it the industry's first thousand-store brand. During the National Day holiday that year, Liangpin Youming officially entered the new format of "hard discount full-category wholesale supermarkets," opening 189 stores. In terms of products, the wholesale supermarket has over 3,000 SKUs, including snacks and adding non-food categories such as paper products, daily chemicals, and daily necessities. At the end of 2024, Wanchen's "Laiyoupin" opened its first supermarket store in Hefei, focusing on "snacks + daily necessities," moving toward the "discount supermarket" model. Zhao Yiming Snacks announced on January 22 this year that its new money-saving supermarket format was launched, with SKUs increased to 3,000, covering daily necessities, fresh food, and frozen products. Three Squirrels is not far behind, cutting loss-making direct-operated stores while entering the hard discount retail track through acquisitions of "Ai Snacks" and "Ai Discount," and even boasting "60 days to open 200 stores." Even Lai Yifen joined the fray at the end of 2024, forming a joint venture with Yangchanji to bet on the "snacks + community" model, trying to counterattack the lost East China market with bulk snacks. From another perspective, when store dividends slow and single-store growth approaches the ceiling, the only way to break through is through "category extension" and "increasing average transaction value." From a format perspective, this is an industry-wide "dimensional reduction strike." It is no longer about who opens stores fastest, but whose scenario is closer to daily life and whose sell-through efficiency is higher—that is who will survive. But the key issue is that supermarketization is not just about having more SKUs. Snack collection stores have around 1,000 SKUs, while "money-saving supermarkets" often have 3,000 or more, sharply increasing the difficulty of product management, logistics efficiency, and capital turnover pressure. For consumers, "cost-effectiveness + variety" is the lure, but whether they are willing to pay for non-snack categories depends on whether the brand's product strength and operational strength can fully match. For snack companies after "supermarketization," you need to understand fresh food preservation, daily chemical repurchase, frozen product circulation, and site selection traffic logic. This is a cross-border leap from "snack collection store" to "high-repurchase livelihood supermarket." Behind this is a completely new supply chain system, product selection logic, and operational rhythm, with multiplied difficulty and increased risk of failure. Clearly, this path is not easy. In 2025, the industry enters the elimination round. Opening stores is no longer a guarantee of victory, and scale is no longer a moat. What truly survives must be companies with long-term profitable models. This industry is being completely rewritten. "Supermarketization" is only the first step in the snack industry's transformation. It is essentially a phased result of channel efficiency improvement, behind which are deep changes in the logic of both retail supply and demand. This development and evolution may show several directions: First, evolution from "snack collection store" to "community comprehensive discount store." From "only selling snacks" to "snacks + drinks + daily chemicals + general merchandise + fresh food," moving closer to "one-stop community consumption." Second, transformation from "bulk model" to a dual-wheel drive of "brand power + product selection power." After channel dividends are exhausted, brand awareness will become important again. In the future, leading companies will start to actively build private labels, increase the weight of product selection and bargaining power, and convey to consumers the concept that "what I sell is not only cheap, but also better." Referencing some of Costco and Sam's Club logic, even using Sam's "hit product + scarcity" rhythm to build brand memory. Third, digital capabilities will become the infrastructure for "winning the second half." Precise store location, real-time SKU dynamics, member repurchase management, price control capabilities, and supply chain digital middle platform capabilities will all become hard thresholds. Whoever can achieve refined operations of "thousand stores, thousand faces" and be the first to close the data loop may build a deeper barrier than scale. Fourth, the "low-price dividend" is fleeting, and supply chain and upstream integration become the core battlefield. When "who is cheaper" can no longer be the only selling point, the ability to control costs and improve efficiency will determine whether you are qualified to maintain low prices. Fifth, cross-border integration and deeper sinking, with the "snacks +" model continuing to extend. For example: snacks + milk tea, snacks + pet food, snacks + cosmeceuticals (referencing Korean convenience store combinations like GS25 and 7-Eleven), etc. Bulk snack brands will increasingly resemble "community lifestyle platforms" rather than single product channels. Of course, store expansion is no longer a moat. Only continuous innovation, refined operations, supply chain efficiency, and brand repositioning can support a winner's logic in the "post-bulk era." Wang Jiankun has returned, and Wanchen has reached a high point, but this is only the beginning of the second half. The snack business is never about "who opens faster," but about who can laugh last.