Source | Lingshou ID | lingshouke Author | Qingshan
"Choosing to Turn a Blind Eye" "In the past, I used to stop by Juewei on my way home from work to buy some duck neck as a snack with my drinks. Now I choose to 'turn a blind eye' and don't even step into the store," Deng Li (pseudonym) told the author. Deng Li, born in 1988, currently works as a product manager at an internet company in Beijing, with a monthly salary of around 15,000 yuan. Ten years ago, he was a loyal customer of Juewei duck neck, buying some braised food every Friday after work. "At that time, I felt Juewei offered good value for money. With 10 yuan, I could buy two or three duck necks, enough for a plate of appetizers." But in recent years, Deng Li has almost stopped patronizing Juewei duck neck. "It's not that I can't afford it, but I feel the price and value are completely mismatched." He did the math: a duck neck costs 10 yuan, a duck head 8 yuan, duck wings mid-section 46 yuan per jin, and duck intestines as high as 92 yuan per jin. "A casual purchase easily amounts to 40 or 50 yuan, and they're all scraps. With that much money, I could buy a whole duck." What bothers Deng Li even more is the store's "marketing tricks." "When you ask for 10 yuan worth of duck neck, the clerk seems not to hear you and directly packs 20 yuan worth, then asks innocently, 'Is this okay?' That feeling is really unpleasant." "Now there are more and more affordable alternatives. Community stores and mom-and-pop shops nearby offer friendly prices, and the braised food at wet market stalls is freshly made daily. If you go early on weekends, you can even find steaming, fragrant braised goods at reasonable prices. Also, some discount stores sell vacuum-packed products at low prices. So I no longer go to stores like Juewei duck neck," Deng Li said. Deng Li's experience is not unique. On social platforms, topics like "braised food刺客" (pricey braised food), "Monthly salary of 20,000 can't afford duck neck," and "Why young people no longer love duck neck" frequently trend. According to a survey of 2,296 responses by Youyisi Report, in 2024, over 80% of respondents admitted they had reduced their frequency of buying braised food from chain brands, with only 3.63% maintaining or increasing purchases. Among the 1,643 respondents who reduced their braised food consumption, the primary factor was price increases, accounting for 86.67%. Besides price, food safety issues also make consumers wary. On the Heimao complaint platform, a search for "Juewei duck neck" yields over 1,500 complaints, involving issues like "foreign objects in food," "diarrhea and vomiting after eating," and "sour taste," with some even requiring hospitalization. In February 2025, the Xichang City Market Supervision Administration in Sichuan Province discovered during routine inspections that all 22 employees at Juewei duck neck stores in Xichang had forged health certificates. Investigation revealed that these certificates were batch-processed through illegal channels by the head store manager, Wei. In response, Juewei Food stated that the involved stores were independently operated by franchisees, but the incident still exposed significant loopholes in franchise management, further eroding consumer trust. Core Business Revenue Decreased by 700 Million Yuan Year-on-Year Consumers' "voting with their feet" is directly reflected in Juewei Food's financial reports over the past two years. Looking at 2024 first, Juewei Food achieved operating revenue of approximately 6.257 billion yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 13.84%; net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company was approximately 227 million yuan, down 34.04% year-on-year; net profit attributable to shareholders excluding non-recurring gains and losses was approximately 203 million yuan, down 49.39% year-on-year. Since its listing in 2017, Juewei Food has maintained profitability, but in terms of absolute net profit attributable to the parent, this is the worst "report card" since listing. Entering 2025, the situation has not improved. In the first three quarters, Juewei Food's revenue fell 15% year-on-year, net profit dropped over 36%, and core braised food business revenue decreased by approximately 700 million yuan year-on-year (from 4.223 billion yuan in the same period last year to 3.527 billion yuan). The braised food segment, accounting for over 80% of main business revenue, "isn't selling," becoming the direct cause of performance decline. The continuous reduction in store numbers cannot be ignored. As of the end of 2023, Juewei Food had a total of 15,950 stores in mainland China, with a net increase of 874 stores for the year. As of the end of June 2024, the total number of stores in mainland China was 14,969, showing a trend of store closures. According to media reports, as of early October 2025, Juewei had 10,606 operating stores, a decrease of over 4,000 compared to the official figure of 14,969 stores as of June 2024. On September 19, 2025, Juewei Food announced receipt of the "Administrative Penalty Notice" from the China Securities Regulatory Commission, indicating that the company failed to recognize revenue from franchise store decoration business for five consecutive years from 2017 to 2021, resulting in understated operating revenue in annual reports, with the highest year accounting for 5.48%. The company's stock has been subject to other risk warnings since September 23, changing to "ST Juewei." From "King of Braised Food" to "ST Juewei," Juewei Food is experiencing its deepest operational quagmire since listing. Franchisees' "Winter" If consumer alienation is the surface of Juewei's crisis, then the plight of franchisees is a more real manifestation of the "crisis." Wang Lei (pseudonym) operates a Juewei franchise store in Daxing District, Beijing. "Now it's good if we have 800 yuan in daily turnover. The gross margin is basically the same, but all costs are rising—rent, labor, utilities—and profit margins are being squeezed hard. Now I'd be grateful to make 3,000 yuan a month." What worries Wang Lei more is the intensifying homogenized competition. Within a 500-meter radius of his store, there are over 20 braised food shops of various sizes, including traditional giants like Huang Shang Huang, Juewei, and Zhou Hei Ya, as well as brands like Zi Yan Bai Wei Ji, Jiu Jiu Ya, and Wang Xiao Lu, and even some unbranded mom-and-pop shops are vying for a share of the "cake." More severely, many Juewei duck neck franchisees report that daily sales per store have dropped from thousands of yuan at peak to less than 2,000 yuan, and some stores have been forced to close due to competition from street vendors and fresh-braised mom-and-pop shops. Additionally, Juewei's franchise management revenue declined from 83.0498 million yuan in 2023 to 61.2202 million yuan in 2024, a year-on-year decrease of 26.28%. This data directly reflects problems in the franchise system. In fact, Juewei's franchise model itself has deep-seated contradictions. In 2012, Juewei established a "Franchise Committee," dividing the country into over a hundred war zones, with franchisees serving as war zone committee members, managing stores through a multi-level agency system. With tiered agency and profit-sharing, relying on this "partner" model, Juewei doesn't make money by selling duck neck but by expanding franchise stores and sharing profits by tier, making it difficult for the company to significantly lower prices. In reality, the gross margins of braised food brands like Juewei are very high. Even with poor performance last year, due to falling raw material prices, Juewei's gross margin increased by 5.8 percentage points to about 33.98%. However, Juewei's selling expenses have been rising sharply. In 2024, Juewei Food's selling expenses were 667 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 23.31%, the highest since listing. Some of this money was used for franchisee subsidies, and some for advertising, but net profit did not increase but decreased instead. Under this model, the headquarters makes money while franchisees suffer. When the market environment deteriorates, franchisees bear the brunt and become the biggest "victims." In the 2024 semi-annual report, Juewei Food stated that amid changes in macro demand and consumption environment, the company shifted from a strategy of rapid expansion to intensive cultivation, prioritizing increasing single-store revenue and ensuring franchisee survival, adjusting store models according to actual market conditions, and overcoming difficulties with franchisees. But slogans are slogans; the reality is that franchisees are voting with their feet. The large-scale store closures are essentially a direct reflection of franchisees losing confidence in this business model. Dilemma and Breakthrough Behind the declining performance and shrinking store numbers is the collective predicament of the entire braised food industry. In 2024, Zhou Hei Ya's operating revenue and net profit decreased by 10.7% and 15%, respectively. According to data from Zhaomen Canyan, as of October 2024, there were approximately 240,000 braised product stores, with a net closure of about 23,000 stores in the past year. In the first half of 2024 alone, the three major brands—Juewei Food, Huang Shang Huang, and Zhou Hei Ya—closed over 1,700 stores. According to Beijing Business Today, in the first half of this year, Huang Shang Huang's total store count decreased by 762 from 3,660 at the end of 2024 to 2,898; Zhou Hei Ya's total store count decreased by 167 from 3,031 at the end of 2024 to 2,864; Juewei Food did not disclose store numbers as in its 2024 annual report, but according to its 2024 semi-annual report, as of the end of June 2024, Juewei Food had 14,969 stores in mainland China, a decrease of 981 from the beginning of the year. Data from consulting firm Frost & Sullivan and Hongcan Industry Research Institute show that the growth rate of the braised food industry has slowed significantly, with a compound annual growth rate of 6.42% from 2018 to 2023, and a market size of approximately 318 billion yuan in 2023. With slowing industry growth, low technical barriers, and continuous influx of new brands, the moats of traditional giants are failing. Facing the dilemma, Juewei is also trying to break through. On the marketing front, Juewei Food has increased investment. In 2024, Juewei Food's selling expenses were approximately 667 million yuan, setting a record since listing. Among them, advertising and promotion expenses were approximately 217 million yuan. In July 2024, Juewei Food announced that celebrity Fan Chengcheng became its first global spokesperson in the brand's 19-year history, attempting to attract young consumers through star power. In digital transformation, Juewei is betting on AI technology. By using AI to predict sales and logistics risks, the company reduced out-of-stock rates by 60% and established a nationwide cold chain network. In product innovation, Juewei is trying to find a second growth curve. In September 2024, Juewei Food launched a milk tea business at some stores in Changsha, offering a low price of "11.9 yuan for 3 cups of original leaf milk tea coupons." However, the effects of these attempts have been unsatisfactory. The 23% increase in selling expenses did not drive revenue growth for the year. In 2024, Juewei Food's main business revenue decreased by 13.95% year-on-year. Even though Juewei Food has the advantage of over 10,000 stores for milk tea, some industry insiders believe that most of its stores are small, making it difficult to add water bar counters and other equipment. Moreover, milk tea brands have mostly established their own supply chains, and product categories have already left an impression on consumers. It won't be easy for Juewei Food to achieve growth through milk tea. Investment and mergers have also suffered setbacks. In the past three years, Juewei Food's investment income has performed poorly, becoming one of the important factors dragging down company performance. From 2022 to 2024, Juewei Food's investment income was approximately -94 million yuan, -116 million yuan, and -160 million yuan, respectively, with cumulative losses exceeding 370 million yuan over three years. In this regard, industry insiders believe that the recent penalties have caused immeasurable damage to the company's goodwill and dealt a huge blow to the confidence of the team, suppliers, and franchisees. What Is the Root Cause? Juewei's predicament is superficially a combination of factors such as price, quality, and competition, but the fundamental reason lies in the failure of its business model. First, the "scale myth" of over-reliance on franchise expansion has collapsed. When the industry was on the rise, rapid expansion could quickly capture market share. But when the market becomes saturated and consumer demand weakens, the number of stores becomes a heavy burden. Juewei implements a decoration model for franchise stores of "headquarters unified design, unified bidding, designated suppliers." On one hand, franchisees are required to use "designated" decoration companies recommended by the headquarters, whose quotes are usually 20%-30% higher than market prices, with the price difference becoming hidden profits. On the other hand, this business is not included in the listed company's operations and accounting system. Under this model, the headquarters profits while franchisees bear the risk. Second, there is a serious disconnect between pricing strategy and consumer expectations. In early 2022, Juewei duck neck raised prices on some products by 5%, and in July of the same year, Juewei again adjusted prices on some categories such as duck feet and squid, with an average increase of 7% to 10%. Previously, due to rising raw materials, labor costs, and rent, braised food brands transferred the pressure of cost increases to product prices. But from the company's financial reports, in 2024, market prices for duck feet, duck wings, duck neck, and other duck by-product raw materials gradually fell, and raw material cost pressure decreased, but terminal prices of braised food brands still did not fall. When raw material prices fall, companies should pass on the benefits to consumers, but the three giants chose to retain profits, directly leading to consumer loss. This "drinking poison to quench thirst" strategy can maintain profits in the short term but will inevitably damage market share in the long run. Third, product innovation is weak, making it difficult to adapt to consumption upgrades. Industry insiders believe that the decline in Juewei Food's revenue in 2024 is actually related to the development of the entire braised food track. The reason is that under the impact of leisure snacks, prepared dishes, and convenience foods, braised products have many substitutes, are not cost-effective, have relatively single offerings, and lack innovation and iteration. A senior industry expert pointed out that when brand stores grow significantly, everyone's goal becomes pursuing sales volume, thinking of ways to run promotions, and quality control becomes less strict. "In the food and beverage industry, it all comes down to two words—repeat purchase." Unstable taste inevitably leads to low repeat purchase rates. Finally, there is a dual crisis of food safety and brand trust. From forged health certificates to complaints about spoiled products, from Listeria exceeding standards to "foreign objects in food," frequent food safety issues continue to erode Juewei's brand trust. And being ST due to financial fraud is a fatal blow to corporate credibility. It must be said that when consumers no longer trust a brand, no amount of marketing investment or sophisticated digital transformation can reverse the decline. Standing at the final time point of 2025 and looking back, Juewei Food is at the most critical crossroads in its history. From an industry perspective, the market has not disappeared; consumers have just switched tracks. They have turned to community mom-and-pop stores with friendlier prices, to emerging brands that emphasize "fresh-braised and fresh-sold," and to vacuum-packed braised products launched by snack brands... Perhaps what Juewei needs to do now is not to continue spending money on marketing or blindly cross-industry expansion, but to return to the essence—winning consumer trust with reasonable prices, stable quality, and reliable safety guarantees. It's just that the time left for Juewei may already be running out. When consumers pass by stores and choose to "turn a blind eye," the answer to this question is actually already clear: it's not that they don't love duck neck anymore, but that Juewei is no longer the trustworthy "Juewei" it once was.