I've been struggling to find a word to describe Uni-President's marketing state in recent years, and a few days ago I suddenly thought of one: Buddhist-style Uni-President. Look, Uni-President's chairman says to "be yourself." Look, Uni-President doesn't assess sales, yet sales still grow. Look, Uni-President, once seen as one of the instant noodle giants, now says it wants to make "life noodles" and lets instant noodles "go as they may." Look, Uni-President has had no major marketing moves in recent years, but the industry pays more attention to it. Look, Uni-President's Assam tea, seemingly without any big moves, has become its top product with about 70% market share. Look, Uni-President says it's enough for a single product to reach 1 billion yuan. In short, Uni-President seems very confident and Buddhist-like in recent years. Buddhist-style is not about having no goals or pursuits, but a state of purposeful letting go, where the approach is calmer and confrontational competition is reduced. But a few years ago, Uni-President was not like this. In the instant noodle promotion war between Kangshifu and Uni-President, the beneficiary was Shuanghui. One ham sausage per cup, costing 0.3 yuan, how much sales did that create for Shuanghui in a year? In the promotion war between Kangshifu and Uni-President, if you hired 100 people, I'd hire 200. This kind of competition I call confrontational competition. In China's duopoly industries, such as instant noodles, dairy, and beverages, at a certain stage, competition becomes super confrontational. This confrontational competition even reached the point of not calculating economic accounts. Eventually, it led central city distributors to give up their agencies, and companies had to operate directly. Brand owners can ignore economic accounts in the short term, but distributors must calculate them. Confrontational competition was normal in that era. The current Buddhist-style Uni-President has opened a new normal of competition. Marketing expert Fang Gang recently mentioned a term: toxic sales. Fang Gang said that during industry downturns, sales departments are like starving people, red-eyed with hunger, stuffing anything into their mouths. Some sales are garbage sales, toxic, and not to be consumed. Ten years ago, when Liu Xinhua first took charge of the instant noodle division, he voluntarily gave up over 500 million yuan in sales. Looking back now, that portion of sales was "garbage sales" for Uni-President. Over 500 million yuan is nothing for Uni-President now. But ten years ago, Uni-President's instant noodle division was at a low point. At that time, some companies picked up that portion of sales and saw growth. But the sales growth did not change their fate. When giving up the 500 million yuan in sales, Uni-President launched two products. One was the Lao Tan Sauerkraut Noodles, which became popular immediately, and the other was Tang Daren, which became popular six years later. Lao Tan Sauerkraut Noodles brought Uni-President a change in sales, while Tang Daren brought a change in the competitive landscape. After Lao Tan Sauerkraut Noodles became a hit, competitors launched a bunch of sauerkraut noodle products, leading to a fierce battle. But after Tang Daren took off, no competitor could catch up. To give up toxic sales, you must pursue valuable sales. Toxic sales can be taken through confrontational competition. Valuable sales can only be obtained through consumer cognitive education. Consumer cognitive education cannot be achieved through front-end fighting. Buddhist-style marketing is another competitive state different from confrontational competition. One type of competition is confrontational competition, also known as front-end competition. Homogeneous products compete for channels, terminals, shelves, promotional positions, promotional activities, and store owners. This type of competition is fierce and visible. Another type is back-end competition. It manifests as competition for consumers, with specific measures such as personalized products, brands, IP, content, platforms, connections, and supply chains. This type of competition is subtle and silent. In the past, multinational companies were strong in back-end competition, while local companies were strong in front-end competition. But multinational companies that adapted to the Chinese market, such as P&G and Coca-Cola, also adapted to front-end competition. Some large local companies now have the strength to engage in back-end competition. Front-end or back-end competition, there is no high or low; both are results of adapting to the times. I disagree with some experts' criticism of front-end competition, and I disagree with the claim that back-end competition is high-level competition. Whatever competitive posture, it must adapt to the environment. Survival of the fittest is the highest competitive law in marketing. Ten years ago, Uni-President could not be Buddhist-style. In that era, confrontational competition was the mainstream. Rapid industry growth means consumers are still in a state of quantity satisfaction. In this state, product homogeneity is normal, and price sensitivity is also normal. With product homogeneity, price sensitivity, and high substitutability, confrontational competition is more likely to arouse consumer desire. I once advocated Chinese-style marketing, but a few years ago, I publicly declared: Chinese-style marketing has ended. Now we must enter Chinese-style new marketing. The environment has changed, and everything must change. Most Chinese companies are not yet adapted to this change. I have a metaphor: winter has arrived, but they are still wearing summer clothes. They should reflect that their clothes are wrong, but instead they blame the weather for being too cold. Two major factors affect the climate of the consumer goods industry: one is the internet; the other is the structural change in consumer demand. This article does not discuss the internet, only the structural change. Since the reform and opening up, consumer goods marketers have lived in an inertia: first, sales will always grow; second, as long as sales grow, there will always be profit. To pursue sales growth, they are even willing to sacrifice profit. All marketing results must be tested by sales. When incremental growth hits a ceiling, past marketing values become invalid. Buddhist-style Uni-President, I believe, is the result of adapting to this change. The progress of a few companies is foresight, most are forced by the market, and some refuse to change. According to liquor industry data, in 2016, liquor sales volume (converted to 65 degrees) was 13.06 million kiloliters; in 2017, it dropped to 11.62 million kiloliters, a decrease of 11%; in 2018, it dropped to 8.55 million kiloliters, a decrease of 26%. However, the sales revenue of the top ten famous liquor companies grew rapidly. Data declined, sales revenue grew. This is the trend in liquor. The beer industry has been declining since 2014 and stabilized in 2018. Sales volume declined, but high-end brands, such as Budweiser, grew rapidly. Craft beer brands also grew rapidly. The instant noodle industry has been declining since 2014. Similarly, it stopped declining in 2018, but high-end instant noodles, such as Tang Daren, grew rapidly. Industry decline is a major trend, but sales still follow incremental logic. This is why most industries are in trouble. This change, except for a few industries still growing like dairy and snack foods, is the case for most industries. This is the new normal. "Being yourself" is difficult because in the past environment, competitors wouldn't let you "be yourself." Many people criticize Chinese companies for product homogeneity, but they don't realize that "consumer homogeneity" is the root cause of corporate homogeneity. For over 30 years of reform and opening up, China has been in a state of "wave consumption," which is a "consumption catch-up" under long-term consumption hunger. It manifests in two ways: first, quantity satisfaction is the main focus, with little difference in demand; second, high price sensitivity. That is, products are homogeneous, and promotion becomes the main weapon for sales. These two characteristics ensure that companies in similar market spaces will inevitably engage in fierce battles. Even so-called brand loyalty is nothing more than "repurchase" induced by benefits. Only when consumption shifts from quantity growth to quality growth does the environment for "being yourself" begin to arrive. At this time, if you still follow the logic of quantity growth, marketing must move toward "channel downward." As marketing expert Fang Gang said, "Once you enter the village, you may not be able to return to the city." For brands like Uni-President, you must hold the brand boundary and understand which sales you don't need. Quality growth has two routes: one is moving up the price band, i.e., mainstream shifting; the other is taking the personalized route. Or both. Note, I emphasize not differentiated products, but personalized products. In the past, many people talked about differentiation, segmentation, niche, and market segmentation, but the final result was either active homogenization or passive homogenization. Active homogenization is when you imitate others; passive homogenization is when others imitate you. In the FMCG field, the technical threshold for imitation is not high. My view is: In China, differentiation has no way out. Because your differentiation efforts cannot stop "passive homogenization." The diversity of marketing does not start from segmentation, niche, or differentiation, but from personalization. Differentiation is physical expression. The physical form of a product is too easy to imitate. Personalization is spiritual expression. Even if the physical form is similar, the spiritual connotation is different. Many people think personalization is niche and not suitable for big brands. But with China's population base, successful niche products have considerable sales. Once a niche product explodes and crosses boundaries, sales can be astronomical. Uni-President, as a leading company in the industry, dares to bid farewell to the mass market and dares to lay out a personalized product matrix. We have to admire their determination. We see that since Lao Tan Sauerkraut Noodles, Uni-President's new products have basically been personalized products. Hai Zhi Yan, Xiao Ming Tong Xue, Assam, etc. Personalized products, although they also have front-end work, such as terminal coverage and terminal promotion, the recognition of personalized IP is the core of Uni-President's entire marketing work. Marketing has shifted from front-end fighting to C-end recognition as the main focus. This is not something any company can control; it is an inevitable result of the times. Personalized products must not use mass recognition methods. In the internet era, mass recognition methods are also unusable. I believe Uni-President's marketing work has two threads. One is the recognition line; the other is the transaction line. What is marketing recognition? I think it is consumer value education. However, this education is implicit. The work on the recognition line used to be in the back-end (market content department), but now it also includes the front-end. Back-end recognition work includes product, IP, content production, and brand, with the aim of shaping the product's personalized label and connotation. In the past, the marketing recognition method was advertising; now it is content. Front-end recognition work includes community building and communication, entering the C-end through the B-end. In the past, B-end work focused on relationships. Now C-end work focuses on recognition. The front-end is air-ground warfare: the army is B-end work, and the air force is C-end work. In the past, the function of the front-end (channel) was transaction and relationship; now the front-end is recognition, transaction, and relationship, a trinity. With marketing recognition, transactions naturally occur. Therefore, transactions become an efficiency system. Now the transaction line work is actually channel digitalization (including B2B), which is essentially an efficiency system. In the past, deep distribution was a human-wave tactic, gaining sales growth at the cost of increased costs. Now, channel digitalization is an efficiency system. Although it still requires people, the data-supported channel system achieves sales and profit growth at low cost. Channel digitalization, which was only B2B two years ago, has now extended to terminal AIOT (AI+IOT) and even to C-end AR. These tools empower the front-end and will greatly enhance transaction efficiency. Moving away from confrontational competition, Uni-President wants to "be itself." Being yourself, you can understand that "serving only some consumers" is normal. Being yourself, you can understand that not all sales are valuable. Being yourself, you must have the confidence that "my users can't be taken away." Being yourself means serving valuable customers with valuable products. Buddhist-style Uni-President lies in its interface, extending from the B-end to the C-end. When the C-end is done well, the B-end naturally remains calm. Buddhist-style Uni-President means it knows to "get on the horse and wait for the wind," not rushing when the time isn't right. Buddhist-style Uni-President means it knows that even without assessing sales, if the work is done well, sales will come uninvited after three months. Due to changes in consumers, front-end confrontational competition can no longer capture consumers. Due to the emergence of internet tools, both front-end and back-end have channels to the C-end, and BC integration has appeared. However, because Chinese companies have long been accustomed to front-end confrontational competition, marketing inertia still exists, but life will become increasingly difficult. Buddhist-style Uni-President seems to lack confrontational competition on the surface, but in reality, it is a contest of internal strength. This is the marketing trend. Uni-President is just at the forefront. If a tip is adopted, a reward of 400-2000 yuan will be paid.