Long press the QR code or click "Read Original" to register. 30+ industry experts, 100+ B2B platform founders, 800+ manufacturer friends, gather in Fuzhou to discuss the internet transformation path of the FMCG industry. Yesterday, PinGuanJun accompanied his wife to the supermarket. When they reached the shampoo section, his wife held a bottle of Clear in her left hand and Head & Shoulders in her right, asking PinGuanJun which one she should buy. PinGuanJun laughed at the time, thinking that these two global FMCG giants, who have been fighting worldwide, had finally brought their battle to his wife's hands. But later, his wife also asked him to choose between Tide and Omo laundry detergent, and Crest and Zhonghua toothpaste, saying that if he chose wrong, he would have to kneel on durian... PinGuanJun was truly confused: it seemed that everything used at home had to be chosen from these two companies. They fight every day, and in the end, it's PinGuanJun who suffers... P&G and Unilever are both global FMCG companies with over a century of history. P&G entered the Chinese market in 1988 and now earns over 39 billion yuan a year in China. Unilever, however, entered China more than 60 years earlier: in 1923, Unilever opened a company in China to sell Lux soap, but Unilever only earns about 16 billion yuan a year in the Chinese market, with a considerable portion coming from the food and beverage sector. But these two companies have been fighting each other in the Chinese market for over 20 years. In which areas have they clashed? First, look at a table: Let's dig deeper into the battles they've fought. · 1. Who won in cosmetics? To review the history of their clashes, let's start with an appetizer: the genuine cosmetics category. In 1988, Olay entered the Chinese market with the slogan "Give you youthful skin," and within less than two years, Olay became the largest skincare brand in the Chinese market. In the same year, Pond's and its flagship product, cold cream, entered China. Its product claims were similar to Olay's, both mainly focusing on whitening, anti-aging, and sun protection. The difference was that Olay initially focused on the department store channel in the Chinese market, while Pond's focused on both KA and department store channels. In that era, Chinese consumers' demand for skincare products surged, and Pond's captured a large market share, while Olay maintained double-digit growth from 1999 to 2009. The two didn't have many direct clashes. Over the following decade, Olay continued to focus on department stores as its main battlefield, maintaining double-digit growth almost every year, while also expanding into KA and specialty store channels. Pond's, on the other hand, shifted its main battlefield to the supermarket channel. In first- and second-tier cities, Pond's covered KA outlets and large/medium supermarkets, almost completely withdrawing from department stores. However, in third- and fourth-tier cities, Pond's still retained some department store counters while also covering supermarket outlets. At the same time, both brands faced issues of brand upgrading and aging in China. At the end of 2007, Olay launched a high-end product, the Regenerist cream, priced above 200 yuan, and promoted the concept of "luxury for the common people." It subsequently launched a series of products to gradually complete its high-end line, while also continuously innovating. Pond's, in contrast, had relatively fewer innovations and breakthroughs, and its lukewarm market performance left it lifeless. In 2006, seizing the opportunity of major changes in the skincare market, Pond's began to significantly raise prices. But this adjustment did not completely turn the tide for Pond's. After sales shrank in first-tier cities, many distributors in second- and third-tier cities also harbored grievances against Unilever, with common complaints about narrow profit margins and insufficient manufacturer support. In 2008, Unilever spared no expense to sign Tang Wei, intending to use this both local and international star to further open the Chinese market and make inroads into the mid-to-high-end skincare market. However, Tang Wei was "banned" due to her role in the film "Lust, Caution." At that time, the industry generally believed that Pond's advertisements included Tang Wei's styling and scenes from "Lust, Caution," so the ads were soon "halted." Pond's dream of building a high-end brand image and returning to department store channels was shattered. Although the two brands are quite similar in positioning and efficacy, and even had almost the same starting point in the Chinese market, Olay took an all-channel route, while Pond's wavered between KA and department store channels. In the end, the performance of the two brands in the Chinese market is clear. Relevant data shows that in 2013, Olay achieved annual sales of nearly 5 billion yuan in the Chinese market, while industry experts revealed that Pond's could only earn 200-300 million yuan a year. In 2014, Pond's returned to the KA channel and has not made much noise since. Olay has become the largest whitening brand in the Chinese market, holding an 18% share of the whitening market. · 2. Shampoo is the main battlefield Shampoo has always been a battleground for all FMCG brands, but it must be said that in the Chinese hair care market, the gap between Unilever and P&G is not small. As early as 1988, when P&G first entered China, it brought Head & Shoulders to the Chinese market. Since then, Head & Shoulders has dominated the anti-dandruff shampoo segment. Subsequently, P&G introduced Rejoice, Pantene, and VS Sassoon, covering almost all functional claims in shampoo. In contrast, Unilever entered the shampoo market relatively late. Although it began selling Lux shampoo in China as early as 1986, its positioning was not strong, and it did not stand out as much as P&G's shampoo brands. In fact, the shampoo brand under Unilever that truly put pressure on P&G was Clear, which only entered the Chinese market in 2007. In 2006, P&G's sales in the Chinese market were 20 billion yuan, while Unilever could only earn 5 billion yuan a year in China. But in 2007, when Clear entered China, Unilever invested 500 million yuan to pave the way for Clear. However, Unilever used this money to do something not very smart. At that time, Clear used advertising and news to label all other anti-dandruff shampoos as "frauds" that must be discarded. In other words, their anti-dandruff technology was pseudoscience, and only Clear was the real deal. At the retail level, Clear even directly targeted Head & Shoulders, requiring display positions near Head & Shoulders, with display ratios not less than Head & Shoulders, and promotional intensity greater than Head & Shoulders. Clear even claimed it would defeat Head & Shoulders within three years. In fact, while Clear was picking a fight with Head & Shoulders, it was also challenging the entire anti-dandruff shampoo category in the Chinese market. In the end, both consumers and channel partners found it hard to stomach, and Unilever's 500 million yuan went down the drain. However, this also gave Head & Shoulders a headache. At the time, Head & Shoulders had to increase advertising spending to counter Clear's ad war, and even resorted to drastic price cuts. P&G even turned the original Head & Shoulders promotion into a full-line promotion with buy-one-get-one offers for Rejoice, Head & Shoulders, and other products. Later, Clear toned down its approach and gradually gained market recognition. According to Bain & Company data, in 2013, the top five shampoo brands in the Chinese market were Head & Shoulders, Rejoice, Pantene, Clear, and VS Sassoon, with shares of 17.5%, 12.7%, 10.1%, 7.9%, and 4.8%, respectively. In recent years, Nielsen data has been similar, with Clear holding the fourth position among the top five, while the others are all P&G shampoo brands. So, although Clear has secured a place in the top five, the overall victory in the shampoo segment still belongs to P&G. · 3. In toothpaste, who fought for second place? The first place is definitely Colgate, no need to argue. But in the oral care field, P&G and Unilever have also clashed, only Unilever's own brand wasn't as resilient... PinGuanJun vaguely remembers that in the market, three toothpaste brands with the character "洁" (clean) – Colgate, Crest, and Zendium – bombarded TV ads every day, either knocking on shells or giving toothpaste to primary and secondary school students. But now, on the toothpaste shelves, Colgate and Crest are still alive and well, while Zendium is nowhere to be seen. Let's set aside Colgate for now and talk about the private matters between P&G and Unilever's toothpaste brands. Like other FMCG categories, foreign toothpaste brands entering the Chinese market brought significant impact to the domestic toothpaste market. Relevant data shows that in 2006, Crest held a 20% share of the Chinese toothpaste market, while Zhonghua and Zendium each held 10%. It can be said that P&G and Unilever were evenly matched in the toothpaste category at that time, but P&G used one brand, Crest, to compete against Unilever's two brands. In fact, Crest only needed to face Zendium as its main competitor in marketing. Why does PinGuanJun say this? Because after Unilever leased the Zhonghua brand in 1994, it planned to shelve it. The promised marketing and promotion expenses for this "adopted son" were not fulfilled, and instead, a large amount of money was poured into Zendium. But this time, Unilever's plan failed again. To gain a firm foothold in the Chinese toothpaste market, a clear functional positioning is essential. For example, Crest focuses on teeth whitening, while Colgate focuses on cavity prevention. However, Zendium did not choose to open up new space in brand positioning but instead overlapped with the industry leader Colgate – cavity prevention. In the end, it was directly defeated by Colgate and quietly withdrew from the Chinese market. Meanwhile, Zhonghua, which Unilever tried every means to eliminate, actually grew larger and larger because of its broad consumer base and national attributes, even without advertising or marketing. It eventually became Unilever's only surviving toothpaste brand in the Chinese market. Although the rise of local toothpaste brands later brought pressure to Crest, Unilever never had a particularly outstanding performance in the toothpaste category again. In May 2015, the China Oral Industry Association released the "2014 Production and Operation Situation of China's Oral Cleaning and Care Products Industry." According to the association's data, the top 10 toothpaste brands in the Chinese market in 2014 were Darlie (partially owned by Colgate), Crest, Yunnan Baiyao, Colgate, Zhonghua... · 4. In laundry detergent, who won? Before foreign brands entered the Chinese market, local brands like Panda and Yizhihua were active in the Chinese laundry detergent market. Eventually, the Chinese laundry detergent market was unified by "Huo Li 28," whose super-concentrated, foam-free laundry detergent once held an 80% share of the national market. Huo Li 28's monopoly was eventually taken over by foreign brands. In 1993, Unilever entered the Chinese market, using Omo to seize market share. In the same year, P&G's Tide entered China, but Omo's sales performance always lagged behind Ariel and Tide. At that time, the Chinese laundry detergent market began to gradually fall into the hands of foreign laundry detergent brands. In 1999, Omo launched a price war in the Chinese market: Unilever cut Omo product prices by 30%-40%. Before the price cut, its market share was 14.9%; after the price cut, Omo's prices were basically about half of P&G's laundry detergent brands, and its market share in China doubled, directly becoming the laundry detergent brand with the highest market share at that time, even reaching 37% in the Shanghai region. At that time, Tide, which held a 7% market share, insisted on a high-end route. One of Tide's laundry detergents directly used the international best formula, and its price reached 18.6 yuan per bag, which was somewhat difficult for ordinary working-class consumers to accept. It wasn't until 2001 that P&G began to go deep into the market, "flying into the homes of ordinary people." After market research, it adjusted its strategy based on consumers' price needs. In fact, before the price war, Unilever and P&G had an unspoken understanding on product prices – the prices of their products were basically the same. Unilever's unilateral significant price cut was like McDonald's suddenly reducing the price of Chicken McNuggets, forcibly taking market share from KFC's Popcorn Chicken. It was somewhat suspected of vicious competition, but facts also proved that, under the premise of guaranteed quality, consumers at that time indeed needed such low-priced products. Although the two companies were fighting fiercely during this period, the domestic laundry detergent market was later attacked by the local brand "Diao Pai," and then Liby came from behind. According to Nielsen data, from 2009 to 2010, Liby's sales share reached 24.3%, making it the number one brand in the Chinese laundry detergent market. Tide ranked second with a 20.6% share, and Diao Pai ranked third with 17.7%. The top three brands held 60% of the market, and Omo, which had fought a price war, seemed to have lost its advantage. Liby has maintained its dominant position to this day. Nielsen data from 2013 showed that Liby's share in the Chinese laundry detergent market had reached 25%, indicating its market share was still growing. In 2014, Nielsen data showed that Liby still held the first position in the Chinese laundry detergent market. In recent years, laundry liquid has become a rising star in fabric washing. The laundry liquid market has grown by more than 30% annually. In 2012, laundry liquid surpassed laundry soap to become the second-largest category in the laundry detergent market. In 2014, the share of laundry liquid in the overall laundry detergent market increased from 23.5% to 29.4%. Brands like Blue Moon, Tide, Liby, and Ariel are all eyeing this market. P&G's sub-brand Ariel launched laundry pods, while Omo chose to remain silent... · 5. For the sake of Chinese people's bathing, P&G and Unilever clashed again Both P&G and Unilever started out making soap. However, P&G's founding brand, Ivory soap, has been outsourced to third-party manufacturers, while Unilever's Dove holds a 40.5% share of the global soap market, making it the world's largest soap brand. Despite Unilever's global dominance in the soap market, in China, Unilever's soap brands simply cannot beat its old rival P&G. In PinGuanJun's impression, Safeguard is basically synonymous with soap. Whenever soap is mentioned, the image of that slim-waisted antibacterial soap brand comes to mind. It is indeed the largest soap brand in the Chinese market. According to public data, P&G's Safeguard and Pampers brands together sell over 8 billion yuan a year in China. In 2007, the Yangtze Evening News published data showing that Safeguard held a 27.54% share of the Chinese soap market, ranking first in the industry. At that time, Dove didn't even make it into the top five. The second-ranked brand was actually another Unilever soap brand – Lux, with a 17.13% market share. It seems that Dove's soap is still somewhat weak in the Chinese market. In fact, Unilever's most influential soap brand in the Chinese market is still Lux. As early as the 1920s and 1930s, Lux soap was popular in the Chinese market, with the famous star Hu Die as its brand ambassador. In 1986, Lux soap re-entered the Chinese market and quickly became the leading brand in the Chinese soap market. However, six years later, P&G's Safeguard entered the Chinese market, and Lux was gradually cornered. The "upstart" Safeguard, within just a few years, forcibly pulled Lux down from the throne of soap dominance. According to 2001 data, Safeguard's market share reached 41.95%, 14 percentage points higher than Lux, which ranked second. Moreover, Safeguard began a multi-category extension strategy. During the SARS period in 2003, Safeguard, which focused on antibacterial concepts, experienced qualitative growth. After all, in such a period, claiming to remove 99% of bacteria was very persuasive. A good brand also needs capable people to promote it. Public data shows that Cheng Junyi, a former P&G executive, served as the director and head of P&G China's personal cleansing products division in 2003 and once increased Safeguard's market share from 35% to 55%, making Safeguard one of P&G's most profitable brands in China. By 2008, Safeguard had become the number one brand for family bathing products in the Chinese market. It ranked first in soap market share and second in body wash sales in China. Safeguard's first-place position in the Chinese market has remained very stable. Until 2013, Safeguard and Lux together held nearly 70% of the Chinese soap market, but Safeguard still held the first position with an absolute advantage. Relevant data shows that even now, Safeguard is the largest brand in both the soap and body wash categories in the Chinese market, without exception. Now you see, although both are the world's top FMCG companies, P&G has still managed to outdo Unilever in various aspects. Dear wife, how should you choose your shampoo? New Food Era · New Distribution —— 2016 China "FMCG + Internet" Summit Forum —— This is a grand event focused on how the FMCG industry's channels will transform under the trend of Internet+ Agenda 09:00-09:30 Registration 09:30-09:35 Host opening 09:35-10:05 2016 China FMCG Industry Trend Analysis Report – Zhao Bo 10:05-10:25 Transformation Strategy and Path for FMCG Enterprises – Liu Chunxiong 10:25-10:45 Opportunities and Challenges Brought by FMCG Channel Reform – Liu Zhao, CEO of Waiqin365 10:45-11:25 Alibaba Retail Link Full Empowerment – Guo Kunkun, Alibaba Retail Link 11:25-12:00 Roundtable Forum – Brand Transformation: Improvement vs. Reconstruction? (Guests TBD) 12:00-13:30 Lunch 13:30-14:00 Distributor Transformation: Trends in City Distribution – Wang Qi, CEO of Weijie City Distribution 14:00-14:30 Roundtable Forum – Why Should Distributors Do Logistics in Transformation? 14:30-15:00 Detailed Explanation of Zhongshang Huimin's "One Machine, Two Wings" Strategy – Su Xiaoxin, VP of Zhongshang Huimin 15:00-15:30 Detailed Explanation of Zhanghe Cloud Factory Strategy – Yang Lixiang, Zhanghe Tianxia (Content TBD) 15:30-16:00 Supply Chain Finance as a Lubricant for B2B to Drive Traditional Business – Chen Xian, CEO of 51 Order 16:00-16:30 Principles and Approaches for 2B Investment – Xu Xiaoping, Founder of ZhenFund (Guest TBD) 16:30-17:00 Small Retail, Big Opportunities: Transformation and Upgrading of Chinese Retail – Wang Jianfeng, GM of E-commerce Division, Yurun Group 17:00-17:30 Roundtable Forum – Who Is the King of FMCG B2B Models? (Guests TBD) 18:00-20:00 Dinner For manufacturer friends who want to transform, this event is not to be missed. Interested friends can long press the QR code below or click "Read Original" to register. Registration: Long press the QR code below or click "Read Original" ↓↓↓ Click "Read Original" [Register]