In a county-level city with a population of 500,000, how much can a single beer brand sell at its peak? In Xingyi, located at the junction of Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi provinces, Zhongyi Trading, a partner of China Resources Beer, provided an answer: about 56 liters per capita. This astonishing figure is more than double China's per capita beer consumption of 26 liters, and it represents sales for China Resources Beer alone. In the fiercely competitive beer category, Zhongyi's achievement is extremely rare. Renowned marketing expert Liu Chunxiong once proposed a standard for a "regional king": making competitors feel unattainable and intimidated. Zhongyi Trading is undoubtedly the beer regional king. On April 1, 2024, Zhongyi Trading celebrated its 20th anniversary. Twenty years is both young and long-lived: young because it's the prime of life for a person, and long-lived because for small and medium enterprises, whose average lifespan is only 3.7 years, 20 years makes it a long-lived company. How was Zhongyi's regional kingship forged? What kind of cooperation path did it walk with China Resources Beer? What useful lessons can Zhongyi's experience offer to dealers?
A Brilliant First Shot: Selling Half a Year's Volume in 28 Days Every wonderful story often has a dramatic beginning. In 2003, an era full of entrepreneurial passion, the young and ambitious Yang Hainan and Chen Jiayong saw a CCTV "Dialogue" program featuring Ning Gaoning, then General Manager of China Resources Group. After learning about the history of China Resources Group and the development of Snow Beer, they decided to become distributors for Snow Beer. After searching around, they drove from Xingyi for two days to find the Snow Beer Mianyang factory in Sichuan. On April 1, 2004, Zhongyi Trading officially became the distributor for China Resources Snow Beer in the Xingyi area, placing an initial order of an entire train car, a full 60 tons of beer. In 2004, the Guizhou market was almost completely blank for Snow Beer. There was no factory, no large team, only a business department in Zunyi. Moreover, the prevailing taste was for heavier beers, and the refreshing taste of Snow Beer had not yet opened the market. The head of Snow Beer's Guizhou market was quite worried about how Yang Hainan would sell 60 tons of beer, thinking it would take at least half a year. In fact, Yang Hainan sold all 60 tons in just 28 days. Not only that, in 2004, Zhongyi Trading achieved sales of 560 tons in just 8 months, ranking among the top three in Guizhou. Since then, for 19 years from 2005 to the present, Zhongyi Trading has firmly held the top position in Snow Beer sales in the Guizhou market, never losing it. How did an outsider who had never sold beer achieve half a year's sales plan in 28 days? Yang Hainan's summary: On the surface, it's like "different trades are separated by mountains," but in essence, "different trades share the same principles." Although he had never sold beer, he grasped two essentials of beer sales: terminals and consumers. For beer to meet consumers, terminals are the core battlefield. Yang Hainan believed that other channel levels beyond terminals were unimportant. First, terminals must be firmly in your own hands. Therefore, from day one, Yang Hainan set an iron rule for Zhongyi Trading: All terminals are directly supplied, not a single case is wholesaled. This rule has been upheld to this day, with all 5,000+ terminals of various sizes in Xingyi controlled by Zhongyi's own team. Second, continuous consumer-facing promotions must be conducted at terminal positions. In 2004, Yang Hainan made two major innovative moves: he funded promotional events at night venues himself, and he built a promotional team of up to 18 people at his own expense. In 2004, the beer market was chaotic with many players, making it hard for new brands to stand out. Yang Hainan reached a promotional partnership with the most influential KTV brand in Xingyi. The so-called promotional event meant all beer brands could be sold, but only Snow Beer's promoters were allowed. Never underestimate the two core actions of "direct terminal supply" and "exclusive promotional events"; even today they are advanced, and in 2004 they were groundbreaking innovations rarely seen nationwide, with results exceeding expectations. Within just half a year, Snow Beer's share in Xingyi's nightlife and late-night snack markets exceeded 50%, and it continued to rise, leading the regional market. In 2006, Zhongyi's 30-person team achieved sales of about 2,500 tons, nearly five times that of 2004. In January 2007, China Resources Beer acquired Pubu Beer to establish its first factory in Guizhou, and Zhongyi Trading entered a new phase of development.
Repeated Charges and Stalemates in Market Share: The Thorny Path of Growth After 2007, Zhongyi's development can be roughly divided into the following stages: 2007-2010 rapid growth; 2011-2012 slowing growth; 2013-2016 intensified competition, internal and external troubles; 2017-present return to dominance. In 2007, China Resources Beer established a Guizhou marketing center. From 2007 to 2010, with strong support from China Resources Beer's marketing organization, Zhongyi developed rapidly, with sales rising from 2,500 tons to 9,000 tons in 2010. From 2010 to 2012, after gaining market dominance, the team became complacent, management slackened, terminal service quality declined, and market growth began to slow. In 2012, sales were only 9,800 tons. In 2013, after discovering major problems in team management, Yang Hainan reflected for over a month and returned to team management. After sorting things out, he laid off 5 of the 6 management personnel, almost rebuilding the entire team. After the team adjustment, he personally led the team to negotiate with stores, visit terminals, and drive market progress. In 2013, Zhongyi achieved sales of 14,000 tons, a year-on-year increase of nearly 43%; in 2014, sales reached 18,000 tons, and Zhongyi regained its dominant position. But the real challenge began in 2015 when Brand L entered the Xingyi market. Brand L launched a fierce attack. In terms of brand, it targeted young consumers' minds; in terms of channels, it launched a comprehensive penetration and battle for core beer positions like late-night snack spots and nightlife venues. Underestimating Brand L strategically cost Zhongyi dearly. In 2016, Zhongyi's sales dropped from 18,000 tons in 2014 to 10,000 tons, and it faced comprehensive challenges in core terminals, with its market position precarious. 2016 was Zhongyi's true moment of life and death.
Extreme Customer Relations Win the Terminal White-Knife Battle: Achieving Regional Kingship Under Brand L's strong market offensive and pressure, in December 2016, Yang Hainan held the most important management meeting. This meeting established the core competitive strategy against Brand L: "Core product downgrade attack + extreme customer relations terminal promotion." First, focus on Snow Pure, which has better quality and higher consumer recognition, as the core competitive product. Snow Pure is a national high-end big product, with quality advantages and a stronger consumer base than Brand L, and it can invest far more market expenses than competitors. Second, launch the "Extreme Customer Relations" plan. What is "extreme customer relations"? Yang Hainan's explanation: Take customer relations to the extreme, making the owner a true friend rather than a transaction. China Resources Beer's summary is more incisive: extreme customer relations has only one standard, which is that business personnel can be "regarded as family" by terminals, and can "do whatever they want" at terminals. How is "extreme customer relations" implemented? For example, in late-night snack shops, 32 high-quality shops were selected as targets. They bought fruits, red wine, high-end drinks, etc., from outside, made weekly terminal visits, and secured the terminals in six weeks. In the first week, the owner was indifferent; in the second week, they gave NFC juice and chatted, firmly avoiding beer talk; in the third week, they gave two bottles of red wine, and the owner started talking about business and consumers; in the fourth week, they gave Snow Beer's high-end face-pattern product, and some owners offered to help sell, but they firmly refused. Until the sixth week's visit, when the owner again offered to sell, they immediately wrote an order for 20 cases of Snow Pure beer, giving it to the terminal in a personal capacity rather than company name, and placed it in a prominent store location. In less than two months, 28 of the 32 high-quality late-night snack shops were secured. Previously, customer relations work focused only on A-class terminals; after "extreme customer relations," B-class and even C+ terminals were included in the "key customer relations management system." For example, on the owner's birthday, flowers, cakes, and fruits are delivered directly to their home by the manager; during holidays, corresponding gifts are delivered to customers, etc. Since the launch of the "Extreme Customer Relations" plan in December 2016, Zhongyi currently has over 1,000 stores in its key customer relations system, covering all channels including circulation, dining, and nightlife, accounting for 30% of all terminals in Xingyi.
Through "extreme customer relations + terminal promotion," Zhongyi successfully reversed its passive situation. In 2017, sales returned to 18,000 tons, and Brand L began to shrink; in 2018, Zhongyi continued rapid growth, with sales of 28,000 tons, setting a new historical high. Since then, Zhongyi has maintained an ultra-high market share in Xingyi, with Brand L's share shrinking to about 15%.
Zhongyi's Revelation: Every Dazzling Crown Is Woven from Thorns Since 2018, in addition to continuing to operate the Xingyi market, Yang Hainan has also responded to China Resources Beer's call, successively providing support to markets such as Lincang in Yunnan and Nanning in Guangxi, with impressive performance. From the initial extensive rapid growth, to the "forgetfulness" after market leadership in the middle period, to overcoming super challenges to become the regional king, what revelations can Zhongyi's 20-year growth path offer us?
First, without the "community of shared destiny" with China Resources Beer, Zhongyi might have fallen in the fateful tribulation. Around 2012, market stagnation due to management loss of control, and in 2016, the performance slump caused by Brand L competition—without the almost unlimited trust and support of China Resources Beer, Zhongyi's growth path might have been interrupted. In fact, when markets face huge challenges, there are many examples of manufacturers only caring about tasks and not about dealers' survival. Therefore, in today's increasingly competitive and difficult growth environment, every dealer must re-examine the level of their relationship with the manufacturer. Choosing a brand is choosing a destiny. For most dealers, this is a life-and-death issue today.
Second, every dazzling crown is woven from bloody thorns. Zhongyi Trading took 20 years to achieve its current market position in Xingyi, with one-third of that time spent under huge challenges or even setbacks. Many dealers encounter similar challenges in their development. The difference is that most dealers fail to overcome such fateful battles, losing growth momentum and becoming ordinary. Dazzling crowns are almost always woven from bloody thorns. To win multiple fateful battles like Zhongyi requires extremely strong mental strength, extraordinary courage, and disruptive imagination and creativity.
Third, even as the regional king, challenges never cease. 2024 marks the 30th anniversary of China Resources Beer, and at the same time, it will face its next 30 years. Similarly, Zhongyi Trading, after its 20th birthday, faces the challenge of how to move toward the next 20 years. In the foreseeable future, brand competition will certainly intensify, and profits from single-brand operations will inevitably decline year by year. Despite being the regional king in the beer category, Zhongyi still faces the challenge of developing from a single category to multiple categories, and new challenges of how to select and operate categories beyond beer.
