****Source | Tingtong Tech Xiaohongshu, seeking to monetize local life services, has voluntarily closed a 'test field'. On December 8, the Xiaohongka team announced plans to suspend the trial operation of 'Xiaohongka' starting January 1, 2026. Less than 100 days after its launch, this local life membership service under Xiaohongshu came to an abrupt end. Xiaohongshu's official explanation was, "Preparation was insufficient, and we failed to meet users' needs for richness and convenience in local life services, so we plan to suspend the trial operation." It also stated, "The team will continue to steadfastly improve local life content and tools." Previously, Xiaohongka carried Xiaohongshu's local life dream, positioned as a 'selected card for food, drink, fun, and entertainment.' With an annual fee of 168 yuan, users could enjoy core benefits like 'up to 10% off in-store consumption,' initially covering thousands of stores in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou. Industry insiders noted that Xiaohongka was expected to build a closed-loop consumption model of 'content seeding + membership discounts.' Xiaohongshu's move aimed to enhance user stickiness through a paid membership system and expand commercial monetization capabilities. Unfortunately, the project ended within less than 100 days. Many industry insiders believe that the failure of Xiaohongka is not just a setback for a single product but a microcosm of Xiaohongshu's lack of local life business genes and its setbacks in this area. However, this does not mean Xiaohongshu has completely failed in local life services. Some analysts point out that this is also a new strategic adjustment for Xiaohongshu, shifting to explore possibilities that align with its own development. The market wind continues to blow. However, for consumers, the days of achieving local life freedom on Xiaohongshu have once again drifted away. 'Aborted' in Less Than 100 Days Doing local life services, Xiaohongshu seems somewhat 'not adapted to the local environment.' In September this year, positioned as a 'selected card for food, drink, fun, and entertainment,' Xiaohongka (local life membership card) was launched for trial operation during Xiaohongshu's third Road Life Festival. Paying an annual fee of 168 yuan, users could enjoy benefits such as 'selected store recommendations,' 'discounts valid across the entire store,' and 'exclusive events,' initially covering thousands of stores in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou. At that time, many analyses pointed out that Xiaohongshu's move was intended to enhance user stickiness through a paid membership system and expand commercial monetization capabilities. To differentiate from the subsidy wars of platforms like Meituan and Gaode, Xiaohongshu designed a 'two-way selection' mechanism. For example, on the merchant side, community reputation was the core screening criterion, rejecting bidding rankings; on the user side, the annual fee threshold filtered out traffic-driven users, targeting high-net-worth individuals. Additionally, to attract such merchants, Xiaohongshu adopted a low-threshold cooperation policy: selected stores did not need to pay intermediary service fees, the platform did not take commissions, and only charged a 0.6% payment processing fee. This was seen as a key step for Xiaohongshu into local life services. At that time, Leon, Xiaohongshu's head of transaction products and local products, said at a media briefing, "Local life is something Xiaohongshu must do and will definitely do. Over the past few years, Xiaohongshu has become a community about lifestyle, so local life is 'unavoidable.'" However, less than three months into the trial, on December 8, the Xiaohongka team issued an announcement stating that the 'Xiaohongka' business would suspend trial operation from January 1, 2026. After suspension, Xiaohongshu would process full refunds for card purchasers without requiring any action from them. The announcement also stated, "Due to insufficient preparation, we failed to meet users' needs for richness and convenience in local life services, so we plan to suspend the trial operation." It also said that going forward, resources would be concentrated in stages, focusing on the influence of local life content. However, it is understood that this suspension only involves Xiaohongka; other local life functions and services provided by Xiaohongshu for users and merchants are unaffected. In fact, the internal strategic moves of Xiaohongshu had already explained and paved the way for the discontinuation of Xiaohongka. It is understood that since early 2024, Xiaohongshu has determined that its local life business is 'not GMV-oriented,' focusing on designing local life transaction product paths from a user experience perspective. The essence of Xiaohongka is a carrier of this logic, not just a transaction tool, with the core purpose of 'further enhancing the influence of community content.' Recently, Xu Lei, vice president of Xiaohongshu, also added, "Xiaohongshu has always preferred encouragement over requirements. We don't ask merchants to do specific things because standardized actions have never been the logic of Xiaohongshu's growth." 'Content over commerce' has kept Xiaohongshu as a powerful content 'seeding' platform, but it has also led to a deeper hidden purchase entrance and less smooth and direct conversion paths for merchants. An 'Ill-Adapted' 'Sudden Brake' In front of the industry walls built by giants with massive traffic, mature ground promotion systems, and deep merchant resources, Xiaohongshu attempted a differentiated breakthrough with a 'content + lightweight membership' model, but the start was not as smooth as expected. In fact, this is not Xiaohongshu's first exploration of local life services. As early as April 2023, Xiaohongshu first opened internal testing for local life group buying, starting with the coffee category, and the official account 'Tuboshu' became active, marking its determination to enter this field. Subsequently, Xiaohongshu accelerated its pace. Public information shows that in September 2024, Xiaohongshu opened restaurant group buying to 49 cities. In early 2025, it opened up to food merchants nationwide; in July of the same year, it expanded to leisure and entertainment categories and reduced the technical service fee rate from 2.5% to 0.6%. In September this year, focusing on local life membership services, 'Xiaohongka' was launched, and on the App's 'personal homepage,' a local life entrance was opened for card-holding members, parallel to the e-commerce entrance 'Market.' Image: A store that once had Xiaohongka However, the trial of Xiaohongka quickly came to a 'sudden brake.' What made decision-makers decide was clearly not just that the community atmosphere was unsuitable for local life services. In the view of industry insiders, the biggest problem with Xiaohongka is weak price competitiveness. Compared with Meituan's 'Shen Member' subsidies and Douyin vouchers, in the highly price-sensitive local life battlefield, the membership benefits of Xiaohongka appear less attractive. At the same time, the annual fee of 168 yuan, compared with more comprehensive membership systems like Taobao's 88VIP and JD PLUS, does not offer sufficient cost-performance advantages. Additionally, the merchant coverage density of Xiaohongka is severely insufficient. "If I hadn't seen the news of the suspension, I wouldn't have known about this channel," a Xiaohongshu user named Chen Er told the author. "Among users I know who have Xiaohongka, as far as I know, they use it infrequently. The coverage of cities is limited, and compared with competing platforms, the merchants and products on Xiaohongka are also very limited." Chen Er also pointed out, "The fulfillment locations are very limited, not even covering the entire province, and among ten merchants, only one or two can be used." Especially, on the merchant side, Xiaohongka clearly was not prepared. According to Blue Whale Technology, a restaurant owner even learned about the suspension of Xiaohongka through media reports. The merchant also revealed that after participating in Xiaohongka activities, the number of seeding notes increased, but it was not proportional to the number of people who actually consumed through Xiaohongka, so they judged the conversion rate to be low. In fact, the above-mentioned store merchant also said that their own membership storage system offered discounts even greater than Xiaohongka's, but Xiaohongka discounts could not be stacked with membership promotions. The owner said, "Customers are still used to using membership storage." Low user willingness to pay, insufficient merchant cooperation depth, and low platform ecosystem fit—multiple factors combined led to the exit of Xiaohongka. In the industry's view, this is not just a setback for a single product but reflects more of a microcosm of Xiaohongshu's setbacks in exploring local life services. Is There Still Market Increment? Among internet companies, Xiaohongshu is a special existence. Its success stems from its unique content community ecosystem. From initial beauty and skincare sharing to later travel, food, home, and other diverse fields, Xiaohongshu has built a 'real sharing' community centered on UGC (user-generated content). Users seek inspiration, share experiences, and build a sense of identity here, forming a highly active and sticky community culture. However, 'success is also due to Xiao He, failure is also due to Xiao He'—the genes of a content community have a natural contradiction with local services. Xiaohongka is a typical victim of different consumer decision paths. For example, content consumption on Xiaohongshu is often based on interest and inspiration. Users may develop a desire to consume after reading a beautifully crafted store visit note, but there is a large time and space gap between that desire and actual consumption. In contrast, local life services like Meituan and Dianping directly connect the short chain of 'search-decision-consumption,' meeting immediate and certain needs. The solidified user mindset also accelerated the premature death of Xiaohongka. Chen Er explained, "The mindset that 'Xiaohongshu = lifestyle content community' has been solidified. When the platform tries to add transaction functions, I feel resistant." This contradiction is particularly prominent when consuming local life services. As a common saying goes, "One can 'seed' on Xiaohongshu but is more accustomed to 'pulling weeds' on other platforms." Image: Tuboshu Xiaohongshu official account page Additionally, in the view of Ma Ming, an insider at a major local life company, more importantly, the evaluation system for local services is difficult to migrate. "Xiaohongshu's core competitiveness lies in authentic and diverse user reviews, but this evaluation system is based on relatively subjective experience sharing. Local life services require more objective and standardized evaluation dimensions, such as delivery speed, price transparency, and after-sales support, which are precisely the weak points in Xiaohongshu's evaluation system." For Xiaohongshu, the dilemma in local life services is essentially a common problem in the commercialization of content communities: how to create commercial value without damaging the core value of the community. However, despite many challenges, Xiaohongshu has not completely given up on local life services. On the contrary, it is also seeking a 'Xiaohongshu-style' solution for local life. For example, not directly competing with platforms like Meituan and Douyin in the transaction link, strengthening the 'content as service' model; avoiding heavy operation areas like food delivery and hotel booking, focusing on local services that better fit the content community attributes, such as store visit guides, event reservations, and course experiences. At the same time, not attempting to build a complete local life closed loop, but cooperating with professional platforms to become their traffic entrance and content supplement. In Ma Ming's view, the closure of Xiaohongka does not mean Xiaohongshu's complete failure in local life services; perhaps it is the beginning of a new strategic adjustment. In the internet industry, genes often determine a company's capability boundaries. Ma Ming believes that Xiaohongshu's advantage lies in content creation and community operation, not transaction matching and offline fulfillment. Rather than competing head-on in the local life track crowded with giants, it is better to redefine the value chain of local life services and find the best combination point between content community and commercial services. In Chen Er's view, she will continue to enjoy checking in on Xiaohongshu, looking for new food and store visit posts. Xiaohongshu may not become the next Meituan or Dianping, but it could become the 'first stop' for local life consumption decisions, where users discover, seed, and share, then head to professional service platforms with clear consumption intentions. This positioning may not be as 'sexy' as a complete transaction closed loop, but it is more in line with Xiaohongshu's genes and more likely to achieve sustainable commercialization while maintaining community value. In a sense, the local life market is vast enough to accommodate different types of players. However, Xiaohongshu's challenge is not whether it can replicate the success of giants, but whether it can find a unique path where content value and commercial value complement each other rather than hinder each other. This path may be rugged, but once traversed, it will also provide a new possibility for the industry.