Over the past two years, JD.com has faced turbulence far exceeding any previous period. This is influenced by the macroeconomic environment, external competitive pressures, and closely tied to Liu Qiangdong's hands-on return. The founder's every move has led this established e-commerce company to undertake a series of seemingly intense, even somewhat contradictory organizational adjustments and strategic upgrades against a rapidly changing industry backdrop: on one hand, JD hopes to regain competitiveness in 'low prices' and make consumers feel the impact of 'cheap and good' again; on the other, it must confront enormous internal and external constraints, paying heavy costs such as profit decline, management pains, and cultural conflicts. Liu Qiangdong displayed anxiety multiple times from late last year to mid-this year, both responding to employee concerns about JD's business and management on the internal network, and lamenting 'organizational bloat and poor internal management' in public or semi-public settings. This strong dissatisfaction is rooted in the broader environment of Pinduoduo's rapid growth and Alibaba's deep transformation. Especially, Pinduoduo successfully penetrated broader markets with extreme low prices, its market value soared, active buyers surpassed Alibaba, and both revenue growth and profit margins led, making JD's previously stable position of 'dividing the world' with Alibaba no longer secure. In Liu Qiangdong's view, this is an imminent crisis: growth slowing, organizational inefficiency, and if JD does not quickly initiate change, it will be hard to prevent competitors from further eroding the market. 'JD must change, or there is no way out.' These were Liu Qiangdong's exact words on the internal network. To fulfill this promise, he directed frontline business from Dubai, thousands of kilometers away, sleeping only about four hours a day, and even went down to oversee specific business line groups like C2 and C3. This highly centralized command style reflects his dissatisfaction with JD's 'slow' response and his desire to transform the corporate culture so everyone is as motivated as in the entrepreneurial days. Many comment that 'Brother Dong' has returned to the state of the price war against Dangdang and Suning over a decade ago, wanting to rebuild combat effectiveness with thunderous measures. However, JD is now an 'aircraft carrier' with over 600,000 employees, no longer the agile speedboat that could quickly turn around. To achieve management transformation, it cannot rely solely on passion and a few group commands; under internal and external constraints, the difficulty of change is evident.
The Two Sides of Reshaping Low Prices The first thing mentioned is the need to reshape JD's competitiveness in 'low prices' . Liu Qiangdong insists that low prices have always been the foundational weapon of JD's past success and must become the most important competitive barrier for survival. But for a considerable period, JD has focused on 'genuine products' and 'quality', and most consumers have a fixed impression of JD as the preferred platform for purchasing home appliances and 3C products, rarely equating it with 'extreme cheapness'. More awkwardly, JD's self-operated model has its advantages—strong control over product quality and supply chain fulfillment—but to significantly offer discounts, it must either spend its own money or squeeze supplier profits. Against a backdrop of weak social consumption momentum, this low-price output is very difficult, quickly triggering joint boycotts from book category merchants and creating opposition from brand owners: JD frequently runs 2-3% discounts to stimulate sales, leaving merchants with no profit and potentially damaging brand positioning. Further contradictions lie in JD's third-party (3P) products, which are small in scale, have high fee rates, and insufficient traffic allocation, unable to support the 'low price' banner in the short term. This was already evident when Liu Qiangdong initially proposed 'let third-party merchants compete to offer low prices': the proportion of platform merchants is too small, and traffic is squeezed by self-operated. If self-operated actively subsidizes, JD must bear more costs, resulting in profit decline. Financial data corroborates this game: on one hand, JD wants to capture lower-tier markets and must continuously release subsidies and low discounts; on the other, profit margins inevitably face pressure. Within the framework of a listed company, JD cannot ignore profits and stock prices, but continuously increasing 'hundred-billion subsidies' also requires real investment, and this seesaw effect is hard to resolve easily with just a few promotional campaigns.
Additionally, JD's past success was not only due to price wars but also because it established a strong logistics system and self-operated quality reputation early in e-commerce. From 'Yangcheng Lake hairy crabs' to 'same-day delivery' and 'next-day delivery', to its own customer service and after-sales systems, these were originally the foundation for JD being seen as warm by users. If it blindly presses the low-price accelerator, it may shake its original advantages and even cause internal disputes: when self-operated procurement promotes heavily in live streams, compressing brand profits, third-party merchants naturally complain 'only self-operated gets traffic, not us', making the earlier reform to integrate self-operated and 3P a mere formality. In the long run, JD's ecosystem may struggle to support the ideal 'cheap and good' goal.
The Other Side of Wolf Culture Management Beyond the low-price reform, JD's internal big-company disease and cultural conflicts have also been spotlighted. Liu Qiangdong angrily criticized on the internal network that JD is rife with copying and imitation, lacking innovation, management is 'more state-owned than state-owned enterprises', with issues like daily afternoon naps, proxy clock-ins, and slacking off, and many 'long-term underperformers unwilling to strive'. Externally, JD deliberately highlights this internal chaos to emphasize the 'urgency of change'; internally, a series of radical measures quickly implemented—including strict attendance checks, restricted lunch breaks, banning proxy clock-ins, requiring those leaving at 6 PM to undergo work saturation reviews, and even directly dismissing employees deemed to have crossed 'red lines'. The phrase 'not my brother' once caused a public uproar because it contradicted Liu Qiangdong's earlier philosophy of 'never firing brothers', precisely reflecting JD's contradictory mindset in driving rapid organizational transformation: to maintain a 'people-oriented' image while stimulating strong execution inevitably leads to roughness and conflict. Some say Liu Qiangdong is learning Pinduoduo's 'wolf culture' management, even bringing in executives from Pinduoduo to head JD Retail's HR. The latter is seen by many JD employees as a 'scapegoat', as when tight attendance systems, overtime culture, and various struggle slogans fill the floors, outsiders point fingers at this newcomer. But upon deeper examination, this is not just the will of an individual or department, but a 'thorough rectification' demanded by Liu Qiangdong himself. For those accustomed to loose management or who firmly believe in JD's original 'brotherhood culture', this top-down management shock and performance pressure is naturally a violent impact. In some online posts or leaks, many JD veterans exclaim 'can't adapt' or 'either choose to leave', which is often the subtext of Liu Qiangdong's 'either be eliminated'.
This seemingly 'radical and pragmatic' iron-fisted approach also hides potential risks. Simply extending working hours, strict clock-in systems, and reducing lunch breaks may not bring real efficiency gains. Office culture is particularly sensitive and can lead to reverse involution: if you want employees to sit longer, they may drag their feet, pretend to be busy, and do 'KPI for KPI's sake', with actual output far less than imagined. High-pressure control may also lead to morale decline and talent attrition, especially if middle managers feel 'top only wants absolute obedience, and any complaint is labeled as 'not striving enough', they may choose to exit. 'Earn quick money, work overtime, pay well' is the tone of Pinduoduo-style employment, weakening the human dimension, with a flatter overall structure and commands often executed 'overnight'. But JD, although it also fought fiercely in its early years, now has a huge workforce and business matrix, accumulating many traditions and inertia over two decades of growth, with many organizational layers, no longer able to execute nationwide with a single command like in the startup days. If it only learns Pinduoduo's wolfish side while ignoring underlying system and cultural differences, forcibly pushing policies can easily lead to friction between employees and management, and entanglement between old businesses and new directions.
Of course, it cannot be said that Liu Qiangdong's approach has been entirely ineffective. Over the past six months or so, JD's hundred-billion subsidy activities have increased visibility, and some categories have seen sales growth. For roles like procurement, 3P merchants, and customer service, JD has indeed raised salaries, especially in procurement, which increased from 16 to 20 months' salary in over a year, with year-end bonuses up to 8 times monthly salary. This is a clear incentive for 'strivers', giving some employees who work steadily real monetary rewards and conveying to the outside world that 'if you can deliver results, JD is willing to pay'. Liu Qiangdong's recent proactive distribution of over 30 million yuan in New Year goods and red envelopes to his hometown also continues his personal 'remembering the source' style, creating a positive image in front of the public: he is not just forcing employees to work hard but is also willing to lead in charitable spending.
Patience Needed for Internal Surgery From the perspective of corporate history, many large companies often undergo difficult trade-offs between 'scale and efficiency' in their mid-to-late stages. To maintain its position in the next round of e-commerce reshuffling, JD urgently needs to coordinate the interest distribution between self-operated and platform, allowing more products to truly compete fairly in pricing and traffic; it also needs to balance high-pressure management with employee creativity, so that truly talented people do not lose enthusiasm; and it needs to find new growth and innovation points beyond the 'low-price war', such as steady expansion in instant retail and overseas markets, rather than just 'learning from Pinduoduo and getting everyone pumped up'.
At this moment, JD is like a giant ship that has sailed for many years. After returning to the captain's seat, Liu Qiangdong has been drastically replacing engines, trying to restore the ship's speed and combat effectiveness to its peak, but in his urgency, he may have overlooked that the hull may have aged, the crew is numerous, and the competitive landscape at sea is no longer what it was, even bearing high expectations from shareholders and the market for profits. Liu Qiangdong has been trying to stimulate more 'wolf nature' in people, but should also be wary of whether internal management methods and incentive systems match reality. Simply increasing working hours, emphasizing clock-ins, and controlling lunch breaks can easily lead to formalism; relying only on high salaries and slogans to inspire morale may also make employees lack genuine trust in the company. Ultimately, whether all employees can clearly understand JD's next direction, whether brand owners and 3P merchants can confidently invest resources on the platform, and whether JD can continue to maintain its advantages in delivery and service are the true pillars determining the success of this transformation. The outside world is watching JD, as well as Alibaba, Pinduoduo, and even ByteDance competing on the same stage. More and more people observe that China's e-commerce and retail industry is transitioning to a stock market, with user growth dividends thinning, and the competitive landscape no longer allows multiple platforms to grow together in incremental scenarios. Everyone is anxious; Ma Yun and Cai Chongxin have also said they want to 'operate on big-company disease', and Huang Zheng maintains 'paranoid' high efficiency and rational decision-making internally, keeping Pinduoduo's astonishing growth. In this situation, JD still has dual moats of scale and brand, but whether it can reverse user perception, make lower-tier users feel 'JD is equally cheap', and expand its moat beyond traditional strong areas like 3C and home appliances requires a long time and patience, as well as a more systematic strategy than simply fighting price wars.
We look forward to JD ultimately achieving balance. We hope this top-down shock can break the long-standing ailments accumulated over the years, truly synchronize 'low-price return' with 'business upgrade', without losing respect for employees or abandoning the pursuit of profit and scale. After all, JD still carries much trust and expectation; it has provided consumers with fast and reliable services and has repeatedly helped society create employment and drive industrial upgrading.
【New Order · Symbiosis】 ****The 10th China FMCG Innovation Conference Time: March 17-19, 2025 Location: Chengdu, China