Source | Kong Shou ID | firesteal13 I have emphasized that all brand building and marketing promotion practices must ultimately return to consumer needs and decision-making patterns. Different understandings of consumer behavior determine different marketing models. Let's take the most common consumer behavior of buying a beverage as an example. In the past, we always believed that the consumer decision-making model is "category thinking, brand expression." Specifically, how does a consumer choose a bottle of drink? They first decide what category to drink, and then consider which brand to buy. For example, first decide to drink cola, then consider whether to buy Coca-Cola or Pepsi; first decide to buy tea drinks, then consider whether to choose Master Kong jasmine green tea or Uni-President iced black tea; first decide to drink sparkling water, then consider whether it's Genki Forest or some other brand; first decide to drink milk, then consider whether it's Mengniu or Yili; first decide to buy water, and of course consumers can further subdivide the category, deciding whether to drink purified water, natural water, or mineral water, and then consider whether it's C'estbon, Nongfu Spring, or Ganten. Under this decision-making model, the mainstream marketing thinking in the industry is positioning and HBG (How Brands Grow) big penetration. Positioning is to help a brand occupy a position in a category. For example, according to positioning thought, Coca-Cola is the pioneer of the cola category and the most classic cola brand; while Pepsi is the choice of a new generation, a young cola brand. If a domestic company also launches a cola brand, its positioning would be "the Chinese people's cola," more suitable for Chinese consumers' constitution. The essence of positioning is category status, but positioning experts often substitute this concept with mind share status. The HBG big penetration theory, which I introduced in my previous article "Stock Dilemma," has the core idea of increasing brand awareness in consumers' minds and coverage through different channels, thereby increasing the brand's market penetration rate and ensuring the brand has a leading advantage in the category. When consumers decide to buy products in that category, they can think of their brand first. Byron Sharp, the professor who proposed this theory, believes that increasing penetration is the only way to achieve growth. A brand must continuously expand its popularity among the broadest population, prompting more non-brand users to purchase, in order to increase the brand's overall sales volume. To this end, Professor Sharp wrote a book called "How Brands Grow" (HBG) to explain his understanding of how brands achieve growth. Because Professor Sharp believes that this concept is different from traditional marketing thinking that focuses on customer relationship management and improving customer loyalty and satisfaction, this book has been translated into Chinese as "Non-Traditional Marketing." Companies that believe in HBG thinking often mention several indicators in brand marketing and use them as work goals. For example, top-of-mind awareness (first mention rate), which refers to the proportion of consumers who, when mentioning a certain product, think of the brand in that category first. To calculate the first mention rate, the method is to ask consumers in a survey: "When you mention a certain category (such as mobile phones or milk powder), which brand comes to mind first?" This indicator is considered an important measure of brand awareness, market position, and market share. Obviously, this indicator is a product of the "category thinking, brand expression" mindset. In fact, precisely because we all believe that consumers have this decision-making model, "positioning + penetration" has become the mainstream concept in the industry, and this is the traditional approach to brand growth. This marketing thinking requires companies to first choose a track (i.e., category) before starting a business, preferably one with large market capacity, fast growth, and still a blue ocean with no market competition (of course, such tracks almost no longer exist now, so they have to settle for second best); Then they need to do positioning to differentiate their brand from competitors and find a niche territory of their own. Next, companies must continuously strengthen their brand's advantage and influence in the category market through sustained advertising and channel distribution, and strive to increase the number and efficiency of customer touchpoints, thereby reminding more consumers of the brand's existence and winning the opportunity for consumers to choose them. However, this model seems flawless, but it cannot answer two questions: First, what are the considerations when consumers choose different categories? For example, why does a consumer decide to drink cola instead of herbal tea, juice, or other carbonated drinks? Why are cola, juice, and milk large categories with many people choosing them, while sparkling water, coconut juice, and plant milk are small categories? What are the reasons for the existence of small categories within the same industry? What are the differences in consumer choices? Should brands in small categories accept their fate? How can they expand the category market and promote more people to choose small categories? If we regard category as the core logic of consumer decision-making, this question is difficult to answer. Moreover, for brands in small categories, this logic has no guiding significance for marketing. Because merely occupying a category is not enough; the market size is too small. Second, what is the value and significance of building a brand? Is it just to occupy a category? "Category thinking, brand expression" can easily lead to a thinking trap, which is to regard becoming synonymous with a category as the ultimate goal of brand building. This way of thinking can lead us to mistakenly believe that a brand's sales come from the overall population and market size of the category, and that the brand's usefulness lies in grabbing the largest share from the category. This will cause the brand's energy to be completely limited by the category, and the brand can only function when consumers demand that category. But in reality, the value of a brand lies in its ability to transcend category limitations, attract people who were originally not interested in the category's products, and gain traffic and sales beyond the category. Just like consumers drink Coca-Cola, is it only because it is the first choice in the cola category? In fact, many people drink Coca-Cola not because they first decided to drink cola and then chose the Coca-Cola brand. Rather, they like the Coca-Cola brand and are moved by its "share happiness" spirit, so they choose to drink the cola category instead of juice or soda. If it weren't for the huge charm and value of the Coca-Cola brand, how could cola become a mainstream large category in the beverage market? For Coca-Cola, only promoting positioning-style slogans like "Drink cola, drink Coca-Cola," "Inventor of cola," "140 years of history, authentic cola" cannot attract consumers of juice and tea drinks to drink cola. Moreover, the thinking logic of category first, brand second has also led to a problem: the positioning school opposes brand extension. They believe that a brand can only represent one category. If a brand diversifies and launches products in multiple categories, it will cause consumer confusion. For example, Xiaomi should strive to become the representative of the mobile phone category, rather than launching Xiaomi TV, Xiaomi air conditioner, and many other categories. This way, consumers won't know what Xiaomi really represents, and when buying a phone, they won't consider the Xiaomi brand (don't laugh, don't think I'm talking nonsense; in 2015, a top domestic positioning expert indeed warned Lei Jun: "Xiaomi's strategy has deviated"). In fact, equating brand and category locks the brand into the category. First, this causes the brand's business to come entirely from the category, and the category size is the upper limit of growth, the brand's ceiling. In this way, the brand can only share the same fate as the category's life cycle; when the category declines or falls, the brand can only follow suit. Just like Gree Group, which has emphasized "Good air conditioners, made by Gree" for many years, has encountered growth difficulties, while Midea Group, which has diversified, has been able to usher in a second spring. Second, once the cognition of a single-category brand is formed and consumer cognition is solidified, it will greatly limit brand extension and commercial possibilities. If Xiaomi only positions itself as a mobile phone category, then it cannot make cars. If consumers only think Xiaomi = mobile phones, then no one will buy Xiaomi cars. Since this model has significant limitations, we must return to the essence and rethink the consumer decision-making model. In fact, the real consumer decision-making model is "scenario thinking, label cognition, brand expression." Let's still use buying beverages as an example. When consumers buy beverages, they first consider the consumption scenario. For example, in the morning breakfast scenario, what type of beverage will consumers buy? The answer is "nutritional beverages," and categories and brands with the "nutrition" label, such as Telunsu milk, Weiquan Daily C juice, and OATLY oat milk, are perfect choices. Even if a consumer loves cola, they probably won't drink cola with baozi and youtiao early in the morning. Cola does not have the "nutrition" label and is therefore not suitable for the breakfast scenario. Another example is the afternoon tea scenario. Whether colleagues in the office meet up to relax with a drink or girlfriends gather for a drink, consumers need "hedonic beverages." Whether it's ordering milk tea categories like Heytea, Naixue Tea, or Chagee, or having a can of Coca-Cola or Sprite, it's all very suitable. There is also the office and meeting scenario. To avoid drowsiness and improve efficiency, consumers will choose "refreshing beverages," such as coffee brands like Luckin, Starbucks, Nestlé, or energy drinks like Red Bull, all of which fall into this category. Consumers will first consider their consumption scenario, and then decide which category to choose; scenario precedes category. Then, consumers will decide which brand to buy based on the labels different brands carry; labels define brand cognition. Scenario and label together constitute the consumer's decision-making foundation and establish the association between brand and consumer. Scenario is associated with the consumer's life scenarios and specific tasks to be done, representing the problems consumers need to solve in life; it determines what kind of products consumers will have demand for. Label is associated with consumer cognition, representing how consumers think about and understand the value of different categories and brands; it determines which solution that fits self-cognition and identity consumers will ultimately choose to complete life tasks and solve their problems. In the article "Consumer Journey," I said that doing marketing is two things: one is to stimulate demand, and the other is to influence decisions. Scenario stimulates demand, labels influence decisions. "Scenario + label" is a complete brand marketing model, constituting a new brand growth path. Enterprises should design brand strategy around scenarios and labels. Occupying a category is actually a typical enclosure-style business logic. It is very suitable for the development stage when the market is full of blank spaces, and companies only need to produce good products and keep up with production to quickly increase volume. But when the market matures and becomes saturated, category thinking easily hits bottlenecks and growth encounters difficulties. Because category thinking only cares about how to cut a piece of cake from the existing market size, it does not have the ability to make the cake bigger. It can only satisfy consumers' existing demand for category products, but cannot create new demand. So this model, which can only obtain stock but cannot create increment, and is only based on dividing the cake by category, I call it stock growth. For brands in new/small categories, the dilemma is that the consumer group purchasing this category is limited, niche, and effective user demand is insufficient. When the category's own scale is limited, the growth that can be achieved by merely occupying the category is extremely limited. At this time, the focus of brand marketing is not just to occupy the category, but to expand the scale and stimulate more people's demand for the category. To this end, the brand needs to first build a scenario, create consumer demand through the scenario, and stimulate consumers' interest and consumption awareness in the brand. For brands in mature/large categories, although the market size of the category is large enough, and the brand seems to only need to occupy the category and divide market share, in reality, many industries and category markets today are saturated, entering the stock era or even shrinking. If brands want to continue to grow, they can only engage in fierce red ocean competition, with increasing marketing investment and increasingly poor sales results. In fact, at this time, if brands want to break through bottlenecks and continue to grow, they must expand new scenarios. New scenarios create new demand, and new demand brings new growth. To summarize, there are two paths for brand growth— One is called stock growth. The approach is to choose and occupy a category, capture the category's existing consumer group and market size; by increasing brand penetration, make the brand the first choice for users in that category, thereby obtaining the largest market share. The other is called incremental growth. The approach is to open up more new consumption scenarios, activate and create new demand, and obtain more new consumer groups; then, by labeling, establish the association between the brand and the scenario, increase the priority of being chosen, and thereby influence user decisions. Stock growth is a cake-dividing model, obtaining category share growth, and dividing a larger market share from the category track. Incremental growth is a cake-making model, obtaining mind-share track growth, and finding new business opportunities in consumers' lives. A brand's industry, product attributes, and development stage are different, so it should choose different growth models. If the category market is large enough and grows rapidly and sustainably, then the brand can choose stock growth and divide a larger market share. But if the category scale is not large enough, or the market is saturated and no longer growing, the brand must find ways to seek increment. Since this article uses buying beverages as an example to illustrate consumer decision-making models and corresponding marketing tactics and growth paths, let's now look at a real beverage brand case. OATLY, a globally popular oat milk brand, was once a sensation in China and was sought after by many consumers. However, when OATLY first entered the Chinese market, it was extremely difficult. In 2018, OATLY first entered China, initially settling in the premium supermarket Ole', but sales were extremely dismal, selling only 1-2 boxes a day. OATLY tried traditional FMCG store customer acquisition methods such as having promoters recommend, free tastings, buy-one-get-one, and free gifts, but at most sold 7-8 boxes a day. At that time, David Zhang, President of OATLY Asia, who had just introduced the brand to China, spent many afternoons squatting at the Ole' supermarket in Jing'an Kerry Centre in Shanghai, looking at the unusually quiet shelves, and his heart was gradually filled with anxiety and doubt. Zhang Chun recalled in a media interview: "Such a 'neither fish nor fowl' product, even in the supermarket, we didn't know where to put it on the shelf because there was no such category! Count it as a beverage, put it with cola? Count it as a dairy product, put it with boxed milk? Or put it with soy milk? It seems none of these are right." He also gave the product to friends to taste and asked for their opinions. At that time, some people tasted it and asked him to take it away quickly, saying they couldn't get used to the taste; another friend said: "Isn't this just foreign soy milk? Chinese soy milk sells for 3 yuan, you can sell it for at most 5 yuan." [2] (OATLY's 1L product sells for 48 yuan, and a 250ml box sells for more than 10 yuan) The main reason for OATLY's dilemma was that "oat milk" was an extremely niche category, or a blank market. In this case, positioning itself as the "leading oat milk brand" or "first choice for plant milk" according to category thinking was meaningless, because consumers didn't have this category in their minds at all. Although Chinese people have a habit of drinking soy milk, there is no concept of "plant milk" in consumers' minds. Forcibly promoting plant milk creates a barrier to understanding. Moreover, if consumers understand OATLY from the perspective of soy milk and form the cognition of "foreign soy milk," it would be devastating, after all, OATLY's price is there. OATLY also tried to compare itself to milk and position itself as "new milk" or "grass milk," and even created a Chinese character by adding a grass radical to the character "milk." But this didn't help much, because milk's position in Chinese consumers' minds is unshakable. "A pound of milk a day strengthens the Chinese people" is almost a memory of a generation's growth. It's hard to convince consumers that oat milk is better than milk or has higher nutritional value. Moreover, if milk is used as the pricing anchor for oat milk, OATLY would be completely defeated. Of course, OATLY could also follow the traditional path and push hard, launching large-scale advertising campaigns to promote the benefits and taste of oat milk, increase natural brand awareness, establish a fashionable and high-quality brand image, and then vigorously distribute products, enter channels, and do displays and activities in stores. But this approach requires extremely high marketing expenses nowadays, and it's difficult to sell through and slow to see results. Zhang Chun also said about this: "Actually, it's simple to push hard. Follow the traditional approach, put it in thousands of large supermarkets, put it in various related health product counters, even if each store sells 2 bottles a day, you can complete the task, but that's not what this brand should do." [3] After hitting walls everywhere, after some exploration and reflection, OATLY took a different path and chose boutique coffee shops as the entry point, taking the first step from the coffee scenario. At that time, OATLY had a product called "Barista," which sold relatively well, and the team recognized its product strength. Using this product to make coffee not only made the taste richer and more outstanding, but also made it easier to make latte art. This is because it has good foaming properties, high heat stability, and the oat milk flavor is low-key and bland, which better highlights the coffee's aroma. Compared to milk and other plant milks, it is an excellent choice for making lattes. So, OATLY sent more than half of its staff to negotiate with boutique coffee shops in Shanghai one by one, persuading them to use OATLY to make lattes; then told consumers that they could upgrade their traditional latte to an oat latte for just an additional 3-4 yuan. The cooperation with boutique coffee shops brought several obvious benefits— For consumers, they could drink a special good coffee with just a slight price increase (boutique coffee prices are generally higher), with excellent taste and aroma, and it was easy to accept. For coffee shops, first, it brought additional income; second, the uniquely flavored oat latte became the coffee shop's signature product, and the healthy, balanced, and sustainable concepts advocated by OATLY enhanced the coffee shop's image and tone; whether OATLY was present even became a "status symbol" for boutique coffee shops. So coffee shops flocked to it, not only recommending each other, but even scrambling to become OATLY partners, sweeping away its Asian inventory, and even continuously raising prices. During some high-consumption festivals, the market transfer price once rose to over 100 yuan per liter [4]. For OATLY, there were at least four benefits. First, OATLY required brand exposure and product display in partner coffee shops, which increased brand exposure and established consumers' initial awareness of the brand. Second, when coffee shops recommended the price-upgrade to consumers, if consumers asked "why," the barista could naturally introduce OATLY's story, brand philosophy, and the product advantages of oat milk, further leaving a deep impression on consumers. Third, boutique coffee shops themselves have a higher price range, which helps enhance OATLY's brand image and price anchor, making consumers more accepting of OATLY's pricing and recognizing it as a relatively high-end product. Fourth, this move greatly reduced the trial cost for new users. Consumers didn't have to go to the supermarket to buy OATLY and take it home; they could experience it by spending a few more yuan at a coffee shop. This reduced the resistance to new product promotion and also avoided fierce competition in traditional retail channels. OATLY's cooperation with coffee shops achieved multiple goals at once. OATLY gained sales, brand exposure, awareness improvement, and image building. This approach was a great success. In April 2018, OATLY had only a few partner coffee shops, but by the end of 2018, the number reached over a thousand. Internally, OATLY called this approach the "Three Ones Strategy"— That is, focusing on "one product": Barista oat milk. The name was originally literally translated as "barista," but Zhang Chun added a "big" character to it, calling it "coffee master." "One city": Shanghai. Shanghai has the strongest coffee culture in China and a scale of boutique coffee shops, and these coffee shops are often "internet-famous check-in spots" in Shanghai, which helps expand the market and radiate to the whole country; in addition, Shanghai also gathers many international companies, with the largest number of foreigners and returned overseas students, making it easier to accept OATLY. "One market": coffee lovers. This audience is very compatible with OATLY's brand characteristics, and they also understand fashion best, have their own personality and attitude, and are leaders in consumption trends. For OATLY, coffee shops are not just a new channel. OATLY is not directly selling its finished oat milk in coffee shops, but selling it as part of coffee. Coffee shops are actually a consumption scenario, just like ready-to-drink, pairing with breakfast, and making coffee at home are all consumption scenarios for OATLY. Many consumers have the habit of using dairy products at home to make milk tea, fruit smoothies, lattes, and other drinks and foods. With the demonstration of oat lattes in boutique coffee shops, it helps drive OATLY's home scenario consumption. The success in boutique coffee shops attracted the attention of leading coffee chain brands in the industry and also helped OATLY gain the capital and opportunity to cooperate with them. On Earth Day 2020, Starbucks joined hands with OATLY and Beyond Meat to launch the "GOODGOOD Star Diet" initiative, advocating a green and environmentally friendly lifestyle, and launched three new products: oat latte, oat matcha latte, and berry oat black tea macchiato [5]. As of April 2021, Starbucks sold 62 million cups of oat coffee in one year, making oat milk a fashionable symbol of middle-class consumption, becoming the favorite fashion item for white-collar workers and the middle class, symbolizing a healthy and self-disciplined lifestyle. OATLY thus broke out of its circle. Coffee chain giants such as Luckin, Cotti, Pacific Coffee, McCafé, and Kcoffee all began to feature OATLY; new tea beverage brands such as Heytea and Naixue Tea also launched oat series products. As of the end of 2020, OATLY had entered more than 10,000 coffee shops and tea shops nationwide, sweeping the entire new consumption circle. To strengthen its influence, OATLY also launched a barista growth program starting in 2020, training more than 200 students within half a year to help them improve their skills, broaden their horizons, and promote communication. Moreover, OATLY also provided professional barista training for hearing-impaired youth through the "Silent Barista" project, successfully helping more than 20 "silent baristas" find stable jobs and start their careers that year. This public welfare project not only influenced industry companies and institutions but also built a platform for in-depth communication with baristas. Centering on the coffee origin scenario, OATLY quickly gained reputation and word-of-mouth, found a market breakthrough, and not only gradually achieved scale growth, with e-commerce and retail fully opening up, but also helped the brand complete its start from 0 to 1. Consumers gradually formed awareness of OATLY and oat milk, and gradually defined the plant protein beverage category. In May 2021, OATLY successfully listed on Nasdaq. As of July 2024, OATLY has entered more than 100,000 coffee shops in China; from 2018 to 2023, OATLY sold a total of 1 billion cups of oat coffee in the Chinese market. Of course, OATLY has not been smooth sailing since then. After creating the coffee scenario, where is OATLY's next scenario, and how to continue to drive brand growth? We will leave this topic for the scenario map section. OATLY was born in 1994, originally developed by Swedish food scientist Rickard Öste as a dairy substitute for people with lactose intolerance, but it was lukewarm in its first 20 years. Until 2012, Toni Petersson took over as CEO and formulated a more aggressive marketing strategy for OATLY. From then on, OATLY changed its appearance and opened a new chapter of sweeping Europe and the United States and moving toward the world. This strategy was to challenge milk and stand on the opposite side of milk. OATLY's advertising slogans were called "It's like milk, but made for humans" and "WOW NO COW!" In addition, it also printed representative copy such as "No milk, no harm," "Yes, we are vegetarians, so what about you?" "Animals all drink the milk of their own kind, why do only humans drink the milk of other animals?" on product packaging and outdoor advertisements. OATLY did this to emphasize that it is more environmentally friendly, occupies less land, consumes less water resources, and emits only 1/5 of the greenhouse gases produced by milk production, and causes less pollution to the environment. Moreover, oat milk is purely vegetarian, lower in fat than milk, has more dietary fiber, and can avoid osteoporosis caused by excessive intake of animal protein. By binding with the popular environmentalism and vegetarianism concepts in Europe, OATLY began to attack traditional dairy products as not environmentally friendly, unhealthy, and not advanced. The milk we have drunk for decades may not be so suitable for humans. As a result, OATLY's new target group was no longer lactose intolerant people, but the middle-class consumer groups in Europe with strong environmental awareness. It defined its users as the "Post Milk Generation." Because environmental protection is a very mainstream ideology in Europe and there are a large number of vegetarians, OATLY achieved great success. This approach naturally caused dissatisfaction among dairy companies. OATLY was first sued by the Swedish Dairy Association for defaming milk and implying that milk is unhealthy. The lawsuit ultimately ended with OATLY losing; later, the lawsuit went to the European Court of Justice, and OATLY was prohibited by the EU Intellectual Property Office from registering trademarks with words like "Milk" and "Creamy," because non-dairy products cannot use dairy-related terms in marketing. Although OATLY barely won the lawsuit in 2021, in 2024 a UK court again ruled that OATLY could not use marketing slogans such as "Post Milk Generation" on its products, nor could it give products names with the character "milk." However, although it lost the lawsuit, OATLY won sales. After losing the lawsuit in Sweden in 2015, OATLY's local sales directly increased by 45% [6]. Although OATLY was widely sought after in Europe with this strategy, it obviously could not be copied to China for the reasons mentioned above: Chinese consumers have a deep-rooted understanding of milk, environmental protection is not a mainstream consumption concept in China, and there are extremely strong dairy companies in China. So OATLY took a different route in China. When OATLY entered the US market in 2016, it also used this strategy, cooperating with North American internet-famous coffee shops such as Intelligentsia and La Colombe, promoting oat coffee drinks with baristas and KOLs, and appearing on Starbucks' menu. In Europe, OATLY's strategy is called "VS milk," and the labels it gives itself are environmental protection, vegetarianism, and health; while in China, OATLY's strategy is "& coffee," and the labels it gives itself are fashion, self-discipline, and trendy items. I once selected OATLY as my best marketing case of 2021 on my public account. OATLY's practice is a thinking template: Categories are limited by product attributes and have their own limitations and ceilings. When the category restricts the brand's imagination and hands and feet, finding new growth opportunities through scenarios and breaking through consumers' cognitive limitations through labels is a practical path, and it is of great reference significance to many enterprises. Marketers like to talk about "mind share," but creating a positioning-style slogan and investing heavily to make the brand the first choice in a certain category is obviously not occupying mind share; at best, it is occupying the category. To occupy mind share, first, through scenarios, the brand must find a place in consumers' lives and become part of users' lives; second, around the needs and thoughts of users in the scenario, design labels for the brand, turn the product into consumers' identity and decision-making standard, and then become part of social culture. Only when the brand integrates into life scenarios and forms or changes user cognition can we say that the brand has occupied mind share. In 1998, when Buffett talked about his classic investment case, See's Candies, he mentioned a viewpoint: "Mind share" is greater than "market share." We usually understand the track as industry and category, and judge whether a track has entry or investment value through category size, growth rate, and market share of different brands. If you see OATLY only as "oat milk" and "plant-based," then you will think this track has no imagination and will soon encounter growth bottlenecks; but if you see the many consumption scenarios of oat milk such as coffee, tea drinks, accompanying meals, and homemade drinks at home, and see the environmental label and fashion symbol, then OATLY has broad imagination space. Similarly, under category thinking, when we look at the beverage track, coconut juice, sparkling water, and plant protein beverages are standard small categories with small market size and little development potential. But switching to scenario and label thinking to look at the beverage track, discovering more beverage consumption scenarios in life such as outdoor camping, CityWalk, office meetings, afternoon tea, barbecue and hot pot, social leisure, and understanding consumers' cognition and demand for nutritional beverages, refreshing beverages, fashionable leisure beverages, and healthy beverages, then you will see different market opportunities. The real track is not in the category but in consumers' lives; it is not the category position, but the position the brand occupies in consumers' lives. Only by continuously opening up and occupying new consumption scenarios, increasing the frequency of appearing in consumers' lives, and continuously changing user cognition through labels, increasing the intensity of consumer demand in that scenario, can a brand truly open up the market and expand market capacity. Seize scenarios and labels, open up new tracks in consumers' minds, and expand mind share. Mind share is not category share, but life share and cultural share. "Scenario + label" is a broader growth path and a more imaginative source of increment.