壹 1Target: 3 years, 10 times growth, 100 billion yuan. At the 2016 Lianshang.com Conference and Global Retail Innovation Summit on April 8, 2016, Tmall Supermarket General Manager A Jian said: "Tmall Supermarket exceeded 10 billion yuan in 2015, with a growth rate of about 4 times per year. We are very confident that after 2018, we will become China's largest supermarket, or the largest hypermarket, whether online or offline, because the largest offline player now is the China Resources group, with total sales of over 100 billion yuan. We are very confident that we will surpass them in 2018 and become China's largest hypermarket." In other words, Tmall Supermarket aims to become China's largest supermarket by 2018, with a sales target exceeding 100 billion yuan. On July 14, 2016, Jiang Pan, the new head of Tmall Supermarket, made his first public appearance and announced the "Double 20 Billion Plan," boldly claiming that by 2018, Tmall Supermarket would become the largest supermarket both online and offline. Tmall Supermarket's sales would easily exceed 100 billion yuan within three years, and it would definitely turn a profit within five years, striving to achieve profitability within three years. Tmall Supermarket plans to achieve 10 times growth in 3 years, with sales exceeding 100 billion yuan, and also strive for profitability. Two consecutive general managers of Tmall Supermarket have the same goal, and I believe this is not an empty boast. Why such accelerated development, and the attempt to achieve profitability within 3 years? Is the operational logic reasonable? This is the focus of this article. 贰 2Strategic Level: Tmall Supermarket as an Offensive Tool In the definition of Alibaba CEO Daniel Zhang, Tmall Supermarket is the fourth "consumer platform" alongside Taobao, Tmall, and Juhuasuan. This means Tmall Supermarket is on par with Tmall, and in terms of organizational structure, I believe it is also the case, at most half a level lower, but both should report to Daniel Zhang. Such emphasis must have its reasons. Reason 1: Increase traffic category penetration. Alibaba's e-commerce platform traffic has reached a bottleneck, and there is an urgent need to expand traffic sources. FMCG is a high-frequency traffic category, but the online retail penetration rate is too low, which also indicates potential. For e-commerce platforms, online supermarkets are a must-attack project, with high repurchase rates and being a major source of traffic. Tmall Supermarket has been in trial operation for 5 years, and in 2016, it is preparing to launch a large-scale attack on offline supermarkets. Reason 2: The battle for first-tier cities. At the beginning of 2016, Alibaba Group CEO Daniel Zhang mentioned at an internal meeting called "Creating Change for the Future" that globalization, rural areas, and first-tier cities are Alibaba's three tough battles in 2016. Zhang said: "As everyone knows, there is a project in the Taobao system called 'All the Way North.' 'All the Way North' is just a code name, not meaning we only attack the north. In first-tier cities, China's big cities are just the standard top ten. We must, in these top ten cities, benchmark against the user needs of these cities, benchmark against the user experience in these places, and be able to occupy the Mind Share of users in these places, thereby occupying the Market Share of these places. This is a tough battle." Tmall Supermarket is the vanguard or main force in the battle for the top ten cities, with Beijing being the first battle in the city offensive. In 2015, Alibaba announced its full entry into the supermarket sector, and Tmall Supermarket began subsidizing Beijing users with 1 billion yuan starting in July. According to official data from Tmall Supermarket, within just one week, sales in the Beijing region increased by 740% year-on-year, with 90% of transactions coming from mobile. The success of the Beijing pilot established confidence and a foundation for Tmall Supermarket's 2016 offensive in the top ten cities. In July 2016, the "Double 20 Billion Plan" was launched: 2 billion yuan to continue subsidizing consumers, and 2 billion yuan for supply chain, product structure, and service upgrades. In the second half of the year, Tmall Supermarket will launch an overall offensive, with the core attack target being offline supermarkets (especially hypermarkets). Reason 3: The battle to intercept JD.com. Starting in 2015, JD.com strategically focused on the supermarket sector. In 2015, JD.com made efforts, not only with JD Supermarket but also with significant investments in Fruit Day and Yonghui Fresh. In 2016, the No. 1 project "New Channel" also had FMCG as its core category, planning integrated cold chain, and establishing a fresh food division. Liu Qiangdong chose to attack the supermarket sector because the high-frequency consumer market (more delivery times) is more conducive to leveraging JD's logistics advantages, or reducing logistics capacity risks. JD's logistics capacity surplus has become prominent, with JD's warehouse area reaching 23 million square meters. As of December 31, 2015, JD had nearly 110,000 employees, 80% of whom were warehouse and delivery personnel. What to do with JD's excess logistics capacity? @Force third-party POP merchants to convert to self-operated merchants. @Entice third-party POP merchants into the warehouse. What will this bring? The contradiction between JD and its suppliers will worsen. Tmall Supermarket benchmarking against JD Supermarket naturally involves price wars, subsidy wars, and interception wars. The fiercer the fight, the higher the online supermarket sales, but the greater JD's losses. This long-term loss problem is a hurdle for Liu Qiangdong. Based on the above three points, Tmall Supermarket is a strategic offensive weapon in Alibaba's retail camp, capable of operating at a loss in the short term, or even not making money in the long term to drag down competitors. In short, Tmall Supermarket should not be underestimated; it is a sharp weapon for Alibaba. 叁 3Tmall Supermarket Attempts New Business Models. Agency Operation Model A Jian, former general manager of Tmall Supermarket, said: "The initial business model was that Blue Fire Wing acted as the retailer at the front end, the Taobao platform provided traffic in the middle, and suppliers were at the back end. But at that time, the concepts of retailer and platform were not clearly defined." This is the agency operation model, where Blue Fire Wing is the agency company specializing in Tmall Supermarket; Taobao is the platform, responsible for providing traffic and endorsing Blue Fire Wing; suppliers supply goods to Blue Fire Wing, and the two have a trade relationship. This is essentially similar to JD's self-operated model, both being B2C trade relationships. The difference is that Alibaba artificially outsourced the entire Tmall Supermarket to a third party for agency operation, so the financial relationship changed: in the self-operated model, JD issues invoices to consumers; in the agency model, Blue Fire Wing issues invoices to consumers. The roles of Blue Fire Wing and Alibaba are different, and their perspectives also differ. As a platform, Alibaba hopes Tmall Supermarket can innovate and take new paths, while Blue Fire Wing, as an agency operator, hopes to profit from it, making long-term goals difficult to achieve. This agency model was inherently unsustainable. Tmall Supermarket closed after the 2011 Double 11 warehouse overflow, exposing many problems, and temporarily shut down for reorganization. After relaunching, Tmall Supermarket changed its business model, insisting on operating in a pure platform manner, and Blue Fire Wing gradually faded out. Learning the Department Store Joint Operation Model At the 2016 Lianshang.com Conference and Global Retail Innovation Summit, Tmall Supermarket General Manager A Jian emphasized Tmall Supermarket's business model: "1. We provide consumers with a one-stop B2C experience, which is not much different from JD, No. 1 Store, and offline supermarkets, because we provide unified warehouse and distribution services, unified checkout, and unified invoices. 2. But for merchants, we still operate in a platform model. What does that mean? Merchants first settle in Tmall Supermarket, for example, P&G settles in Tmall Supermarket, and at the same time puts P&G's goods into our warehouse. They participate in our marketing and promotions, they are responsible for the price of the goods, and they are responsible for inventory. We do not have the action of production and sales. Our entire business model is still based on commission. For example, if P&G sells a product here, I charge them a commission, and the rest is settled to them. That's how we do it." According to Jiang Pan: "Tmall Supermarket is now 'platform-style self-operation,' which is different from both general self-operation and consignment." Traditional physical supermarkets mainly use consignment and self-operation models, while Tmall Supermarket is learning the joint operation model of traditional department stores: the platform and suppliers jointly operate, with suppliers having pricing power (opposite to physical supermarkets), promotion rights, and product rights (product editing and inventory arrangement). The platform is responsible for invoicing, warehouse distribution, and after-sales service. The joint operation model, which has been criticized in the department store industry, is being used by Tmall in the supermarket industry, which is indeed interesting. Suppliers Become Deep Cooperation Partners In traditional supermarkets, most suppliers are only responsible for supplying goods, while the hypermarket is responsible for pricing and promotions; in Tmall Supermarket, suppliers are not only responsible for supplying goods but also have pricing and promotion rights. By giving pricing and promotion rights to suppliers, suppliers become deep cooperation partners with retail functions. This is a change in business model. Tmall Supermarket does not have front-end and back-end gross margins, only platform sales commissions (the 2017 fiscal year Tmall Supermarket sales commission has been announced); Tmall Supermarket's settlement cycle is only 10 days, while physical hypermarkets generally have a payment period of 45-60 days, and actual 90-day payment periods also exist. Changes in the payment period may directly reflect in the retail price of goods; the shorter the payment period, the more favorable the price. After several years of trial operation, Tmall Supermarket has begun to make efforts to plan for 3 years, 10 times growth, and 100 billion yuan, which may indicate a fact: Tmall Supermarket's practice in business models should be relatively complete, at least Alibaba believes the direction is correct. This is a major event in the supermarket sector. Physical supermarkets should not underestimate it! Because suppliers may supply both physical supermarkets and Tmall Supermarket simultaneously. One sells for others, and one sells on Tmall Supermarket itself, which may lead to a situation of left hand fighting right hand. 肆 4Tmall Supermarket's Operational Logic Some operational data I (Yun Yangzi) have been tracking Taobao for 7 years, and after long-term verification, Alibaba's public operational data is basically credible. 1) Regarding sales: 2015 Tmall Supermarket 10 billion yuan (data source: public speech by former general manager A Jian, credible). 2014 Tmall Supermarket 2.5 billion yuan (former general manager A Jian said "2015 Tmall Supermarket sales maintained 4 times growth," and current general manager Jiang Pan said in public in 2016 "last year Tmall Supermarket sales increased more than three times," "last year Tmall Supermarket orders doubled," proving they are the same statement.) 2016 expected Tmall Supermarket 40 billion yuan (current general manager Jiang Pan said in an interview with Business Observer in 2016: "This year, Tmall Supermarket sales should double from the current base. Last year's 'Double 11,' Tmall Supermarket orders exceeded one million, and this year orders should grow exponentially.") Yun Yangzi's interpretation: In 2016, Tmall Supermarket sales in the range of 30-40 billion yuan are reasonable. Setting a target of 40 billion yuan indicates high self-requirements, and it is also possible to achieve. 2) Regarding average order value: Jiang Pan's public statement in 2016: "Tmall Supermarket's current average order value is 100-200 yuan, the highest in the e-commerce supermarket field, more than double that of traditional supermarkets." Yun Yangzi's interpretation: For a large online supermarket positioned for the mass market, the current average order value is generally in the 100-150 yuan range. Based on Jiang Pan's context, it is more likely that Tmall Supermarket's average order value in 2016 is in the 130-150 yuan range. This average order value means that most categories in the online supermarket can make money. 3) Regarding UV traffic: A Jian's public statement in 2016: "Currently, the entrance to Tmall Supermarket is through Mobile Taobao and Tmall. With such a small entrance, daily visiting users have already exceeded 10 million." Yun Yangzi's interpretation: 10 million UV per day is credible, but the ratio of mobile to PC visitors is unknown because the conversion rates differ significantly. 4) Regarding inventory turnover period: Jiang Pan's public statement in 2016: "We require merchants to improve to an inventory turnover period of within 60 days. Those who do not meet the target will be charged warehouse overdue and excess storage fees according to the contract. In the future, from now on, we require all merchants of Tmall Supermarket to work with us to achieve an inventory turnover period of within 30 days." Yun Yangzi's interpretation: Tmall Supermarket's current inventory turnover period is 60 days, with a target of within 30 days, close to hypermarket standards. There is a lot of room for improvement, and operational efficiency can be doubled. 5) Regarding warehouse capacity: Jiang Pan's public statement in 2016: "Tmall Supermarket's Cainiao dedicated warehouses have 11 regional warehouses, with a total area of nearly one million square meters. Before the third quarter of this year, Tmall Supermarket's Cainiao dedicated warehouses will open 8 more large warehouses, upgrading the national total to 19 large warehouses." Yun Yangzi's interpretation: Note that the third quarter completion means there will be high-intensity battles in the supermarket sector in the second half of the year, which will affect price wars among hypermarkets, community supermarkets, and online supermarkets. 6) Regarding employee count: Jiang Pan's public statement in 2016: "Tmall Supermarket strives to have only '108 heroes' as employees; currently, Tmall's small second-level staff is only over 100 people." Yun Yangzi's interpretation: Tmall Supermarket's customer service is outsourced to a third-party company, Blue Fire Wing, so it is possible to have only a hundred people. 7) Regarding repurchase rate: Jiang Pan's public statement in 2016: "Tmall Supermarket's next-month repurchase rate has reached 38%, and the three-month repurchase rate has reached 55%, and this data is still continuously improving." Yun Yangzi's interpretation: The repurchase rate is based on active users. Among users who logged in this month, 38% made a purchase the next month, and 55% made a purchase within three months; this indicates good traffic quality, and visitors are customers. If expressed as 30-day repurchase rate and 7-day repurchase rate, it would show Tmall Supermarket's user stickiness and purchase frequency. Merchant Recruitment: Global Sourcing In March 2016, Tmall launched a dual import channel strategy of cross-border import + general import. Overseas merchants can either settle in Tmall Global or adopt a general trade model to settle in Tmall Supermarket. On July 15, 2016, Tmall Global announced exclusive strategic alliances with 20 global supermarket chains including Sainsbury's and Costco. The 20 global chain supermarkets that reached upgraded exclusive strategic cooperation with Tmall Global all come from popular import countries such as Europe, America, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, and are among the largest supermarket groups in their respective countries. They include US Costco, Germany Metro, UK Sainsbury's, Spain Dia, Netherlands Albert Heijn, Italy Coop, iper, Eurospin, Japan AEON, Fresta, South Korea emart, lottemart, Thailand Kingpower, Australia Woolworths, metcash, New Zealand Countdown, etc. Among them, 90% of the global supermarkets are entering the Chinese market for the first time, as a core strategy to boost global performance. Tmall Supermarket's business model is the joint operation model, which is conducive to the settlement and operation of the above 20 overseas supermarkets, truly achieving global sourcing. In future consumer communication, it is easy to form a perception: Tmall Supermarket has global sourcing and everything you need. Perception leads to behavior, and in the future, consumers are likely to make Tmall Supermarket their first choice for supermarket shopping. This is not a concept; Tmall Supermarket is already on the way to achieving it. Tmall Supermarket does not recruit Taobao brands; it only recruits two types of domestic brands: one is national mainstream brands in the FMCG industry, and the other is regional advantageous brands. One point worth high attention is that half of Tmall Supermarket's products are directly supplied by brand owners. This is very powerful, meaning that in the future, brand owners will have more and more counterattacks against physical supermarkets regarding the contradiction between suppliers and retailers, especially the strong position of hypermarkets will begin to weaken. Operations: Localized Operations Tmall Supermarket has global sourcing, so operations must be localized. This is also the consensus of online supermarket operators. How to localize is a big question. The localization of physical supermarkets is opening stores; the localization of online supermarkets is zoning + building warehouses. In May 2016, Tmall Supermarket announced that its localized operations capability would expand from five cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hangzhou) to 11 cities. At the same time, Cainiao Network's warehouse and distribution system was upgraded from 8 regional warehouses to 11 regional warehouses. Currently, Tmall Supermarket's Cainiao dedicated warehouses have 11 regional warehouses, with a total area of nearly one million square meters. Before the third quarter of this year, Tmall Supermarket's Cainiao dedicated warehouses will open 8 more large warehouses, upgrading the national total to 19 large warehouses, and upgrading localized operations from 11 cities to 31 cities, gradually serving the whole country. At the logistics level, Tmall Supermarket and the Cainiao Alliance will continue to use the "warehouse + local delivery" model. This model is a characteristic of Tmall Supermarket, which establishes warehouse distribution centers in core node cities, integrates local delivery companies with strong service capabilities, and radiates to surrounding cities for delivery, to achieve the shortest path and fastest delivery efficiency. Relying on the Cainiao Alliance's distribution system, Tmall Supermarket has achieved same-day and next-day delivery in nearly 700 districts and counties nationwide, with a delivery success rate of 99%, far higher than the industry average. One feeling: the development speed is so fast! A major battle in the supermarket sector is inevitable. The rapid development of localized operations means greater challenges and opportunities for Tmall Supermarket. Promotions: Price Wars Since July last year, Tmall Supermarket has invested over 1 billion yuan in consumer subsidies, quickly making it the largest online supermarket in China. Jiang Pan said in 2016 that Tmall Supermarket would continue to invest heavily, launching the "Double 20 Billion Plan": 2 billion yuan to continue subsidizing consumers, and 2 billion yuan for supply chain, product structure, and service upgrades. From this perspective, last year the platform subsidized 1 billion yuan to achieve sales of 10 billion yuan, and in 2016, Tmall Supermarket will subsidize 4 billion yuan to achieve expected sales of 40 billion yuan, which is logical. In terms of consumer subsidies, Tmall Supermarket will continue to play the low-price card: red envelopes, full reduction, compensation for price differences, product subsidies, buy two get one free, and other activities to maintain Tmall Supermarket's most competitive price in the market. Summary: From the operational data and current situation of Tmall Supermarket, even if the average order value does not increase, there is room for UV traffic to grow several times, and the conversion rate also has room to double. Localized operations and global sourcing can be initially completed. 3 years, 10 times growth, and 100 billion yuan is not a problem at all, and the target can even be achieved one year ahead of schedule. Moreover, from Tmall Supermarket's commission points, it should be able to achieve a gross margin of about 20% (similar to physical hypermarkets), and the possibility of profitability within three years is still very high. 伍 5Tmall Supermarket's Impact on Physical Supermarkets Tmall Supermarket will have a significant impact on physical supermarkets in the coming years. The basic idea may be: Unite community supermarkets to eliminate hypermarkets! This also aligns with the development trend of physical supermarket formats, where community supermarkets will get better and hypermarkets will get more troublesome. Eliminating Hypermarkets Tmall Supermarket appears to hope to unite with hypermarkets, for example: Metro has settled in Tmall Supermarket. Tao Yuan, e-commerce general manager of Metro China, said that Metro and Alibaba will explore further cooperation projects in 2016, including deepening Tmall Supermarket, omni-channel integration, dual import channels (cross-border + general trade) distribution system, and introducing more advantageous categories. In the future, they may even replicate the successful model of this Chinese market experience with Alibaba to the global market. But uniting hypermarkets to settle in Tmall Supermarket is not logically feasible. Because of homogeneous competition, hypermarkets would fight at a loss, while Tmall Supermarket profits from commissions. The probability of well-known chain hypermarkets settling in Tmall Supermarket is very small. What we see with Metro is also walking on two legs: one leg settling in Tmall Supermarket, and the other building its own online mall, the so-called "one body, two wings" strategy. Physical chain hypermarkets and Tmall Supermarket, these two similar formats, have no basis for cooperation and can only compete directly. From a retail perspective, traditional hypermarkets are less convenient than community supermarkets, have less product diversity than online supermarkets, and find it difficult to have price advantages. In the next few years, in first- and second-tier cities, we are likely to see the shrinkage of the hypermarket format. Therefore, Tmall Supermarket's 2016 target of attacking first- and second-tier cities is very reasonable. In 2016, Walmart and JD.com formed a deep alliance, and RT-Mart and Gome united, clearly showing a sense of crisis. Many hypermarkets are doing O2O omni-channel, which is also a helpless move; they have no choice! Whether Tmall Supermarket can eliminate hypermarkets is another topic, but one of the main methods Tmall Supermarket may adopt is to unite community supermarkets. Uniting Community Supermarkets Tmall Supermarket's suppliers currently fall into roughly three categories: brand owners, distributors, and retailers. Currently, public information shows that brand owners account for half of the suppliers. Judging from the standard deduction rate of Tmall Supermarket in the 2017 fiscal year, with such a high commission rate, there should be few retailers. Therefore, Tmall Supermarket's suppliers are basically composed of brand owners and distributors. This is also common sense, after all, retailers (community supermarkets) are also competitors of Tmall Supermarket. Online supermarkets and community supermarkets are originally rivals. Comparing convenience, both have advantages and disadvantages. For planned shopping, online supermarkets are more convenient, delivering to home; for unplanned shopping, community supermarkets are more convenient, available at any time. Comparing prices, they can be similar, but online supermarkets can more easily express promotional advantages, causing consumers to perceive online supermarkets as more favorable; Comparing product diversity, online supermarkets have obvious advantages. Without considering age groups, overall, online supermarkets do have more advantages than community supermarkets; consumers will think online supermarkets have "more products, favorable prices, and home delivery." But the above is only a static view. Community supermarkets are not without means against online supermarkets. This is a watershed. If community supermarkets do not find means, online supermarkets (JD Supermarket and Tmall Supermarket) will maintain a high-pressure competitive state; if community supermarkets find means, because of different models, Tmall Supermarket will adopt a cooperative approach, while JD Supermarket will continue to maintain a competitive state. This means is whether community supermarkets can do O2O well. The integration of online and offline can leverage the respective advantages of community supermarkets and online supermarkets. Imagine: N community supermarkets + 1 online hypermarket is a powerful combination; community supermarkets can range from a few hundred square meters to a few thousand square meters, adapting to the community environment, and there is an online hypermarket in the air with everything. Community supermarkets doing O2O is definitely the right direction, and various factions will compete fiercely. China Resources Vanguard is one typical case. From a dynamic perspective, the future evolution process will be somewhat complex, but one conclusion is certain: Tmall Supermarket will unite small-scale chain community supermarkets and regional chain community supermarkets (for example, Guangzhou Shengjia). If not united, large physical retail companies will have the motivation to integrate and create a national chain community supermarket O2O, which would be a big trouble for Tmall Supermarket. From Tmall Supermarket's perspective, uniting community supermarkets to eliminate hypermarkets is in the common interest of both parties. The deduction method I use is not from the current perspective, but what may happen in the next few years; because it involves how Tmall Supermarket will do O2O in the future, and the competitive-cooperative relationship with community supermarkets still has some variables. In short, Tmall Supermarket's ultra-fast development of 3 years, 10 times growth, and 100 billion yuan will definitely turn the supermarket sector upside down and have a huge impact on the industry. Where will hypermarkets go? How will community supermarkets develop? What impact will it have on community convenience stores? These are questions the industry should consider.

Industry Expert Comments:

1. Zhang Chenyong (O2O Project Leader at a listed retail group, author of "Retail O2O: Mindset, Tactics, and Practice") Tmall Supermarket plans to exceed 100 billion yuan in three years and become the king of online and offline supermarkets. Zhang Yong said that Tmall Supermarket is positioned as a consumer platform alongside Taobao, Tmall, and Juhuasuan. The general manager of Tmall Supermarket is Jiang Pan, Vice President of Alibaba Group, and in 2016, it plans to invest 4 billion yuan in Tmall Supermarket. From the above, it is clear that Alibaba attaches great importance to Tmall Supermarket. I believe the most fundamental reason Alibaba values Tmall Supermarket so much is the recognition that the open platform model cannot dominate e-commerce, and the self-operated self-distribution model is the most suitable way to operate standard and high-frequency goods. Alibaba operates a large e-commerce ecosystem, and self-operated self-distribution is an indispensable part of the ecosystem. In addition, focusing investment on Tmall Supermarket can simultaneously attack JD.com and support Cainiao Network. Tmall Supermarket's previous rapid growth mainly relied on Taobao's traffic diversion and red envelope subsidies. Currently, Tmall Supermarket's daily UV has reached 10 million, which is already high. Whether Tmall Supermarket can reach the 100 billion scale in three years depends on the space for Taobao traffic diversion and the intensity of subsidies. If Tmall Supermarket reaches the 100 billion scale, it will have a significant impact on JD.com. JD's current self-operated business revenue is also over 100 billion yuan. Among its four major business divisions, the consumer goods division is at the tens of billions scale. JD's customers are mainly concentrated in first- and second-tier cities, relying on self-operated fast delivery to serve consumers and spread word of mouth. Tmall Supermarket's market is also mainly concentrated in first- and second-tier cities, also relying on self-operated self-distribution to attract consumers. Therefore, if Tmall Supermarket can achieve the 100 billion scale, it will inevitably seize JD's customers and market. Tmall Supermarket's average order value is 100-200 yuan, indicating that Tmall Supermarket mainly meets the demand for stock-up shopping. Consumers shop at Tmall Supermarket for the family's needs for a period of time. Hypermarkets are also retail formats that meet one-stop stock-up shopping needs. Apart from JD.com, the most impacted by Tmall Supermarket are hypermarkets. Convenience stores and individual supermarkets mainly meet convenience shopping needs, so they will not be impacted by Tmall Supermarket. For hypermarket decision-makers, paying attention to small formats and compressing hypermarkets is already a necessary strategic plan for the future. 2. Yuan Wai (Taobao O2O Operations Expert) Tmall Supermarket's city warehouses are sinking, delivery is immediate, achieving same-day delivery, and if refined further, two-hour delivery. But warehouse location has pressure. In addition, the demand for convenience and fresh food may be fulfilled by other businesses. For example: Taobao convenience stores, Hema Fresh. Author: Yun Yangzi (Deputy Director of Lianshang China Retail Research Center, Secretary-General of New Retail Advisory Group) At the request of many distributor friends, the fourth phase of the B-end e-commerce inspection class of this public platform will be held from August 15-18 to visit Nanjing and Hangzhou to inspect Qianmi Network and Alibaba Retail Link. Distributor friends interested in transformation can join us for on-site inspection: Activity process: Time: August 15-18

Nanjing·Hangzhou 15th: Check in at designated hotel in Nanjing; 16th: On-site inspection of Qianmi Network, then high-speed rail to Hangzhou in the afternoon; 17th: Participate in the "FMCG Distributor B2B Transformation Exchange Summit"; 18th: On-site inspection of Alibaba Retail Link in Hangzhou; Welcome distributor friends interested in transformation to join us to learn and inspect on-site: Organization Form ************1. Company visit

  1. Actual market case visit
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  3. One-on-one communication************ Participating distributor friends only need to pay a registration fee of 200 yuan Other expenses are self-covered Note: This inspection is limited to distributors only Distributor friends interested can long press the QR code below to register. When adding, please note: "Phase 4 Registration". Non-participants, please do not disturb Group photos from previous inspections: Phase 3 B-end e-commerce inspection group photo, from top to bottom: Yunbao Shangmeng, Weijie City Distribution, Wanshang Yizhan. Phase 2 B-end e-commerce inspection group photo, from top to bottom: Jinhuobao, Caiba, Yishang. Phase 1 B-end e-commerce inspection group photo, from top to bottom: Piduoduo, Beiquan, Yishang. -END- The best FMCG distributor learning platform in China Dedicated to providing enterprises and distributors Professional, practical, and useful tutorials Committed to helping Chinese FMCG distributors grow rapidly The most professional and practical knowledge base in the FMCG industry Reply with the red number below to get the corresponding content Reply with number 1 to view the complete knowledge base | 001 Excellent article selection | 002 Distributor market operations | 003 Terminal visit management | 004 Sales supervisor skills | 005 Sales improvement techniques | 006 Channel expansion | 007 Managing distributors | 008 Distributor development | 009 Distributor internal operations management | 010 Team management | 011 Efficient distribution techniques | 012 Sales manager's eighteen skills | 013 KA operation methods and strategies | 014 First lesson for new salespeople | 015 Internet, brand | 016 Distributor B2B transformation | [Long press QR code to follow]