Tingyi Holdings, known for its instant noodles, announced in a midday filing that its Q3 2015 revenue fell 6.45% year-on-year to $2.77 billion (approximately 17.7 billion yuan), with instant noodle and beverage revenue declining 6.2% and 5.26% respectively. The company's Q3 net profit was $144.3 million (about 9.2 billion yuan), compared to $159.7 million in the same period last year, a year-on-year decrease of 9.6%. For the first three quarters, net profit was $342 million (about 21.8 billion yuan), down 12.67% year-on-year. In the first half of 2015, Tingyi's revenue had already fallen 11.5%, and profit attributable to shareholders fell 14.8%, with both instant noodle and beverage businesses declining by more than 11%. Moreover, the contribution of instant noodles to the group's sales dropped from 36.95% in the same period last year to 36.8%. As traditional substitute foods like instant noodles become less popular, how Tingyi, once dominant in instant noodles and beverages, can reposition itself in the snack food sector is an urgent issue. Tingyi's Transformation Dilemma Today's Predicament Originated from PepsiCo Acquisition Rome wasn't built in a day. Tingyi's current predicament was actually foreshadowed three years ago when it acquired PepsiCo's China business. Generally, to successfully integrate an acquired company, the acquirer needs strong corporate culture and excellent core values. For Tingyi, these are precisely its biggest weaknesses. In my view, Tingyi's culture is more like Foxconn in the food and beverage industry, reflecting Taiwanese manufacturing-style management. Moreover, Foxconn and Tingyi leaders are of similar age, and their management styles share many similarities, with employee management closer to militarization. In contrast, PepsiCo's culture is young, dynamic, and innovative. Its losses in China were due to complex equity structure, excessive state-owned capital, and management failure. After the "Tingyi-Pepsi alliance," short-term measures like cost reduction, layoffs, procurement synergies, and channel integration can yield quick results, but in the long run, mixing vastly different corporate cultures is fraught with hidden dangers. On the surface, Tingyi's acquisition of Pepsi's China business brought honor to the Chinese. But Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's PC division, BenQ's acquisition of Siemens' PC unit, and TCL's acquisition of Alcatel all experienced two to three years of integration pains, and Tingyi cannot avoid this either. Furthermore, after the acquisition, Tingyi's human and material resources were inevitably dispersed, leading to neglect of some areas. It's Time to Say Goodbye to Copycat Strategy In the beverage industry, apart from a few major brands, most companies adhere to a copycat strategy, with Tingyi and Wahaha being typical examples. Whenever small and medium enterprises, competitors, or international brands launch new products that sell well, Tingyi and Wahaha quickly imitate them as their own. Back then, Xurisheng pioneered the iced tea category in China, but Tingyi copied it and reaped the rewards. Jianlibao's Fifth Season promoted guava flavor to great success, and Tingyi followed suit for over a decade, inadvertently becoming the leader in that category. For milk tea, it was Kirin's afternoon tea, Uni-President's Tetra Pak milk tea, and Assam milk tea that first opened the market, while Tingyi and Wahaha used low prices to compete for market share. When the market grows and consumers purchase a beverage category frequently, products of slightly lower quality still have market space, or growth can be achieved through channel expansion. When the economy declines, consumers purchase less frequently, and limited budgets shift toward the best-quality products (assuming similar prices). In the future competition in the food and beverage industry, once channels become homogeneous, the importance of product strength and brand strength will become increasingly prominent. Overall, Uni-President's brand reputation is stronger than Tingyi's, a result of years of focus on R&D, innovation, and quality. Especially in the past two years, Uni-President has launched innovative products like Xiao Ming Tong Xue and Hai Zhi Yan, which not only enhanced its brand image but also genuinely boosted sales. While other beverage brands saw significant declines, Uni-President maintained stability this year, thanks largely to these innovative products. Therefore, it's time to say goodbye to the "copycat strategy" that Tingyi has long regarded as classic. Where is the Low-Cost Strategy Heading? Of course, Tingyi's current predicament is not simply due to bad luck, a few quality incidents, or poor marketing, but is deeply related to its corporate culture and strategic positioning. Tingyi expanded from Taiwan to mainland China early on, and its corporate culture has always been cost-oriented. With the same costs, Taiwanese companies can produce better-quality products; with the same quality and price, costs can be lower. Tingyi initially succeeded through copycatting, and later, after strategic planning by McKinsey, implemented channel refinement, channel and terminal dominance, and a nationwide layout of factories and sales offices. Over time, this formed a comprehensive low-cost leadership strategy. Once a low-cost strategy and corporate culture are formed, they are difficult to change in the short term. When Uni-President's Assam milk tea became a hit across China, Tingyi also wanted to win with a low-cost milk tea product. To save money, it did not purchase the world's best production line for milk tea equipment, and due to combined factors like formulas and raw materials, the taste of its milk tea always lagged behind Uni-President's, and sales naturally fell behind. Companies that once relied on price wars, such as Galanz and Changhong, are now struggling; Wahaha's Future Cola, when launched, fought a price war with Coca-Cola and still lost. The root cause of Tingyi's several food quality incidents in recent years is also the impact of its low-cost strategy. To escape the predicament, Tingyi must strengthen its product innovation. Blindly pursuing low costs will only keep it mired in the mud. -END- Original Selection Click on the title below to read directly: [Line Sales Representative Practical Operation Guide (with full PPT download attached)
Capital, Earnings & M&A
Tingyi's Transformation Dilemma | Q3 Revenue 17.7 Billion Yuan, Instant Noodles and Beverages All Decline...
Tingyi Holdings, known for its instant noodles, announced in a midday filing that its Q3 2015 revenue fell 6.45% year-on-year to $2.77 billion (approximately 17.7 billion yuan), with instant noodle and beverage revenue declining 6.2% and 5.26% respectively. Net profit for Q3 was $144.3 million (about 9.2 billion yuan), down 9.6% from $159.7 million a year earlier; first three quarters net profit was $342 million (about 21.8 billion yuan), down 12.67% year-on-year.
