Click to read the original text for details In the FMCG industry, seizing a competitor's market is undoubtedly the best way to grow, as it saves a lot of consumer education costs and can achieve a multiplier effect with minimal effort. It is truly a war without gunpowder. Such competition naturally creates a history of feuds among brands. 01 Nongfu Spring vs. the Purified Water Industry Since the emergence of the new brand Genki Forest, the FMCG industry hasn't been this lively for a long time. We see Genki Forest attacking in all directions, entering various fields. Last year, it entered the markets of Red Bull and Nongfu, and this year it provokes Coca-Cola. Compared to the silence of Red Bull and Coke, Nongfu Spring doesn't tolerate such provocations; when someone comes looking for trouble, it really fights back. For instance, last year it collaborated with Ultraman, saying that children who believe in light are never unlucky. But some industry veterans cleverly pointed out that Nongfu was implying Genki Forest. Because Ultraman fights little monsters, and monsters are aliens, it naturally targets Genki Forest's Alien electrolyte water. Although Coca-Cola has a drink called Monster (i.e., Monster Energy) that fits the speculation better, looking at Nongfu's history of struggles, Genki's Alien is more fitting for the "victim" role. Since Genki went public, Nongfu was the first to "educate" this newcomer. First, it forbade distributors from carrying Genki Forest products, then it used the "Heavenly Wealth God" campaign to replace Genki's sparkling water with its own. As Li Yunlong would say: I hit the elite on purpose. Genki is not to be trifled with either. Industry insiders claim that behind the Fukushima white peach incident of Nongfu Spring sparkling water (i.e., because of the nuclear leak in Fukushima, Japan, its agricultural products are not allowed to be imported into China) there is the shadow of Genki Forest, though it's all just rumors. This incident caused Nongfu Spring to suffer a hidden loss. That's why Nongfu Spring chose the "Ultraman fights little monsters" story to continue the battle with Genki Forest. Since Zhong Shanshan entered the FMCG industry, his approach can be described with a couplet: "Punching Wahaha in the south, kicking Master Kong in the north," with the horizontal scroll: "C'estbon, don't run." Looking at Zhong Shanshan's rise to wealth, it's inseparable from Wahaha. The same pronunciation (Zhong and Zong), the same place (Hangzhou), and both transitioned from health products to FMCG. In his early years, Zhong Shanshan made his first pot of gold by being a Wahaha distributor, but the method was slightly less honorable—parallel imports. At that time, Wahaha was extremely popular; getting it meant profit. At the same time, Wahaha had special policies for its fellow townspeople. So after Zhong Shanshan obtained the agency rights for Wahaha oral liquid in Hainan and Guangxi, he wasn't content with his own territory and instead reached into Zhanjiang, Guangdong, where he had no operating rights. When Wahaha discovered this, they revoked his agency. This agency experience provided Zhong Shanshan with the most primitive accumulation for his future business: first, he learned the tricks of the health product industry; second, he understood how to strengthen distributor management. In 1992, Zong Qinghou keenly sensed the crisis in the health product market and turned to the beverage industry, launching products like Wahaha AD Calcium Milk. In particular, he successively hired Jing Gangshan and Wang Leehom as spokespersons for Wahaha purified water. From "My Eyes Only Have You" to "You Are My Only One," it replaced Robust's "27-layer filtration" and became the leader in purified water, officially announcing the first consumption upgrade for Chinese consumers—spending 1 yuan to buy bottled water. Unlike Wahaha's complete abandonment of health products, Zhong Shanshan always believed that the health product market was still being cultivated, but practitioners had ruined it. So Zhong Shanshan and his Yangshengtang also entered the beverage industry without letting go of the health product market, making Yangshengtang the parent company and Nongfu Spring just a sub-brand of Yangshengtang. In 1996, four years after Wahaha's transformation, Zhong Shanshan registered Zhejiang Qiandao Lake Yangshengtang Drinking Water Co., Ltd., also focusing on purified water. Shortly after, he launched Nongfu Spring natural water and renamed the company to Nongfu Spring Drinking Water Co., Ltd. Now the beverage industry has entered the era of "bigger quantity, more refreshing." In 1997, Zhong Shanshan set his sights on family packs and launched 4L Nongfu Spring. This shows Zhong Shanshan's far-sightedness. Most commendably, he introduced the "Tian Ji horse racing" strategy into product management, using his "lower horse" (purified water) to compete with Wahaha's "upper horse." In 2000, after declaring that purified water was not beneficial to health, Nongfu Spring gave up making purified water. This also kicked off the battle between purified water and natural water, gradually killing the 1-yuan water and establishing Nongfu Spring as the leader in China's bottled water market. In fact, Nongfu Spring's sparkling water battle against Genki Forest's sparkling water also used the "lower horse" against the "upper horse"—a product that has no impact on its own overall market but is the opponent's trump card. I can afford to lose, but the opponent cannot afford to play. With this move, Wahaha was dethroned from the top of the purified water industry. In 2003, Master Kong's mineral water claimed the sales crown. This time, Nongfu's strategy was: Where is your water source? After pulling Master Kong off the throne, Nongfu Spring's opponent became C'estbon, which was the earliest to do bottled water and backed by state-owned China Resources. This time, Nongfu Spring used pH test strips to tell consumers that weakly alkaline water is good water. Compared to Nongfu Spring's strategies against Wahaha, Master Kong, and C'estbon, the battles against Evergrande Spring Water ("your water source is next to mine") and Genki Forest ("Ultraman fights little monsters") are just small side dishes. At the same time, a story similar to Zhong Shanshan and Zong Qinghou's falling out was also unfolding dramatically in the instant food industry. 02 San Taizi vs. Hualong Today's consumers no longer remember these two brands. Because both brands have changed their names: San Taizi's founder, Wang Zhongwang, is also the founder of Wugudaochang, while Hualong's founder, Fan Xianguo, changed Hualong to Jinmailang. They are also fellow townsmen and also distributors. The struggle between Wang Zhongwang and Fan Xianguo was more direct. At that time, Hualong instant noodles were a brand as famous as Huafeng and Master Kong. As Fan Xianguo's fellow townsman, Wang Zhongwang, with his thinking and ambition, obtained the general agency for Hualong in the northwest region. Unlike Zhong Shanshan, whose agency was revoked, Wang Zhongwang chose to directly confront the "big brother." In 1999, he launched San Taizi instant noodles and set up the factory right next to Hualong, taking away a large number of marketing backbone staff from Hualong. These were not enough; even more excessive was that San Taizi's logo was directly designed as the image of Nezha stepping on a dragon from the famous "Nezha Conquers the Dragon King." Aren't you called Hualong (which means Chinese dragon)? I, San Taizi, will pull out your dragon tendons. This was not just a subtle implication but a blatant provocation. Obviously, Fan Xianguo couldn't tolerate this. After multiple reports to relevant authorities, Wang Zhongwang had to change San Taizi's logo to just Nezha's cartoon image. "Based on the rural market" was Hualong's successful experience, and Wang Zhongwang obviously wouldn't miss this mature strategy. He quickly broke the monopoly of Hualong, Baixiang, and Nanjiecun in the rural market. San Taizi's success also attracted Master Kong's attention, which invested 300 million yuan in Wang Zhongwang's San Taizi. On the other side, Hualong received investment from Nissin. Perhaps it was Nissin's requirement, or perhaps they were also disgusted with the brand symbol dispute with San Taizi, so Hualong changed its name to Jinmailang. On the other side, San Taizi received investment from Master Kong. If it had played steadily, when Jinmailang was preparing to enter the city, it could have become a rural brand competing with Baixiang. But Wang Zhongwang became a bit arrogant after a study trip to Japan. He resolutely decided to enter the "non-fried instant noodle" industry, making enemies with the entire instant noodle industry. But unlike Nongfu Spring's use of the lower horse against the upper horse, San Taizi's main business was fried instant noodles. By establishing Wugudaochang, he was also dragging down his own trump card. Although Wugudaochang opened the market with the slogan "non-fried is healthier" and sales surged in a short time, problems followed: immature product technology, poor taste, and noodles that wouldn't soak. The most fatal issue was the blind construction of factories leading to a broken capital chain. From then on, Wugudaochang went through COFCO and then to Chen Keming Noodle Industry, never returning to its former glory. The once San Taizi completely disappeared from consumers' memories. 03 Sanquan and Sinian Unlike the previous two pairs, which went from patron to enemy, the story of Sanquan's Chen Zemin and Sinian's Li Wei is not so bloody. In the early years, both Chen Zemin and Li Wei were in the ice products business, but Li Wei was an agent for Walls, while Chen Zemin had his own brand. Both faced the same problem: good sales in summer, no business in winter. The far-sighted Chen Zemin discovered the business opportunity of making tangyuan (glutinous rice balls) in the northeast and quickly achieved sales of over 100 million yuan. On the other hand, Li Wei, who was good at building relationships, quickly became friends with Chen Zemin's eldest son, Chen Nan, and they became inseparable. After obtaining first-hand information about Sanquan tangyuan from Chen Nan, Li Wei established Sinian and, unlike Sanquan's large tangyuan, launched differentiated small tangyuan, achieving good results. There is a saying in Henan: Sanquan's tangyuan, Sinian's dumplings. Although the two compete, they have been relatively mild. The real battle was over their "lower horses"—frozen zongzi (rice dumplings). In 2003, Sinian launched the "Bamboo Leaf Fragrant Zongzi" brand. At that time, the zongzi leader was Wufangzhai, and Sanquan's zongzi was only a supplementary product. After all, the sales season for zongzi is even shorter than for tangyuan and dumplings, so the zongzi market was not important. But Sinian achieved very impressive results with "Bamboo Leaf Fragrant Zongzi," approaching Wufangzhai's zongzi sales. It should be noted that the biggest problem with frozen zongzi on the market at that time was that the bamboo leaves looked not fresh, which was also the difference between frozen zongzi and freshly wrapped zongzi. But Sinian found the traffic code, making its bamboo leaves look bright and attractive—returning green bamboo leaves (dyed with copper sulfate). Before the Dragon Boat Festival in 2005, Sanquan first purchased a large number of bamboo leaves in the market in advance, then launched the "Refuse Returning Green" slogan nationwide, displaying returning green bamboo leaves alongside normal ones at every zongzi point to educate consumers. This move completely caught Sinian off guard. At that time, the zongzi had already been sent to distributors. If distributors wanted to repackage and sell, they couldn't buy bamboo leaves. Sinian faced a large number of distributor returns every day—because distributors were facing returns from the terminals. It can be said that this "lower horse" move by Sanquan suppressed Sinian again, especially since Sinian's Bamboo Leaf Fragrant Zongzi sales were five times that of Sanquan's zongzi. And Sanquan also used this "Refuse Returning Green" campaign to promote its own "Dragon Boat Zongzi," achieving considerable results. It can be said that Sinian used Sanquan's secret to successfully steal a march, and then Sanquan used Sinian's secret to counter-kill. Use the "lower horse" to kill the "upper horse," using your own non-critical product to destroy the opponent's trump card. When most FMCG brands are fighting head-on, engaging in price wars, competing on channels and execution, especially when the gap between the opponent's trump card and yours is widening, trying to compete on price may not necessarily win market share; instead, it becomes a situation where sales only happen with promotions and not without. Similarly, for brands that hold the "upper horse," how to raise the category threshold, prevent enemies from using low prices to grab your market, and form a protective layer around the trump card product are strategies to consider. That's all for today's gossip. If you like other brand feud stories, you can leave a comment, and we will update accordingly. _ -END- _