Jianlibao's contradictory appeal lies in its advertisements constantly seeking to evoke emotional resonance from the post-80s generation, while the main consumer group of beverages has long become the post-90s and even post-00s. This means that, from a communication perspective, Jianlibao's advertising may have missed its target audience. Twenty years ago, Jianlibao, once ubiquitous on streets and alleys, is now nowhere to be found on more than twenty shelves in the beverage section of a large supermarket. Twenty years ago, in 1996, was Jianlibao's peak, with sales exceeding 5 billion yuan. Twenty years later, Jianlibao's total sales in 2015 were only around 1.6 billion yuan. It is now difficult to see Jianlibao in first-tier cities. In 2005, Jianlibao changed hands. After being under Uni-President Enterprises (China) Investment Co., Ltd. for ten years, Jianlibao Trade was sold again. The news of this sale did not spark widespread discussion in society. On November 28, Uni-President announced that it would sell 100% equity of Foshan Sanshui Jianlibao Trade Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Jianlibao Trade") to Guangdong Jianlibao Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Jianlibao Group"), meaning that Uni-President would no longer have the operating rights to the Jianlibao beverage brand, and the Jianlibao brand would return to Jianlibao Group. Uni-President sold Jianlibao to Chunxin Capital under CITIC Assets for 950 million yuan. Chunxin Capital had no prior experience in the food and beverage sector. When inquiries were made to the three parties—Uni-President, Chunxin Capital, and Jianlibao—all parties remained cautious in their statements. This is not only because it is a critical period for the transaction, but more importantly, as a former "national brand," Jianlibao's second takeoff may not be just a commercial challenge. The ill-fated "Oriental Magic Water" Jianlibao is once again at a turning point after 11 years. But this time, can it return to the center stage? Ten Years Under Uni-President Uni-President was tight-lipped on the topic of its 11 years owning Jianlibao Trade, only claiming that it achieved a 2.5-fold return on investment from the sale of the Jianlibao brand. Looking back at its earlier statements, Uni-President probably did not get what it wanted from this cooperation. In fact, the process of Uni-President bringing Jianlibao under its wing was not smooth. Public information shows that in 2004, Uni-President's initial intention was to acquire Jianlibao entirely for $100 million and assume its then debt of about 5 billion yuan. But it did not succeed. Wu Xiaobo recorded in "The Big Defeat" that Uni-President's invitation was obstructed by distributors, with many twists and turns. It was not until October 2005 that Uni-President instead spent 1 million yuan to acquire all equity of Jianlibao Trading Company from Sanshui Municipal Government, changing from a full acquisition to a brand lease. Here, the special story of this transaction needs to be explained. Through coordination among multiple parties, Jianlibao's operating rights and ownership were separated, and Jianlibao Trade Company (referred to as Trade Company) was established to operate Jianlibao. Thus, Jianlibao was divided into two entities: the Group Company and the Trade Company. The Group Company owned the brand, fixed assets, and debts, while the Trade Company controlled by Uni-President was responsible for actual operations, building a sales team, and achieving integrated production, supply, and marketing. The two parties agreed on a three-year term for brand usage rights. Uni-President officially obtained 99.91% equity of Jianlibao Trade in 2007. In the view of Hu Zicong, partner at Roland Berger, the cooperation between Jianlibao and Uni-President was similar to that between Wanglaoji and JDB. Jianlibao utilized Uni-President's already penetrated channels to make breakthroughs. According to reports, at that time, Uni-President also hoped that Jianlibao could supplement its shortcomings in carbonated beverages. This cooperation was a good opportunity for Jianlibao, which was declining at the time. During the ten years under Uni-President, Uni-President did make multiple attempts to save the deteriorating Jianlibao. However, the handling at that time planted a huge landmine for the future. It was this separation that laid the groundwork for the future difficulties of Jianlibao's brand development. Uni-President's decision-making on Jianlibao was somewhat restricted, which was reflected in the contradiction in its brand image promotion and positioning. In the industry's view, Uni-President is actually very good at understanding consumer demands, especially in following the main market consumers—young consumers—as can be seen from its new products in recent years. Uni-President has successively launched "Duo C Duo Piaoliang" orange juice, Xiao Ming Tong Xue, Hai Zhi Yan, Assam milk tea, etc., in the tea (fruit tea), juice, and milk tea sectors. These products all seek to get closer to young consumers in terms of packaging, advertising, and channels. The results also proved that Uni-President's keen sense brought it achievements. Xiao Ming Tong Xue and Hai Zhi Yan have become its new growth points. In the 2015 annual report, Uni-President Group stated that in the tea sector, Uni-President Green Tea, Uni-President Ice Black Tea, and Xiao Ming Tong Xue had formed a tripod. In the juice sector, Hai Zhi Yan also became a growth point. In the revival of Jianlibao, Uni-President indeed did what it is best at—brand rejuvenation. Starting in January 2008, Li Wenjie, who had served Uni-President for 24 years, took over as general manager of Jianlibao Trade Company. Regarding Uni-President's management approach, we can get a glimpse from his speech at the 2009 China International Sports Industry Summit Forum. He believed that the reason for Jianlibao's success was its positioning as a sports drink. He called the diversification that Jianlibao had done before him (such as Fifth Season, Explosive Fruit Soda) "brand confusion." Therefore, after 2009, Jianlibao needed to do two things: focus on the sports drink industry and thoroughly develop it. He believed that what could make Jianlibao "start a second business and create brilliance again" was in sports drinks. Continuing sports marketing, such as the Guangzhou Asian Games, was a huge opportunity. According to the official website, after 2005, Jianlibao conducted dozens of promotions in sports events and related activities through title sponsorship, sponsorship, and other forms. At the end of 2009, Li Wenjie left dejectedly. Jianlibao invested heavily in advertising for the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games but achieved mediocre results. However, his successor Li Shizheng continued the strategy of "returning to the city, returning to youth and fashion, returning to modern management channels" from Li Wenjie's era, and launched multiple new products. Li Shizheng even personally went to the front line to promote Jianlibao in 2010. Previously, multiple media reports stated that a person in charge from Uni-President had said that Jianlibao Group and Uni-President did not have completely consistent views on the positioning of the Jianlibao brand. The shareholders of Jianlibao always hoped that Jianlibao would heavily play the nostalgia card and position it as a national brand. Uni-President's failure to complete the full acquisition also meant that Uni-President could not consistently implement its rejuvenation strategy in specific business strategies. Thus, we see a wavering image of Jianlibao. Jianlibao has launched dozens of beverage brands. From the naming and the way of entering schools for promotion, the effort to rejuvenate is obvious. But from advertisements and promotional videos, we can also see a Jianlibao that is nostalgic about its past glory and always tries to evoke the nostalgia of the post-80s. The contradiction is obvious. Contradictory Appeals Jianlibao's brand marketing can be summarized into two lines: the main line is the consistent sports element, and the auxiliary line is the post-80s nostalgia style. From 2011 to 2012, Jianlibao launched two "post-80s" micro-films. The first micro-film "Collective Memories of the Post-80s" (also known as "Finding the Post-80s Memorial Hall") features a protagonist who hopes to build a memorial hall for the post-80s. In this nostalgia-themed video, nine minutes convey a message: in the memories of the post-80s, Jianlibao must be present. The second is "Tribute to Post-80s Entrepreneurs." In 2014, Jianlibao launched a 10-minute micro-film "Opening the Sealed Emotion," which tells the story of a post-80s protagonist and his childhood memories with Jianlibao. This film has been played 660 million times on Sohu Video. The reason why Jianlibao is out of touch with the main consumer group can be partially explained in its promotional micro-films. At the beginning of "Collective Memories of the Post-80s," there is a key detail: the protagonist's toy company is struggling because it failed to capture consumer demand. When the company closes, the boss asks: "Do you know what toys are in the eyes of the next generation?" This question seems equally applicable to Jianlibao. A brand that once led the trend is now stuck in nostalgia, which makes people sigh and think about how Jianlibao fell into the nostalgia maze. Jianlibao's contradictory appeal lies in its advertisements constantly seeking to evoke emotional resonance from the post-80s generation, while the main consumer group of beverages has long become the post-90s and even post-00s. This means that, from a communication perspective, Jianlibao's advertising may have missed its target audience. It is undeniable that Jianlibao has always been called a memory of the post-80s. Its popularity back then was not only due to the leader's keen marketing sense but also the Chinese people's emotional attachment to football and sports. Years later, the main consumers of beverages are no longer those people. Nielsen data shows that the post-90s and post-00s account for 30% of beverage consumers. For the post-90s and post-00s, they have no stories or emotional connections with Jianlibao. It seems difficult to find a point of resonance for these consumers to join Jianlibao in a cross-time recognition. This means that Jianlibao's advertisements calling for post-80s memories are unattractive to 30% of consumers. As a post-90s, in my view, Jianlibao is just a beverage. To move us, a drink that cannot carry any emotion can only rely on taste, packaging, and the image it creates. And this group's requirements for beverages are no different from those for fashion items. A large-scale survey by Information Times also showed that post-90s consumers not only pay attention to the taste of beverages but also like fresh packaging and fashionable product advertisements. Hu Zicong from Roland Berger analyzed that the new generation of consumers demands more innovation and diversity in various consumer goods. Typical post-70s consumers pursue trusted and safe brands, are more loyal to brands, and some have habits like drinking a can of cola every day, while post-90s constantly seek new things. The post-90s and post-00s grew up during the development of social media, are enthusiastic about online sharing, and care about packaging. Packaging that emphasizes "appearance" is not only for purchase but more for sharing. Where to Go in the Future For Jianlibao, channels and brand image may be twin flowers that influence each other. From its brand marketing actions in the past year or two, Jianlibao has also tried to get closer to the preferences of the post-90s and post-00s, joining the social marketing wave and launching interactive advertisements. This Spring Festival, Jianlibao used the "Journey to the West" IP to make an attempt, launching the topic "Monkey Year, Monkey Awesome" on Sina Weibo, trying to spread virally, inviting celebrities like Wang Zulan to participate. In addition, it tried funny comics, turning Jianlibao into "Master Bao" and launching comic stories. During the World Cup, it also released corresponding posters. In addition to playing the nostalgia card, Jianlibao also strives to play the sports card. Jianlibao has been labeled both a functional drink and a carbonated drink. In the promotional video on its official website, it emphasizes "sports drink." Nielsen monitoring sales data shows that functional drinks and juices are the fastest-growing beverage categories. As of October 2015, functional drinks and juices grew by 6.9% and 4.4% respectively compared to the same period last year. An article on the Adquan website records that in 2008, Jianlibao launched "1984 Jianlibao," using the Olympic opportunity, through the slogan "With great events, the national drink Jianlibao" and related concepts such as Jianlibao's milestones, to evoke nostalgia for the classic. Li Wenjie once proposed to let Jianlibao "return to the city, return to youth and fashion, return to modern management channels." This strategy is beyond reproach. But the result did not go as he wished. So what exactly led to Jianlibao's current situation? The three reform measures require bold reforms in product channels, product positioning, and corporate governance. Nielsen data shows that consumers now shop more in small supermarkets, and chain convenience stores contribute 7% of the growth in the beverage category. Hu Zicong expressed the same observation: from a channel perspective, convenience stores are the main channel for young people to buy beverages. But Jianlibao is not available in these channels, and the situation is not optimistic. Not to mention the brand, young people cannot buy Jianlibao in terms of channels. In terms of product channels, it is now difficult to see Jianlibao in first-tier cities. A reporter saw at a Yonghui Superstore in Shanghai that among nearly 20 shelves in the beverage section, there was not a single can (bottle) of Jianlibao. Similarly, in several convenience store chains I visited, such as FamilyMart, Haolinju, 7-Eleven, and Liangyou, Jianlibao was also absent. A purchasing director at Yonghui Superstore and supermarket staff confirmed what I saw. A person familiar with supermarket shelf information told me that supermarket shelves are generally purchased by brand owners. The larger the shelf space a company rents, the more money it spends and the better its sales. I also learned that after products are put on shelves, detailed supermarket promotion plans are needed; otherwise, if sales rank low within six months, they can easily be removed. In addition, Hu Zicong also believes that if the cooperation between the two parties was a licensing arrangement, Uni-President had no incentive to invest more market resources when the license was about to expire. From a brand marketing perspective, Uni-President tried to make Jianlibao's advertisements resonate with the post-90s. For me, this style is indeed "to my taste," but this attempt did not last long. Now, Uni-President's contract with Jianlibao has expired, and Chunxin Capital under CITIC has taken over. However, Chunxin Capital has no experience in operating beverage businesses. In communication, Chunxin Capital said that at this stage, it is not convenient to disclose more information to the outside world. In the era of Chunxin Capital, what fate awaits Jianlibao is unknown. In Hu Zicong's view, if Jianlibao is positioned as a sports drink, it is actually a relatively outstanding category, but the brand needs to be re-examined. He believes that Jianlibao needs to figure out several questions: Who is the current consumer group? Who does Jianlibao want as its consumer group? Understanding in what scenarios young people drink functional beverages might be the next step. 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