Source丨New Distribution Finance Yonghui Superstores, which is fully learning from Pangdonglai, continues to incur losses, and the market is again worried about this disciple of Pangdonglai. The author noted that on April 25, Yonghui Superstores released its 2024 annual and Q1 2025 financial reports. In 2024, the company's revenue was 67.574 billion yuan, down 14.07% year-on-year, and net profit attributable to shareholders was -1.465 billion yuan, with losses increasing by 136 million yuan compared to the same period last year. Although Yonghui's continued losses were already expected by the market, at least from the latest financial data, it still has not met market expectations. It is worth noting that in Q1 2025, Yonghui Superstores' revenue was 17.479 billion yuan, down 19.32% year-on-year; net profit attributable to shareholders was 148 million yuan, down 79.96% year-on-year. Regarding the reasons for the losses, Yonghui explained in its financial report that it was mainly due to the company's proactive store optimization and strategic and business model transformation, as well as the fair value change loss of -172 million yuan from its holding of Advantage Solutions shares during the period. Yonghui is fully learning from Pangdonglai and accelerating its store renovation pace. The current transformation pain for Yonghui Superstores will continue. In the author's view, in the short term, learning from Pangdonglai is one of the few options for Yonghui to break through, but from a longer-term perspective, Pangdonglai may not be the antidote for Yonghui. Pangdonglai Is Not the Antidote for Yonghui Since Pangdonglai became a super internet-famous top-tier Chinese local supermarket, Pangdonglai and its founder Yu Donglai have become the new myth of China's supermarket industry, and Pangdonglai's disciples have flocked to it. Among the many disciples of Pangdonglai, Yonghui Superstores is undoubtedly the most active, the most comprehensive, and the most hardworking one. Behind this is the deep trouble that this Chinese supermarket giant is in. In recent years, traditional supermarkets have experienced a major retreat. Even retail giant Walmart has closed many traditional hypermarkets in the Chinese market. Yonghui Superstores is the most anxious one. According to Yonghui's financial reports, it has lost more than 9 billion yuan for four consecutive years and closed 232 stores in one year. Since last year, Yonghui Superstores has fully turned to learning the Pangdonglai model. The stores renovated by Yonghui have taken on a new look, with adjusted product categories, especially the addition of Pangdonglai products, which have become a traffic-driving tool. According to continuous media reports, after Yonghui Superstores stores in multiple cities across the country were renovated by Pangdonglai and reopened, customer traffic surged, and they even became internet-famous supermarkets, with long queues like Pangdonglai. It is precisely because of Pangdonglai's internet-famous label and effect that the renovated Yonghui stores have attracted many consumers to buy. The real attraction behind this is the keyword "Pangdonglai." However, everything is a double-edged sword. Yonghui Superstores' full learning from Pangdonglai will also have such an effect, with both positive and negative aspects. The positive side is that it makes Yonghui stores no less than "reborn." According to data disclosed by Yonghui, as of the end of March, Yonghui had 41 "steady-state renovation stores" that had been open for more than 3 months. The renovated stores quickly and significantly increased customer traffic and sales, achieving a cumulative net profit of 14.7 million yuan. On the other hand, we need to look at the problem from a long-term perspective. Whether the Pangdonglai effect can be sustained in Yonghui's renovation is also a key point that the market has been watching. According to reports from multiple media outlets, some of Yonghui's renovated stores are now facing the situation of being booming at opening, but after two or three months of opening, customer traffic significantly declines. According to Sina Technology, Yonghui's first store in Beijing to learn from Pangdonglai, the Shijingshan Yonghui Xilongduo store, attracted 50,000 visitors on its opening day last September, with cumulative customer traffic exceeding 900,000 in the first month after opening, and customer traffic increased nearly 6 times after renovation. Half a year later, customers here are relatively scarce now. According to customers who frequent this store, the daily customer flow is "not too many people," and even on Saturdays and Sundays, it will not be overcrowded. The key reason behind this is that the internet-famous effect is time-limited. Many local consumers of Yonghui's renovated stores are also attracted by the Pangdonglai label. The opening of Yonghui's renovated stores has also become news that local official media focus on reporting and promoting to attract consumers to buy. The core attraction is curiosity consumption. Yonghui Superstores renovated by Pangdonglai will also face the business situation of going from booming at opening to gradually returning to normal. The test for Yonghui's store operations is long-term. Yonghui's Real Antidote Is Itself After entering 2025, Yonghui is no longer the same Yonghui as before, and in learning the Pangdonglai model, Yonghui has chosen to step on the accelerator. Last year, Miniso invested 6.278 billion yuan to take control of Yonghui, indirectly becoming its largest shareholder. Seeing Yonghui's progress in learning from Pangdonglai, Miniso founder Ye Guofu was clearly not very satisfied. On March 17 this year, he became the leader of the company's reform leadership group and acted as CEO. Under Ye Guofu's management, Yonghui is comprehensively accelerating store renovations, planning to reach 200 renovated stores in 2025. At least at this stage or in the next two to three years, fully learning from Pangdonglai is Yonghui's primary task. But in the author's view, the Pangdonglai model is only a temporary antidote to Yonghui's difficulties. From a long-term perspective, Yonghui's real antidote is Yonghui itself. In the short term, Yonghui Superstores needs to focus on two major things, and these two things are closely related. The first major thing is to continue to fully learn the Pangdonglai model and continue renovation until all stores are renovated. The second major thing is to think from a business perspective. Yonghui learns from Pangdonglai to renovate stores. Each renovated store requires capital investment and increased operating costs such as employee wages. The question is whether the renovation costs can be recovered when the renovated store goes from booming at opening to returning to normal operations. From a long-term perspective, Yonghui cannot learn from Pangdonglai forever. It only learns the model and business strategy of Pangdonglai. Once all stores are renovated, after a long time, the renovated stores cannot attract consumers like they did at opening for a long time, and they will eventually return to normal. On March 29, Yonghui Superstores held its 2025 Global Supplier Conference in Xuchang, Henan. At the meeting, Ye Guofu said that Yonghui will focus on core suppliers, core big single products, and long-termism to promote Yonghui's transformation and upgrading. At the same time, Ye Guofu also clearly stated that Yonghui will firmly follow the quality retail route of the Pangdonglai model. It can be seen that what Ye Guofu and Miniso really want to learn is the quality retail route behind the Pangdonglai model. The core competitiveness of quality retail lies in super big single products, or exclusive long-term internet-famous big single products, and the key supporting force behind it is a sufficiently strong, streamlined, and efficient supply chain capability. The quality retail route seems easy to learn, just like in the past two years, the domestic warehouse membership supermarket track has become hot, and many supermarket brands are busy learning from Sam's Club, but they always fail to learn. Even Hema, a former disciple of Sam's Club and even wanting to surpass Sam's Club, ultimately did not want to be the Chinese version of Sam's Club and returned to being itself. Therefore, for Yonghui, it is simple to learn the appearance of the Pangdonglai business model, but learning Pangdonglai's supply chain model requires hard work. The key to Yonghui's long-term transformation and upgrading path in the future is to build a supply chain model suitable for itself. Some experts analyze that Yonghui's learning from Pangdonglai for renovation is selective module optimization, which is not thorough enough. Even Yu Donglai at a public meeting asked Yonghui executives a soul-searching question: since the stores are profitable, why not increase employee wages? Another point worth noting is that Pangdonglai is positioned as a mid-to-high-end retail brand, while Yonghui is a mass consumer supermarket brand. How to weigh and balance this is also a key issue. Now Yonghui has entered the era of Ye Guofu's management and is still fully learning from Pangdonglai. However, some market views believe that Ye Guofu is likely to bring Miniso's ten-yuan store model into Yonghui, forming a mid-to-low-end breakthrough path of own products + ten-yuan stores. Ye Guofu first admired the Costco model, then turned to admire and learn the Pangdonglai model, but Yonghui Superstores ultimately has to be itself. In summary, for Yonghui in trouble, learning from Pangdonglai can temporarily alleviate anxiety, but in the long run, Pangdonglai is not the antidote; the real antidote is itself. In the current Chinese supermarket retail industry, Pangdonglai is still booming, Sam's Club is still racing, Hema is accelerating its downward expansion, Meituan Xiaoxiang Supermarket is entering offline, and instant retail warfare is escalating. Competition is extremely fierce. Yonghui in transformation still needs to tell a more compelling new story than learning from Pangdonglai in the future.
零售业态
Pangdonglai Is Not the Antidote for Yonghui
Yonghui Superstores, which is fully learning from Pangdonglai, continues to incur losses, and the market is again worried about this disciple of Pangdonglai. According to its 2024 annual and Q1 2025 financial reports, revenue fell 14.07% to 67.574 billion yuan in 2024, with net loss attributable to shareholders widening by 136 million yuan to 1.465 billion yuan. While the losses were expected, the latest data still fell short of market expectations, and the transformation pain is set to continue.
