Having worked in the instant noodle industry for fifteen years, I have witnessed its development cycles, the changing rankings of industry leaders, the contributions of different price points, and the breakthroughs and exits of companies. It also confirms the power of top management's strategic planning. Today, I will mainly discuss the feud between Jinmailang and Baixiang, the strategic maneuvers of their executives, and the fierce competition among frontline staff.

Honestly, I didn't want to write this article. If I write it too superficially, it does a disservice to myself; if I go too deep, I worry about stirring up the sensitivities of top executives. But if I don't write it, it seems like a wasted effort for a fifteen-year veteran of the instant noodle industry.

After intense internal debate, I decided to write it, looking beyond the surface to uncover the stories behind corporate success.

Before 2008, Jinmailang didn't consider Baixiang a threat, focusing entirely on competing with Master Kong. At that time, Master Kong's sales were about 2.5 times Jinmailang's, while Uni-President and Baixiang posed no threat. Xiao Jinye and Dong Sanfu were unstoppable in rural markets, and Jinmailang's premium bag and cup noodles directly challenged Master Kong in urban areas. The industry was shocked by the one-minute CCTV ad for Gutang Danmian (Bone Soup Egg Noodles), which was spectacular. It was estimated that they were spending the equivalent of an Audi A8 per day on CCTV ads, and Jinmailang's brand awareness was extremely high.

Corporate development paths are full of twists and turns. When raw material prices rose, Jinmailang abandoned the 1 yuan retail price point, leaving it to smaller companies, and instead increased the weight to sell at 1.3 yuan with Da Jin Ye. At that time, Da Gu Mian and Jin Zhuang Si Yuan also targeted the 1.3 yuan price point. However, Baixiang was very market-savvy. When products at the 1.3 yuan price point couldn't break through because changing consumer habits is too difficult, they immediately reduced the weight and returned to the 1 yuan price point. This gave Baixiang a chance to soar. Jinmailang insisted on promoting the 1.3 yuan Da Jin Ye, but the market was besieged from all sides. Their spirit was admirable, but sales were sluggish. This time, Baixiang solidified its position in the 1 yuan noodle market, laying the foundation for its next leap.

Baixiang hired a president from Procter & Gamble at a high salary, and in the second half of 2010, they launched Jing Dun Da Gu (Slow-Simmered Bone) at 1.5 yuan retail, while limiting shipments of the 1 yuan noodles. This propelled Baixiang from fourth to third place, where it stayed for five years (2011-2015), forcing Jinmailang to sit in fourth place for five years. Jinmailang paid a heavy price for its strategic mistake.

As companies grow, existing executives may no longer be able to drive development. Both Baixiang and Jinmailang sought external consultants: Baixiang hired Trout & Partners (Deng Delong), and Jinmailang hired Ries Consulting (Zhang Yun). Their different positioning philosophies set the stage for Jinmailang's eventual overtaking of Baixiang.

With a solid sales base, Baixiang gained confidence and attacked the 2.5 yuan price point with Da Gu Mian. In Henan, they went all out with a single flavor and single packaging. Brand image and awareness improved, but sales and profits declined. The failure had two reasons: first, the 2.5 yuan Da Gu Mian was ill-timed, as the economic crisis reduced consumer purchasing power; second, consumers associated Da Gu Mian with Baixiang, and the brand couldn't support the 2.5 yuan price point.

After hiring Ries Consulting, Jinmailang focused entirely on the 1.5 yuan Da Jin Ye, upgrading the noodle block to 100 grams to capture consumer mindshare. They advertised heavily on major satellite TV channels, claiming "Six bags equal seven bags, a box gives you four extra bags." From 2014, Da Jin Ye began to surge, becoming the number one brand and sales leader in the 1.5 yuan price point.

After two years of cultivation in 2014 and 2015, Da Jin Ye started to compete head-to-head with Baixiang's Jing Dun Da Gu in individual markets and some regions. Jing Dun Da Gu showed signs of retreat, but Baixiang was not yet dethroned from third place.

In August 2015, Jinmailang launched Yi Dai Ban (One and a Half Bags) and Yi Tong Ban (One and a Half Cups), which were precisely positioned and captured some of Master Kong's share. These two products contributed 800 million yuan in 2016. This year, Jinmailang decisively pulled Baixiang down from third place.

Pulling Baixiang down from third place is not Baixiang's biggest crisis. The real crisis is the loss of top talent, low-level imitation of product structures, and confusion and hesitation among frontline staff, which means Baixiang has no chance of a comeback in the short term.

Jinmailang is the most focused company in the instant noodle industry. They don't have a single pack of dry noodles; they rely solely on boiled noodles, which helps build the brand. The brand's reputation and value are relatively high.

In the past three years, Jinmailang has continuously produced hit products: Da Jin Ye, Yi Tong Ban, Yi Dai Ban, and Dao Xiao Kuan Mian (Knife-Cut Wide Noodles), all contributing to sales and laying a foundation. Combined with the decade-long "Four-in-One" strategy, Jinmailang is like a awakened lion with wings, ready to take off.

Baixiang is still a company I respect. Every strategic step Baixiang took was correct; they had the right timing, location, and people, but the wind of opportunity never came. The 2.5 yuan Da Gu Mian was ill-timed, and the 2 yuan Zhen Gu Tang (an upgraded version of Zhen Gu Bao) was launched without industry followers. They deliberately weakened and abandoned Jing Dun Da Gu, not realizing that the 1.5 yuan price point products would defy expectations and extend their lifecycle.

What's more frightening is that the president hired from outside the industry made several moves that solidified Baixiang's fourth-place position. First, they launched a 120-gram noodle block at 2.5 yuan (Hao D Mian), following Yi Dai Ban, which was a major blunder. Even worse, they reduced Jing Dun Da Gu's noodle block to 75 grams, added two seasoning packets, increased channel profits, but reduced consumer pull. Any sensible person would pick the 100-gram Da Jin Ye off the shelf over the 75-gram Jing Dun Da Gu. There were also a series of new products: Ban Le Duo (dry noodles), Za Ban (noodle sheets), and imitations of Master Kong and Uni-President cup noodles, lacking their own identity and symbols. The result was much ado about nothing.

Corporate competition appears to be a bayonet fight among frontline soldiers, but in reality, it's a strategic game among top executives. Jinmailang's victory comes from its strong financing capability, well-paid and numerous staff, disruptive product innovation, and the protection of the Four-in-One strategy. Baixiang's defeat stems from weakening its own identity and blindly worshiping foreign methods in confusion.

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