In early 2013, Jiang Jianqi moved from his old house to a new one. Employees said the boss finally moved. Jiang Jianqi's old house was 120 square meters, where the family lived for 20 years. Of course, this detail has little to do with so-called 'frugality,' just like his other habit of over 20 years: every morning, he brings a bag of steamed buns to the office—it's merely a habit. Jiang Jianqi's company is more famous than he is: Xiangpiaopiao. This company, which successfully pioneered China's cup milk tea market, still tirelessly promotes itself year after year: 'Xiangpiaopiao milk tea, selling 1 billion cups a year, cups linked together can circle the Earth three times.' Three circles? Some netizens say, 'Recently, a small asteroid might hit the Earth?' Another replies, 'No worries, the Earth is shielded by Xiangpiaopiao milk tea! Three circles in total!' Jokes aside. From the perspective of corporate growth speed alone, this is definitely a company that did more things right than wrong. In ten years, starting from grassroots, quickly exceeding 100 million, without bank loans, relying entirely on self-owned funds, in 2013, sales revenue exceeded 2.7 billion yuan solely from milk tea. What's the secret? It's about finding ways to make the company safer tomorrow while walking on thin ice every day: From 2004 to 2006, Xiangpiaopiao expanded into virgin territory, as it was the only player in the cup milk tea market at that time. From 2006 to 2010, the battlefield was ablaze. Wahaha glanced at cup milk tea and turned away; just as they breathed a sigh of relief, Youlemei under Strong Group, Lipton奶茶 under Lipton, Xiangyue奶茶 under Dahao Da... dozens of milk tea brands swarmed in, plunging the industry into chaos. Youlemei even declared: even if it means strategic losses for two years, they would take down Xiangpiaopiao! The pioneer risked becoming a martyr. This Zhejiang native was provoked. Thus began a six-year war: he cut off diversification, went all-in, and ultimately was pushed by rivals to run at the speed of a Red Hare horse. This speed eventually became a brilliant inspirational story in China's FMCG industry. Solitude Looking at today's Zhejiang FMCG industry, three companies deserve attention: Wahaha, Nongfu Spring, and Xiangpiaopiao. All three are located in the Jiangnan region, but due to the different personalities of their bosses, they exhibit different corporate styles. Zong Qinghou, 70, is known for his assertiveness. He ignores any imported marketing management theories, trusting only his own eyes and 'feet.' On the surface, he seems taciturn and humble, but at critical moments, he shows his autocratic style and strategic maneuvering. The Danone incident is an example. It is said that this giant company with over 150 branches and 30,000 employees still has only one chairman and one general manager, with no deputy general managers, and both positions are held by Zong alone. Outsiders say, 'Even purchasing a forklift or a broom requires his personal signature.' Zhong Shanshan, 61, has already shown his personality in the recent 'Nongfu Spring incident.' Zhong is known in the industry as a 'lone wolf,' going his own way, quite arrogant. He likes tea, calligraphy and painting, and is skilled in writing. Classic ad slogans like 'Nongfu Spring is a little sweet,' 'Duo'er, beauty from the inside out,' and 'Nongfu Orchard, shake before drinking' all came from his pen. What is not widely known is that Zhong Shanshan's Yangshengtang is a national high-tech enterprise that successfully developed China's first cervical cancer vaccine and the world's first recombinant hepatitis E vaccine. Perhaps due to the nature of the industry, Zong Qinghou, Zhong Shanshan, and even Jiang Jianqi all have a 'solitary' side, but with different intensities. Jiang Jianqi, 51, has a more delicate personality. He hung Mao's calligraphy 'Seek Truth from Facts' high in the conference room to prevent being 'dazed' by increasing praise. He likes the sound of machines running in the workshop; if the sound stops, he feels uncomfortable, just as strongly as he feels when he doesn't go to the office on weekends. This entrepreneur, who started with pastries and popsicles, also has an impatient side. It is said that a desk was once cracked by his palm. 'Of course, now he has restrained his temper a lot.' Unlike Zong Qinghou, over the past two decades, Jiang Jianqi has maintained a strong attitude of 'taking what is useful' towards external management ideas. He has tried Trout, Peter Drucker, and Peter Senge's management thoughts in his company, then found what suits him best. It is said that for a point in Drucker's book, he would drive two hours from the Huzhou base to the Hangzhou marketing center, argue with a vice president, and then drive back to Huzhou. Jiang Jianqi was born in Nanxun, Huzhou, a famous land of fish and rice in Jiangnan. In the Qing Dynasty, the wealth of local wealthy families could match the annual fiscal revenue of the Qing government, and a strong business atmosphere was passed down through generations. Since childhood, Jiang Jianqi heard the most about business, which directly led to his extreme discomfort after being assigned to the Shanghai Railway Bureau after graduating from college. The railway bureau job was leisurely, so leisurely that even if 50% of the staff left, it seemed to have no impact. At work, they read newspapers and drank tea, discussing international affairs in the morning, criticizing government policies, and after work, discussing what to cook for dinner, 'How to braise crucian carp?' —How to cook? This made Jiang Jianqi feel that life was like a long night, and he was suffocating. At that time, his younger brother, who studied food science, had set up a food factory in Nanxun. Jiang Jianqi often returned to his hometown to help. Obviously, doing business was much more interesting than discussing braised crucian carp every day, even if it was hard. The food factory mainly produced pastries. After one Spring Festival, they earned over 10,000 yuan, which was one of the happiest moments in Jiang Jianqi's life. In his words, even earning 1 million a day now is not as happy as it was then. In the second year, his brother planned to give up for other reasons, so Jiang Jianqi resigned and took over the food factory. This was a point of no return. A local farmer entrepreneur in Huzhou had a good relationship with Jiang. This guy was illiterate; to remember the public security bureau chief's phone number, he drew a 'pistol' in the phone book, and for a doctor's name, he drew a 'cross.' But he said something philosophical: 'Running a business is just that. I have endless money, but also endless debts.' Endless money, but also endless debts—sometimes, a person's fate and path are predetermined by heaven. The Production Relations of a Mom-and-Pop Shop Xiangpiaopiao's vice president, Cai Jianfeng, is Jiang Jianqi's elementary school classmate. When we met him, he had just quit smoking. It is said he used to smoke three packs a day, and over the years, the ceiling of the Huzhou office was stained a different color than other offices. Cai Jianfeng has a life notebook where he records major events: for example, he met Jiang Jianqi in 1971, married his wife in 1994... arranged like this, it's quite interesting. In the industry, they are recognized as a good team. An even more interesting scene occurred when Jiang Jianqi recruited Cai Jianfeng. A motorcycle stopped by the roadside, picking up Cai Jianfeng who had just arrived at the station. That day, Jiang Jianqi wore a knitted undershirt with seven or eight holes scattered on the back. Cai Jianfeng remembers this detail vividly because Jiang Jianqi was no longer a small boss at that time. The next morning, Jiang Jianqi, as usual, brought seven or eight steamed buns to find Cai Jianfeng, and then they went to the factory together. At the factory, the workers were dedicated, and the working environment was good. Cai Jianfeng decided to join Jiang Jianqi. That winter, he brought his wife and 4-year-old child to Nanxun. Looking back, Jiang Jianqi was a typical opportunist during this period. Although the factory was small, the annual profit of several million yuan gave him a taste of entrepreneurship, and he was content with small success. He named his company 'Laowantong' (Old urchin) because after watching 'The Legend of the Condor Heroes,' he thought the name was distinctive: 'Once you see it, you remember it.' Laowantong's main business was making popsicles. The formula was obtained from a relative at the Zhejiang Provincial Food Research Institute. The business went smoothly at first, but soon encountered competitors. That year, a new company making crushed ice pops was founded in Wenzhou, Zhejiang. Its management team was entirely from Want Want Group. Also focusing on regional markets, with Want Want's experience, this company rose sharply and developed rapidly. Gradually, it began to clash with Laowantong in various counties and cities in Zhejiang, and many of Laowantong's customers switched to selling crushed ice pops. However, the confrontation did not last long; the Wenzhou company gradually faded away. The victory seemed absurd, but it was not without reason. Looking back, Jiang Jianqi believes that Laowantong won for several reasons: First, facing the opponent, he was forced to innovate, such as changing the nunchaku-shaped popsicle to a baby bottle shape. Children were curious about the cute packaging and bought it, gradually creating a small fashion effect. More importantly, it was management. Jiang Jianqi later discovered that this opponent, born from Want Want Group, directly copied Want Want's organizational structure from the start, with finance, sales, and HR departments—small but complete. But does a startup need such a complete organizational structure? In contrast, Laowantong's management, from the sales VP to the production VP to the accountant, all sat in one office. Every day, requests from market personnel or even a single expense reimbursement form were handled instantly, keeping decision-making costs low. —Productivity and production relations must match. Jiang Jianqi believes that when sales are around 70-80 million yuan, the boss should personally focus on marketing, and the organizational structure should not be too large. Once sales reach a certain level, then match it with a new organizational structure. In short, efficiency first. This leads to a derivative: Why has the mom-and-pop shop form, which is both praised and criticized today, become the common form in early entrepreneurship? For example, a fried dough stick seller: the wife is the cashier, the husband is the purchaser and production worker. This cooperation is often powerful—first, the division of labor is reasonable; second, the goal is unified; the couple understands each other without trust issues; if one is busy, the other immediately fills in, seamlessly. Further derivative: In fact, making the so-called 'Amoeba management' take root in China is not difficult. As long as each decomposed team is like a mom-and-pop shop, it will definitely be a highly effective team. Of course, 'mom-and-pop shop' here does not mean a team of a couple, but the spirit of 'one goal, no selfishness, unity, and quick replacement.' —Xiangpiaopiao in its entrepreneurial period embodied this spirit. Spectacular! In 2003, Jiang Jianqi and Cai Jianfeng sat in the office, smoking one cigarette after another. A puzzle made them anxious: at that time, Laowantong had annual sales of tens of millions, but it clearly hit an unbreakable ceiling: the main product, popsicles, was a typical seasonal product, declining sharply in winter, and likely to become a transitional product. The company urgently needed to enter a new field, but looking around, they were at a loss. The only certain direction was to make a drinkable product. In Jiang Jianqi's business cognition, drinks always sell more than food. Look at Qiaqia melon seeds: a pack of melon seeds often takes half a day to crack, and some even seal the rest and crack them for another half day... It's frustrating to watch. Making beverages, but what kind? At this stage, Jiang Jianqi carefully studied Wahaha. Wahaha's style and position in the FMCG industry are like Tencent in the internet industry or Midea in home appliances. As a super product manager, Zong Qinghou is extremely good at imitative innovation. Once a new category emerges in the market, Wahaha often follows immediately, then uses its powerful distribution network to overturn the category creator. For example, its most profitable product, Nutrition Express, imitates Xiaoyangren's 'Miaolian'; its eight-treasure porridge imitates Yangzhou Qinqin's; and its founding product, Wahaha Children's Nutritional Oral Liquid, was developed based on Qingchunbao and Chinese Pollen Oral Liquid... Clearly, Jiang Jianqi couldn't take this path. He even had to design a 'low-profile period' for his future products to prevent being followed and undercut by the industry leader. In 2004, one day, Jiang Jianqi saw a milk tea shop on the street with people queuing to buy pearl milk tea. Experience told him: wherever there is a long queue, there is a supply-demand imbalance, and there is always room for innovation and business opportunities. Jiang Jianqi had a sudden idea: Why not make street milk tea convenient and branded? Acting immediately, he invited the Hangzhou Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology to help develop the formula and a design company to design the packaging. After about half a year, the product was successfully trial-produced. —He gave the product a new name: Xiangpiaopiao. Before launching, Xiangpiaopiao only chose four cities for trial sales: Wenzhou, Huzhou, Wuxi, and Suzhou. In each city, they selected middle schools, universities, and standard supermarkets. The company arranged personnel to track each sales point and then charted the results. The six-month test results were satisfactory—this was a product with potential. Apart from the hard data curves, what Jiang Jianqi saw with his own eyes excited him. One day, a trial sales point owner in Wuxi called Xiangpiaopiao and said, 'It's incredible! Come to Wuxi quickly to see the market.' As agreed, Jiang Jianqi and Cai Jianfeng went to the school where the shop owner was. They were stunned: the owner's wife had lined up dozens of cups of milk tea, poured the milk tea powder into the cups, and placed a dozen thermos bottles nearby. 'Do you really have this many people buying your milk tea?' 'Just wait and see,' the owner replied. When the school bell rang, students poured out like a swarm of grasshoppers, bypassing the sun umbrellas, picking up the milk tea and drinking—'That scene was spectacular.' Ignition (1) In 2005, Jiang Jianqi decided: Xiangpiaopiao was ready to go to war. How to fight? They refused to scatter resources like pepper. After all, the trial sales data had already told Jiang Jianqi where the tipping point was. According to Malcolm Gladwell's tipping point theory: 80% of a task is completed by 20% of the participants. Similarly, to start a trend, you must concentrate resources on the tipping point. Once you find the right point, a gentle touch can set the world in motion. Returning to the foundation of local business, you'll find that almost every trend's logical starting point comes from a specific group. For example, in ancient African tribes, the chief's women wore heavy metal chains, which eventually became a symbol of leisure and not having to work, and thus became popular. So, where is the group that can quickly ignite the trend of cup milk tea? Taxi drivers? Celebrities? Industry opinion leaders? Traditional distributors? —It's students. Xiangpiaopiao chose schools and surrounding supermarkets for trial sales. But how could students buy a product that even shop owners had never seen? So, Xiangpiaopiao included a red note in each box: 'This box contains an extra cup of milk tea, invited by Xiangpiaopiao for the shop owner to taste personally.' The market gradually responded. The sales team bought dozens of copies of 'China Yellow Pages,' printed out the addresses of primary, middle, and high schools within a radius of over ten kilometers based on the location of each trial sales point, and then mailed them to the trial points, saying, 'Sell the milk tea to these places.' —The phone rang nonstop. Some trial shop owners were curious: 'You guys are amazing! How do you know there are so many schools around me? I've been here for years and didn't know!' Following this method, step by step, Xiangpiaopiao successively focused on major cities with radiating influence like Hangzhou, Zhengzhou, Nanjing, and Beijing, doing them thoroughly, then radiating to surrounding cities, leveraging momentum to achieve success naturally. At the national sugar and wine fair held in Jinan in 2005, Xiangpiaopiao officially recruited distributors nationwide. Previously, distributors had never seen cup milk tea. After tasting it, they were excited and signed orders in droves. A few months later, orders from all over the country poured into Huzhou, and Xiangpiaopiao's book funds quickly rose to 50 million yuan. —The ground forces were accelerating, while the aerial advertising bombardment remained focused. That year, with limited financial strength, Xiangpiaopiao spent 30 million yuan, only on Hunan Satellite TV. Xiangpiaopiao became the first in the milk tea industry to advertise. Some people didn't understand: the national market wasn't fully covered, and it wasn't in supermarkets, so why advertise? In fact, on the night he decided to spend 30 million yuan on advertising, Jiang Jianqi didn't sleep all night. After repeated hesitation, he finally strengthened his belief: 'For new products that are easily imitated, the first punch must be heavy and fierce, and must quickly enter the customer's mind.' The power of belief is sometimes ten times stronger than confidence. It's worth mentioning this 15-second ad: On a train, a girl holds a milk tea, looking like she wants to drink it but doesn't. Suddenly, everything goes dark—the train enters a tunnel. The train quickly exits the tunnel. Huh? Where's the milk tea? It was stolen by a boy in front. This is an ad that could make people 'faint,' but surprisingly, it was extremely effective. Because they were afraid the audience wouldn't understand, the ad repeatedly said 'Xiangpiaopiao milk tea' and 'milk tea fragrance wafting'—a total of seven 'Xiangpiaopiao's. In fact, this ad also prompts a thought: What kind of ad is a good ad? We'll answer this question later. Ignition (2) By 2006, China's cup milk tea market began to change. In the previous two years, Xiangpiaopiao had fought across the country, leaving competitors in the dust. Its sales jumped from tens of millions in 2005 to 480 million yuan in 2006. The speed of expansion in just one year surprised even Jiang Jianqi. In the turbulent FMCG world, the gross margin for cup milk tea was over 40% at that time. Was there such a good business? The cake attracted predators. Xiangpiaopiao caught the attention of peers, and resistance came. In the second half of 2006, Youlemei under Strong Group, Lipton奶茶 under Lipton, and Xiangyue奶茶 under Dahao Da successively entered the cup milk tea market... In a short time, dozens of milk tea brands appeared nationwide. The most competitive was Youlemei under Strong Group. Strong Group started with jelly and has been in the food industry for many years. Whether in financial strength, distributor network, or sales team size, it was clearly superior to Xiangpiaopiao. Xiangpiaopiao entered a period of fighting alone against a pack of wolves. At this time, Strong Group declared: 'Who are Old Jiang and Old Cai? Never heard of them in the industry. We'll take down Xiangpiaopiao within two years.' In fact, Strong Group had the confidence. For example, in seaweed, its Meihaoshiguang seaweed overtook the category creator Boli seaweed in just a few years. Clearly, heroism still lingered in their hearts. Strong Group struck first, launching an advertising volume three times that of Xiangpiaopiao and a sales team four times larger. But a year passed, and it seemed to have no impact on Xiangpiaopiao. The reason was that Strong Group made a positioning error: it named its milk tea 'Strong Group Milk Tea.' Since Strong Group jelly was deeply rooted in people's minds, this naming was as abrupt as Bawang shampoo launching Bawang herbal tea. Even if the intensity of the abruptness differed. Strong Group was an old hand after all. It quickly realized its mistake and showed the courage to cut off its own arm, letting all previous advertising money go down the drain: in the second half of 2007, it recalled all old-brand milk tea from the market and relaunched a new brand—Youlemei. Thus, a real market competition began. So, what was Xiangpiaopiao doing during this period? Due to Strong Group's initial mistake, Jiang Jianqi felt the opponent was not as formidable as imagined. Coupled with the smooth sailing in previous years, Xiangpiaopiao really 'floated.' In 2007, it introduced a grand development plan: first, launch a convenient rice cake project aimed at replacing instant noodles; second, open milk tea chain stores to enter the catering industry; third, enter the real estate market. They acted immediately. The convenient rice cake project invested over 30 million yuan, two milk tea shops were opened, and business was surprisingly good. Even more humorous, Xiangpiaopiao was also selling peanuts at this time, with sales reaching over 30 million yuan. On one side was the floating Xiangpiaopiao, and on the other, the pursuing Youlemei. From 2007 to 2009, price wars, channel wars, advertising wars, and verbal wars rose one after another. Xiangpiaopiao had to face attacks from many opponents while also diverting energy to other diversified projects. Jiang Jianqi realized: crisis was coming. In 2008, Xiangpiaopiao's sales revenue approached 1 billion yuan, while Youlemei's sales kept rising. By the first half of 2009, it was very close to Xiangpiaopiao. Xiangpiaopiao was in jeopardy. Pain Reform means daring to cut off your own flesh. This applies to companies in transition as well. In the second half of 2009, Jiang Jianqi began deep reflection and also visited many domestic marketing management institutions. He tried to find a prescription for his company and an answer for his future business career. —Focus, concentration, and withdrawal from diversification: this was the answer Jiang Jianqi got. But truly cutting off business segments other than milk tea required great courage. First, cut the rice cake project: 30 million yuan had been invested, and not even a bubble appeared. Painful. Second, cut the peanut project: annual sales were over 30 million yuan. Closing it caused great internal controversy. The production manager was so anxious he was hospitalized. In the hospital, he held Jiang Jianqi's hand and said, 'President Jiang, this factory cannot be closed!' At that moment, Jiang Jianqi felt an indescribable sadness. Third, cut the real estate project: at that time, the huge profits in real estate were obvious to all. Many thought Jiang Jianqi was crazy, but he insisted that after the previous real estate project was completed, Xiangpiaopiao would never enter that industry again. In fact, a company is sometimes like a person. The workshop runs, employees work, products sell—this is the company breathing. Being in it, you can feel its pulse. Suddenly, three projects were shut down at once, like sending away three children you raised yourself. Jiang Jianqi felt pain. Of course, pain can be long-term or short-term, big or small. At that time, Xiangpiaopiao had to make strategic sacrifices and force itself back onto an unknown path that might be even more painful. The climax came again. Xiangpiaopiao, betting everything on milk tea, began to emphasize its position as the industry pioneer. 'The pioneer of cup milk tea, Xiangpiaopiao sells X billion cups a year, cups linked together can circle the Earth X times.'—This is the ad that the whole country seems to have heard. Now is the time to answer the earlier question: 'What kind of ad is a good ad?' In fact, after the first ad, Xiangpiaopiao launched another ad: Jiang Jianqi found the then-popular online singer Xiangxiang and asked the composer of 'Mice Love Rice' to write a song called 'Xiangpiaopiao' for her. This song was later used in an ad starring Chen Hao. This ad was directed by a Hong Kong director and is recognized as the highest-quality ad Xiangpiaopiao ever made, 'like an art film.' But is an ad like an art film a good ad? Final market sales data showed that those seemingly rustic, uncultured ads were more likely to produce market results. Jiang Jianqi said, 'For TV ads, sound is more important than text, and text is more important than visuals. Many ads have beautiful visuals, but after watching, consumers don't even know what the company does. Such ads are completely meaningless.' Besides advertising, Xiangpiaopiao also began to differentiate its products from competitors. For example, packaging: Xiangpiaopiao's cups were larger than competitors', and the paper was more refined, highlighting the features of ample quantity and good value. Even the straws: other brands simply folded them and put them in the cup, while Xiangpiaopiao specially customized a two-section combined straw, which was short in two sections normally, and could be extended by a gentle pull when used... By the end of 2009, Xiangpiaopiao and Youlemei finally reached a historic juncture. At this time, another industry variable appeared: inflation led to rising raw material costs. So, should cup milk tea prices rise? Xiangpiaopiao decided to take the lead in raising prices, because low profit margins would not only drag the company into the mud but also damage the industry. But if Xiangpiaopiao raised prices and competitors didn't, what then? Jiang Jianqi's team fully assessed this and believed competitors might have two reactions: follow the increase or stay put. They prepared two contingency plans in advance. But no one expected that competitors would actually lower prices instead of raising them—to expand market share, Youlemei abandoned profit thinking, launching what seemed like a suicide air raid. Crossing the Most Difficult Moment In 2010, every inch of land was stained with blood. In September, because many distributors in traditional circulation channels were driven by profit and would stock whichever brand was cheaper, in markets like Hunan and Hubei where Xiangpiaopiao was not strong, Youlemei began a large-scale invasion with obvious results. What to do? Holding on meant everything. Jiang Jianqi even prepared for the worst-case scenario of a 30% market decline, but firmly refused to lower prices. At this time, a new problem arose: the price increase decision made a few months earlier encountered execution difficulties. At a market analysis meeting, provincial and city managers complained. Vice President Cai Jianfeng, responsible for the price adjustment strategy, slammed the table and said, 'This meeting is over.' What did they do instead? The next day, several hundred people were taken to a team-building center in Fuyang, Zhejiang. Cai even brought his 10-year-old daughter. A Singaporean coach led the training. After two days and two nights of team-building, at the summary meeting, everyone was in tears: the training subjects they thought were impossible were all completed. —So, the market analysis meeting was reconvened right after the summary meeting. Cai Jianfeng asked, 'Can this price increase succeed?' 'Definitely!' The crowd below shouted in unison... In fact, raising prices for FMCG companies is indeed a difficult proposition. Even for a company like Master Kong, if a price increase decision can be implemented from headquarters to terminals within half a year, it's a remarkable achievement, 'worthy of a celebration.' Since its founding, Xiangpiaopiao has raised prices five times, sometimes achieving the goal within two months. In this battle, Jiang Jianqi showed his toughness. Seeing the opponent seize the opportunity to expand the market on a large scale, he remained unmoved, never compromising, never yielding. In December, good news came from the terminals: even though Xiangpiaopiao raised prices, many distributors returned to Xiangpiaopiao. The reason was that milk tea is a product with high requirements for taste. Consumers were used to Xiangpiaopiao's flavor, which was generally reported to be purer. Other brands' milk tea, though cheaper, often only produced short-term purchase effects. After a thrilling price war, in 2010, Xiangpiaopiao's milk tea sales exceeded 1 billion cups, with sales revenue exceeding 2 billion yuan. Entering 2011, Xiangpiaopiao's sales continued to grow, widening the gap with competitors again, and maintaining its position as the industry's number one brand. It's worth mentioning that a big reason Xiangpiaopiao was able to hold on during the price war was its zero-inventory strategy. Xiangpiaopiao products are produced on an order basis, payment before delivery, and consignment is refused. This eliminates inventory pressure. Refusing consignment is a style Jiang Jianqi has developed over years of doing business. He believes that Chinese distributors and manufacturers need a closer combination, and consignment, where distributors can sell the goods or return them if unsold, often leads to a lack of responsibility. He remembers one year when Zhejiang was hit by floods. He went to the market and saw that the products at the bottom, soaked by water, were basically consigned products, while the products truly purchased for distribution were placed on top. Therefore, when initially selecting distributors, Xiangpiaopiao also valued whether they only sold Xiangpiaopiao products. Currently, Xiangpiaopiao has thousands of distributors nationwide, and over one-third of them have Xiangpiaopiao milk tea as their main business. Xiangpiaopiao also leaves enough profit margin for them. In the distributor link, Youlemei showed inherent shortcomings. Youlemei's distributors often had both milk tea and jelly products. Once the off-season for milk tea came and maintenance was insufficient, sales often dropped immediately. And because jelly products provided support, many distributors found it hard to focus solely on selling milk tea, leading to insufficient sales motivation. Sky High and Earth Thick Cup milk tea—an industry initially unnoticed—showed astonishing explosive power. Why? First, because ten years ago, Xiangpiaopiao seized the structural defect in China's milk tea market and opened a new category door. Second, thanks to the fierce competition among various experts, they jointly expanded the market cake. In fact, for a company like Xiangpiaopiao that relies on a single category to defeat enemies, the advantage is concentrating strength into a fist without retreat, while the disadvantage is the market capacity of the industry itself. Three years ago, Xiangpiaopiao's sales reached 2.4 billion yuan. Whether it can break through the industry ceiling of 5 billion or even 10 billion yuan depends on whether the company can build a platform strategy in the coming years. Jiang Jianqi is clearly aware of this issue. He established a milk tea research center in Beijing, attempting to break through the industry bottleneck from a technical perspective; at the same time, he expanded north to Tianjin and west to Chengdu, building factories and increasing capacity... More importantly, he needs to break a consumption habit. —The market is so wonderful. The imagination about the Jianghu seems never to see an end. Jiang Jianqi said, if you want to question the future and question tomorrow, then think about Xiangpiaopiao ten years ago, and yourself ten years ago. 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