Nowadays, the hottest business trend seems to be the "rise of China-chic." From Palace Museum lipsticks to Perfect Diary, Florasis, Heytea, Genki Forest, Bosideng, and Feihe, a wave of domestic brand consumption is heating up. But this is only a phenomenon, not the essence. Some say the rise of China-chic is a symbol of cultural confidence; others believe it is a natural spillover of China's supply chain reaching world-class levels; still others think it is the success of clever marketing and public sentiment "seeding" and brand detonation... None of these are wrong, but if we return to the essence, every category champion after the rise of China-chic, that is, every consumption target we call "new domestic goods," actually represents the formation of a new mental entry point and the establishment of new brand equity. Therefore, we have summarized four roadmaps behind the rise of new domestic brands and deeply analyzed the process of building China-chic brands and the attribution analysis of their rise. But the general conclusion can be revealed in advance: Before the rise of China-chic, the overall characteristic of China's economy was a "supply chain economy"; after the rise, it entered the era of "brand power economy." Only with brand rise can the long-term rise of China-chic be safeguarded.

-01- Creating New Category Awareness and Locking the Track —Genki Forest In the rise of "new domestic goods," the category with the biggest dividend is what we usually call "creating new category awareness." The biggest feature of such brands is that by locking the mental track, they capture the huge dividend from new additions within a subcategory. Genki Forest actually did a few things right: 1. Insight into trends and creation of concepts; 2. Multi-faceted momentum building until detonation, including social seeding, KOL endorsement, social fission, media hype, and offline advertising bombardment; 3. Large-scale replication of success, bringing in capital, and establishing multi-directional, complex, and independent channels; These three dimensions are not just marketing rhythm; they must also be supported by actual reality. Further analysis reveals three more precise focal points: 1. Insight into trends and concept creation must be based on new product strength; 2. Multi-faceted momentum building and detonation must be based on innovative channel reach and user interaction models; 3. Large-scale replication with capital entry must be based on impressive early growth data; These three dimensions will become the standard procedure for our research on all cases, but you will find that simply completing these three tasks is not enough. Successful entrepreneurs have their own micro-innovations in different sub-segments, which are also key. Genki Forest founder Tang Binsen was born in 1982 and has been a super学霸 since childhood. In 2001, he was admitted to Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. In his sophomore year, he participated in the "International Programming Contest" and won the gold medal. In 2014, Chinese Media acquired Zhiming Xingtong, which had planned an independent IPO, for 2.66 billion yuan. That year, Tang Binsen was only 32 years old and already a billionaire. He did not immediately leave the company he founded because the acquisition agreement required him not to resign or sell all shares within three years. But the ambitious Tang Binsen was unwilling to tie himself to existing success. He began his investment career, but in Genki Forest, founded in 2016, Tang Binsen holds more than 60% of shares as the absolute controlling shareholder. This means this time, his role is not an investor but a founder. Tang Binsen Seizing consumption trends and creating new concepts is the first step in the rise of new consumer brands. Therefore, many articles simply attribute Tang Binsen and Genki Forest's success to his accurate grasp of young people's pursuit of sugar-free and health concepts. But if you think carefully, this reason is not very tenable, or rather, this factor alone is not enough to lead to Genki Forest's success. Sugar-free beverages were not invented by Genki Forest. In 2011, Nongfu Spring launched the sugar-free tea drink "Oriental Leaf," and Tianwo Tea House launched the "Tianwo Jin" series of three sugar-free teas; in 2012, Master Kong launched the sugar-free tea beverage Benwei Tea House; and in the sugar-free carbonated beverage track, Coca-Cola launched Diet Coke in the last century; in the fruit-flavored sparkling water field, the old high-end sparkling water brand Perrier also has 4-5 fruit-flavored (but unsweetened) sparkling waters to choose from. So, Genki Forest's success is definitely not because it was the first to launch a product with absolute product advantage. However, in terms of product strength, Genki Forest optimized itself to the "category first" position. Sugar-free beverages are not a first, but Genki Forest fixed the shortcomings of predecessors:

  1. Earlier sugar-free tea drinks may be healthier, but the biggest problem is that they have no sweetness. Drinks that eliminate "sweetness," such as sugar-free tea and sugar-free Perrier, are destined for a very small audience. They are more suitable for groups that care highly about health and are willing to tolerate taste loss. This group is too small, so Genki Forest did not choose it. This is also an important reason why even Genki Forest's tea drinks are sweet;
  2. Traditional "two colas" do have many sugar-free carbonated drinks, but their "parent bodies" like Coke, Fanta, and Sprite have been too deeply branded as "unhealthy"; In terms of resource strength, Genki Forest is far behind the "two colas" in strength. It does not yet have the ability to invent new sweeteners, but this does not prevent it from making a single-point breakthrough in publicity. It claims to have found "erythritol"—a sucrose substitute that ensures sweet taste while avoiding large amounts of calories. Unlike the "aspartame" added to sugar-free cola, erythritol has not had negative news like "affecting health." This is one of the keys to Genki Forest's emergence. After establishing the basic product form, Tang Binsen faced the challenge of injecting this mental concept into consumers' minds. In the early days, his approach was the standard "two micro, one shake, one book," with "one book" referring to Xiaohongshu. The extreme contradictory mentality of loving sweetness and fearing sugar is very typical among young people (especially females), and Tang Binsen happened to grasp the balance between the two. Genki Forest's seeding technique on Xiaohongshu reached master level. For example, Genki Forest has a post with 19,000 likes on Xiaohongshu. The well-known IP "Dad's Evaluation" (with 4.085 million followers) did a review on "sugar and weight gain," and these two keywords directly hit core users and core pain points. Screenshot from Xiaohongshu APP "Dad's Evaluation" account In addition to Xiaohongshu, platforms like Weibo, Kuaishou, and Douyin are also key for Genki Forest's community marketing. Celebrity endorsements are also common, with traffic stars like Fei Qiming, Wang Yibo, Deng Lun, and Huang Jingyu liking, and first-line stars like Huang Xiaoming and Jackie Chan cheering, and live-streaming king Li Jiaqi assisting sales. The latest spokesperson is the popular sister Zhang Yuqi from "Sisters Who Make Waves"... But if it were only this, Genki Forest might just be one of the better internet-famous drinks, and it would be replaced by brands with higher "seeding" skills and more money to invite better celebrities. So, the most correct thing Genki Forest did was to be prepared for danger in times of peace. After the attention from traffic tactics significantly increased, it did two things right—first, lock the track; second, build brand equity. Locking the track is a crucial step: "Father of Modern Marketing" Philip Kotler proposed the STP theory, whose core is that enterprises should conduct market segmentation and targeting, and then occupy customer minds in the segmented market through clear brand positioning. For Genki Forest, locking the track means basically locking the "sugar-free" field, never easily stepping out of this range, and maintaining the position of "sugar-free leader." Even if there are later minor sub-categories like milk tea, they are not mainstream. Marketing researcher Zheng Guangtao pointed out that STP emphasizes market segmentation, even placing it before brand positioning, because consumers in the market are scattered, and broad-net market expansion is inefficient. Therefore, successful people should focus on a key segmented market. He believes that 1% penetration in 10 markets is not as good as 10% penetration in 1 market. Because 10% of consumers in one market will ignite the remaining 90%, and even ignite other related markets. This obviously aligns with Genki Forest's approach, but "locking" is only the marketer's wish, because countless brands will try to enter this mental space. So, how to lock becomes the key of keys. Genki Forest's approach is to quickly "detonate" after choosing the track. What is detonation? What is the standard for detonation? The standard explanation is that an explosion is caused by rapid combustion in a limited space. In short, so-called brand detonation requires focusing on a key segmented market, high-density coverage and reaching consumers. When market penetration pressure exceeds the detonation critical point, if brand equity and sales show exponential growth, it is considered successful detonation. On the contrary, open traffic space cannot achieve detonation effect because traffic has a certain volatility, is inherently short-lived in memory, cannot form mental impact, and cannot burn extremely in a limited space. In the process of many new brand establishments studied by the author, there is a natural dividing line similar to the "Qinling-Huaihe" line from traffic tactics to brand tactics. Broadly speaking, this line is from traffic-based tactics centered on massive online PR and extreme KOL seeding to brand detonation tactics using variety shows and elevator media as elements of offline media. For example, Focus Media is characterized by large budget investment. However, because it is stably built on the life path of 300 million core middle-class people—the office-apartment cycle—as long as you choose the right "mental nail" (i.e., the advertising slogan) and continuously "swing the hammer" (i.e., loop playback), you can quickly establish effective reach. In terms of mental impact, its effect on building brand equity and breaking through the "blood-brain barrier" of mainstream consumer minds is more stable and deeper than any other offline media, so it becomes the "gold standard" for our brand growth observation. In this regard, Genki Forest's operation is textbook-like. It continuously seeds online to expand popularity, then closely cooperates with top internet celebrities like Li Jiaqi, harvesting sales through live streaming, with multiple out-of-stock events. When it found that online seeding increments reached the ceiling, Genki Forest immediately chose to strongly expand offline, in spaces like apartment buildings and office buildings that consumers pass daily, playing brand ads 4-6 times at high frequency to "force" brand ads into users' minds subtly. Of course, there is a premise: the group active in the apartment-office frontline is mainly mainstream white-collar workers, a group of up to 310 million, which highly overlaps with Genki Forest's consumer base. It must be emphasized that investing in offline media seems like a simple, standardized operation, as if you can just pay and place an order, but not every enterprise can maximize the use of this tool. Those who can master this tool must have two characteristics besides sufficient budget—firm will and courage to invest. This must be linked to the study of founder Tang Binsen. In reviewing history, we found that as early as when he operated game overseas, he adopted a saturation attack strategy: "We dared to spend 1.8 billion on advertising when we created 2 billion in revenue, doing brand exposure in central cities like New York, London, and Moscow. This approach of playing from high to low rather than the opposite made 'Clash of Kings' the most successful exported game in Chinese history." This principle is also applied to Genki Forest. When Genki Forest's actual sales were still about one-tenth of Coca-Cola's in China, its offline media investment dimension and intensity, as well as the amount of information consumers perceived, exceeded brands like Coca-Cola. After online youthful tactics and offline elevator media strong detonation, Genki Forest's brand awareness quickly broke out of the circle, almost becoming a star brand known to young consumers in first- and second-tier cities.

-02- Based on Supply Chain, Providing Differentiated Experience —Perfect Diary and Florasis If Genki Forest's key battle lies in creating new categories and continuously consolidating track advantages through brand equity accumulation, and its product strength is relatively simple, then the rise of Perfect Diary and Florasis is more referential because one of their success prerequisites is China's strong industrial and supply chain. During the 2019 "618" e-commerce festival, among 110 brands on Tmall that broke 100 million, 60% were domestic brands; 589 domestic beauty and skincare brands saw year-on-year transaction growth of over 100%; during the 2019 Double 11 e-commerce festival, domestic makeup brand Perfect Diary ranked first in the makeup list, followed by first-line international brands like Maybelline, Estée Lauder, and Lancôme. In the same year as Genki Forest's founding, 2016, Huang Jinfeng founded Perfect Diary. Most of the founding team graduated from Sun Yat-sen University. Sun Yat-sen is also known as Sun Yixian, so Perfect Diary's company is named Yixian E-commerce. The official meaning of its brand name "Perfect Diary" is Unlimited Beauty, translated as beauty without limits. Actually, some stories are not as grand as they are polished, like slogans such as "China's L'Oréal." To be honest, Huang Jinfeng initially thought of just agenting a few foreign beauty brands and doing domestic agency operations. Later, he found opportunities in makeup and used rich industry experience to start OEM products. In 2017, he created a small shop named "Perfect Diary" on Taobao. After listing products, he used marketing techniques learned at Yuni Fang to sell them. He spent heavily to invite big stars like Angela Chang, popular traffic star Zhu Zhengting, and sales king Li Jiaqi to endorse. The next Double 11, it achieved the amazing feat of breaking 100 million yuan in sales in just 90 minutes. Like Genki Forest, Perfect Diary initially took a light model, using OEM (original equipment manufacturing) and ODM (original design manufacturing) models. Perfect Diary's three major OEM factories are Cosmax, Intercos, and Shanghai Zhenchen. These three have historically cooperated with international big brands: Cosmax OEMs for Dior, Lancôme, and YSL; Intercos OEMs for Armani, Gucci, and La Mer; Shanghai Zhenchen OEMs for L'Oréal and Estée Lauder. Zhang Xilun, author of "12000-word Comprehensive Interpretation of Perfect Diary," wrote: The world's strongest cosmetics OEM and ODM factories are almost all rooted in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta. After years of OEM for big brands, they have become very systematic. Even rapidly rising domestic brands can easily stand on the shoulders of giants. Perfect Diary adopts a dual approach of creating hit products and building a matrix. Generally, big brand cosmetics development cycles are half a year to a year, and some single products sell for years. But with OEM and ODM models, Perfect Diary maintains a launch rate of 5-6 new products per month. This rapid update frequency, combined with price advantages, is full of temptation for the Z generation with "curiosity consumption," and also ensures product update frequency, giving Perfect Diary a very high capital turnover rate. In research on Perfect Diary's marketing discussions, the most common is the "three-stage seeding" on online media, and its strong private domain traffic building is not something the author needs to repeat. In contrast, research on its offline marketing is less, but more worth digging into. When people focus on explicit factors like seeding strategies and Tmall 618 lists, we should actually pay more attention to its offline media investment—because offline media investment is often a watershed, a test standard for whether a company decides to continue traffic tactics as an "internet celebrity" or establish an offline foundation for long-term brand building. Overall, we can consider that Perfect Diary is expanding offline investment. That is, in addition to pursuing the pleasure of online traffic dividends and sales surges, Perfect Diary has begun to use offline media platforms to build a brand moat. During Double 11, office white-collar workers were constantly bombarded by Perfect Diary ads endorsed by Zhou Xun at elevator entrances. According to classic advertising classification, there are two paths to trigger user action: First, influence behavior by stimulating emotions; Second, influence emotions and behavior by shaping cognition; We usually classify internet traffic ads, seeding monetization, and live-streaming sales as the first type, i.e., emotion-stimulating. Its characteristics are easy precision, clearly measurable ROI, fast monetization, and quantifiability. However, the first type of advertising has long boards but also absolute shortcomings. If we look at the total time users spend on internet content, a single product's display time on the internet is very short, so it usually uses emotion stimulation to try to prompt users to click and buy within 5 seconds. In live-streaming scenarios, the host's personal performance and user control ability become key. But impulsive consumption is not easy to cause mental memory; you forget after buying. That is, any emotional stimulation is only suitable for short-term impulsive consumption and has almost no help in cultivating long-term brand preference and consumption habits. Because emotions come quickly and dissipate faster. Performance ads can make you order within 5 seconds, but also make you forget after 5 seconds. Do you remember what brands you saw in performance ads this month? Let's first look at the surface market phenomenon—according to media reports: "In this 'reborn' summer after the epidemic, beauty brands have joined the ranks of attracting new young groups. In addition to new forces like Perfect Diary riding the traffic tailwind, domestic and foreign beauty giants like Guerlain, Clinique, and Estée Lauder have also begun to incorporate youthfulness into their brand marketing strategies, dominating outdoor media like elevators and igniting offline topics." For example, Chando chose the positive and sunny Xie Na as skincare spokesperson, attracting a wave of young fans; Clinique used spokesperson Gao Yuanyuan to target the young whitening market, promoting the new third-generation "202 Whitening Laser Bottle." And new domestic brands represented by Florasis also began to use offline detonation to launch brand storms. In contrast, Florasis was born a year later and took a differentiated national style route from Perfect Diary's "affordable alternative to European and American big brands." Its early market strategy was also Douyin traffic + Xiaohongshu seeding, live-streaming harvesting, etc. But it is worth noting that starting in October this year, Florasis began offline media investment. Many consumers entering and exiting specific scenes like office buildings and apartments were brainwashed by the "powder" ad endorsed by actress Du Juan; in October, Florasis announced on Weibo that Ado became the promotion ambassador for Florasis Miao Impression, and launched "Florasis Miao Impression Haute Couture," and then its new brand ambassador Ado also appeared on elevator screens, detonating the mainstream urban population.

-03- Rejuvenation of Old Brands—Bosideng and Feihe It is not only enterprises founded a few years ago that are qualified to be called "new domestic goods." There is a type of enterprise that may have been established for decades, with a broad sales base and solid product foundation, but lacks brand equity accumulation and brand detonation. However, once old brands discover the path to brand rejuvenation, they have a greater probability of "turning into dragons when encountering wind and cloud." Essentially, it is the improvement of product strength, but the real detonation is the completion of brand "regrowth." Bosideng is a particularly prominent example. There is a small story here—Bosideng had been seeking breakthroughs and once took the "riding alone for a thousand miles" approach, letting its menswear brand spend huge money to establish a large store on Oxford Street in the UK. However, because there was no good brand equity and it did not fully enter the minds of British consumers. As a domestic brand that has maintained "old brand, reliable quality" for many years, Bosideng learned from its pain, and amid increasing competitive pressure, it sensitively discovered its own brand equity deficiency. After that, we saw the comprehensive benchmarking against Canada Goose, inviting international top designers for co-branded designs, landing on New York and Milan Fashion Weeks for launches, and making the Everest series of high-end polar clothing priced at over 10,000 yuan... And all these efforts finally, through CCTV and Focus Media brand detonation, broke through user minds, causing a wave of customer congestion in Bosideng offline stores not seen for years. In 2018, it recorded revenue exceeding 10 billion, with annual market value growth of 300%. After 2019, Bosideng has become a trendy brand that urban groups actively follow. Feihe's path is also worth learning from. Five years ago, China's high-end infant formula was firmly in the hands of foreign brands. In fact, in terms of quality alone, products from high-end brands like Feihe are no worse than foreign brands. But the brand equity in consumers' minds has always been low. To this end, Feihe strengthened the promotion of milk powder quality, such as introducing the "Beidou 42° milk source belt," and on the other hand, changed its long-standing slogan "consistent good milk powder" to "more suitable for Chinese babies' constitution," fully creating a differentiated concept. Compared with foreign brands' "global formula," "global" is clearly not as good as "more suitable for China" in conveying an exclusive attribute, because Chinese common sense is that one side's water and soil nourishes one side's people. Many maternal and infant stores in first- and second-tier cities found that more and more customers were asking about Feihe milk powder, but they had no stock to sell. Flexible merchants immediately followed consumer demand, ultimately achieving coverage of more than 100,000 of the 130,000 maternal and infant merchants nationwide. Feihe, while heavily advertising on CCTV and Focus Media, also conducted comprehensive ground promotion. It is an enterprise that firmly combines "air force bombing" and "ground battles"—in the first year of brand advertising, it held 100,000 mini-show mother education activities at maternal and infant terminals; three years later, it was 530,000 mini-shows a year. The powerful air advertising firepower plus strong terminal ground promotion greatly shortened the time for advertising to take effect. Currently, according to industry statistics, Feihe's domestic market share has surpassed all foreign brands to rank first in China, becoming the "number one" in Chinese milk powder. In five years, its market value rose from 1 billion to 160 billion. The cases of Feihe and Bosideng bring inspiration to investors investing in Chinese enterprises: Chinese consumers are not necessarily "foreign is better." If local advantages and professional attributes can be appropriately highlighted, and then precisely detonated among mainstream consumer groups, domestic and old brands can also enjoy brand dividends. Especially at a time when China-chic is rising and national confidence and cohesion are unprecedentedly united.

-04- Focusing on Segments, Defeating Strong Foreign Brands with Violent Aesthetics —Milkground On March 12, 2019, Guangze Co., Ltd. (600882.SH) announced that it had completed changing its company name from "Shanghai Guangze Food Technology Co., Ltd." to "Shanghai Milkground Food Technology Co., Ltd." on March 4, and its securities abbreviation would also change from "Guangze Co., Ltd." to "Milkground," which had been approved by the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The prominence of the "Milkground" brand did not come out of nowhere. Public information shows that Milkground officially defined 2019 as the first year of brand development. Before the name change, Milkground focused on offline elevator media and started a strong screen-dominating mode, determined to be the "first cheese brand in China." In the cheese market, Chinese companies do not have category awareness advantages at all. Because cheese is a genuine imported product and a consumer good that Chinese people have not yet accepted very well. Some say: "Chinese people can't even recognize all international big cheese brands, how can they accept domestic cheese brands?" But Milkground happened to find the key to the problem—Chinese people's shallow awareness of cheese consumption is not a bad thing but a good thing. It shows that foreign brands have not established sufficient brand awareness in Chinese consumers' minds. In this case, "entering blank minds" is much easier than "changing inherent minds." "Milkground, Milkground, cheese sticks, cheese sticks, high calcium and nutritious, accompanying me to grow, really delicious, really delicious." So, a cheese ad adapted from the nursery rhyme "Two Tigers" frequently bombarded elevator entrances. Some say this ad is brainwashing, some find it cute, but importantly, it is easy to remember and full of childlike fun. Behind this simple and cute ad is a brand detonation full of violent aesthetics—Milkground cheese stick ads were broadcast in dozens of major cities nationwide, including first-tier cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, covering hundreds of thousands of buildings and communities, with high-frequency all-day broadcast. For Milkground, such a fierce brand offensive was not unexpected. In the view of its person in charge, Milkground had made full production preparations, and 2019 was the first year of Milkground's brand. It can be said that Milkground accumulated huge brand equity in a very short time. A direct result of Milkground's continuous screen dominance was the rapid surge in its online popularity. According to Baidu Index 90-day search index, its main competitor Breguet was slightly higher than Milkground for a long time, but from the end of February 2019, Milkground rose sharply, with search index several times that of Breguet. The 90-day WeChat Index also showed the same trend as the Baidu search index. Milkground's WeChat Index suddenly spiked at the end of February, and thereafter maintained a lead several times that of Breguet. Taking the WeChat Index on March 11 as an example, Milkground was 27,010, Breguet was 9,670, with the former about three times the latter. Milkground's opponent Breguet is not a novice but an internationally renowned brand. Breguet is a French cheese brand, born at the foot of the Alps, and is the largest international brand under the Savencia Group. To date, Breguet cheese sells more than a dozen series and over 50 varieties through retail, catering, and industrial channels, and has been selling in China for over 30 years. In the cheese field, the Savencia Group focuses on cheese and specialty dairy products, is the world's largest specialty cheese manufacturer, with 60 years of cheese-making history and world-class cheese production processes. Such a cheese brand with strength, heritage, and awareness should, logically, have an absolute monopoly. In fact, many such top brands in the previous era—the era of TV media platforms and hypermarket channels—relied on the strong financial resources and advanced operational concepts of multinational companies to defeat a generation of Chinese brands, basically occupying every category of daily chemicals, food, and mass consumer goods. However, after 20 years of development, with both offline traffic and digital capabilities, as well as a rich arsenal of brand strategy weapons supported by unique theories, Chinese brands have the strategic and tactical infrastructure to comprehensively challenge international brands in all fields (except luxury goods). Take Milkground as an example. After more than a year of persistent investment and various supporting strategies, its sales in China far exceeded Breguet, winning the battle in one fell swoop.

-05- Conclusion: The Underlying Logic of the Rise of Domestic Goods Having written so many cases of the rise of domestic goods, we try to summarize the regular underlying logic: First, be good at seizing the time window. The current rise of new domestic goods makes us feel that business opportunities are everywhere, but for micro-level track competition, every success must be due to correctly seizing a key time window. One cannot step into the same river twice, and a time window cannot open twice for an enterprise. If Genki Forest had not seized the window of the rise of sugar-free healthy beverages, but followed behind other category pioneers; if Perfect Diary and Florasis had not seized the window of Z-generation consumers seeking affordable alternatives and being more familiar with China-chic; if Bosideng and Feihe had not seized the window of old domestic brand upgrades; if Milkground had not seized the time window of foreign brands' complacency in marketing... then many cases in this article would have been rewritten, or even not become cases. Second, do not fall into the traffic trap, do not let excessive pursuit of traffic make business hostage to traffic, becoming "making the world full of difficult business." Recently, an article titled "Internet Traffic Makes the World Full of Difficult Business" was widely shared. The content is quite professional and cannot be fully repeated here. But the core argument is that traffic-centric "performance advertising" will make business owners lose direction, indulging in the pleasure and addiction brought by a large number of traffic-based, performance-based marketing methods such as seeding quantity, exposure times, live-streaming sales, and purchase conversion, losing the grasp of the essence of creating success—building a brand. The article argues that without brand equity, no matter how surging traffic is, it is only a short-term effect. Performance ads make people "buy," brand ads make people "love." "Buying" without "love" cannot last; "love" without "buying" is not true love. Strategically, the idea of bringing "love" through "buying" to establish a continuous relationship with users is far less direct and long-lasting than promoting more "buying" through "love." Third, the fundamental of differentiated marketing lies in flexibly choosing a combination of multiple marketing methods; no single model can solve all problems. Wang Xing, CEO of Kantar China and Global President of BrandZ, pointed out in a recent speech that according to the characteristics of enterprises, personalized and flexible combination of media investment will greatly enhance marketing effectiveness. She said: "In the future, social media communication mainly based on content marketing, combined with high-frequency offline communication mainly based on core life scenes, will be the two major communication trends to win brand value enhancement. In addition to the two micro and one shake on online social media, Xiaohongshu and Bilibili have also become important choices for young people's social interaction. Elevator media in apartment buildings and office buildings that consumers pass daily, represented by Focus Media, along with shopping malls, cinemas, and other media, are core contact points for consumers. Such media touchpoints have become increasingly meaningful for advertisers in the post-epidemic era, becoming one of the few media platforms with positive growth in the overall decline in the first half of the year in China." This actually tells us that any single method is not perfect. The dividing line and combination of performance advertising and brand detonation is a rhythm grasp that can be called "art." Perhaps an example can be given: the effect of traffic advertising is like making quick money, and the money earned must be deposited in a bank or fund in time, otherwise it will be lost. Online traffic achievements, if not combined with offline mental fixation, will cause a large loss of hard-won traffic effects. This has enlightening significance for the building of any brand. Once the tip is adopted, a payment of 400-2000 yuan will be made.