Click 'Read Original' for details. Red-can JDB remains scarce 50 days after re-launch announcement; analysts cite gold-can inventory pressure and other factors. At the June 15 launch event for the red-can product, JDB announced, "Within 45 days, wherever JDB is present, both red and gold cans must be available." Now, over 50 days later, how is market distribution progressing? Starting August 5, reporters visited markets in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shandong and found that the red-can launch plan has not proceeded as promised, with red-can JDB still rarely seen. The latest 1.441 billion yuan judgment in the "Wanglaoji" trademark dispute adds further pressure on JDB. Industry insiders point out that with red-can products not yet widely distributed, gold-can inventory still high, disputes with COFCO and ORG, and multiple factories facing bankruptcy, JDB may struggle to complete its three-year listing plan. I. Red-can product shows little sign of 'comeback' On June 15, JDB's new president Li Chunlin signed a mobilization order for the red-can product launch, stating: "From marketing to factories to operations, all staff must act immediately, uniting the company and market clients to begin full distribution. We will fight for 45 days to ensure that wherever herbal tea is available, JDB is there, and wherever JDB is, both red and gold cans are available." Starting August 5, reporters visited markets in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shandong and found that the red-can launch plan has not been fully implemented. A convenience store owner in Fengtai District, Beijing, said JDB sales staff never recommended the red-can product, and the store does not sell it. A clerk at a Beijing Wumart supermarket in Lizeqiao said they have never seen red-can JDB. A community store owner in Weifang, Shandong, also said, "Their (JDB's) salespeople are not very proactive and don't come often; they still sell gold-can products." A JDB wholesaler in Shanghai said, "Currently only gold-can products are available; we haven't received notice to sell red-can products." On JDB's official website homepage, there is currently no display of the red-can product. When a reporter inquired as a merchant with the gold-can JDB global investment promotion manager, the manager first said only gold-can products were available, then changed to say both gold and red cans are available. On e-commerce channels, a Beijing News reporter searched "JDB" on Taobao and found almost all gold-can products. Searching for "JDB red can," only one store called "Jinzhimu Online Supermarket" had the red-can product, but with zero sales. Among the seven products listed on JDB's JD self-operated flagship store, there is no red-can product. Regarding whether the red-can launch has encountered obstacles, reporters contacted JDB starting August 5 but had not received a response by press time. II. Easy to share hardship, hard to share prosperity Once upon a time, Wanglaoji and JDB worked side by side to build a significant share of the domestic herbal tea market. Many post-90s grew up drinking red-can herbal tea. But as the saying goes, it's easy to share hardship but hard to share prosperity. After establishing their market, tensions between Wanglaoji and JDB gradually escalated, leading to a years-long herbal tea dispute that entertained many onlookers. Recently, I reviewed their decade-long feud, which mainly revolves around trademark disputes and red-can packaging disputes. First, the trademark dispute. The origins trace back to 1995 when Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Group (GP Group), the holder of the Wanglaoji trademark, leased the production and sales rights of red-can Wanglaoji to JDB. In 2001, Hongdao Group's chairman Chen Hongdao signed an agreement with GP Group, allowing Hongdao Group to extend the production and operation rights of "Red Can Wanglaoji" until 2020. However, this involved Chen Hongdao bribing GP Group's former deputy chairman Li Yimin three times, totaling HK$3 million. After the bribery was exposed, GP Group took back the "Wanglaoji" brand in 2012. JDB lost the right to use the trademark and began building its own brand, "JDB." Regarding the red-can packaging dispute, on July 6, 2012, GP Group and JDB Group each filed lawsuits against the other over the rights to the red-can packaging on the same day. The Guangdong High Court's first-instance judgment ruled that GP Group should own the rights to the packaging of "Red Can Wanglaoji Herbal Tea," ordering JDB to stop infringement and pay GP Group 150 million yuan in economic losses plus over 260,000 yuan in reasonable legal costs. JDB subsequently launched gold-can packaging. However, the second-instance trial at the Supreme People's Court reversed the decision. In August 2017, the Supreme People's Court ruled that both GP Group and JDB had made significant contributions to the formation of the packaging rights for "Red Can Wanglaoji Herbal Tea," and both parties could share the rights, provided they do not harm others' legitimate interests. But in June this year, almost simultaneously with JDB's re-launch of red-can packaging, the court formally accepted GP Group's application for retrial of the "shared red-can packaging" ruling. GP Group believes that the "red-can packaging" and the "Wanglaoji" trademark should both belong to it and is determined to fight to the end. Summarizing this long-running dispute: back then, GP Group, due to inflexible institutional structures, handed the "bad hand" of Wanglaoji to JDB, a private enterprise with stronger operational capabilities. But later, JDB turned that bad hand into a winning one, making "Wanglaoji" a golden brand and turning negative assets into quality assets. GP Group then decided to take back the leased trademark, leaving JDB to fight legal battles while starting anew. Initially, JDB did well, leveraging its operational experience from running "Wanglaoji" and the rapid growth of the herbal tea market. In 2012, JDB's annual sales exceeded 20 billion yuan, and in 2013, they grew by 20-30% over 2012. But the good times didn't last. JDB used much of its profits to fight Wanglaoji, engaging in price wars, competing for distribution channels, and prolonged litigation, ultimately harming both sides. JDB's growth stalled in 2015 and declined in 2016, with sales dropping to 15 billion yuan in 2017. Although Wanglaoji surpassed JDB with 20 billion yuan in 2015, it also struggled. In my view, looking at development patterns across industries, competition between two strong players often hinders industry growth, keeping companies in a vicious cycle of burning cash and losses. Focusing too much on competitors while neglecting user experience leads to a counterproductive business state. Take the fiercely competitive internet tech industry: legendary rivalry stories abound, but endings are often unexpected. Didi and Kuaidi, Ctrip and Qunar, Meituan and Dianping—they often compete with billions in funding in the short term but quickly merge. In contrast, JDB and Wanglaoji in the FMCG industry have engaged in such long-term battles over trademarks and packaging, ultimately affecting the herbal tea industry's overall situation. This is clearly not a model to follow. III. No real winners in mutual attacks: Winning the fight but losing the market is not worth it Beyond formal price wars, channel battles, and lawsuits, JDB and Wanglaoji have also been busy in PR and marketing, endlessly retaliating against each other. Since GP Group took back the Wanglaoji trademark, their PR battles have not ceased. One notable incident occurred in March 2013 when JDB issued a statement appealing for public attention, questioning GP Group's 1 billion yuan claim, and ending with "Please help forward so that NPC and CPPCC representatives can see it." The Weibo post received over 70,000 forwards. Initially, JDB's "victim card" strategy seemed effective. JDB emphasized the disparity between its private enterprise status and GP Group's state-owned enterprise status. At the time, the public and media often sided with the weaker party, and some viewed SOEs as monopolistic and privileged, while private enterprises represented innovation and free competition. But the situation in commercial PR can change rapidly. JDB's "victim marketing" was initially clever, helping it gain ground in PR. However, the saying "overdoing it is as bad as not doing it at all" applies. After tasting success, JDB repeated and amplified the victim narrative, making it seem like it was appealing to the public while ignoring the law. This is akin to someone without work skills constantly complaining about poverty and social inequality—eventually, the public grows tired of it. So, in PR and marketing, these rivals also fought to a draw, harming both. At the time, many netizens commented that since Wanglaoji and JDB fell out, both herbal teas didn't taste as good as before. While this is psychological, it shows the negative impact of the dispute. In fact, in today's business world, from the internet to traditional industries, mutual-attack marketing is common. The entire marketing system has formed an instinctive positive feedback loop, with each party participating consciously or unconsciously. In my view, mutual-attack marketing itself is not inherently wrong, and if used appropriately, it can yield positive results—after all, topics generate attention. Many companies not only use extreme language to attack rivals but also theatrically threaten legal action. From a strategic market and PR perspective, fighting and name-calling seem to be a required course for companies, a popular marketing tactic in China. It engages the public, increases exposure, and moderate competition between oligarchs can even lead to lower prices for consumers, which isn't entirely bad for all three parties. Even former enemies like Youku and Tudou, Ganji and 58, Didi and Kuaidi fought fiercely. As the saying goes, bad news travels fast. When a company releases a new product or strategy, users often glance at it, but bad news—like "capital chain rupture, bankruptcy, lawsuits, or mudslinging"—piques users' curiosity, eliciting exclamations like "Wow, awesome, haha." So, in my view, some mutual attacks between companies have become a tacit understanding. But the decade-long feud between JDB and Wanglaoji clearly exceeds that "tacit understanding." They are genuinely fighting for real. Even if one temporarily gains an advantage, in the long run, the result is mutual destruction. In my opinion, in business competition, cleverly using public opinion is not wrong. But if public opinion is used as a tool to suppress competitors and deceive users, focusing only on telling stories to gain sympathy or engaging in fights for attention, it may end in a messy situation, harming the industry's image in users' minds and creating a stereotype that makes life harder for the entire industry. IV. Beyond single product form: Developing sub-brands or brand elevation can break the deadlock In fact, as parties to the dispute, Wanglaoji and JDB may have already recognized the adverse consequences of long-term competition. But they still insist on fighting to the end, likely because both brands follow a "big single product" strategy, with herbal tea as their only product—their sole "rice bowl." To fundamentally resolve the "deadlock" of mutual destruction, I suggest changing the brand operation style by establishing sub-brands or adding new dimensions to the brand to avoid overlapping "ecological niches" with competitors. First, developing sub-brands is a common strategy among large enterprises across various fields. Take the tech internet sector I work in: from smart home appliances to smart TVs and smartphones, many brands have established sub-brands to cater to different user needs in different scenarios. In the smartphone field, Huawei, a world-class communication equipment supplier, has launched the P series, Honor series, and Mate series, covering high-end and low-end markets, dominating the entire industry chain without affecting each other. If JDB and Wanglaoji could create sub-brands in related FMCG areas, leveraging the parent brand's influence and endorsement, they could not only avoid impacting their main business but also capture more user groups and tap into emerging consumer markets. Returning to the FMCG industry, P&G China, one of the largest daily consumer goods companies, has brands like Head & Shoulders, Rejoice, Safeguard, Olay, Pampers, Tide, and Gillette, each leading in their respective product categories. Similarly, in the beverage industry, Wahaha has multiple brands including purified water, mineral water, Future Cola, Future Lemon, AD Calcium Milk, and Nutri-Express. In fact, the "big single product" strategy itself is not problematic, but it has prerequisites. For example, Coca-Cola, also in the beverage industry, was born in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1886 and has a history of over 100 years. Although Wanglaoji's formula is claimed to have a history of 180 years, its branding journey is only recent, spanning just over a decade. Meanwhile, Coca-Cola's equipment procurement is the most stringent among commercial clients worldwide. Its street-level marketing and brand operation capabilities are world-class. In my view, like Apple in the smartphone industry, Coca-Cola's strategy is more of a "king strategy" than a "big single product" strategy. Both focus on top-tier products and bestsellers to capture global markets. This strategy is high-risk, high-reward, but only absolute top brands like Coca-Cola and Apple have the strength and capability to "hedge" such high risks. In contrast, Wanglaoji and JDB clearly lack the strength to hedge the high risks of the "big single product" strategy. In my opinion, the competition between JDB and Wanglaoji is still at the same dimension. Whoever can abandon inefficient competition in marketing and appearance and adopt more diversified sub-brands and brand elevation may be able to re-enter the fast lane of herbal tea industry development sooner. Source: Internet Jianghu, Beijing News; compiled and edited by New Distribution. -END-