The 'Nine No's' for community group buying came abruptly but just in time, giving the entire track a chance to catch its breath. However, the 'light brake' within the track has made it possible for those outside the walls to test the waters. Currently, SF Express has officially launched its community group buying platform 'Fenghuotai', which can be found in both mini-programs and official accounts. However, perhaps due to previous lessons from SF Preferred and SF Heike, SF's entry into the biggest internet trend of 2020 has been very low-key. According to SF official response, they did not deliberately label Fenghuotai as community group buying; the platform is an urban-rural supply chain comprehensive service platform created by SF Fengnong Technology. Relying on SF's nationwide cold chain logistics system and supply chain capabilities for direct sourcing, it builds two-way circulation channels for agricultural products going up and industrial products going down, providing community stores with B2B procurement and sales of fresh/FMCG products, community marketing tools, and shared delivery services, and providing consumers with safe, fresh, and high-quality products sourced directly from the source. Moreover, the platform is in the early operational testing stage, with limited content and fewer supported group leader areas, but the available fresh produce is relatively abundant. -01- Fenghuotai: Playing with the Feudal Lords? Facing the complex track of community group buying and the 'city expansion' plans of major platforms, SF's 'Fenghuotai' chooses to first occupy first-tier cities like 'Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen' that other community group buying platforms have not yet entered, which is completely different from other platforms' strategy of 'surrounding cities from rural areas'. Fenghuotai customer service also stated that services will be opened in all cities within the product delivery range. Clicking into the mini-program, one can find that Fenghuotai's operating model is similar to other platforms: after confirming the specific location of the community, the system automatically matches the corresponding group leader. The product categories mainly include fresh produce, New Year goods, alcoholic beverages, and holiday gifts, with a focus on large fresh items and New Year goods, and a relatively small SKU count of around a hundred items. However, the obvious difference between SF's 'Fenghuotai' and other community group buying platforms is that all products on 'Fenghuotai' are sold in whole boxes, whole packs, or large gift sets and family packs, giving a wholesale purchasing feel, with an average order value of around a hundred yuan. It has the characteristic of lower prices for larger quantities, but for the audience currently targeted by community group buying platforms, using 'Fenghuotai' would be very uneconomical, as buying a certain type of fresh product and consuming it all within the freshness period is a significant burden. Moreover, unlike other community group buying platforms where products are picked up by customers, delivery methods include group leader delivery and SF Express delivery, but the group leader delivery option is currently unavailable due to incomplete system development. In other words, Fenghuotai currently only offers delivery to home and does not support self-pickup. However, in the community group buying model, the group leader role is essential. According to SF couriers, SF required its couriers to register as 'Fenghuotai' group leaders a month ago, but specific operational details were not disclosed. Additionally, SF official also stated that currently, the group leaders of 'Fenghuotai' are temporarily the SF couriers in the area, and more professional group leaders are being recruited. The group leaders of 'Fenghuotai' are also SF's 'partners'. After becoming a group leader, 8%-20% of the sales recorded under that group leader will become the group leader's commission. The group leader is responsible for delivering goods to homes and completing fulfillment; the commission is essentially a delivery service fee. Group leaders can also recommend new group leaders to join as 'partners'. After a successful recommendation, the original partner can permanently enjoy a 1% net sales revenue reward. The more group leaders recommended, the more income, but if recommending nearby stations, it also means the customer base will be dispersed, reducing commission income. The biggest difference between becoming a 'Fenghuotai' group leader and other platform group leaders is that theoretically, they do not have to push special offers daily like other platform group leaders to attract and maintain users. In simple terms, 'Fenghuotai' intends to integrate SF's supply chain, traffic, and delivery resource advantages to try to forge a new path with 'SF characteristics'. But this time, can SF get closer to success? -02- SF's Retail Dream Several years ago, Ma Yun deeply felt the pain of logistics in e-commerce and created Cainiao Network. For another big shot, Wang Wei, despite being the king of the logistics industry, was also constrained by the labor-intensive and capital-intensive nature of the industry and went the opposite direction into e-commerce. 'Fenghuotai' is SF's test of community group buying, but it is far from SF's first attempt at the retail format. As early as 2012, SF Preferred was officially launched, once called a 'project that cannot fail' internally and regarded by the industry as a benchmark for domestic logistics companies to 'counterattack' into e-commerce. In 2014, when O2O was prevalent, SF launched 'Heike' network service community stores, which mainly offered four services: product pre-order, offline online shopping experience, convenience services, and self-service parcel drop-off and pickup, attempting to solve the 'last mile' logistics problem and seize community entry points. In 2015, most 'Heike' stores were closed, and those not closed were renamed 'SF Home'. At the same time, to prepare for listing, SF Holding officially spun off the SF Commercial sector responsible for online and offline retail business. Data showed that this sector lost over 1.6 billion yuan in three years. In September 2016, convenience stores became popular, and SF renamed its offline stores 'SF Home' again to 'SF Preferred', repositioning them as 'express + convenience stores'. SF Preferred was no longer about offline experience and online ordering but physical retail, with categories expanded to include fresh produce and cross-border imported goods. In 2019, SF Preferred, the 'project that cannot fail', also failed, facing large-scale store closures nationwide. Despite having a large base of high-net-worth users and a well-established and efficient logistics and delivery network, it still could not escape the fate of large-scale store closures. So, why is SF stubbornly picking up community retail again now? Summary: In China, the development of the logistics and express delivery industry heavily depends on the development of e-commerce. It can be said that without e-commerce, there would be no current state of China's logistics and express delivery industry. However, with the increasing cost of online traffic and customer acquisition in recent years, the slowdown in e-commerce business development has become a constraint for the express delivery industry. Meanwhile, personnel and management costs have not stopped growing with the slowdown; on the contrary, they have increased significantly. Therefore, expanding business lines and seeking new engines for revenue growth is not a concern only for SF as an express delivery and logistics company. Hence, people often joke that all express delivery companies have a retail dream. Little do they know, this dream is one that the express delivery industry must pursue. Additionally, whether it's the O2O home delivery models like Hema and Yonghui that have emerged in recent years, or the now crowded community group buying track, home delivery and store visits essentially solve the 'last mile' delivery problem, and traditional express delivery is the first to bear the brunt. SF's brand is strong, but because it is too strong, it has been solidified in the high-quality express delivery field, and users' perception of it remains in the impression of 'lychee air freight'. From e-commerce models to physical stores and even unmanned retail, SF has tested the waters and failed. With a strong logistics system and quality user touchpoints, the inability to succeed cannot be simply summarized as 'lack of genes'. Now that the smoke of war is rising, can SF build 'Fenghuotai' and hope to dominate the track? Once the tip is adopted, a reward of 400-2000 yuan will be paid.