More knowledgeable about distributors than manufacturers, more understanding of internal management than distributors. ------------------------------- Voice-over: In work, it's inevitable that subordinates make mistakes, but some people are special. Some are close to the leader, and some are veterans with high status in the team. When such subordinates make mistakes, everyone is concerned about how the leader will punish them. If not handled well, it can affect team building. As early as the Three Kingdoms period, Zhuge Liang faced the same problem. When the Shu Han regime was first established, the team was complex and management was scattered. Through punishing three subordinates, he quickly stabilized the situation, demonstrating superb management wisdom. So, what was the brilliance of Zhuge Liang's punishment of problematic subordinates? What inspirations can we draw from it? We have a saying: "When drawing a dragon or a tiger, it's hard to draw the bones; when knowing a person, you know their face but not their heart." It means the human heart is the most unpredictable and hardest to understand. Look at the octopus Paul, it could predict World Cup results. But if you asked it to predict what Teacher Zhao is thinking now, it definitely couldn't. The human heart is the hardest to predict. Many times, a person sits across from us, smiling at us every day. We think we know them well, but suddenly one day, they might do something completely unexpected. How would you feel then? This is what Liu Bei encountered. In the spring of 220 AD, a rumor spread among the high-ranking officials in Chengdu that a shocking rebellion plot had been uncovered beside Liu Bei, involving Ma Chao. This news terrified all the officials in Chengdu. Ma Chao was a man with troops, a force of battle-hardened soldiers. Moreover, Ma Chao had high prestige in the Xiliang region, and his call would be answered by many. If Ma Chao rebelled, it would be a disaster. While the officials were tense, they investigated and were relieved to find it wasn't Ma Chao who wanted to rebel, but that someone was trying to incite Ma Chao to rebel. Who was so arrogant as to incite Ma Chao at this time? It turned out to be a highly valued advisor beside Liu Bei, whose name was Peng Yang, as recorded in the Records of the Three Kingdoms. This man had a decent appearance but a terrible personality. First, he was extremely arrogant and conceited. Second, he spoke harshly and uttered wild words. Under Liu Zhang, he was a minor secretary, but even in that position, he offended everyone around him. Later, his colleagues exposed him, reporting that he had problems, and Peng Yang was punished. What punishment? He was shaved bald and had an iron ring placed around his neck, a very humiliating punishment. Peng Yang was a frustrated man punished by Liu Zhang. Liu Bei's entry into Sichuan brought Peng Yang good fortune. Following the advice of Pang Tong and Fa Zheng, Liu Bei made Peng Yang an advisor. Discovering Peng Yang's talent, Liu Bei promoted him exceptionally. After Liu Bei took control of Chengdu and became Governor of Yi Province, he promoted Peng Yang to the position of Secretary-General, equivalent to a government secretary in modern terms. How did Peng Yang react after being promoted? The Records of the Three Kingdoms record that once promoted, he became arrogant and complacent, looking down on everyone around him. Zhuge Liang hated three types of people his whole life: first, those who were disloyal to their superiors and surrendered; second, those who were disrespectful and arrogant; third, those who put personal interests above the organization. In the Shu Han regime, those who clashed with Zhuge Liang were all of these three types. Looking back at this minor Peng Yang, who had no territory and no achievements, yet was so arrogant, his behavior aroused Zhuge Liang's extreme disgust. On one occasion, Zhuge Liang suggested to Liu Bei, "Peng Yang is ambitious and has great aspirations; we should guard against him early." Following Zhuge Liang's advice, Liu Bei transferred Peng Yang from the central government to be the governor of Jiangyang, a local official. Liu Bei's move was also clever; he was testing Peng Yang. If someone says you have ambition and a bad attitude, but you think you're fine, then I'll transfer you to a grassroots position. In real life, we can also see this. Sometimes leaders arrange for young cadres to be temporarily assigned to grassroots positions. I tell you, this is a good thing. First, it tests your work style and builds trust. Second, it gives you a chance to show yourself and build a good image. This is a good thing! But Peng Yang didn't have this breadth of mind or level of vision: A person's breadth of mind and level of vision determine your destiny! When Peng Yang received the transfer order, he immediately became anxious. He had been basking in glory and success, and suddenly he was demoted to a grassroots position. Peng Yang felt like a blooming flower hit by frost, a proud rooster doused with water—extremely unhappy. What to do when unhappy? He went to Ma Chao to complain. Ma Chao asked him, "Mr. Peng, you are highly skilled, and our lord has always valued you. Why are you suddenly being sent to a small place?" Peng Yang gritted his teeth and said something very unpleasant: "Liu Bei, that old fool, is muddle-headed. What can I say?" Then Peng Yang lowered his voice and said to Ma Chao, "You handle the outside, I'll handle the inside, and the world can be settled." This was clearly inciting Ma Chao to rebel. As the Chinese saying goes: "Disease enters by the mouth, disaster comes out of the mouth." A person must control their mouth, especially when emotionally unstable. Peng Yang's complaints, in today's terms, are like being criticized by a leader at work, even scolded, and feeling unhappy. What do you do when you're criticized by a leader and feel unhappy? You could go to the leader and communicate, ask what you're doing wrong, and exchange views. Or you could go back and reflect on what's wrong and change it. Or you could lie in bed and sleep, adjust your emotions. The worst thing is to complain more when unhappy, saying whatever is most hurtful or satisfying. You must never do that; when emotional, you must not speak recklessly. Therefore, in interpersonal relations, we believe that a person skilled in handling relationships must have four basic communication abilities: first, the ability to express oneself in language—not necessarily eloquent, but able to convey your thoughts. Second, the ability to understand others—you not only need to be comfortable yourself, but also know how to make others comfortable. Third, the ability to self-motivate in adversity—life isn't always smooth; you may face setbacks, and you need to encourage yourself not to give up. Fourth, and most importantly, the ability to control negative emotions. Peng Yang lacked this ability. If we're really angry and want to complain, what should we do? There are two very useful methods. The first is called the "freezing method." That is, when you have negative emotions and want to slam the table or curse, imagine yourself as a piece of ice, frozen solid, not speaking or moving, and hold on for a while. Psychological research has found that when people are angry, catastrophic behaviors occur in the initial short period—like smashing TVs, burning houses, hitting wives, jumping off buildings. If you can endure that short period, you'll be fine. This is called the "devil's hour." If you endure it, you're fine. The second method is called the "distraction method." You can leave the scene and do something relaxing and pleasant, like taking a walk, playing ball, singing, watching TV, lighting incense, listening to music, or reading a book. All these are fine. So if you have some adjustment skills, you won't have big problems. But Peng Yang didn't; when unhappy, he said whatever came to mind, whatever was most satisfying. So we say that the most satisfying and relieving words at the moment are often the ones you regret most later. We must all control our negative emotions, be masters of our emotions, not slaves to them. After Peng Yang left, Ma Chao wrote a detailed report of the whole incident and sent it to Liu Bei. Liu Bei was furious—you're inciting my general to rebel! He immediately sent people to arrest Peng Yang and throw him in prison. So we say a person must control their emotions. People like Peng Yang let emotions override reason and can't control their mouths at critical moments. Throughout history, many people have failed because of this. In prison, Peng Yang was scared. Now he knew fear. The Records of the Three Kingdoms record that Peng Yang wrote a letter to Zhuge Liang with two contents: first, to defend himself; second, to ask Zhuge Liang to plead with Liu Bei not to be too harsh. Look, now he knew fear and regret. Voice-over: When a leader punishes a subordinate who has made a mistake, the measure is very important. If the punishment is too light, it won't convince the public; if too heavy, it will chill people's hearts. For Peng Yang's mistake, should it be light or heavy? At that time, Liu Zhang, one of the leaders, was too lenient, exposing many management problems. Liu Bei was a new leader; only by strengthening management could he quickly change the chaotic situation and stabilize the political situation. So what punishment would Zhuge Liang recommend for Peng Yang? Peng Yang's problem wasn't just complaining; it was inciting rebellion. If we tolerate this, how can we lead the team in the future? So Liu Bei said firmly to Zhuge Liang, "This person cannot be forgiven; he must be dealt with seriously." In the end, Peng Yang was sentenced to death, but he was allowed to take his own life, and he committed suicide. From this, we see that in a team's progress, many people make mistakes. We call problematic employees "landmines on the road forward." When encountering a landmine, there are two attitudes: one is to "smooth things over" and just go around it; the other is to "never let it go" and detonate it. So what attitude should we take? Many people make mistakes here, especially those with gentle personalities. We once encountered a case where a unit was doing civil engineering. Within a few days, the audit department found a problem: the person in charge of materials was issuing false invoices and fraudulently claiming material funds. The evidence was conclusive after a joint review, so the leadership decided to deal with it seriously. Just as they were about to handle it, people came to plead for mercy, and the person involved also wept and said, "I won't do it again; I'll sincerely reform." The leader saw the amount was small, so he decided to let it go with a warning. But once they let it go, problems emerged. First, public opinion said the leader lacked fairness, couldn't hold the water level, and was using the cause to give favors. More seriously, the second rumor was that the leader had also taken advantage and benefited, so he didn't punish others because he had his own problems. Moreover, once this precedent was set, the entire material management of the project fell into chaos. Several incidents followed, and eventually, the leader was disciplined by superiors, and the project failed after several ups and downs. This is what we often call "tolerance and indulgence lead to endless trouble." When leading a team, remember: when you need to be tough, you must be tough. We call it "punish the past to warn the future, cure the illness to save the person." In management, it's called: even if you ride a thousand-mile horse, you still need a whip in hand; when it's time to swing, swing, when it's time to hit, hit. When there's no problem, we can be harmonious; when there's a problem, we must be thunderous. To save the person involved, save those around, and save our cause, Zhuge Liang's attitude toward problematic employees was always clear: they must be dealt with. However, in technique, he was very particular. Zhuge Liang had two particularly typical techniques in handling problematic employees in Shu Han. Let us introduce them. The first technique is called: "Set a bottom line, leave room for leeway." This technique involves a very remarkable person, an important figure in the Shu Han regime, named Li Yan. Li Yan was from Nanyang, Jingzhou, and was a subordinate of Liu Biao. When Cao Cao occupied Jingzhou, Li Yan, because he looked down on Cao Cao, preferred to flee to Chengdu to join Liu Zhang. Later, when Liu Bei entered Sichuan, Liu Zhang sent Li Yan to fight Liu Bei at Mianzhu, but Li Yan surrendered to Liu Bei. Liu Bei promoted Li Yan to General of the Starry Night. In the second year of Zhangwu, Liu Bei summoned Li Yan to Yong'an Palace and promoted him to Shangshu Ling (Secretary of State). In the third year of Zhangwu, when Liu Bei was seriously ill, he entrusted state affairs to Zhuge Liang and Li Yan. So in fact, the Shu Han regency was entrusted to two people, not one; Li Yan was Zhuge Liang's deputy. Li Yan had shallow qualifications and background. Why did Liu Bei entrust the regency to Zhuge Liang and Li Yan? Why choose Li Yan? What was the reasoning? Liu Bei chose Li Yan for two purposes: first, at that time, Liu Bei had two major groups of cadres: the Jingzhou group and the Yizhou group. The Yizhou group had more people. To balance the relationship between the two groups, the regent ministers must include one representative from each group. So choosing Li Yan as the Yizhou representative was to balance the two groups. The second reason was that Li Yan's position was Shangshu Ling and Zhongdu Hu, commanding internal and external military affairs, leaning more toward military. Zhuge Liang was in charge of politics and civil affairs. Liu Bei hoped one would manage politics and the other military, to balance power and ensure no one dominated, and to check Zhuge Liang. Liu Bei's strategy in promoting Li Yan was called: the "exceptional promotion strategy." Many leaders choose the exceptional promotion strategy for major tasks. Why? Some think, "I'm giving this job to someone with insufficient qualifications and background." But actually, if a young person with shallow qualifications follows the normal order, they wouldn't become a leader. Now you promote them exceptionally, they will definitely cherish it, work hard, be grateful, and obey commands. These four "definitelys" are not necessarily possessed by those with seniority, quality, and background. So for major events, many leaders like exceptional promotion. Liu Bei also liked it and promoted Li Yan. Later, in the cooperation between Zhuge Liang and Li Yan, problems erupted. Li Yan did two things that aroused Zhuge Liang's extreme disgust. As mentioned earlier, Peng Yang disgusted Zhuge Liang mainly due to arrogance; Li Yan disgusted him mainly due to greed. First, Li Yan wrote to Zhuge Liang, suggesting he imitate Cao Cao and become king. Zhuge Liang replied with a stern rebuke. Second, in 227 AD, when Zhuge Liang launched the Northern Expedition, he transferred Li Yan to guard Hanzhong. But Li Yan made demands, saying he wanted to establish Bazhou and be the envoy; if not, he wouldn't go to Hanzhong. This was endless. Then in 230 AD, Zhuge Liang again launched the Northern Expedition and transferred Li Yan to lead his troops to Hanzhong. Li Yan wrote back, saying that the Wei regents, like Sima Yi, had established their own offices and staff, implying he wanted the same treatment. Li Yan was the type who, whenever the leader asked him to work, would take the opportunity to demand benefits. This infuriated Zhuge Liang, but for the sake of the overall situation, he didn't explode. Instead, Zhuge Liang exceptionally promoted Li Yan's son to be the local governor of Jiangzhou. Only then did Li Yan go to Hanzhong. Once there, a major incident occurred. Zhuge Liang had Li Yan manage grain and guard the rear while he went on the Northern Expedition. As the Chinese saying goes: "The honest and generous have fewer setbacks; the petty and treacherous have many changes." That is, the same task done by an honest person goes smoothly, but done by a petty person, there are many problems. Li Yan, being petty, caused trouble. At that time, it rained, and the grain supply failed. There were objective reasons for the failure; you could just explain to the leader. Everyone makes mistakes; admitting it proactively is better than anything. But Li Yan chose not to admit it and tried to cover it up, which was very foolish. Think: if you have one mistake and try to cover it, you need a second mistake. Then for the second, you need a third, and so on, until you fall into an abyss. We say that those who try to cover up mistakes not only lack courage but also brains. Li Yan used a particularly petty method to cover up. First, he wrote to Zhuge Liang saying the emperor ordered a retreat. Second, he wrote to the central government saying Zhuge Liang retreated to lure the enemy. When Zhuge Liang returned, Li Yan said happily, "Prime Minister, the grain is sufficient now; why did you retreat?" This made Zhuge Liang furious. Zhuge Liang then produced all of Li Yan's previous letters, with clear evidence in black and white. So Zhuge Liang, together with dozens of ministers, submitted a joint impeachment of Li Yan, stripping him of all positions, demoting him to commoner, and finally exiling him. At this point, we must discuss a historical debate. Many teachers have talked about this. Some teachers argue that Li Yan was wronged. As a co-regent, Zhuge Liang held all political and military power, dominated everything, and sat in Chengdu, while Li Yan was sent to a remote area and marginalized. So Li Yan's bargaining was about fighting for his due rights and resisting unfair treatment, which was justified. There is such a voice. But my personal view is that when our cause develops, improving personal treatment is right. A person with contributions asking for treatment is understandable. But Li Yan's problem wasn't asking for treatment; it was that when he asked, he made two fatal mistakes: The first mistake was putting personal gains above the cause's gains. We say regents bear responsibility and contribute. What is leadership? Leadership first means more dedication. But Li Yan didn't think that way; he treated the regency as political capital and a stepping stone for advancement, using his status to seek personal benefits. Let's take Zhao Yun, Zilong. At the time of the regency, Zhao Yun's status—fourth brother—his prestige and martial arts were higher than Li Yan's. But Li Yan was made Shangshu Ling and enfeoffed as Marquis of Xiang. Zhao Yun was General of the East, only a Marquis of Ting, Marquis of Yongchang Ting. When enfeoffed, Zhao Yun was two ranks lower. Later, during the Northern Expedition, Li Yan had risen to General of Chariots and Cavalry, which, according to Han dynasty ranks, was second only to Grand General. He was on par with Zhuge Liang, at the prime minister level. But Li Yan still complained, felt wronged, and demanded treatment. At that time, Zhao Yun, a veteran of two dynasties who had saved the late emperor's life, with such seniority and merit, was still only General of the East. And he was still at the front, risking his life. His position was much lower than Li Yan's, yet he was still fighting hard. You got more benefits than him, yet you complain and don't go to the front. Zhao Yun didn't ask for treatment, didn't complain, and worked diligently. So in terms of dedication, Li Yan was far inferior to Zhao Yun. This is putting personal treatment above the cause. The second, even more fatal mistake—killing Li Yan wouldn't be a pity or wrong—was that Li Yan used responsibility as a bargaining chip. You can make demands, but you can't use responsibility to bargain. At the critical moment of the Northern Expedition, when asked to go to the front, Li Yan said, "Give me treatment and I'll go; if not, I won't." Think of a simple question: if the organization doesn't pay you, do you stop fulfilling your responsibilities? If the unit doesn't pay you, do you stop loving life? If Zhuge Liang doesn't make you an envoy, do you stop saving the country? And we ourselves are the same. Think: if parents are partial, favoring the eldest or second child and neglecting you, as a son, do you stop supporting your parents? If our unit treats us unfairly and we feel wronged, if the office catches fire, do you not put it out? Of course you must. So Li Yan's actions were very wrong. What is responsibility? It is doing things well without any excuse, no matter when or where. What is loyalty? It is fulfilling promises without compromise, even when wronged or treated unfairly. Li Yan had neither responsibility nor loyalty. At that time, many in the Shu Han regime saw Li Yan's problems, and everyone unanimously demanded that Li Yan be removed. But Zhuge Liang still tolerated Li Yan, initially satisfying many of his demands and giving many rewards. Some said, "Such a person should be cleaned out quickly. Our team must progress, everyone must be an angel, a Lei Feng." But in reality, it's not like that. That is, when we do our cause, we don't expect everyone to be an angel. What do we expect? We expect to guide people to perform angelic acts. So we give you a saying: "Good management can guide devils to do angelic things; bad management forces angels to do devilish things." In management, you don't have to reform people; you just need to guide them. Zhuge Liang's principle was: it's okay if you have selfish motives, as long as you contribute. I set a bottom line for you; as long as you don't cross it, it's fine. What was Zhuge Liang's bottom line? Support the central government and support the Northern Expedition. As long as Li Yan did these things, Zhuge Liang could tolerate everything else. But Li Yan disappointed Zhuge Liang's hopes and tolerance. Later, he didn't support the central government or the Northern Expedition, and engaged in petty maneuvers. Management must have a high-voltage line. If you don't touch it, we're all fine. If you touch it, we must be ruthless. So Zhuge Liang decided to be ruthless with Li Yan. Voice-over: In a team, if a high-status person makes a mistake and it's not handled properly, it can easily cause controversy, threaten team stability, and undermine the leader's authority. In Shu, Li Yan was such a person. Like Zhuge Liang, he was a key minister entrusted by the late emperor Liu Bei. He had deep roots in Shu and had a competitive relationship with Zhuge Liang. So how should mistakes by subordinates like Li Yan be punished to minimize negative impact? When being ruthless, Zhuge Liang didn't beat him to death with one stick. This is where Zhuge Liang was clever. Even when you're emotional and about to be ruthless, you must weigh how to do it. Li Yan was a regent minister, a high-ranking and powerful subordinate. For ordinary people, you can slam the table and glare, but for such a powerful person, you must carefully consider two issues: first, if you're too harsh, uninformed people might say it's an internal leadership struggle, with the big leader taking personal revenge. Also, the subordinates originally under this cadre might fear being implicated and become antagonistic. So you must pay attention to the measure. In handling Li Yan, Zhuge Liang paid attention to three issues: First: "Fully expose the contradictions before handling." Zhuge Liang wrote two commendations in succession, clarifying Li Yan's problems thoroughly before dealing with him. Second: "Take the democratic route, turning personal opinions into everyone's opinions." So in the request to handle Shangshu Ling Li Yan, Zhuge Liang got more than 20 cadres to sign. This was to gain approval from everyone, increase authority, and reduce public misunderstanding. Third: Although Li Yan was stripped of all positions, Zhuge Liang "gave him a way out, respect, and leeway." He didn't beat him to death; he retained his rank and treatment. Zhuge Liang also personally visited Li Yan and, in a letter to Li Yan's son, indicated that if he reformed, he could return to work in the future. This shows Zhuge Liang's breadth of mind and his strategy for stabilizing the team. We say Li Yan was an employee with attitude problems. There are also employees with no attitude problems but ability problems. When such people make mistakes, it's also challenging, especially if they have a good relationship with the leader. What to do? In the Shu Han regime, who was this? It was Ma Su, Ma Youchang. Ma Su was Zhuge Liang's confidant. The most awkward thing for a leader is when a confidant makes a mistake. How do you handle it? If you're too lenient, people say you're partial; if too harsh, they say you're heartless and lack feeling. So Zhuge Liang thought of many ways to handle Ma Su. The Records of the Three Kingdoms record that in the spring of 228 AD, Zhuge Liang led the main army out of Qishan, winning victories all the way. Tianshui, Nan'an, and Anding all surrendered, and the Northern Expedition situation was excellent. The strategic key at that moment was Jieting. Who did Zhuge Liang appoint as the commander of Jieting? He chose Ma Su. Why Ma Su? We judge two reasons: first, Zhuge Liang was confident the Northern Expedition would succeed, and the Jieting commander would have the first merit. Second, Zhuge Liang had a selfish motive: he didn't give this first merit to Zhao Yun or Wei Yan, but specifically to Ma Su. Because Zhuge Liang hoped that with this merit, Ma Su could advance further and perhaps become his successor. So Zhuge Liang wanted to boost Ma Su. But Ma Su was truly "a horse's tail stringing tofu—can't be lifted." Once at Jieting, he abandoned the water and went up the mountain, didn't guard the main road, didn't build fortifications, and was ultimately defeated badly, causing the entire line to collapse and the Northern Expedition to fail. Later, people analyzed why Ma Su couldn't hold Jieting. Regarding cadres like Ma Su who can't hold Jieting, let's talk about a board game: Chinese chess. Many of you probably play it. There's a saying: "Learn the chariot, horse, and cannon, and you won't need to be called for meals." Those who play chess forget to eat. Chess contains brilliant management strategies. Let's discuss one piece: the advisor (shi) next to the general. This advisor is like a strategist who advises the leader. Chess sets two rules for the advisor: first, when the advisor moves, it's called "supporting the advisor" (zhi shi). Second, no matter how it moves, it doesn't leave the nine-palace, which is like the command center. So chess rules tell us that advisors who give ideas and theories can only advise, not go to the front line to execute. But Zhuge Liang sent Ma Su, an advisor, to the front line to execute. This shows Zhuge Liang didn't know how to play chess; he violated the piece movement rules. So we ask a deeper question: why can't advisors who give ideas and theories handle front-line execution? It's because of the brain. People who theorize and plan have a special thinking mode called "extreme thinking." Why do people have extreme thinking? Let's analyze a phenomenon. Ask a kindergarten child, "Sweetie, what's one plus one?" The child will smile and say, "It's two." Ask a third-grader, "What's one plus one?" The child will look at you with contempt and say, "Pfft, everyone knows it's two." Ask a high school student, "What's one plus one?" They won't answer; they'll be angry and say, "What, do you think I'm stupid?" Ask a PhD with extreme thinking, "Doctor, what's one plus one?" The PhD will nod, look into the distant sky, take a deep breath, and say, "Hmm, that's a good question. There's phenomenology, semiotics, semantics, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, maybe even evolutionary theory. Give me 100,000 yuan, and let's set up a project to study it." So the characteristic of extreme thinking is that with more knowledge and analysis, complex thinking leads you to extremes. The real essence of learning is to acquire much knowledge and still return to common sense—that's remarkable. So what is wisdom? Wisdom is knowing the conditions for applying knowledge and acting without hesitation in the face of common sense and truth. That's wisdom, but Ma Su didn't have it. Zhuge Liang told him, "By the mountain and water, camp on the main road." With this common sense, you'd win. But Ma Su went and thought of extremes: "I need to do something unconventional, have an innovation point." For those who like Peking opera, you know the play "Loss of Jieting, Kongcheng, and Beheading" specifically about Ma Su's execution. My friend asked me, "Among ancient Chinese management wisdom, which two cases do you like most?" My two favorites are: one is Zhuge Liang's tearful execution of Ma Su in the Three Kingdoms, and the other is Song Jiang slamming the table and scolding Li Kui in Water Margin. Let's talk about Ma Su first. In the opera, Ma Su returns after a great defeat. When reporting, Zhuge Liang first called in Wang Ping, not Ma Su, and scolded Wang Ping. Then he had Ma Su report at the gate. Ma Su entered, already feeling guilty. Ma Su was better than Li Yan: Li Yan made excuses to cover up, but Ma Su didn't cover up; he admitted, "Prime Minister, I lost the battle and disappointed you. Punish me!" Zhuge Liang didn't scold or hit him. He pointed at Ma Su's head and said, "Youchang, Youchang, you're not Youchang, you're childish. I told you to camp by the mountain and water on the main road. Why didn't you listen?" Ma Su said, "Prime Minister, I wanted to create an innovation point, write a paper at year-end, and get a senior title." Being unconventional isn't necessarily good; home-cooked meals are the most nourishing. Using common-sense methods to do work well is the highest management. Being unconventional for its own sake, formalistic innovation, harms others and yourself. So Zhuge Liang said, "You're really infuriating me!" Ma Su said, "Prime Minister, I accept punishment." Zhuge Liang said, "I won't punish you." Then he took out the military pledge, saying, "The pledge is clear: when you left, it was stated that if you lost, you'd come with your head. Guards, take him out and behead him!" When Ma Su saw they were really going to kill him, he panicked and knelt, saying, "I have elderly parents and young children at home. I'm only in my thirties. Can you spare me? Let me atone for my crimes with merit, won't that work?" Voice-over: In a team, there is a type of subordinate with a special identity and an unusual relationship with the leader, like Ma Su. Ma Su had fought alongside Zhuge Liang for many years, and their relationship was like father and son. When such people make mistakes, leaders often find it difficult. If handled lightly, others say you're showing favoritism; if handled heavily, it's emotionally hard. When punishing such subordinates, what issues should we consider? And how did Zhuge Liang do it? When Ma Su pleaded, Zhuge Liang's tears fell. He said, "Youchang! It's not that I want to kill you; military law is merciless! You violated the rules. Killing you is like cutting out my heart, but I must do it." So Zhuge Liang assured Ma Su, "Don't worry. I've arranged your affairs. Go in peace." Thus, Ma Su was taken out and beheaded. Surprisingly, after beheading Ma Su, there were two effects. First, "the entire army was terrified." Everyone said, "Brothers, never make mistakes. Ma Youchang had such a good relationship and high level, yet he lost his head for a mistake." So everyone was fearful and respected the rules and authority. Second, "the entire army was moved." Everyone said, "Our prime minister is truly a good man, so fond of and concerned for his subordinates." So we say, "A wise leader is one whom subordinates both fear and love; a wise parent is one whom children both fear and love." Fear alone isn't enough, and love alone isn't enough. So what is a strict father? A father who is both feared and loved. After handling Ma Su, Zhuge Liang didn't stop. He then submitted a memorial to demote himself by three ranks. This was also Zhuge Liang's wisdom. When a problem arises, if you punish subordinates and then act like nothing happened, what kind of leader are you? Many leaders, when problems occur, shirk responsibility, find excuses, punish the underlings, and let themselves off the hook. But doing so not only affects your authority but also the entire organization's management order. Zhuge Liang's intention was: after punishing him, I punish myself, demoting myself by three ranks. This increased the authority of management and enhanced the team's cohesion. So looking back, when Zhuge Liang handled employees, for people like Li Yan, he set bottom lines and left room. For people like Ma Su, while strictly enforcing discipline, he particularly emphasized emotion. -------------------------------------- Like this article? Feel free to click the top right corner to share it to your Moments; About us: WeChat name: FMCG Distributor Professional Consulting Management Account intro: 20 years of FMCG distributor operation and management experience, specializing in distributor department management: Senior marketing teachers help your business grow. Learning and exchange QQ group: 344257092 -----------------------------------------