The Liberation War, from September 3, 1945, to June 30, 1950, lasted 4 years and 10 months, during which the People's Liberation Army eliminated a total of 8.07 million enemies. Taking the three major campaigns as a dividing line: in the three years before them, 2.64 million enemies were eliminated; the three major campaigns, from the Huaihai Campaign on September 12, 1948, to the end of the Pingjin Campaign on January 31, 1949, lasted 142 days and eliminated 1.54 million enemies; in the 11 months after the campaigns, 2.4 million enemies were eliminated. Before the three major campaigns, the PLA was numerically inferior to the Nationalist forces, on strategic defense, accumulating small victories over a long period, until Su Yu began large-scale corps operations. The three major campaigns were the shortest in duration but had the fastest elimination rate, wiping out several enemy corps at once. After the campaigns, there were no major battles, just sweeping away the remnants. Why does an article about B2B platforms bring up the three major campaigns? Since the explosion of e-commerce platforms, a certain mindset has formed: when a track's wind comes, it must be explosive. Everyone goes all out to seize the wind, and once a leader takes the lead, latecomers have no chance. So you must fight with all your might to lead the track. Ten years ago, the explosion of B2B changed this perception; latecomers actually did better than the leaders. What should be the rhythm for a track that combines "offline + internet"? Below, we discuss two issues: first, who are the competitors of B2B platform operators; second, the pace of B2B platform advancement, especially the strategic opportunity point. Who are the competitors of B2B platforms? Peers are competitors; rivals in the same industry are competitors. This deep-rooted perception has its logic. It is the perception under normal circumstances. However, during times of transformation, it is precisely not the case. Haven't we recently heard the phrase "invisible competitors"? It means competitors are outside your field of vision. The competitors of B2B platforms are not other B2B platforms, but traditional distributors. Currently, B2B's overall share is about 10% of distribution. At this point, competition among B2B platforms is like doing a ritual in a snail shell—there's no room to maneuver. With such a small overall share, if every B2B platform wants rapid growth, it inevitably leads to excessive competition, overconsumption of resources, and possibly bleeding out just before victory. We have always emphasized that trading-type distributors have no future, but that doesn't mean they will automatically give up resistance. When faced with danger, fighting desperately is human nature; only a very few experts will realize this. So, I have always stressed that the future is not about distributors successfully transforming, but about a new generation of distributors rising, while the old generation disappears entirely. However, before they disappear, their resistance will be fierce. After all, who is willing to step off the historical stage willingly? Therefore, it is necessary to observe changes in B2B, and even more important to observe changes in trading-type distributors. We must study both B2B and distributors. The distribution share that distributors give up is the share B2B can easily acquire. Stubborn resistance can last a long time, but collapse happens in an instant. In the Liberation War, the three major campaigns were the "instant" of the Nationalist army's collapse. The key is: when the collective collapse of trading-type distributors happens in that instant, is your B2B platform ready? Strategic Opportunity Point First, look at the chart below. What kind of chart is this? Some might say it's a standard product life cycle chart. In fact, all life cycle charts are basically similar, including human life cycles, product life cycles, enterprise life cycles, and industry life cycles. I specifically drew two vertical lines: one is the life-and-death line, and the other is the strategic opportunity point. Ren Zhengfei once said that enterprises should dare to concentrate forces at strategic opportunity points and implement saturation attacks. For example, when Huawei discovered the strategic opportunity in networks and data centers, he explicitly proposed "pounce on it, tear it open, develop vertically, expand horizontally," ensuring breakthroughs at strategic opportunity points through intensive investment and concentrated resource allocation. He pointed out: "Seize the strategic opportunity; spending any amount is victory. Miss the opportunity; not spending is also death." Thus, on the life cycle chart, two intervals form around the strategic opportunity point. The front is the symbiosis stage, where both large and small can coexist, as with current B2B platforms. The so-called competition at this time is child's play compared to the strategic opportunity point. After the strategic opportunity point, the market space suddenly expands. At this point, enterprises can form a new positive cycle: low price → scale expansion → lower price → further scale expansion... At this time, low price and scale cycle repeatedly; falling behind at any node enters the death rhythm. In 1999, Mengniu was founded; in 2000, founder Niu Gensheng proposed that Mengniu would achieve 10 billion yuan by 2005. Because China's dairy industry had already entered the strategic opportunity point, they couldn't grow slowly at that point. So, Mengniu's 1000% growth rate at that time was not surprising. So, where is the strategic opportunity point for B2B platforms? My prediction is roughly around 30% of distribution share. I emphasize the word "around"—don't be rigid about the 30% figure; judge based on personal feel. Why 30%? Because at this point, many trading-type distributors will see no hope and voluntarily give up, preserving their gains. Before that, they will resist with their old capital, even at a loss. Another point is very important and can be called the life-and-death line. When HarmonyOS was launched, Ren Zhengfei proposed a 16% life-and-death line. Only when market share exceeds 16% can the HarmonyOS system remain invincible in subsequent competition and form a stable ecosystem. Pay special attention to the word "ecosystem": around HarmonyOS, a complete ecosystem must form for it to have application value. Similarly, B2B is not competing alone; it also has an ecosystem. The four major functions of traditional distributors must be dispersed into four major ecosystems. Once past the life-and-death line, B2B platform development will accelerate; once past the strategic opportunity point, latecomers have no hope, and the industry enters an oligopoly state. The Ending Determines the Beginning The life-and-death line and strategic opportunity point mentioned earlier—do they apply to all industries and enterprises? Not necessarily. This is related to the industry's endgame state. An industry's endgame roughly has three states: First, oligopoly Any industry that scales will eventually move toward oligopoly. Industries born in the industrial society are basically like this. Think about it: home appliances, automobiles, mobile phones, tires, beverages, instant noodles, ham sausages—which of these is not an oligopoly? The characteristic of oligopolistic industries is that 90%, 99%, or even 99.9% of enterprises will die or be acquired. Second, high fragmentation Chinese cuisine, tea, condiments, snacks, French wine, German beer—hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of enterprises coexist and thrive, forming an ecosystem. Highly fragmented industries are mostly those formed in agricultural society, where products are highly dependent on geography, climate, and produce, often with geographic labels. However, Chinese tea going global is highly concentrated, and German beer entering China is concentrated. In the same industry, the industrial form differs between the country of origin and the importing country. Third, limited concentration Cosmetics, clothing, and baijiu are limited concentration. In limited concentration, personalization and differentiation are key, while also having some scale. The endgame pattern of an industry is related to its characteristics. For limited concentration industries, focus on personalization and differentiation. For limited concentration industries, create unique labels, such as Moutai's production area label. If an industry is characterized by scale, it will definitely move toward high concentration, though the degree may vary. B2B is undoubtedly an industry with scale characteristics, and it will eventually move toward oligopoly, and a national oligopoly at that. This is the industry's endgame characteristic. China's distributor landscape is fragmented, so early B2B based on this landscape is also regional and fragmented. B2B's oligopolization will definitely start with small regional oligopolies, then advance to strategic regions (one or several provinces), and finally enter national oligopoly. This is a one-way road. Winners are kings, losers are villains; there is no "mountain king" territory. If B2B platforms don't realize this in their growth and development, they will realize it through mistakes in the future. The goals, paths, and pace of B2B platforms must be planned accordingly. I once wrote a book, "Let Growth Change Destiny," and don't think growth means no worries. The so-called "changing destiny" means having a place in the endgame. Lessons from Others This is a case I experienced personally. In 1998, a friend started a business, and I was deeply involved; I trained the first few batches of salespeople. Later, I became a shareholder and served as a director for a long time. I resigned as director 10 years ago and paid less attention. Recently, I saw news online that this company with billions in revenue entered bankruptcy restructuring. It made the news because it was a regional leader, but not yet a national leader. The problems this company faced, I foresaw 20 years ago. Twenty years ago, I asked the boss three questions. I asked: In this industry, how many companies were there in the U.S. 20 years ago, and how many are there now? The boss answered: 20 years ago, there were 20,000 companies; now there are 300. I asked again: How many companies are there in China now? The boss answered: 30,000 companies. I asked a third time: In 10, 20, or 30 years, how many companies will there be in this industry in China? I answered myself: China may have only 300 companies in the future, or even fewer. I further said: Within 20 years, the mortality rate in this industry in the U.S. is 98.5%, with a survival rate of 1.5%. The future in China will be the same. At the start of this company, it was truly profitable, with multiple dividends in a year. Three shareholders started with 400,000 yuan in capital. Twenty years ago, it quickly grew to over 100 million yuan. Just when they were excited, I poured cold water on them. That cold water was: this industry in China also has a 98.5% mortality rate, and most currently profitable companies will go bankrupt. If this industry in China will also have only 300 companies in the future, what is the turning point that determines the future? I believe there are two turning points. One is around 2005, which was when I asked the question. The other I didn't predict, but now it appears to be around 2020. In 2005, the industry was both growing rapidly and the beginning of deep distribution. Offline marketing efficiency greatly improved, and startups could complete primitive capital accumulation through the light model of deep distribution. Once the industry entered heavy-asset competition, there would be no opportunity for primitive accumulation. This was a golden opportunity for a company lacking capital background. This time point was the company's life-and-death line. In 2005, I began guiding this company in deep distribution, with excellent results, once achieving the top sales in over half the market in a province in a year. However, the boss didn't persist; too many people in the company opposed deep distribution. From then on, I saw the company's future clearly—it wouldn't be among the top 300. After that, although the company still grew rapidly, even becoming a regional leader, around 2020, the industry suddenly entered heavy-asset marketing, and the golden window for light-asset development closed. More seriously, the industry's former mainstream business disappeared, becoming an internal ecosystem of industry giants, and the social supply chain became an internal supply chain. When an industry explodes, if you don't explode; or when it doesn't explode, you've exhausted all your strength. Then, the consequences are predictable. B2B Platform's Life-and-Death Line and Strategic Opportunity Point Earlier, I mentioned two figures: the 16% industry life-and-death line and the 30% strategic opportunity point. First, it must be clear that the future of FMCG B2B platforms is highly concentrated. First, concentrate in small regions to form regional oligopolies. Then, through mergers and acquisitions, achieve concentration in larger regions. Because B2B is definitely economies of scale, with very high concentration. Second, because the overall share of FMCG B2B hasn't reached the 16% industry life-and-death line, the B2B ecosystem hasn't fully formed. B2B order platforms, B2B distribution platforms, B2B finance, and more supporting services haven't formed; B2B is fighting alone, with relatively high costs. Finally, let's talk about the strategic opportunity point for B2B platforms. In the FMCG channel, the following business logic applies: brand awareness (brand operators) → B2B orders (order operators) → B2B distribution (city distribution operators) → B2B financial services... This logic shows that the brand operator's brand awareness is the most important link in the channel; other channel functions are derived from it. That is, as long as there is consumer awareness and purchase, then which platform to order from, who delivers, etc., are only differences in efficiency and cost. Even if original distributors want to deliver, the brand owner may not let them. So, the strategic opportunity points for B2B platforms are: first, when industry giants realize that third-party operations are more beneficial to brand owners' channel efficiency and cost; second, when distributors' trading business is on the verge of collapse. B2B's current state is somewhat like the early stage of the Liberation War. It can only develop at a smaller cost; don't risk everything to win or lose. Even if you fall behind at this point, there's still a chance to catch up. At this time, watch the 16% industry life-and-death line. Once past the 16% line, you can speed up a bit, but don't bleed out. The real time to strike is when the 30% strategic opportunity point arrives. Maybe 10 years of lurking, but the decisive battle lasts only a year or two. What is a decisive battle? It's a battle that determines the outcome. As Ren Zhengfei said: "Seize the strategic opportunity; spending any amount is victory. Miss the opportunity; not spending is also death." In terms of mindset, don't overestimate B2B's present, and don't underestimate B2B's future. When you're full of confidence, it may just be the beginning; when you're in despair, the decisive moment may be coming. B2B is certainly a trend, but trends can mislead. Trends are long-term, but the value of each time period is different. Don't think B2B is just intense competition now; the real competition aims at "mass death" of competitors—cleaning house—and manifests as a repeated cycle of "price cuts—scale expansion—further price cuts," thus deciding the outcome in one battle. The turning point for FMCG B2B is not about leading at a certain stage, nor is it limited to a short-term game of winning or losing. The real winning move often lies in the eve of a cyclical turning point. Only those who position themselves in advance at the right time can achieve "saturation attack" at the strategic opportunity point. 2025 will be a critical window for the restructuring of the FMCG industry structure. From the collapse of the traditional distribution system to the high-intensity competition of B2B platforms; from the rise of a new generation of distributors to the systematic reconstruction of product power, organizational power, and channel power—the entire trading system is crossing surface turbulence and moving toward deep-water competition. Facing this round of deep restructuring, what should distributors do next? August 19-21, Shanghai, [2025 New Demand · New Supply 7th FMCG Conference]. We will gather outstanding regional distributors, representative B2B platforms, leading brand owners, and retailers—frontline operators—to systematically discuss this topic, exploring underlying logic and practical experience. This is a gathering for the next cycle and a strategic co-creation to preview the future. Welcome to join! 🔺 Details of the 7th China FMCG Conference Scan QR code for ticket inquiries