A few days ago, a friend chatted with me about foreign beverage companies eyeing the Chinese market and wanting to understand the current domestic beverage landscape for future expansion. My view is clear: any beverage company that builds the "Three Forces"—product, brand, and marketing—and persists will inevitably become a 10-billion-yuan enterprise. First, product force. A good product truly speaks for itself. What makes a good product? I believe it's the "Three Goods": good quality + good packaging + good concept. Take Uni-President's Kaixiaozao (self-heating rice) as an example; with the "Three Goods" quality, it will surely achieve great things in the future. Next, brand force. This concept cannot be formed overnight; it includes the accumulation of loyal consumers over time and the high alignment between product philosophy and consumer values. Why did Nongfu Spring target Genki Forest's sparkling water this summer? The reason is simple: Nongfu Spring is not targeting sparkling water per se, but a company that has grown rapidly with a "health" concept—a concept that is also Nongfu's positioning. In essence, if Genki Forest grows stronger, Nongfu Spring's "health" brand force would be weakened, shaking Nongfu's foundation. Finally, marketing force. Marketing models can truly disrupt a company's development. Jinmailang Beverage, except for its innovative boiled water product, follows and imitates other products, yet its overall sales are not low. The key reason is the "Four-in-One" marketing model. Next, I'll analyze the "Three Forces" of several leading domestic beverage companies. Each item is scored out of 5, with 5 being the best and 1 the worst (personal opinion, for reference only). Nongfu Spring's Three Forces Product: 4 | Brand: 5 | Marketing: 4 1. Product Nongfu Spring should be viewed in two parts: water and non-water products. Non-water products are unquestionably the benchmark in the beverage industry in terms of quality, packaging, and concept. However, the packaging of water products seems outdated, almost unchanged for a decade. It could be seen as creating a classic, or as not matching the preferences of Generation Z consumers. 2. Brand "Nongfu Spring is a bit sweet," "We don't produce water; we are nature's porters." These well-known slogans, along with over twenty years of consumer water testing education, have built an irreplaceable brand force. 3. Marketing A brief analysis of Nongfu's marketing model: the core idea of the exclusive distributor model is that the company fully authorizes distributors and provides timely assistance and services. 1) Expense lump-sum: Based on city tier, modern trade share, and university/scenic spot share, distributors receive market expenses of 7%-10% of annual sales. It specifies the ratio between market expenses (for terminal displays, consumer education, etc.) and channel expenses (for promotions like product bundling). 2) Sales assessment model: Sales compensation is set by the distributor based on their market situation, photographed and retained by the office and region monthly. Company-employed sales reps (now rare) receive base salary from the company, with commissions paid by the distributor. Dedicated sales reps have no direct relationship with the company; the company pays a monthly base subsidy, and the distributor covers the rest. 3) Grassroots managers deeply involved in distributor management: Nongfu's grassroots managers, called customer managers, oversee 4-7 sales staff. They work within distributor operations, participating in morning meetings, market strategy discussions, market activity planning, personnel assessment, order delivery, and warehouse management. Model advantages: 1. Distributors are the first touchpoint; flexible market expense usage enhances market responsiveness and cost-effectiveness. 2. Expense lump-sum with high margins drives distributor enthusiasm. 3. Role shift: the company moves from expense user to expense checker, focusing on auditing, supervision, and control, leading to better market order. 4. Result-oriented, simple processes, flexible execution, and fast financial verification. 5. Comprehensive and advanced distributor communication, training, and development systems. Model shortcomings: 1. Distributors vary in market, management, and assessment capabilities. 2. Distributors are profit-driven; Nongfu's process management is relatively loose, and peripheral suburban areas have lower coverage and service levels due to lower output. Jinmailang Beverage's Three Forces Product: 3 | Brand: 3 | Marketing: 5 1. Product Within Jinmailang, there's a consensus that following is the lowest-risk entrepreneurship. From its product structure, most products, except for boiled water and Madun Town, have "prototypes" in the market—imitating Mizone, tea π, soda water, functional drinks, etc.—but none seem to perform well. Previously, limited strength prevented innovation, but now it's different. As a benchmark enterprise in the north, with a say in product innovation, R&D, and food technology, it should invest more in new product development to meet the young post-90s consumers' desire for novelty and change, adding more care and innovation. 2. Brand Brand force is relatively weak in first- and second-tier cities, but in lower-tier cities, it is gradually penetrating with the "Jinmailang is practical" image, accumulating loyal customers who buy Jinmailang for value: same price, 50% more volume than others. 3. Marketing I've analyzed the Four-in-One model multiple times; refer to my previous articles. Here, I'll summarize three points: 1. The "Four-in-One" system and strong incentive policies motivate frontline staff, improving human efficiency. 2. The "Four-in-One" system reduces distributor importance, giving the company more initiative and flexibility in partner selection. 3. Through strict systems, processes, and tools, it effectively improves terminal service quality and efficiency. Currently, it's one of the best offline coverage models in stimulating grassroots employees' initiative and even human nature. Of course, the Four-in-One model has room for improvement. It excels at the "small boss" level but lacks mid-level strength. Like farmers harvesting crops, lifting a large bag of grain requires waist strength. A small boss's duty is to sell and maintain products according to requirements; that makes an excellent small boss. The logic of product sell-through depends on: product + tools + methods. Regarding the above issue, if sell-through is hindered, is it a product problem? A tool problem? Or a method problem? In any case, it's not the small boss's problem. The small boss's job is to follow the work standards; if done, they should be rewarded. Those managing the small bosses must be responsible for the results of the process. The problem lies with the "superiors" of the small bosses. The core solution is to turn the "superiors" into partners. Uni-President's Three Forces Product: 5 | Brand: 4 | Marketing: 2 1. Product Uni-President claims to have Asia's largest food R&D center, which is commendable. Its products are indeed excellent, like Laotan Sauerkraut Noodles, Tang Daren, Kaixiaozao, and Assam, with good quality, beautiful packaging, and clear concepts, making it an industry model. 2. Brand There's a significant north-south difference: strong in the south, relatively weak in the north, with some northern regions rarely seeing Uni-President products. 3. Marketing Uni-President's marketing model is vague, and its marketing team seems quite "laid-back." From the traditional model to the later "Big Package Earn" (Dabaozhuan), which failed in promotion, there's no fully matching marketing model. Regarding "Big Package Earn," some issues need resolution, such as: 1. The model's rights, responsibilities, and benefits are unclear and mismatched, and the tone is not set. 2. Recruiting small bosses lacks precise target audience positioning and a complete survival rule. Management converts existing staff into small bosses to meet assessments, leading to high turnover. Workers accustomed to five-insurance and one-fund cannot become small bosses; a rabbit's run differs from a wolf's. 3. Treating north and south as one chessboard, unclear market positioning, and failure to understand the underlying logic of failed cooperative businesses, etc. Master Kong's Three Forces Product: 3 | Brand: 5 | Marketing: 4 1. Product In terms of product innovation, Master Kong has been disappointing in recent years, relying on super single products (braised beef noodles for instant noodles, iced tea for beverages). Of course, with huge traffic products driving sales, other SKUs won't sell too poorly, but if Master Kong wants a second venture, it's hard to succeed with existing products. 2. Brand Absolute volume determines absolute brand; brand force is unquestionable. 3. Marketing Master Kong's marketing model hasn't seen much innovation over the years. Simply put: the market is divided into 1-5 tier business districts. Districts 1-2 are direct-operated, with company staff taking orders and maintaining the market, while distributors are pure delivery partners. Districts 3-5 are primarily distributor-operated, with support from business office managers. Master Kong is the company that maximizes the deep distribution model of channel cultivation, and combined with its brand force, it can dominate. However, this model lacks in stimulating personnel initiative, or achieving high human efficiency may incur higher labor costs. Final Thoughts: First, I declare that the above is only my personal opinion; corrections are welcome. Now, back to the initial question: How should beverage companies position themselves to move toward a 10-billion scale? I believe the first step is to solve the product force issue. If you can't achieve the "Three Goods" (good quality, good packaging, good concept), don't invest blindly, or you'll likely waste your investment. Second, solve the marketing force issue. Good products must match good marketing models; the era of "good wine needs no bush" is long over. Finally, continuously build your brand force from start to finish. This is one of the core values of a company. For example, if you changed Moutai's name and packaging, or Nongfu Spring's water, could they achieve their current scale? The answer is obvious. The above are some suggestions for developing beverage companies. Feel free to leave comments for discussion. Are you "watching" me?