Community group buying has been developing in China for five or six years now. Whether it's leading brands or mid-tier brands, so far, none has truly found a profitable model. As of now, I believe platforms have not thoroughly studied the underlying logic of fresh produce retail, yet they blindly engage in fierce competition through capital and so-called traffic entry points. The current community group buying seems like a track without an end; it's easy to enter but hard to exit. This article presents my personal observations and thoughts on community group buying. ****-01-****Why do community group buying platforms keep emerging? First, let's look at why community group buying has sprung up like mushrooms, with all sorts of players showing their tricks: First, the barrier to entry is low; anyone can do it, and the technology is readily available. Community group buying can even be done without technology; a simple social group is enough. Second, there is no shortage of suppliers in the distribution sector, making it easy to organize products. The supplier model in community group buying objectively continues the procurement model of large supermarkets like Walmart, pursuing the lowest supply prices. Especially in the agricultural and sideline products sector, overproduction is common. Community group buying uses so-called collective procurement to squeeze suppliers, precisely because there is no shortage of suppliers in this field. ****-02-****What are the current shortcomings of community group buying? Currently, the development of community group buying has the following shortcomings and problems: First, the ecological logic designed by current community group buying is not feasible, at least not at present. The so-called solution to "people, goods, and scenes" is just nonsense. As it stands, platforms have merely cultivated a group of "aunties" who buy cheap goods. Objectively speaking, this group cannot bring future consumption or reflect consumption upgrading. What is "people"? Investors, employees, partners, and consumers. If a business model does not consider any of these elements, it will eventually fail. What is "goods"? Today, goods are not just products; they also include explicit or implicit products in the distribution process. Explicit products are the physical goods themselves (fruits, vegetables, daily necessities), while implicit products are the experience, emotions, etc. What is "scene"? It's the experiential scenario of application, not just replacing the wet market. Second, the profit models designed by group buying companies are pseudo-models. Any sustainable business needs to pursue ecological harmony and win-win symbiosis. Suppliers need room, operators need returns, and sales units need profits. If you rely on endless subsidies and burning money without bottom lines, you will eventually fail. Some leading brands claim to process tens of millions of orders daily, but based on normal procurement and cost estimates, each order loses 1-2 yuan. Suppliers who have worked with community group buying are gradually realizing this track is like "killing the goose that lays the golden eggs." Some leading brands have 80% of their suppliers supplying at a loss. The strategy of acquiring customers through low prices has entered a vicious cycle. Today, you attract 200 consumers in a community with 30 eggs for 1 yuan; tomorrow, a competitor can lure them away with a bag of salt for 1 cent. In today's community group buying, strictly speaking, consumer brand loyalty is gradually disappearing; there is no lowest price, only lower. The method of stabilizing group leaders with high commissions has completely failed. Taking Changsha as an example, a community of 1,000 households has at least 8 group leaders, and some even promote multiple group buying brands. Imagine when a community has multiple group leaders; the pie is divided so thinly that some will go hungry, as the pot is only so big. The method of relying on capital to burn money and subsidize to sustain life may once again enter an era similar to ride-hailing. The ride-hailing case tells us that to this day, no brand has made a profit, and no capital investor has earned money. In today's community group buying, some capital seems to be feeling the urge to exit, seeking the next successor. The method of endlessly squeezing suppliers will eventually provoke widespread anger. If every group buying brand uses its butcher knife to threaten upstream suppliers, it could even seriously threaten the upstream agricultural and sideline industries. Third, community group buying currently cannot solve the branding problem of fresh produce. This is a major shortcoming in domestic agricultural products (because consumers who care about brand in fresh produce do not participate in group buying). Consumers who have bought vegetables or hot fruits on Meituan, Xingsheng, or Chengxin Youxuan have a much lower repurchase rate than at wet markets. Fourth, scenario-based selling cannot be realized in community group buying (this is a weakness). An auntie who goes to the wet market to buy pork ribs might also buy seaweed; a seller who buys crucian carp might also buy tofu. Without this experiential feeling, doing fresh produce community group buying is doomed to a dead end. Fifth, short-changing and passing off inferior goods as superior have become the mainstream in current community group buying. As long as the price is low, quality doesn't matter. Some companies sell nearly expired products to consumers through group buying. I have personally experienced some community group buying platforms, including Xingsheng Youxuan, Meituan, and Duoduo Maicai, and they generally have this problem. Sixth, most of the current operators or founders of community group buying come from the internet industry. They over-mythologize concepts like the internet (new retail), lack practical experience, lack typical retail logic thinking, and interpret internet concepts too deeply, winning investors' favor through PPT-style profit models. ****-03-****Future development direction of community group buying First, based on the current vortex, community group buying will undergo a reshuffle through capital competition (burning money to kill off some), then leave a few wounded players to calm down, deeply summarize problems, and explore the underlying logic of fresh produce social e-commerce. Second, government regulatory authorities (market regulation, agriculture, transportation, etc.) will provide guidance and supervision, and relevant laws will be enacted. For example, some community group buying currently uses the same vehicle to mix daily chemical products and fresh food, which poses serious food safety risks. Third, new capital will cooperate with surviving group buying companies or new entrants, using capital to promote industry development. For instance, they may directly cooperate with agricultural production areas, managing from the field according to national policies. Fourth, product branding (IP) and team professionalism are the direction and foundation for survival. Fifth, in the future, community group buying will definitely involve people with deep research into the underlying logic of consumer retail, who will lead industry development. Sixth, scenario-based—deep integration of AI technology will drive the transaction scenario in community group buying. Frankly speaking, we are not denying the "community group buying" business model, but it has developed too fast, forgetting the underlying logic of business value. Every community group buying platform needs to think: after the wild growth, how to truly bring value to consumers and society in the next stage, rather than simply using low prices to satisfy consumers' "bargain-hunting" psychology. This is not sustainable and has no value. Tips will be paid 400-2000 yuan upon adoption.