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Years ago, I met a sales director from a Jianlibao branch factory. During the meal, he said, "Don't think your foreign companies are so great. I might not be a good director at Coca-Cola, but your Coca-Cola director wouldn't be able to run Jianlibao either."

At that time, I was a sales supervisor at Coca-Cola and found his words hard to swallow. Years later, after leaving the foreign enterprise world, working in private enterprises, and consulting for hundreds of companies of various sizes, I realized he wasn't exaggerating.

When it comes to operations, domestic and foreign enterprises truly have different playbooks, with vastly different strategies and tactics. A sudden switch would be impossible to adapt to.

Chinese Kung Fu versus Western Boxing—there are countless differences, but which is superior? This article takes a focused look at dealer policies, examining cooperation positioning, assessment direction, and management methods to reveal a glimpse of the operational differences between domestic and foreign enterprises.

Let's start with two typical cases.

Case 1: Annual Dealer Policy of an International Leading Beverage Company

  1. Grant Dealer A exclusive distribution rights for Brand B's product series within a designated area.
  2. If the dealer fails to meet the sales targets and market development indicators set by the manufacturer, the manufacturer reserves the right to add additional dealers or operate direct markets in the area.
  3. Based on equal negotiation, both parties reach consensus. The dealer voluntarily commits to exclusive distribution and complies with the manufacturer's designated area and suggested pricing. Any violation of market order, designated area, pricing agreements, or exclusive distribution commitments allows the manufacturer to impose economic penalties or even revoke distribution rights, while retaining the right to claim further damages.
  4. The dealer's work indicators and rebate/incentive policies are as follows:

Rebate Structure

  • Reward of 0.3 yuan per case sold; additional 0.3 yuan per case for on-time payment; additional 0.3 yuan per case for exclusive distribution (not selling designated competitors).
  • For price undercutting, cross-region selling, late payment, or breach of exclusive distribution: first offense deducts 0.1 yuan per case from annual rebate; second offense deducts 0.3 yuan per case; third offense deducts 0.5 yuan per case.

Incentive Structure

  • Points system: 5 points for achieving annual sales target.
  • 2 points for achieving 80% or more account opening rate in designated outer regions (distribution and wholesale network development in lower-tier markets).
  • 1 point for 80% or more compliance in supplying and displaying in hypermarkets.
  • 2 points for passing random distribution rate checks.

Case 2: Dealer Incentive Policy of a Domestic Cosmetics Company at a Beauty and Cosmetics Expo

  • On-site payment of 100,000 yuan at the expo immediately earns a small truck valued at 30,000 yuan.
  • In addition to the gift, the dealer must pay a 10,000 yuan cash deposit.
  • Guarantee to complete 300,000 yuan in sales and payment collection within 6 months after the expo.
  • If the dealer fails to meet the 300,000 yuan target, the manufacturer has the right to withhold the deposit.
  • If the dealer completes the 300,000 yuan sales within 6 months, the company will return goods worth double the deposit in the seventh month.
  • Dealers who complete the target and whose purchases include 20,000 yuan of sun protection products will receive an additional gift of equal value in sunscreen products.

Take a close look at these two dealer policies. Do you notice anything? These examples represent the typical Western Boxing and Chinese Kung Fu philosophies in dealer management. The seemingly ordinary wording hides strategic intent, which I'll elaborate on below.

Difference 1: Cooperation Positioning

Western Boxing: Large foreign enterprises in China place great emphasis on legal awareness. They play word games in contracts, often with dozens of pages in both Chinese and English, making dealers sweat while the manufacturer holds all the cards.

In cooperation with dealers, foreign enterprises exhibit a strong "colonial mentality." Their true positioning of dealers is not as "gods" or "strategic partners," but as economical and durable execution tools. Once a tool no longer meets the company's needs, it can be discarded at any time without legal consequences.

Look at Case 1, Clauses 1 and 2 of the international beverage company's annual dealer policy:

  • Grant Dealer A exclusive distribution rights for Brand B's product series within a designated area.
  • If the dealer fails to meet sales and market development targets, the manufacturer reserves the right to add dealers or operate direct markets.

Analysis: Western Boxing emphasizes meticulous market cultivation, but most dealers have network gaps:

  • Few wholesalers can cover all secondary distributors and retailers in a region.
  • Almost no county-level dealer can cover all townships below.
  • Dealers' supply and service capabilities are often inadequate, so large retail chains usually require direct supply from the manufacturer.

In this context, easily promising exclusive distribution rights, only to be passive if the dealer underperforms, would mean giving up on outlets the dealer cannot cover. So Western Boxing masters use wordplay—appearing to promise exclusivity while actually committing to nothing.

  • Why sign "special authorized distribution" contracts instead of "exclusive agency" contracts? The reason is somewhat alarming: Chinese law currently protects exclusive agency rights but has not strictly defined distribution rights. If you sign an exclusive agency agreement and then open a second account, the dealer can sue you. But with exclusive distribution rights, opening a second account, lawyers would tell the dealer, "Mr. Zhang, this matter is not strictly defined by law yet."

  • The exclusive distribution rights granted are limited, with numerous preconditions that allow cancellation at any time.

    • "Granting exclusive distribution rights for Brand B's product series" means other future products may not be given to the dealer, limiting the dealer's control over the full product line and spreading risk.
    • "If the dealer fails to meet sales and market development targets, the manufacturer reserves the right to add dealers or operate direct markets"—this is like saying, "I'll marry you for life, but I reserve the right to divorce." "I can stay with you forever without divorce, provided you treat me well and meet the contract's work indicators."
    • Work indicators include not only sales but also compliance with designated areas, pricing, and exclusive distribution agreements. The upfront statement "the dealer voluntarily complies and accepts penalties for violations" avoids the trap of the manufacturer lacking administrative punishment rights.
    • Cross-region selling and price undercutting are common dealer behaviors, and full exclusivity is impossible. These rules act like a spring rod, flexible when needed. When the manufacturer doesn't want to replace the dealer, violations are met with verbal warnings and light penalties, not severe punishment. But smart manufacturers document violations for future use. When the time comes to replace a dealer, they can cite past violations and terminate the contract, retaining further claims.
    • Soft indicator assessment: What are soft indicators? Sales and payment collection are hard indicators. If the contract states that meeting sales targets secures exclusive rights, dealers will find ways to inflate sales to "survive." Soft indicators are process metrics like distribution rate, merchandising, hypermarket entry rate, and display compliance, as in Case 1's incentive policy. The "softness" lies in the manufacturer's ability to find fault with distribution or merchandising at any time, providing grounds for revoking exclusive rights.

Commentary: Foreigners respect the law—they seek advantage within legal loopholes. Contract drafting is a gentle knife, seizing the initiative. Whether or not the "servants" harbor rebellious thoughts, the "master" has murderous intent from the start. This reveals the true strategic positioning of dealers by foreign enterprises. Don't curse the "foreign devils" for this; business is fundamentally about interest exchange. There's no emotion in business, not even morality. When dealers criticize manufacturers for being heartless and burning bridges, they should remember: "Don't let friendship bear responsibility."

Chinese Kung Fu: Successful domestic enterprises often dominate rural markets. They may look impressive on the surface, but their corporate quality needs improvement, and legal awareness is weak. In contracts, they often solemnly promise to retain exclusive distribution rights if the dealer meets sales targets, advocating "whoever develops the market benefits." They position dealers as "market developers with manufacturer support" and "strategic regional partners."

Under this guiding philosophy, manufacturer-dealer relations are initially harmonious. But once dealers grow, they inevitably seek profit maximization, leading to wasted market expenses and ineffective policy execution. The channel falls under dealer control. Channel flattening is an inevitable trend. Large dealers wanting to preserve their monopolistic territories is understandable. The day the enterprise signs a contract with a large dealer, it's destined that they will eventually clash. Initial contracts are poorly drafted, and dealer networks are unevenly developed. Manufacturers often hesitate to penalize dealers, and replacing them often incurs costs beyond normal business—sometimes even "buying the market," such as:

  • A well-known solid wood flooring brand in South China paid a one-time "market development compensation" to its provincial dealer upon splitting the territory.
  • A famous instant noodle company in North China gave dealers "surplus shares."

For example, when the former Shandong general dealer was flattened to become a Jinan city dealer, resistance and backlash were inevitable. How to ease the pain? Tell him: "In 2005, we'll cut you down to Jinan city dealer, but the sales from new dealers and distributors in Zibo, Laizhou, Qingdao... will count toward your rebate." In 2005, he only needs to do well in Jinan; other cities are not his concern, and the manufacturer gives him a free rebate. Of course, the manufacturer also has to pay rebates to the new Qingdao dealer, creating double costs borne by the manufacturer. But the free ride doesn't last: in the first year, the manufacturer gives the Shandong general dealer rebates. In 2006? Half rebates. In 2007? No more.

  • A medium-sized food enterprise in South China left an "inheritance" for a dealer: The company wanted to cut off a major client. Knowing the client was large, a small company might face conflict and might not "beat" him in the local market. What to do? Leave an "inheritance." The payment method with this client was "pay for the first truck when the second arrives." Before cutting him off, the delivery truck sizes gradually shrank: from 8 tons to 6 tons, then 4 tons, then 3 tons... Under various pretexts, the trucks got smaller. Finally, when the dealer owed only 3 tons of goods (about 40,000 yuan), the company suddenly turned hostile and cut him off. Afterward, a sales rep went to the dealer, feigning ignorance: "Hey, Boss Zhang, you still owe me that 40,000 yuan." The dealer naturally refused: "Damn it, you replaced me without reason and still want money? Get lost!" The sales rep pretended to back off. In reality, the company's general manager told me they never intended to collect that 40,000 yuan; it was the "inheritance" left for the dealer.

Why call it an inheritance? Think about it: the client took 3 tons of goods (40,000 yuan) without paying. He puts on a tough front but fears the manufacturer might report him to the industry and commerce bureau, police, or court. The manufacturer, after cutting off a major client, also fears retaliation. It's like a pole hitting a wolf—both sides are scared. Neither dares to provoke the other.

Commentary: Chinese enterprises are "honest," even eager to become sworn brothers with dealers, swearing blood oaths. As long as you can complete sales and make money for me, I'll never betray you. Unfortunately, circumstances force change. Under competitive pressure, manufacturers must refine their dealer networks. The vows of yesteryear become today's shackles. The brothers you nurtured with indulgence become formidable enemies. That's the price of "honesty." If only they had known, they wouldn't have started!

Difference 2: Assessment Direction

Western Boxing: Foreign enterprises manage markets relatively rationally, with dealer policies reflecting a process-oriented assessment approach.

Look back at Case 1, Clause 4 of the international beverage company's annual dealer policy:

  1. Dealer work indicators and rebate/incentive policies:
  • Rebate structure:
    • 0.3 yuan per case sold, additional 0.3 yuan for on-time payment, additional 0.3 yuan for exclusive distribution.
    • For price undercutting, cross-region selling, late payment, or breach of exclusivity: first offense deducts 0.1 yuan per case, second 0.3 yuan, third 0.5 yuan.
  • Incentive structure:
    • Points: 5 points for annual sales target; 2 points for 80% account opening in outer regions; 1 point for 80% hypermarket supply and display compliance; 2 points for passing distribution rate checks.

Analysis: This clause emphasizes two things: market order penalties and process indicator rewards. Dealer interests are tied not only to sales volume.

Clear deduction standards for price undercutting, cross-region selling, late payment, and exclusivity breaches. Three violations wipe out the annual rebate—this is how market order is enforced.

Year-end incentives are linked to distribution rate, display compliance, and hypermarket entry rate. This guides dealers, clarifying the direction (improve distribution, display, account opening). If these process indicators are truly achieved, results naturally follow—"good process leads to good results."

One dealer meets sales target and gets 5 points. Another dealer misses sales but excels in distribution, merchandising, hypermarket display, and account opening—also 5 points. Large and small dealers compete on the same starting line, and the manufacturer's incentive program is no longer a "big dealer club."

Commentary: Sow good seeds and reap good fruits. A process-oriented philosophy naturally creates a virtuous market cycle. This explains why foreign enterprises can enter urban markets, why their products have fewer cross-region sales, price chaos, and bad debts, and why they can sell multiple product lines.

Chinese Kung Fu: Domestic enterprises take the opposite approach: results-oriented. Motivating dealers to complete sales is the core. They show remarkable ingenuity in stimulating dealer purchasing, with policies centered on "traps"—a series of linked traps. Once you step in, they keep trapping you, making you feel "once you enter the palace gates, it's as deep as the sea; by the time you look back, a hundred years have passed."

Look at Case 2's clauses and you'll understand.

Analysis:

  • "On-site payment of 100,000 yuan at the expo immediately earns a small truck valued at 30,000 yuan"—sell goods, give a truck. You want the truck? Pay on the spot. That's the first trap, but this method is old news; it alone can't trap dealers anymore.
  • "In addition to the gift, the dealer must pay a 10,000 yuan cash deposit"—so the truck isn't free. But once you pay the deposit, you're on the "pirate ship" and can't get off. That's the second trap.
  • "Guarantee to complete 300,000 yuan in sales and payment collection within 6 months"—you want your deposit back? The deposit guarantees you'll sell, buy, and pay for my goods for the next six months! Otherwise... That's the third trap.
  • "If the dealer completes 300,000 yuan in sales within 6 months, the company will return goods worth double the deposit in the seventh month"—if you complete the task, the truck is free, and you get double back—in goods! Note: you paid cash, you get goods. The manufacturer doesn't specify what goods, and using goods to offset payment means the manufacturer profits again, and those goods become your inventory pressure, forcing you to sell more. That's traps four, five, six—a series of three.
  • "If the dealer fails to meet the 300,000 yuan target, the manufacturer has the right to withhold the deposit"—that's the seventh trap. But the manufacturer comforts you: "It's okay, even if the deposit isn't refunded, think of it as buying a 30,000 yuan truck for 10,000 yuan." Sounds reasonable, but most people hate losing the deposit, so they sell like crazy.
  • "If the 300,000 yuan purchase includes 20,000 yuan of designated products, you get an equal value product reward"—the designated product is surely one with inventory pressure or a new product the manufacturer wants to push. And the reward isn't cash; it's "equal value products" with the manufacturer holding "final interpretation rights." Count them—this is probably the tenth trap.

Commentary: "Gift" but with conditions: "if," "otherwise," "provided"—these conjunctions often appear in domestic dealer incentive policies, reminiscent of the feared "Eighteen Grapples" or "Bone-Breaking Grappling" in Chinese martial arts: once I touch you, you're crippled.

Sow bad seeds and reap bad fruits. Under this philosophy, everyone rushes to complete sales. Do you believe there's no cross-region selling, no bad inventory, no single-product selling? I doubt it.

Difference 3: Management Methods

Western Boxing: Foreign enterprises' management of dealers boils down to one word: "control." Dealers under the "iron heel" of foreign enterprises often become puppets.

Foreign enterprises control dealers through several steps:

  1. Brand elevation: Consumers, hypermarkets, wholesalers, and retail stores recognize the manufacturer, not the dealer. The dealer is the consumer! Whoever captures the consumer holds power. Foreign enterprises can act arrogantly toward the channel because of their massive brand management costs and advertising investments. With brand power, they can make dealers run volume without profit and still obey!

More cunningly, brand promotion targets not only consumers but also the channel—holding terminal/wholesaler conferences (sometimes funded by local dealers). The manufacturer takes the stage in a five-star hotel, with managers and hired trainers giving passionate speeches, shining like the Lion King in Narnia, intimidating the audience. Secondary distributors and terminal customers look at the manufacturer as if seeing a god, while the dealer cowers in a corner.

When promoting their brand, manufacturers may even "swallow" the dealer's brand. Dealer storefronts and employee uniforms become the manufacturer's logo. Dealer business cards no longer say "Boss of a trading company" but "Olympic Designated Product Partner" or "Partner of [Brand]" (the manufacturer's designated brand), and even their websites become the manufacturer's URL.

What does this mean? The dealer transforms from a local warlord or mountain king into a traitor squad leader or security commander. Unfortunately, many dealers don't see it and proudly show off their new business cards.

  1. Control your capital: Raise entry barriers and exit costs—make dealers commit their entire livelihood.

Example: In 2005, P&G restructured to fewer, larger dealers. For new dealers, P&G raised asset guarantees to 6 million yuan and required 4 million yuan in working capital, along with "exclusive focus" requirements: no competing products, no arbitrary use of funds.

A foreign alcoholic beverage company required dealers to advance payments for hotel exclusivity fees, reimbursing half of the previous month's advances each month, tying up dealer funds. Due to high brand awareness and guaranteed sales, dealers had to accept. In Shandong, the capital occupation snowballed, leading to a dealer's capital chain breaking. Unable to buy goods and meet sales targets, the manufacturer threatened to revoke distribution rights. The desperate dealer even attempted suicide by hanging.

  1. Control your network resources: The dealer is just a delivery driver; terminals are visited by the manufacturer's salespeople.

Example: Coca-Cola's 101 system—manufacturer salespeople visit terminals to take orders, and dealers handle delivery. More importantly, every order is entered into the computer per manufacturer requirements, allowing headquarters to check any dealer's inventory and shipment details from the previous week at any time.

  1. Control your profit: Example: A foreign condiment company implemented CIF pricing for dealers. Dealers must sell to terminals at cost—no markup, no discount. Dealer monthly profit is reflected in the manufacturer's monthly rebate. In reality, most dealers use the monthly rebate to subsidize prices to boost sales. So dealers initially lose money on sales, with real profit only in annual/quarterly rebates and periodic sales contests. The manufacturer can always find evidence of price undercutting to cancel annual/quarterly rebates. The result: dealers invest capital, sell at a loss, and the manufacturer decides how much profit they make, based on post-rebates. Because the brand is strong, dealers have invested heavily and dare not say no, lamenting, "I'm the fish on the chopping block."

  2. Control your mind: This is the most powerful tactic. Coca-Cola established a "dealer management university" in China a decade ago, brainwashing dealers with corporate philosophy, product knowledge, and sales methods, building faith and belonging. As a participant, I deeply felt the power of brainwashing. Many market disputes that can't be resolved with profit can be resolved with brainwashing.

Examples:

  • When Coca-Cola promoted the new 101 sales system, not only did branch factories organize training for dealer bosses, but dealers were also required to send their sales managers, finance, and warehouse staff in batches for comprehensive training. Finally, dealers had to visit designated model markets and dealers for observation, internship, and exams—with results tied to rewards.
  • A foreign grain enterprise, promoting an integrated operations system, invested in producing video and CD materials demonstrating standardized dealer business, sales, administrative, and financial management, requiring dealers to improve according to the systems in the CDs.

Commentary: Imagine a dealer whose network is entirely in the manufacturer's salespeople's hands, whose shipment and inventory details are known to the manufacturer, whose business card title makes him a manufacturer employee, whose staff are trained by the manufacturer and wear its uniforms, whose boss is regularly sent to "dealer president training classes" for brainwashing, whose capital is tied up, and whose purchase volume and profit are dictated by the manufacturer. Would you dare rebel? Before you even start with another brand, the manufacturer would know. And the better brands are already taken; the worse ones you wouldn't want. Worst of all, after years of cooperation, the dealer hasn't built a real sales team—sales are handled by the manufacturer, and the dealer's team has degenerated into after-sales service staff.

So, as a dealer, what do you have left? You're a puppet!

Do you think this manufacturer will really stay with you for life in strategic partnership? A joke! The execution ground is already littered with heads and blood!

Is it easy for foreign enterprises to gain absolute control over the market? Just the manpower cost of controlling terminals is enormous. The strong-arm control of dealer channels breeds resentment that dares not speak. At the slightest disturbance, dealers might rise up and turn against them. A single spark can start a prairie fire! The wholesale channel's lack of profit and willingness to cooperate is always the Achilles' heel of foreign giants—and the springboard for domestic enterprises to challenge them.

Chinese Kung Fu: Domestic enterprises have weak control awareness in dealer management. They prefer to form interest bonds with dealers—for example, establishing a joint venture as the manufacturer's local branch, with the manufacturer providing extra expense support and the dealer mobilizing people, vehicles, and network resources for sales. This reduces the manufacturer's market operation costs, letting the dealer take the lead in spending on the market to sell products. A four-ounce force can move a thousand-pound weight.

Domestic brand promotion focuses more on consumers. The benefits of trade-oriented brand promotion are not yet widely recognized.

Domestic enterprises also want to control dealer capital, but due to weak brand power and execution, collecting deposits, requiring exclusivity, or demanding advance payments often becomes empty talk.

On brainwashing, domestic enterprises do the worst. At best, they hire a trainer to give a talk at the annual dealer conference. Systematic dealer training? Establishing a dealer management academy? Training dealer operators? Impossible—that costs too much. Note: this is the crux. Foreign enterprises see training as an investment, focusing on ROI. Domestic enterprises see training as a cost, and costs should be minimized.

Domestic enterprises' management of dealers boils down to one word: "bribery." They use countless tricks that are impressive!

Example: A well-known food enterprise renamed its year-end rebate as "stock." The so-called stock means each truckload of goods counts as one share. If you buy 10,000 truckloads, you have 10,000 shares, and at year-end, you get "stock dividends."

Year-end stock dividends—essentially just rebates, but dealers feel different: they're now shareholders, like they've become masters.

The problem is, even if you hold 80,000 shares, what's each share worth? This isn't a listed company; finances are opaque. The general manager will stand on stage and say either, "This year our company performed poorly, so each share's dividend is 0.1 yuan," or "This year we did great, each share's dividend is 10 yuan."

Analysis: The clever ones rule others. The manufacturer's boss sits in his office, tweaks the share value, and easily motivates dealers. During peak season, when production capacity and transportation lag, he announces a 20% discount on share value for this month's purchases—immediately, purchases drop. In off-season, when no one buys, he announces doubled share value—immediately, purchases surge. Want dealers to push high-end products? Announce doubled share value for high-end products—immediately, everyone sells high-end. See how the boss plays with share values, and hundreds of dealers dance to his tune. That's Chinese-style cunning and wisdom.

Case 4: A domestic small appliance company established a regional dealer incentive fund, dividing dealers into large, medium, and small tiers with different sales targets and reward bases. Larger targets mean larger reward bases. And rewards aren't for all who complete targets; it's first-come, first-served—only the first 30 dealers to meet specified sales goals get rewards. Even more powerful: there are rewards next month, but with a relay rule—the last 10 dealers who fail to meet this month's sales target are disqualified from next month's competition (they only get normal rebates, not the incentive fund).

Analysis: Get it? Target sales are based on historical sales and region size. Everyone's target is challenging but achievable. This is called "everyone has a target."

Dealers with larger targets get larger reward bases, so no one can complain.

In a region with 40 dealers, only the fastest 30 to complete sales get rewards; the rest are out of luck. With the relay rule, failing this month means no reward next month. This policy drives dealers to run like crazy, wishing they had more legs.

Commentary: Everything has a price. Foreign enterprises pay high manpower costs to control dealers and market terminals. Domestic enterprises sometimes win by playing with channel profits. But while they congratulate themselves, they feel a nagging emptiness. The results-oriented sales assessment and profit-bait management hide bad inventory, single-product selling, price chaos, and policy non-execution. Yes, domestic enterprises excel at finding order in chaos—performance climbs even amid market confusion, but behind the glorious facade lurks crisis.

Two final notes:

  1. The references to domestic/foreign enterprises and Chinese Kung Fu/Western Boxing are not absolute. China's economy is globalizing, blending East and West. Many domestic enterprises adopt foreign practices, and many foreign enterprises localize. The terms are just symbols for convenience, representing two management styles (Western Boxing: big brands, big resources, standardized management; Chinese Kung Fu: small and medium brands with limited resources, winning by surprise). Don't take them literally.
  2. Dealer policy may seem like a high-level topic, but it spans from annual contract design and regional structure to individual rewards/penalties and even promotional plan execution. This article isn't just for "meat-eaters" (decision-makers); salespeople and ordinary folks are all part of the game.

Summary of Differences in Dealer Management Policy Formulation

Item Western Boxing Chinese Kung Fu
Cooperation Positioning Legalistic, word games; from the start, sets the stage for future dealer replacement, seizing initiative, showing dealers are positioned at the execution level. Relies on dealer strength to build the market, lower costs, but easily controlled by the channel; hasty start leads to conflicts and high exit costs when replacing dealers.
Assessment Direction Process-oriented, creating a virtuous market cycle and stable order. Results-oriented, planting hidden dangers.
Management Methods Full-channel control, high market/manpower costs; dealers cooperate under duress, profits decline, especially wholesale channel willingness drops—a fatal weakness. Sales assessment as the way, profit temptation as the tactic; flexible, low cost, high profit, good relationships; wins battles but lacks stamina for long wars, with market order crises that may lead to self-defeat.

Foreign enterprises shouldn't be arrogant. Their success in China over the past decade has made them self-satisfied, thinking their village is bigger than Beijing. Many well-known foreign companies claim they "never purchase external sales training" because "we have a very complete sales system." I worked in foreign enterprises for eight years, experienced the so-called "complete sales system education," and once thought I was the best. Only after leaving did I realize the world is vast. The systems foreign enterprises admire have scientific merit but aren't flawless; some are even flashy but hollow. Foreign enterprises have failed in China, while domestic enterprises have won with clever tactics, posing real threats and survival pressure. High market manpower costs, dealer resentment, and unprofitable wholesale channels are the three fatal weaknesses of foreign enterprises today.

Domestic enterprises shouldn't feel inferior but should filter foreign "advanced experience."

For example, the full-channel control and refined management that foreign enterprises tout may look impressive but are like whistling past a graveyard at night. The human-wave tactic is both a need and a helplessness for foreign enterprises—grasp it and you get thorns; let it go and you stumble. Coca-Cola and Master Kong are both reflecting on whether to ally with the channel or try the joint sales model to reduce costs. Domestic enterprises that blindly imitate without understanding suffer the consequences.

Foreign process indicators are absolutely correct, but execution requires massive brand support and inspection systems. It's better to learn the philosophy, adapt the tactics, take small steps, and move toward that direction without rushing.

Foreign brainwashing of dealers is worth emulating. Many dealers started from wholesale market stalls, with low education, relying on courage and intuition. Now, with market changes, fierce competition, declining profits, channel flattening, and the rise of large retailers, dealers face brutal survival pressure and are eager to learn.

Dealers' limited social circles and horizons mean they don't know what to read or what courses to take. If manufacturers invite dealers to conferences and provide genuinely useful courses, or even just recommend good training CDs and books, it's far more effective than taking them on a trip.

What to train? "To catch bandits, catch the king first"—start with the boss. Teach what dealers don't know: product expertise, international industry trends, dealer evolution abroad, financial statement analysis, warehouse loss reduction, personnel monitoring and motivation, delegation, and how to prevent their operators from sidelining them.

After training the boss, "shoot the horse first to hit the rider"—go on tour to train dealer employees. These are the people who will sell your products in the market. Once brainwashed, they'll push your products more.

Two methods:

  1. Bring them in: Establish a dealer management university, inviting dealers in batches for systematic training. This is relatively costly. Domestic enterprises shouldn't overextend. Just hold two sessions a year during the annual dealer conference, with high quality and good hotels. The main purpose is to "impress" and showcase company strength.
  2. Go out: Combine external training resources, set up an internal department to develop courses, from basic technical levels like product knowledge, sales habits, routine promotions, and customer visit methods. Create simple, standardized training materials. Require every sales supervisor and manager to memorize them, turning managers into junior trainers who tour and provide standardized training to dealer employees.

For higher-level management courses, use internally trained trainers. A dedicated lecturer team tours regions to train dealers and their business managers in batches, similar to beauty companies' education marketing systems.

Would dealers welcome manufacturers sending trainers to teach? Does it cost much? Even the trainer's travel expenses can be borne by dealers.

Is it difficult? A monthly salary of 10,000-20,000 yuan is enough to hire a training manager who can develop courses based on existing experience.

Is it costly? Don't think training doesn't directly create value. After training, dealers order more enthusiastically, their employees push your products more, and your control over dealers strengthens. If courses are effective, dealers are willing to pay, and training departments can even be self-financing—such cases are not rare.

The key is the boss's concept and determination—remember: training is not a cost; it's an investment.

Chinese Kung Fu and Western Boxing each have their merits. The best is to master both.

I wish all marketing professionals in China to be inclusive and eclectic.

Whether you're a top executive "in the temple" or a salesperson "in the rivers and lakes," whether local or foreign, everyone should clearly understand their position and role, be less narrow and dogmatic, more clear-headed and pragmatic, and accumulate small gains into big ones, advancing wave after wave.

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