---
title: "Yonghui is saving its stores, Walmart is changing its fate"
description: "Two pieces of news about traditional hypermarkets recently caught attention: Yonghui announced the second phase of its transformation, focusing on supply chain reform and private label development, while Walmart reopened a renovated store in Chengdu with plans to upgrade over 100 stores this year. Both are moving in different directions: Yonghui is working to bring customers back to its stores, while Walmart is redefining its hypermarket model for efficiency and precision."
author: "汪海"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
telephone: "+8615854817671"
published: "2026-06-05"
categories: "Retail Formats"
language: "en"
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original_source: "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/GNc7UrJlfhRw-NWwrp3rMw"
translation: "https://xinjignxiao.com/zh/articles/%E6%B0%B8%E8%BE%89%E5%9C%A8%E6%95%91%E5%BA%97-%E6%B2%83%E5%B0%94%E7%8E%9B%E5%9C%A8%E6%94%B9%E5%91%BD-494f1349.md"
attribution: "New Distribution — https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/yonghui-is-saving-its-stores-walmart-is-changing-its-fate-494f1349/"
citation: "汪海. “Yonghui is saving its stores, Walmart is changing its fate.” New Distribution, 2026-06-05. https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/yonghui-is-saving-its-stores-walmart-is-changing-its-fate-494f1349/"
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---

# Yonghui is saving its stores, Walmart is changing its fate

> Two pieces of news about traditional hypermarkets recently caught attention: Yonghui announced the second phase of its transformation, focusing on supply chain reform and private label development, while Walmart reopened a renovated store in Chengdu with plans to upgrade over 100 stores this year. Both are moving in different directions: Yonghui is working to bring customers back to its stores, while Walmart is redefining its hypermarket model for efficiency and precision.

Recently, I came across two pieces of news about traditional hypermarkets, and looking at them together is quite interesting.
One is from Yonghui.
Yonghui announced that its transformation has entered the second phase. The next step will focus on supply chain reform centered on product centralization, with plans to develop 200 new private label SKUs by 2026 and push private label sales to exceed 20% of total sales.
The other is from Walmart.
Walmart's store at CapitaLand Plaza Jinniu in Chengdu has reopened after a renovation. This store has been operating in Chengdu for 20 years. The upgrade involved a systematic overhaul of product assortment, store layout, and omnichannel experience. Walmart also plans to complete upgrades and new store openings for over 100 stores within the year.
When looking at Yonghui and Walmart today, we can't just focus on who opened a new store, who changed shelves, or who renovated. What's more noteworthy is that both are traditional hypermarkets, but they are heading toward two completely different futures.
Yonghui is saving its stores; Walmart is changing its fate.
# **Traditional Hypermarkets**
# **Can No Longer Rely on Size**
For a long time, the advantages of hypermarkets were clear: large area, many SKUs, convenient parking, and one-stop shopping.
For retailers, hypermarkets were also the easiest format to achieve economies of scale: they had foot traffic, suppliers, shelf space, promotional resources, and relatively stable rental and channel income.
But this logic is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain today.
Consumers can buy groceries through instant retail; for low prices, they can go to discount stores; for quality, they can go to Sam's Club or Hema; for daily replenishment, they don't even need to enter a store. The core one-stop shopping that hypermarkets once offered is being fragmented by platforms, community stores, membership stores, and discount stores.
So, what Yonghui and Walmart are doing now is essentially answering the same question: **If hypermarkets are to continue existing, what is their reason for being?**
Over the past two years, Yonghui has been making adjustments: improving the environment, service, and product assortment, bringing stores back into consumers' view, and restoring foot traffic and reputation. According to the official announcement of the second phase, it is now going deeper, with the core becoming the rebuilding of operational capabilities.
Before upgrading its stores, Walmart had also been laying groundwork on the product side for a long time, continuously strengthening its private label. "Great Value" (沃集鲜) is becoming increasingly prominent in categories like grains, oils, snacks, and beverages.
It's not hard to see that Walmart is not first changing the store and then finding products; it seems to first take control of product capabilities in key categories, and then amplify those capabilities through new-generation stores.
The store upgrade is just the moment consumers see; the real change has already happened on the shelves.
One is solving "why consumers should still come";
the other is solving "how stores can be more efficient."
This is the most interesting divergence between Yonghui and Walmart.
# **Yonghui's Transformation: First Bring Consumers Back to Stores**
The first thing the industry noticed about Yonghui's transformation was the store changes.
The environment became brighter, the layout clearer, product displays more comfortable, employee service more proactive, and fresh produce, bakery, deli, and food-service scenarios were re-emphasized.
In the past few years, Yonghui's biggest problem was that consumers' trust in it weakened.
Once, Yonghui built its reputation on fresh produce and had strong community penetration in many cities. Many families thought of Yonghui first for groceries, meat, and fruit. But as Hema, Sam's Club, PUPU, Dingdong, instant retail, and discount stores entered, Yonghui's advantages were continuously eroded.
Consumers' impression of Yonghui became blurred.
Is it cheap? Not necessarily.
Are the products better? Not necessarily.
Is it more convenient? Not necessarily.
Once a retailer loses a clear position in consumers' minds, store foot traffic becomes increasingly passive. Even if the store is still open, consumers may not have a reason to walk in.
So the task of Yonghui's first phase of transformation was actually to rediscover the "reason to enter the store."
It first addressed the perception issue. Make consumers feel the store has changed and are willing to come in; bring back lost foot traffic; make the store lively again; and get the industry talking about Yonghui again.
A bustling store can be achieved through transformation, but operational capability cannot be sustained by bustle alone. Consumers may come the first time out of novelty; for the second and third visits, it must rely on products, prices, quality, and consistent experience.
That's why Yonghui is now proposing the second phase of transformation, with the core shifting to products and supply chain.
**Private label is naturally a key part of this.**
In the past, many supermarkets developed private labels mainly for low prices, margins, and differentiation. But today, the meaning of private label has changed. It's not just about adding a few SKUs; it represents a retailer's determination to regain control over product definition.
Whoever defines the product can define the price band, quality perception, repurchase reasons, and consumer mindset. If Yonghui only makes its stores look more like Pangdonglai, it will easily fall into debates about "how well it imitates."
But if Yonghui can gradually build its own product system through private labels and customized products, it will have the opportunity to move from a "transformation model" to a "business model."
For example, some high-frequency products are not complex, but they are suitable for building daily repurchase. Consumers buy them every week, and each time they feel the quality and price. Once a habit forms, trust in the product gradually translates into trust in the store.
That's what Yonghui really needs to do in the second phase.
From this perspective, Yonghui is saving its stores, but not just a few stores; it's also saving the confidence of local supermarkets.
It needs to prove that local hypermarkets are not doomed to close, shrink, or wait to die. As long as they dare to change the organization, products, and supply chain, old supermarkets still have a chance to be chosen again by consumers.
# **Walmart: Making Stores Smaller, More Precise, and More Efficient**
Compared to Yonghui, Walmart's store upgrade seems less emotionally impactful.
It doesn't have a "desperate counterattack" story, nor the buzz of "learning from Pangdonglai," nor particularly dramatic organizational changes. External evaluations often say: "The 'father' is becoming more and more like the 'son'." That's precisely why Walmart's changes deserve a closer look.
The renovation of the Chengdu CapitaLand Plaza Jinniu store is just a visible milestone. The real preparatory actions are Walmart's continuous adjustments over the years in product, supply chain, private label, and omnichannel.
Especially "Great Value."
In the past, when people mentioned Walmart, many thought of foreign hypermarkets, everyday low prices, and imported goods. But in the past two or three years, if you often shop at Walmart, you'll notice its private label is becoming more prominent.
Walmart is gradually incorporating fresh produce—a high-frequency, high-repurchase, high-trust category—into its own product definition system. This is very important because one of the biggest problems with hypermarkets in the past was that shelves looked full, but the product mindset did not belong to the retailer.
**Consumers remembered a brand, a supplier, or a promotion, not "this store has good selections."**
When a retailer doesn't have product definition rights, it easily becomes just a selling space. Whoever gives resources gets shelf space; whoever promotes gets position.
Now Walmart is no longer just a hypermarket; it wants consumers to believe: **The products Walmart selects are trustworthy; Walmart's private label products are worth buying; the price and quality defined by Walmart are stable.**
That's the real value of Great Value. This is actually similar to Sam's Club's logic.
Sam's Club's greatest strength is that it helps consumers make choices. Sam's has long built "buyer trust" through curated SKUs, private labels, and consistent quality.
Of course, Walmart hypermarkets cannot completely replicate Sam's. It faces a more mass-market, higher-frequency, more community-oriented consumer base. But Sam's has proven one thing: a retailer's true moat should not be the size of its shelves, but whether consumers trust its ability to select products.
In the past, hypermarkets relied on area, shelves, and supplier resources to satisfy as many needs as possible. Now Walmart wants to rely on product judgment, supply chain efficiency, and data capabilities to satisfy needs as accurately as possible. These two logics are completely different.
So, Walmart is changing its fate.
Walmart has always been good at systematization. Its advantages have always been supply chain, product standards, fulfillment capabilities, and global experience. If these capabilities are re-integrated into the Chinese hypermarket model, Walmart may carve out a path different from local supermarket transformations.
# **One Looks to Pangdonglai for Solutions, the Other to Sam's Club for Answers**
If you put Yonghui and Walmart together, you'll notice an interesting phenomenon: Yonghui's transformation is always compared to Pangdonglai; Walmart's upgrade is compared to Sam's Club.
Behind this are two completely different retail methodologies.
Pangdonglai represents a store operation philosophy: do people well, do service well, do the store experience well, and put consumer feelings first.
Yonghui learning from Pangdonglai is essentially making up for the lesson that traditional supermarkets most often overlooked: retail is not just about products and prices, but also about people and the store environment.
This is very important for Yonghui because its fresh produce advantage and store base are still there, but if the in-store experience doesn't keep up, consumers will continue to leave. It needs to use Pangdonglai-style transformation to turn stores from a place to buy things into a place "willing to browse, willing to trust, and willing to come."
Sam's Club represents another methodology: curated SKUs, private labels, membership relationships, supply chain efficiency, and high repurchase. It doesn't win by bustle but by certainty. What Sam's really sells is the service of "I've chosen for you."
What Walmart hypermarkets need to absorb now is part of Sam's capabilities.
Of course, Walmart hypermarkets cannot become Sam's. Their customer bases, price bands, membership mechanisms, and store models are different. But Walmart can definitely learn from Sam's underlying logic: reduce inefficient SKUs, strengthen private labels, improve product certainty, and turn stores into more efficient consumption venues.
So, although Yonghui and Walmart seem to be making adjustments, one is making up for the "people" lesson, and the other is making up for the "product" lesson.
If Yonghui only stays at improving store experience, it will easily be seen as a "temporary recovery." Only when private labels, product centralization, and supply chain reform truly take off can it complete the second-phase leap.
If Walmart only upgrades a few stores, it will also be seen as ordinary renovation. Only when Great Value, curated SKUs, omnichannel fulfillment, and the store model form a closed loop can it truly complete the hypermarket reconstruction.
So neither company has reached the finish line.
# **Final Thoughts**
Hypermarkets will not return to the past. This is the first thing we need to acknowledge when discussing Yonghui and Walmart today.
Today's consumer needs are fragmented, channels are fragmented, and scenarios are fragmented. If hypermarkets want to continue to exist, they must re-answer their own value.
Yonghui and Walmart are not new players, nor are they companies traveling light; they carry heavy historical baggage. But precisely because of that, their changes are more worth watching.
Yonghui's changes represent a self-rescue path for local supermarkets; Walmart's changes represent a reconstruction path for foreign hypermarkets. It's hard to say which path is definitely better, but one thing is certain: traditional hypermarkets can no longer survive on inertia.
In the future, hypermarkets will eventually return to the same question: When consumers have more choices, why should a hypermarket still be chosen?
Whoever can answer this question well will have the opportunity to become the next-generation hypermarket.


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## Citation metadata

- Publisher: New Distribution
- Author: 汪海
- Published: 2026-06-05
- Canonical: https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/yonghui-is-saving-its-stores-walmart-is-changing-its-fate-494f1349/
- Original source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/GNc7UrJlfhRw-NWwrp3rMw

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