---
title: "Why Can't Xiaohongshu, Which Helps Others Plant Grass, Sell Goods Well Itself?"
description: "In early 2025, after the operational models of the 'Zhengzhou gang' and 'Xiamen gang' on Xiaohongshu were exposed, some marketing professionals bluntly stated on social media that 'to some extent, planting grass is equivalent to fraud.' 'Planting grass' has been a unique label for Xiaohongshu between content and e-commerce over the past few years, giving it a distinctive niche in the marketing of consumer goods. However, a strange phenomenon has occurred: Xiaohongshu itself is not very good at selling goods. After attempting self-operated e-commerce, group buying, and other businesses, these projects eventually ended in closure."
author: "周铭"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
telephone: "+8615854817671"
published: "2026-02-22"
categories: "Brand Marketing"
language: "en"
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original_source: "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/oiAhspHxbfLga3kDtvAdVA"
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citation: "周铭. “Why Can't Xiaohongshu, Which Helps Others Plant Grass, Sell Goods Well Itself?.” New Distribution, 2026-02-22. https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/why-can-t-xiaohongshu-which-helps-others-plant-grass-sell-goods-well-its-fd9f57bd/"
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---

# Why Can't Xiaohongshu, Which Helps Others Plant Grass, Sell Goods Well Itself?

> In early 2025, after the operational models of the 'Zhengzhou gang' and 'Xiamen gang' on Xiaohongshu were exposed, some marketing professionals bluntly stated on social media that 'to some extent, planting grass is equivalent to fraud.' 'Planting grass' has been a unique label for Xiaohongshu between content and e-commerce over the past few years, giving it a distinctive niche in the marketing of consumer goods. However, a strange phenomenon has occurred: Xiaohongshu itself is not very good at selling goods. After attempting self-operated e-commerce, group buying, and other businesses, these projects eventually ended in closure.

In early 2025, after the operational models of the 'Zhengzhou gang' and 'Xiamen gang' on Xiaohongshu were exposed, some marketing professionals bluntly stated on social media, 'To some extent, planting grass is equivalent to fraud.'

'Planting grass' has been a unique label for Xiaohongshu between content and e-commerce over the past few years, giving it a distinctive niche in the marketing of consumer goods.

However, a strange phenomenon has occurred: Xiaohongshu itself is not very good at selling goods. After attempting self-operated e-commerce, group buying, and other businesses, these projects eventually ended in closure.

This is a very interesting paradox: consumers can effortlessly shift their trust in the same notes. When notes are viewed from an observer's perspective, Xiaohongshu serves as decision-making reference content; but when the blogger stands from the seller's perspective, the content becomes an advertisement. Furthermore, once a note includes a product link, it inevitably loses its core sense of trust.

Jess, the head of open platform and e-commerce, once expressed a similar view: 'We do not think inserting product cards into notes is an elegant interaction method.'

This year, Xiaohongshu upgraded its 'planting grass' concept and proposed the 'life economy' idea. In Xiaohongshu's discourse, 'life economy' refers to 'the essence of life economy is returning to the needs of individuals.' At a previous Will Growth Conference, Xiaohongshu mentioned a similar phrase: 'Planting grass means seeing specific people' and 'Understanding the scale of people determines the depth of business growth.'

If we translate the jargon into plain language, how should we understand Xiaohongshu?

**Is 'Life Economy' Just a Variation of Planting Grass?**

First, let's state the conclusion: the essence of Xiaohongshu's business is non-standard products, that is, non-'mainstream' content and goods. This is fundamentally different from the shelf-based e-commerce of Taobao and JD.com, as well as live-streaming e-commerce.

Let's illustrate the difference with an example.

In its 'Xiaohongshu Business Cases,' Xiaohongshu mentioned an outdoor brand, Piccaihe, which is very representative. In the past, when we mentioned the outdoor jacket category, the keywords might have been hardcore, outdoor, and hiking, which is why top-tier outdoor jackets like Arc'teryx and Mammut were sought after. However, in Xiaohongshu's case introduction, Piccaihe succeeded by focusing on commuting and photogenic aspects. In a shelf-based e-commerce environment, Piccaihe would likely be a 'non-mainstream' outdoor jacket brand, but in the context of content and planting-grass e-commerce, Piccaihe meets the needs of many consumers.

Returning to Xiaohongshu's discourse, it satisfies individual, segmented, and 'non-mainstream' needs. **Non-mainstream is not a derogatory term; it means different from the mainstream, popular, and traditional.** For example, if Coca-Cola were sold on Xiaohongshu, it might struggle to compete with Taobao and JD.com, but if it launched a new flavor, it could 'plant grass' for consumers on Xiaohongshu.

**Starting this year, Xiaohongshu introduced a new concept called 'life economy.'** On January 28, at the first Xiaohongshu Life Economy Summit, the definition of 'life economy' was first released: an economic form in which individual life needs are expressed, connected, and stimulated through digital technology, forming a positive interaction between supply and demand and promoting the expansion of domestic demand.

Additionally, Xiaohongshu proposed the transformation of consumers from 'consumer' to 'prosumer.' This concept was similarly mentioned in the Fourth Consumption Era. In 1983, PARCO Group's magazine 'Transit' proposed the concept of 'creators' (創費者), suggesting that consumers are not just consumers but also co-create consumption concepts and products.

In simple terms, consumer goods have shifted from factory design, manufacturing, and mass distribution to being inspired and directed by detailed consumer needs, forcing brands to meet segmented demands, thus leading to co-creation between consumers and brands.

**From planting grass to life economy, the core has not changed.** To some extent, Xiaohongshu's grasp of consumption trends is correct; but on another level, its entry point is one-sided.

**The Dividends and Traps in the Logic of 'Non-Standardization'**

For a long time, 'planting grass' has been regarded as Xiaohongshu's core commercial asset. However, in recent years, this model has faced severe trust challenges and efficiency crises. Bloggers, brands, and users have all questioned Xiaohongshu's 'planting grass economy.'

Xiaohongshu's natural tone determines that it is a breeding ground for cultivating 'non-standard products.' Whether it's the successful home furnishing category or the controversial real estate agent traffic generation, the underlying logic is to use highly non-standardized visual information to influence users' decisions in advance.

One of Xiaohongshu's most successful categories is renovation and home furnishing, a typical 'non-standardized' growth path. The core of its success lies in the fact that home products are not presented as isolated 'standard products' but as part of a living scenario.

**However, this non-standardization is inherently anti-efficient; through personalized combinations, it sacrifices the efficiency of display.**

This logic also works in the real estate agency field. The Economic Information Daily once reported on the chaos of fake listings on Xiaohongshu, where agents posted a large number of low-price, high-quality listings to attract traffic, a practice that also exists in the Beike system. Lianjia founder Zuo Hui was committed to establishing true listings before his death, launching a campaign for true listings in the industry and introducing an all-channel true listing system in 2012. Lianjia stood out among many real estate agencies thanks to its true listings. However, in Xiaohongshu's ecosystem, a large number of agents have flooded in, dragging the industry back into disorder.

**From another dimension, planting grass is also descending into chaos.** Under the shadow of Xiaohongshu's non-standardized content, there is a highly mature black and gray industry chain. Represented by the 'Zhengzhou gang,' 'real sharing' has been fully industrialized.

The 'Zhengzhou gang' follows a typical logic of 'traffic self-rescue' and 'low-cost expansion.' They hire a large number of young people with associate degrees, producing hundreds or thousands of notes daily by assembling notes. Their core strategy is 'use 60-point people to produce 60-point content, but make the process 120 points.' Although these contents appear to be genuine reviews, they often lead to private domain traffic or low-quality white-label products. When similar copy proliferates, users avoid them.

Xiaohongshu's early growth dividend came from the community consensus of 'real sharing.' However, as commercialization penetration increases, this consensus is being eroded by the flood of 'internet celebrity filters' and 'soft ads.' User-side negative feedback is more direct. On social media, topics like 'too many ads' and 'another account starting up' frequently resonate. For example, the much-criticized scenic spot filters: users are 'planted' and go to the destination, only to find the real scene is severely inconsistent with the photos. The 'filter scam' has become a label that is hard to shake off.

This visual 'oversaturation' leads to diminishing marginal returns of planting grass. When bloggers continuously optimize image saturation and composition for traffic while ignoring real experiences, Xiaohongshu's core value—authenticity—begins to crumble.

**E-commerce Trial and Error: Long-term Wavering Between Standard and Non-standard Products**

Xiaohongshu's e-commerce development history is essentially a game about the priority of 'standard products' versus 'non-standard products.' From the early self-operated model to the current buyer model, each turn has been accompanied by significant opportunity costs.

But Xiaohongshu stands on the high ground of planting grass yet fails to close the transaction loop.

Xiaohongshu has repeatedly attempted e-commerce businesses but ultimately did not persist. In the second half of 2023, Xiaohongshu announced the closure of its self-operated e-commerce platforms 'Little Oasis' and 'Welfare Society.' These two businesses were significant attempts by Xiaohongshu to enter the e-commerce field, with 'Welfare Society' operating for nine years, mainly selling standard beauty and skincare products. Xiaohongshu's group buying attempt in local life services, 'Xiaohong Card,' also ended in failure.

So the question arises: whether it's goods or group-buying dining, Xiaohongshu's planting grass ability is so strong, why can't it hold up at the final payment stage?

The fundamental reason for the failure of the self-operated standard product model is that Xiaohongshu provides important decision-making but does not provide a closed transaction loop.

After a series of standard product trials, Xiaohongshu finally found its suitable e-commerce model in 2023 through 'buyers' like Dong Jie and Zhang Xiaohui. The core of buyer e-commerce is the monetization of 'non-standardized' aesthetics. These buyers' differentiated live streams no longer rely on follower counts or the lowest price across the internet to gain an advantage, but on their ability to interpret quality and style. Dong Jie's promotion of niche designer brands, with her personal temperament highly matching the products, inspires users' longing for a specific lifestyle. For typical non-standard products like clothing, the content value of buyers can compensate for price disadvantages. Compared to simple parameter comparisons, Xiaohongshu users are more willing to pay for 'this outfit shows a certain taste.'

Xiaohongshu's repeated wavering in the e-commerce closed loop essentially reflects its extremely awkward position in the decision-making chain. If Xiaohongshu could provide a complete service loop, it wouldn't need to divert traffic to Taobao; but it also seems to need to maintain a certain distance from transactions to preserve the purity of its content.

The natural separation between decision reference and transaction: decision-making is not equivalent to transaction.

**Moving Toward the C-End: The 11th China FMCG Conference**
**Date: March 16-18, 2026**
**Location: Chengdu, China**


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## Citation metadata

- Publisher: New Distribution
- Author: 周铭
- Published: 2026-02-22
- Canonical: https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/why-can-t-xiaohongshu-which-helps-others-plant-grass-sell-goods-well-its-fd9f57bd/
- Original source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/oiAhspHxbfLga3kDtvAdVA

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