---
title: "Who Stole Genki Forest's Dream of 10 Billion in Revenue?"
description: "Seven years after its founding, Genki Forest still hasn't crossed the 10 billion yuan revenue mark, a reality it must face. At its 2023 national distributor conference, the company reported double-digit growth but didn't disclose specific figures. Founder Tang Binsen repeatedly emphasized 'returning to tradition' in front of nearly 400 distributors, signaling a shift away from its high-growth internet marketing model toward traditional FMCG practices."
author: "YN"
publisher: "New Distribution"
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published: "2024-01-30"
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# Who Stole Genki Forest's Dream of 10 Billion in Revenue?

> Seven years after its founding, Genki Forest still hasn't crossed the 10 billion yuan revenue mark, a reality it must face. At its 2023 national distributor conference, the company reported double-digit growth but didn't disclose specific figures. Founder Tang Binsen repeatedly emphasized 'returning to tradition' in front of nearly 400 distributors, signaling a shift away from its high-growth internet marketing model toward traditional FMCG practices.

Seven years after its founding, Genki Forest still hasn't crossed the 10 billion yuan revenue mark, a reality it must face.
At its 2023 national distributor conference, Genki Forest reported double-digit growth for 2023 but didn't disclose specific numbers. Facing nearly 400 distributors, Tang Binsen repeatedly emphasized the phrase 'returning to tradition.'
In fact, in recent years, Genki Forest's 'high-growth myth' has gradually come to an end. During the three years of rapid development from 2018 to 2020, Genki Forest's sales growth rates were 300%, 200%, and 309%, respectively. By 2022, however, sales growth had plummeted to only about 20%, a cliff-like decline. This has led outsiders to lament that Genki Forest's growth magic has disappeared. As its internet marketing tactics lose effectiveness, Genki Forest, now in a slow-growth phase, is beginning to align with traditional FMCG practices.
In terms of organizational structure, it has fully adopted the regional model, learning from traditional consumer goods companies. Tang Binsen, the founder known for his aggressive style, also lowered his profile in 2023, traveling to learn from others. In 2023, Genki Forest even adopted the slogan 'reduce costs, increase efficiency, and go all in on sales.'
As the company enters its seventh year, Tang Binsen has begun to realize that his previous management style was too presumptuous. At the beginning of the year, the major corruption case involving Ye Licheng served as a wake-up call. In sales, Genki Forest initiated sweeping reforms. To show sincerity to distributors and win their support, it even learned from Nongfu Spring by launching a 'co-built sales representative' model with distributors.
In this 'restart year,' Genki Forest is gradually moving onto the traditional track. However, having lost its 'vitality,' whether it can carve out a new path in the highly competitive traditional FMCG model remains to be seen.
**Genki Forest's 'Restart Year'**
2023 is Genki Forest's 'restart year.'
Genki Forest's official website changed its description from 'internet innovative beverage company' to 'Chinese food and beverage enterprise.' To accelerate its alignment with traditional companies, Genki Forest made significant adjustments to its product, brand, marketing, and channel strategies, and even overhauled its corporate structure.
According to media outlet Case, at the beginning of 2023, Genki Forest adjusted its super business units, consolidating the incubators scattered across various divisions into one product incubation department. This department houses eight independent incubators, each typically staffed by 5-6 people, tasked with incubating new products with market potential.
According to Huxiu, mid-year Genki Forest underwent another structural adjustment. First, the former marketing department was renamed the 'market department.' Second, Xu Feixiong, the head of the former marketing department, stepped down. Additionally, a 'manager' was added between brand managers and partner Nicolas, with co-founder Uki appointed as head of the brand growth center, overseeing all brand managers and reporting to Nicolas.
Currently, Genki Forest's top management consists of CEO Tang Binsen and two other partners. One is Nicolas, an internet veteran who joined in 2021 and is responsible for all products, brands, and overseas business. The other is Max, a seasoned executive overseeing mid-to-back office functions, factories, finance, legal, HR, retail digitalization, and crucially, the marketing center (all sales and channels).
In Genki Forest's seventh year, Tang Binsen has also changed significantly. Previously, he often said that his company and traditional beverage manufacturers were from two different worlds. Now, he frequently talks about learning from giants and returning to tradition.
Throughout 2023, visiting distributors, suppliers, and customers became a routine for Tang Binsen.
In July 2023, after chairing a sales meeting in Nanjing, Tang Binsen immediately flew to Hong Kong to visit He Boquan, founder of Robust and a consumer investor.
According to Time Finance, the meeting lasted five hours, with Tang Binsen preparing over 20 questions, chatting with He Boquan from 6 PM to 11 PM. He asked detailed questions about He's decision-making processes back then, trying to understand the mindset of his predecessor.
Three months earlier, at the launch of the 'cola-flavored' Genki Forest, Tang Binsen had a one-on-one exchange with Curt Ferguson, President of Coca-Cola Greater China & Korea, asking about his past experiences and understanding of the Chinese market.
At the 2023 distributor conference, Tang Binsen asked the distributors and executives: What kind of company is a beverage company essentially? What value does it create? First, innovation; second, improving efficiency—delivering products to users at lower cost and higher efficiency. Genki Forest is an efficiency company, and that's its biggest competitive barrier and advantage.
Tang Binsen also expressed respect and admiration for Nongfu Spring founder Zhong Shanshan, saying, 'He can make good products, work steadily, and doesn't engage in shady dealings.'
**After Sugar-Free Sparkling Water, Hard to Create Another Hit**
To this day, defining the 'sparkling water' category single-handedly and making Genki Forest synonymous with 'sparkling water' is still a common topic when people talk about the company.
In May 2018, Genki Forest's 'sugar-free sparkling water' became an instant hit, replacing aspartame with erythritol, a sugar alcohol, improving the taste of sugar-free sparkling water. Supported by this hit product and boosted by marketing, Genki Forest quickly broke through in the sugar-free sparkling water market.
Tang Binsen once publicly stated, 'I hope that when people mention sparkling water, they think of Genki Forest, and that Genki Forest introduced concepts like erythritol to the domestic beverage industry.'
After finding product differentiation, Genki Forest focused on marketing. On one hand, it signed top celebrity endorsements and sponsored popular variety shows to boost brand influence. On the other, it heavily invested in KOL and KOC 'planting notes' on social media platforms popular with young people like Xiaohongshu and Douyin, forming a closed marketing loop from top to bottom. Public data shows that in 2020, Genki Forest's revenue was 2.7 billion yuan, with advertising expenses of 900 million yuan, accounting for 33.33% of total revenue.
Tang Binsen previously mentioned in an interview, 'When we dared to generate 2 billion yuan in revenue, we spent 1.8 billion on advertising.' However, in the beverage industry with low entry barriers, this model is hard to sustain long-term.
After Genki Forest popularized the '0 sugar' concept, the market grew rapidly. Public data shows that since 2020, over 30 sugar-free sparkling water products have been launched, including those from industry giants like Coca-Cola and Nongfu Spring, as well as new tea brands like Heytea and Naixue. Although these sparkling water brands differ in their main selling points, their packaging and ingredients offer little novelty. At that time, Nongfu Spring, Coca-Cola, and PepsiCo all vowed to 'kill' Genki Forest by 2022.
Now, Genki Forest's hit-product formula is failing; sugar-free soda is no longer its exclusive advantage.
Following suit, many giants launched '0 sugar' product lines to besiege Genki Forest. 2022 was the first year Genki Forest's sales cooled, with sales growth dropping from 309% and 170.3% in 2020 and 2021 to just 30% now.
Beyond slowing sales growth, Genki Forest's deeper concern is that in the multiple tracks it has entered—such as sparkling water, electrolyte water, sugar-free tea, and plant-based beverages—traditional FMCG brands like Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nongfu Spring, and Yili have also established a presence, continuously eroding its market share.
Over the past 12 months, Genki Forest's performance has been weak, while Nongfu Spring's Oriental Leaf saw a year-on-year surge of 114%. Suntory China's main product, Oolong Tea, achieved 200% growth in the first half of this year. Notably, both traditional companies have sales volumes in the billions.
Given this context, the challenge of creating a second growth curve outside the sparkling water category is evident.
**Genki Forest Lowers Its Posture, Reconciles with Channels**
Whether it's internet-based product development or marketing, these were once Genki Forest's innate talents. But when Genki Forest engages in hand-to-hand combat with Nongfu Spring, Suntory, and others in offline channels, these talents have become constraints on its breakthrough.
For example, based on internet thinking, Genki Forest relied on massive deployment of smart retail vending machines to seize points from mom-and-pop stores in offline channels. But after spending real money, the channels became chaotic.
Additionally, to achieve sustained high growth, Genki Forest shifted all pressure onto distributors. Under inventory pressure, distributors tried every means to offload goods, leading to problems like 'channel crossing and price chaos.'
One distributor said that in early March, they purchased a case of Genki Forest for 42 yuan, but half a month later, goods appeared on the market at 34 yuan per case.
Even the 'innovative flavors' that Genki Forest considered its magic weapon failed to make a splash in lower-tier markets. More troubling, these seasonal limited-edition flavors became 'death warrants' for distributors.
A Genki Forest Sakura White Grape sparkling water that sold out in spring 2021 couldn't sell in summer 2022. One distributor stocked over 40,000 cases and still hadn't sold them all by the 9-month shelf life. The Sakura White Grape flavor went from a spring 2022 limited edition to a 'death-chasing leftover,' famously dubbed 'deadly Sakura White' among distributors.
At the end of 2022, at Genki Forest's distributor conference, Tang Binsen used the phrase 'return of the prodigal son' to express apology and sincerity to distributors. He said, 'We've been too lucky in the past few years, but that exposed some problems. In the long run, relying on distributors to develop our sales network is the right path. The internet thinking of 'decentralization' is poison; we didn't understand sales well enough...'
In fact, Tang Binsen's reflection is related to the fact that in the first three quarters of 2022, Genki Forest's distributor system abolished the 'regional' system. At that time, provincial heads reported directly to the company's channel head. Under the 'provincial system,' Genki Forest adopted a 'one-way order model.' Each province would first set sales targets, then assign tasks to distributors based on sales goals, leading provinces to push pressure onto distributors to meet targets.
Under the then-statistical standards, as long as products were delivered to distributors' warehouses, they could be counted in the company's sales figures. In other words, products didn't need to be sold to consumers to be counted as sales.
A distributor once said that in 2022, Genki Forest headquarters would predict based on experience and deliver products directly to distributors' warehouses without their knowledge, causing unsold excess inventory. In the sales process, some provinces saw channel crossing, leading distributors to feel the 'price system was chaotic.'
As Tang Binsen reflected, these phenomena are changing. Starting in 2023, Genki Forest began thoroughly investigating problems in its national sales system and carried out major rectifications. Internally, it launched a big cleanup of the sales system, firing non-compliant sales staff and replacing the head of the marketing center with Fan Jun, who became the new marketing head.
After taking charge, Fan Jun reorganized Genki Forest's sales structure, consolidating provinces into eight war zones. In terms of distributor ordering, the original 'one-way order confirmation model' was changed to a 'two-way order confirmation model.' When Genki Forest ships to distributors, distributors receive a message with all product details and a verification code; only after the distributor confirms accuracy does shipping proceed. Additionally, under the new model, distributors' specific distribution actions are monitored, and task indicators are refined from traditional sales volume to more granular distribution metrics.
Furthermore, to align with traditional beverage companies, Genki Forest also learned from brands like Nongfu Spring in early market development, adopting a 'co-built talent' model to expand terminal talent teams and optimize the overall sales team through refined terminal control.
For example, in 2023, Genki Forest began 'co-building sales representatives' with distributors, where business agents handle specific tasks like product shelving, material placement, and activity execution in the region. These agents work deeply with distributor teams, exclusively serving Genki Forest products. Under this model, Genki Forest and distributors share employee salaries, with Genki Forest covering 60%-70% and social insurance for the agents.
According to Genki Forest data, in less than a year, the number of co-built sales representatives increased by nearly 1,000.
**How Much Longer for the Dream of Becoming China's Coca-Cola?**
Beyond sales and channels, Genki Forest's reforms also extend to products. At the beginning of 2023, after frequent meetings with his team, Tang Binsen determined a strategy of 'narrowing the product line and slowing down new product launches.'
Specifically, it significantly cut new products launched in 2022, and the entire R&D cycle was extended from 6-8 months to about two years from concept to launch.
It's worth noting that Genki Forest had previously been aggressive in launching new products. In 2022, the 'total number of annual new products' launched and released hit a record high, covering tea drinks, functional drinks, soda, milk tea, juice, plant-based drinks, and more. Among them, over 15 new flavors of sparkling water were launched in 2022 alone.
An insider revealed that in 2022, Genki Forest launched a batch of products developed during the pandemic but not yet released, leading to an unusually high number of new products that year.
However, the flood of new products didn't receive positive market feedback. As the market became increasingly saturated, Genki Forest's business growth slowed starting in 2022. In April 2022, then-Vice President Li Guoxun disclosed that Genki Forest's 2022 collection target was set at 10 billion yuan, with growth rate lowered to 37%.
Moreover, in 2023, Genki Forest's performance still failed to break the 10 billion yuan mark, and the hit product 'sparkling water' overall was flat compared to 2022 sales.
Therefore, for a considerable period, finding a second growth curve beyond sparkling water has been a persistent headache for Genki Forest.
In exploring a second growth curve, some hits have emerged. For example, at the end of 2022, leveraging the post-pandemic surge in consumer health awareness, Genki Forest's Alien electrolyte water sold well. According to official information, as of early December, annual sales of Alien electrolyte water exceeded 3.5 billion yuan, nearly three times its 2022 sales.
Another example is Genki Forest's iced tea drink, which became the third-largest product line internally in 2023. Additionally, the Zizai water product line saw sales grow from zero to over 100 million yuan in 2023...
However, these seemingly plausible 'second growth curves' remain uncertain. For instance, its mineral water product 'Youkuang' was once highly anticipated but was eventually abandoned.
Another example is the trial of cola-flavored sparkling water. In promotional materials, it was claimed that Genki Cola had absolute improvements in taste, carbonation, and throat hit. At the product launch, Tang Binsen even ambitiously stated, 'Cola is just a flavor; I hope this is no longer a forbidden zone.'
But even so, consumer feedback after market launch was far from ideal.
For instance, in lower-tier markets where 'cheap and large bottle' is the core competitiveness, this cola-flavored Genki Forest is hard to find. A Xiaohongshu blogger posted, 'Why not just drink a 3-yuan sugar-free cola?'
Despite the setbacks in 2022, Genki Forest made significant adjustments in 2023, moving closer to traditional brands, changing its distributor strategy, and making lower-tier markets a new strategic goal.
But in lower-tier markets dominated by Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nongfu Spring, and iced tea brands, Genki Forest faces a tough battle to carve out a place.
In terms of price, a bottle of Genki Forest cola-flavored sparkling water sells for 5 yuan, while Coca-Cola, the national happy water, retails for only 3 yuan. Not to mention the long-standing competition from Kangshifu and Tea π in lower-tier markets against Genki Forest's Ran Tea and Ice Tea, as well as the impact of Nongfu Spring's Oriental Leaf and Suntory on its Fiber Tea products.
Whether Genki Forest can effectively play the 'health card' in lower-tier markets is also uncertain. After all, in first- and second-tier cities, new middle-class consumers who pursue a healthy lifestyle are willing to pay for Genki Forest's '0 sugar, 0 fat, 0 calories,' but in lower-tier markets with higher price sensitivity, the choice between health and good taste is harder to discern.
Clearly, it's not easy for Genki Forest to recreate the 'sparkling water' myth. To engage in a prolonged battle with giants in the future, Genki Forest still has much to learn.
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