---
title: "Who Killed Double 11?"
description: "This year's Double 11 saw the slowest growth in transaction value in 12 years, with a year-on-year increase of only 12.2%. The article analyzes the underlying causes, including platform strategy shifts favoring brands over consumers, the rise of livestream e-commerce, and changing consumer behavior among younger generations."
author: "苗正卿"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
telephone: "+8615854817671"
published: "2021-11-17"
language: "en"
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---

# Who Killed Double 11?

> This year's Double 11 saw the slowest growth in transaction value in 12 years, with a year-on-year increase of only 12.2%. The article analyzes the underlying causes, including platform strategy shifts favoring brands over consumers, the rise of livestream e-commerce, and changing consumer behavior among younger generations.

Source: Huxiu Business, Consumer & Mobility Group

Unexpectedly quiet.

This was the Double 11 with the slowest growth in transaction value ever. According to data from China Commercial Industry Research Institute, **the year-on-year growth rate of total online transaction value for Double 11 in 2021 was only 12.2%, the lowest in 12 years.** The decline in consumer enthusiasm is further reflected in the number of packages: on Double 11 day, the total number of packages was only 1.158 billion—barely higher than the 2016 figure (1.07 billion packages in 2016).

The major platforms' reported results were not bad, but they could not hide the "fatigue": Tmall's total transaction value for Double 11 was 540.3 billion yuan, up 8% year-on-year, compared to an average growth rate of over 26% in the previous four years; JD.com's cumulative transaction value was 349.1 billion yuan, up 29%, while in 2018 and 2019, JD.com's growth rates were 26% and 28% respectively.

Two external factors became excuses for some practitioners.

First, at the end of October, relevant authorities imposed explicit restrictions on SMS marketing by e-commerce platforms for Double 11, and on November 1, the Personal Information Protection Law officially took effect.

**SMS marketing and big data methods based on personal information were seen in the past few years as the "marketing vanguard" and "tech elite" of e-commerce.** There is no denying that these changes reshaped the e-commerce ecosystem, but they are by no means the root cause of Double 11's cold reception.

What is easily overlooked is that **this is not the only time Double 11 has cooled off in its 13-year history.**

In 2012 and 2016, Double 11 also faced crises: in the summer of 2012, a series of fake promotions by e-commerce platforms nearly made that year's Double 11 unsustainable; in 2016, due to rising traffic costs, some brands and online stores began to say "NO" to the traditional "shelf e-commerce" style Double 11, which became the driving force behind the birth of livestream e-commerce...

This is like a "cycle law" for Double 11: **approximately every four years, this largest group dance in China's e-commerce world needs to be rearranged.** The keyword hidden behind this cycle is **the game between platforms and consumers and brands, as well as the redistribution of interests around traffic dividends.**

**The Third Crisis of Double 11**

An operations person at a major platform, who requested anonymity, told Huxiu that **the pandemic factor delayed the "Double 11 crisis" that should have appeared earlier**, or rather, the "e-commerce crisis."

He said bluntly that the cold winter of Double 11 in 2021 essentially stemmed from policy changes on multiple platforms in 2018. In 2018, multiple platforms collectively changed their promotional subsidy policies. Before 2018, Double 11 was mainly characterized by "discounts + gifts + ultra-low prices," but after 2018, this model changed to "spend threshold reduction + pre-payment model."

"This is a strategy that clearly favors B-end brands, because it is these big Bs who spend money to buy traffic on the platform. But obviously, this complex promotional model **will reduce the consumer experience.**" This person even pointed out that the "stay up late to order" model in 2021 was a continuation of this strategy: any product manager with a conscience would understand that making C-end users stay up late directly reduces user experience, but for B-end clients, the platform provides longer user time.

In the eyes of some old-school internet company people, this is no longer the original Double 11.

"What was Double 11 like in 2009?" One of the aforementioned "old-school" people gave a simple example: **in the earliest Double 11 event in 2009, fewer than 30 brands participated on the platform.** It was a typical C-end consumer carnival: most products were discounted to 30-50% off, and some even had buy-one-get-one-free or buy-one-get-three deals.

**This kind of Double 11, which truly benefited consumers,** radiated extraordinary charm: at that time, a platform's single-day transaction value exceeded 50 million yuan, equivalent to 10 times the daily average.

A product manager who requested anonymity said bluntly that after the 2021 Double 11 results came out, too many people were shouting "Double 11 is dead," but he felt that if they returned to the era of "minimum 30% off, fixed price 50% off," Double 11 results might continue to double.

The problem is that brands (suppliers) **are unwilling to continue this classical Double 11**, and perhaps even the platforms are unwilling. At a small-scale exchange event in August this year, a business line head at a platform revealed that the most important source of revenue for e-commerce platforms is brands and large store owners with advertising budgets—they are willing to buy traffic products and promotion optimization products.

"C-end users do not directly contribute to the platform. The platform's revenue mainly comes from deposits, traffic promotion fees, and some commission-like fees based on sales." The person told Huxiu, **this revenue model means that the platform's own profits are closely related to the advertising and sales of brands (or store owners)**, and advertising and sales on e-commerce platforms are essentially traffic businesses.

This person said bluntly that the concentration effect of Double 11 means that every year, Double 11 is actually a major test of the overall model and strategy of e-commerce platforms. "There is a delicate balance between C-end users and B-end users, and e-commerce platforms think about constantly adjusting this balance point."

The reason the classical Double 11 (direct and simple 30% or 50% off model) was abandoned is: **for platforms, this extensive traffic strategy cannot squeeze out the maximum value of traffic**, and for brands (store owners), **this simple model may be a huge impact on traditional store channels.**

A clothing brand participated in e-commerce platform Double 11 promotions around 2010 but quickly withdrew afterward. The reason was that the excessively low activity prices made some offline channel distributors very dissatisfied, even believing it led to "price breaking."

The classical Double 11 had a major crisis around 2012. That year's e-commerce promotions were no longer so "simple," and there were multiple incidents of fake promotions and fake activities. In the most severe stage, some platforms even worried that that year's Double 11 would be paused.

**A bigger crisis came from users.** From the growth rate of transaction value that year, it is not difficult to see that in 2012, consumers began to "doubt" Double 11. In some surveys in 2012, consumers' biggest concerns about Double 11 were "fake promotions" and "quality doubts."

Essentially, this sounded an alarm for all subsequent Double 11s. The 2012 lesson did make some e-commerce platforms turn back, and from 2012 to 2013, these platforms began to crack down on fake promotions, which indirectly opened a new era for Double 11: from 2013 to 2016, Double 11 transaction value showed explosive growth.

Taking Tmall as an example, in 2016, Tmall's Double 11 transaction value exceeded 120.7 billion yuan—almost 3.5 times that of 2013.

A side note can witness this period: the leapfrog development of logistics. **In 2016, Double 11 logistics orders reached 657 million, while in 2009, the number of logistics orders on Double 11 day barely exceeded 10 million.** Several major logistics companies also completed capitalization around 2016. **At first glance, this was almost a perfect era.**

**But a new crisis knocked on the door of Double 11 in 2016 again.** Some small brands and store owners found that they were no longer suitable to participate in Double 11 promotions.

A store owner who later became a livestream host revealed in an interview that in 2016, the platform's traffic prices were several times higher than a few years earlier, and for small store owners like them (compared to big brands and large stores), **the return on investment during Double 11 was already relatively low.**

In fact, from the decline in the growth rate of Double 11 transaction value in 2016, some clues can be seen. Although the book results of Double 11 in 2016 were very impressive, **the year-on-year growth rate of transaction value that year was the lowest in the past few years.** In fact, between 2013 and 2021, only 2019 and 2021 had lower year-on-year growth rates than 2016.

It is worth noting that **livestream e-commerce was precisely the "prescription" given by the platform that year.** A top host, in 2016, due to declining data from her online store and **growth entering a "stagnation zone," tried livestream selling.** She once publicly stated that the reason she tried livestreaming was because the platform promised traffic support—for store owners willing to cooperate with the platform in trying livestreaming, some traffic resources were given.

**The "Disappearing" Hosts and Double 11**

"If you don't fake orders, you die; if you fake orders, you also die."

This was a complaint made to Huxiu in early October by the founder of a capsule drink company. At that time, investors strongly suggested he go on livestream immediately—to appear on a super host or at least a top host's livestream during Double 11 to boost GMV, and then raise another round of financing at the end of the year.

At that time, the major hosts had already started selecting products for Double 11. With the help of investors, this founder "squeezed in" and successfully met with a host's product selection team. But the product selection team made an unbearable demand: "If the livestream doesn't sell well, your team must buy the products yourself; you can't ruin our reputation for selling because of one brand."

The founder calculated that for this livestream, he would need to set aside 10% of this year's financing as "risk capital." If the livestream didn't sell, he would need to use this money for "turnover," while the appearance fee and commission would still be charged by the host.

Huxiu contacted two top host teams regarding this issue. One team, known for its selling power, told Huxiu: "**For small brands that are not yet famous, no host today will promise sales in the livestream. It's like putting your products in a top supermarket or booth; if they don't sell, is it only the channel's fault?**"

It is worth noting that from 2016 to 2018, hosts were a new remedy for Double 11 and e-commerce platforms: at that time, traffic prices on traditional shelf e-commerce were high, and the prices of traditional recommendation slots and traffic resources on e-commerce platforms were rising—this caused a large number of small and medium brands, even white-label products, **to be unable to afford these traditional "traffic resources."**

For C-end consumers, **they themselves are the ones who bear the cost of traffic.** As one result of high traffic prices, the "price advantage" of Double 11 products purchased by consumers gradually decreased. From the consumer's perspective, they urgently needed a new "selling model."

Now it seems that from 2016 to 2018, **livestream e-commerce was a means of using human labor to solve the above "system problems":** hosts selected products to bring cheaper products to consumers, gathered larger traffic by letting consumers benefit, and ultimately pushed back on brands and platforms to gain more resources.

A senior internet observer once said, **in a sense, hosts are a kind of "super big C," or in the period from 2016 to 2018, they were the "representatives of C-end users' needs."** An obvious phenomenon is that the growth rate of Double 11 transaction value began to slow down compared to the GMV growth rate of "Double 11 livestream e-commerce."

But as more people became hosts, competition became fierce: to obtain more platform resources and product resources, these hosts needed to gain more C-end users, and the basis for gaining more C-end users was more high-quality products and platform support—as competition intensified, **hosts' dependence on platforms and suppliers (brands) continued to increase.**

The ultimate result of this situation can already be seen in 2021: in some hosts' livestream rooms, you can no longer even buy the cheapest products.

Two deep-seated reasons caused this phenomenon. First, competition among hosts increasingly revolves around goods, or high-quality stable supply. Up to now, most hosts' self-built brands have been hard to call successful. In the livestream rooms of top hosts on major platforms, the highest proportion of GMV sales is almost always third-party brands.

A detail from October this year is worth noting. A person from a top host team on a platform told Huxiu that the product resources of some beauty and skincare head brands were completely taken by a few super hosts—even other top hosts on the platform could only get goods through their own purchasing teams at counters.

It is worth noting that directly securing product resources often means direct dialogue with brands or major distributors. But the key premise of this cooperation is—**to ensure the integrity of the offline channel ecosystem of big brands**, that is, there must be no "ultra-low prices" that cause channel price breaking.

Another key reason is that in 2021, the platform's strong support for brand self-broadcasting is strengthening brands' bargaining power with hosts.

An industry insider told Huxiu that several super hosts have formed their own fan base. Their "traffic revenue contribution" to the platform is high but close to saturation, and it is difficult for platforms to expect a few super hosts to multiply traffic investment.

Currently, it is brands that have the ability to invest—**those brands that worry about the conversion rate of big hosts and the inability to accumulate private domain traffic**—are eager to enrich their online reach by building their own livestream channels.

When brand self-broadcasting became a trend on major platforms in 2021, **the balance between brands and hosts had already changed.** Even macro factors are reshaping this balance: in 2021, high shipping prices and production halts in some production areas **led to insufficient supply of some brands in the market**, which further **strengthened the bargaining power of brands.**

As a direct result of these factors, during Double 11 in 2021, we did not see many truly "lowest prices across the internet for big brands" in the livestream rooms of super hosts or even top hosts.

"The big hosts at this stage are different from those in 2016-2018," a senior practitioner in the livestream industry, who requested anonymity, told Huxiu. The two well-known super hosts and their teams have plans for further financing or IPO. "They are no longer the small hosts in a small room recommending good products to a few thousand or tens of thousands of fans."

**Just as the Double 11 of 2009 has disappeared forever.**

Currently, the deeper issue surrounding this year's Double 11 cold reception is how this model, which has been running for 13 years, can face the rising new generation of consumers?

In September this year, an e-commerce platform conducted a study specifically on consumers born in 2005, and the results were not optimistic: this group of consumers had slightly lower awareness of the traditional major e-commerce platforms than their predecessors, and some consumers born after 2005 were "not very interested" in the concentrated shopping event of Double 11.

When this group of consumers, who grew up watching short videos and are deeply influenced by ACG, national style, and esports culture, gradually grow up, what kind of Double 11 do they need? **This may not be a problem that can be solved by simply offering more young categories.**

For example, do these consumers, who grew up with fragmented content, have the patience to watch a continuous livestream lasting up to 5 hours? And can the existing Double 11 gameplay meet their needs for circle social interaction?

"We will eventually grow old, but there will always be new young people."

**Are you "watching" me?**


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