---
title: "The First Wave of Snack Store Owners: Cashing Out with Millions"
description: "The first batch of snack store owners have quietly exited with fortunes, yet the industry continues to attract newcomers. Despite a wave of store transfers, the high turnover and profit potential keep the dream alive for many."
author: "洞见数据研究院"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
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published: "2025-05-30"
categories: "Consumer & Categories, Retail Formats"
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citation: "洞见数据研究院. “The First Wave of Snack Store Owners: Cashing Out with Millions.” New Distribution, 2025-05-30. https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/the-first-wave-of-snack-store-owners-cashing-out-with-millions-3739d77a/"
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---

# The First Wave of Snack Store Owners: Cashing Out with Millions

> The first batch of snack store owners have quietly exited with fortunes, yet the industry continues to attract newcomers. Despite a wave of store transfers, the high turnover and profit potential keep the dream alive for many.

**Source** | Table and Inside
"Without the snack store business, I would have switched careers long ago," said Li Xi, a shop transfer agent, expressing deep gratitude to snack store owners.
Over the past two years, his business has visibly struggled, with more restaurants and milk tea shops seeking transfers each month. Despite aggressive promotions on platforms like Douyin and Xiaohongshu, comments are filled with wary remarks like "profiteer" and "don't try to rip me off."
Fortunately, snack collection stores have been a goldmine for him: a township store in Jiangsu/Zhejiang sold for 530,000 yuan in a day; a second-tier city store transferred for 1 million yuan, with clients taking overnight high-speed rail to inspect...
In an era where franchising has lost its allure and the "hot potato" game no longer works, the bulk snack industry continues to create wealth myths like "annual revenue of 6 million" and "making your first 10 million," attracting countless entrepreneurs.
From 2022 to 2024, the two giants of bulk snacks, Mingming Henmang and Wanchen Group (parent of Haoxianglai), demonstrated "violent rise" with nearly 200% compound annual revenue growth. The former, about to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, earned a whopping 800 million yuan last year, a 284% year-on-year increase.
Even as the "transfer wave" hits, many of Li Xi's clients remain unfazed, even buying the dip: "The previous owner didn't know how to do business; I'll definitely make money."
In the first quarter of this year, GeoQ Data recorded 1,094 store closures among typical chain snack brands; however, more than 1,400 new stores opened.
In the trillion-yuan snack world, the first batch of collection store owners have quietly left, but more are still rushing in.

**6-Cent Marinated Eggs and 1.7-Yuan Cola**
**Supporting Owners' Tens of Millions**
Da Xiong always emphasizes that entering the snack store business was "destined."
Four years ago, while scouting for entrepreneurial projects across China, he was attracted by a long line of students outside a snack store: during school dismissal, they ignored convenience stores and supermarkets, heading straight for the farthest snack store, then queuing with large baskets to pay.
After deeper research, he was shocked by the industry's "quiet wealth-making" ability: a store owner in the Yangtze River Delta with over a dozen stores earned tens of millions in a decade; demonstration stores recouped investment in months "easily"...
However, this seemingly perfect opportunity didn't make Da Xiong impulsive, as online opinions were filled with pessimism like "high homogeneity, no room to compete" and "snack business has entered hell mode."
Only after going undercover as a store clerk for over 10 days, witnessing three cash registers running non-stop until they "smoked" and queues still forming at 10 PM, did he decide, "This is it."
Unlike predecessors who opened their own stores, Da Xiong chose franchising because the snack store business model points to: "under the big tree, you enjoy the shade."
"Low prices are the biggest draw," Da Xiong summarized. A 3-yuan cola at convenience stores sells for 1.7 yuan here; a 1-yuan marinated egg sells for 6 cents... The extreme value for money is hard to resist.
To maintain low prices while ensuring quality, the best way is "to use scale to negotiate better prices upstream." Simply put, brands with more stores and larger scale can leverage centralized procurement to lower purchase costs, supporting the "low price" label.
With this in mind, he jumped on the bandwagon of a snack brand's national expansion.
For Yan Ran, who rose from clerk to store manager due to her love of food, snack stores not only "control" customers' wallets but also hook "foodies" by the stomach.
According to Yan Ran's observation, almost every snack store has over a thousand SKUs, with a large proportion being white-label products, "like our store, about 70%." These white labels, without brand premium burdens, are more willing to cooperate with bulk brands in flavors and new product launches.
"Headquarters launches new products every two or three days; if they sell well, they stay; if feedback is poor, they're eliminated," Yan Ran said. This supply strategy, tailored to regional preferences, makes many snack connoisseurs treat snack stores as their sourcing channel.
For example, Qianjiaxiang duck feet, Xiaomianao nuts, Mala konjac silk... These brands and flavors unheard of elsewhere are bestsellers in Yan Ran's region, with many buying by the case.
Not only white labels hit the spot, but branded products are also improved. As shown below, common chips and drinks are made in mini versions, allowing customers to taste various flavors for 10 yuan without the waste of large supermarket packages.
"A cycle of big brands attracting traffic and white labels retaining customers forms, so snack stores don't worry about foot traffic," Yan Ran analyzed, noting that many customers visit every other day or even daily.
This is also validated by data: in 2024, Mingming Henmang recorded 1.6 billion transactions with a repurchase rate of 75%; Wanchen Group's weekly repurchase rate reached 2.3 times.
Riding this wave, Da Xiong's franchise store became a "money tree" upon opening: first month sales exceeded 1 million yuan, and within less than a year and a half, he recouped his initial investment of over 1 million yuan.
But just as the door to "easy money" opened wide, Da Xiong sold his second-tier city store.

**Annual Revenue of 6 Million**
**Worse Than a 300K Salary Job**
With a monthly salary of over 7,000 yuan, 20% higher than the neighboring milk tea shop manager, after nearly three months of recruiting and interviewing dozens of candidates, not one successfully joined.
Da Xiong didn't expect finding a reliable store manager to be so difficult.
He had anticipated the hiring challenge: "Snack stores have too many SKUs; clerks are essentially snack movers, moving hundreds of cases of water a day." The heavy workload makes regular employees quit after two days, while store managers handle recruitment, staff management, and daily operations, making the workload even more intense.
However, offering such a high salary and still finding no one exceeded his expectations. "To hire, I'd need to pay more," Da Xiong said, but he couldn't afford further losses.
Snack collection stores are touted as "money printers," with annual revenues often in the millions, but up close, they're "profit grinders."
Ping Ping's snack store started with 10 employees, gradually reduced to 7, then 5, and finally only 3 on rotating shifts, barely staying afloat.
"No choice, with expenses exceeding income, I had to cut staff," Ping Ping sighed. Initially, seeing camping-loving parents and young people leaving snack stores with large bags, she opened a store in an affluent urban area.
Surrounded by middle-class customers, she envisioned sitting back and watching money roll in: with a minimum monthly revenue of 500,000 yuan and a conservative 10% net profit margin for FMCG, she could earn 600,000 yuan a year, recouping investment in under two years.
But reality hit hard: to project high-end, she leased a 150-square-meter store with a monthly rent of 15,000 yuan; fully staffed, fixed monthly expenses reached 30,000-40,000 yuan.
"Bulk snacks need to stay fresh, so I restock every few days," Ping Ping calculated. With over a thousand products, monthly purchasing costs reached 400,000 yuan.
As a result, a store with annual revenue in the millions had a net profit margin in single digits, leaving the owner with just over 200,000 yuan a year, "not as good as working a job," Ping Ping joked. Worse, she "peaked on entry": due to the camping trend fading and road construction in front of the store, foot traffic dwindled, making recouping investment seem distant.
Compared to Ping Ping's pitfalls, Da Xiong's decisive exit was also due to foreseeing the low cost-effectiveness of urban stores.
"In the snack business, it's about 'rural areas surrounding cities,'" he analyzed. In lower-tier markets, rent and labor are cheaper, but consumption is strong.
Urban workers live a two-point life between office and apartment, not wanting to go anywhere after work, limiting store reach; while county residents finish work early, have more free time, and online shopping is inconvenient, so everyone flocks to one or two commercial centers.
During his initial research, Da Xiong noticed that most snack brands' demonstration stores were in county and township areas. So when he passed a county in a populous central province and saw a commercial center with huge foot traffic—large supermarkets bustling from morning to night—but no snack store yet, he immediately became interested.
To seize the opportunity, he paid a 100,000 yuan premium for a prime location and opened a super-sized store with the investment scale of a big city, hoping for a smash hit.
But after opening, Da Xiong was shocked: the store was crowded daily, but most people only browsed without buying, with actual sales at only 70% of other regions.
He initially thought it was a product mismatch, but after surveying nearby counties, he realized it wasn't about products—it was purely about "poverty."
"Average income there is nearly 1,000 yuan lower than elsewhere; snacks are discretionary spending, and with less income, people cut back on snacks," Da Xiong realized. In this industry where profits are squeezed, a poor location choice is a costly lesson.
However, a location that's too good can also be dangerous.

**After Ten Thousand Stores**
**No Smooth Road for Snack Franchising**
"Once your monthly revenue hits 500,000, you can't escape being 'inserted' by competitors," Zhang Zhang experienced the feeling of a "top student" having their homework copied after opening a snack store.
The difference is that rankings can tie, but business is a zero-sum game where one's gain is another's loss.
Almost overnight, snack stores sprouted around Zhang Zhang like mushrooms. With various retail bulk brands working together, two stores squeezed into a 1-kilometer radius around him, and a friend's store even had a competitor open right next door.
Citywide, the situation is even more concerning: from just two or three stores in 2023, it's now expanded to over 20.
"A 10-20% drop in revenue is normal, and severe cases see it halved," Zhang Zhang said. To compete for customers, a friend's store once ran promotions as low as "38% off"—a tactic close to a clearance sale.
He wasn't spared either: "If others are cheap, we can't be expensive, or why would customers come?"
Beyond direct price wars, the pressure from headquarters to accept mandatory shipments is increasing: "Snack stores sell similar items; to differentiate, they push more new products, regardless of whether the store can display them all."
This cold brand attitude is a far cry from when Zhang Zhang first joined.
When he first franchised, the brand and franchisees were in the same boat: in the bulk model, the more franchisees sold, the larger the brand's wholesale scale and profits. For example, Mingming Henmang earned an average of 99% of its revenue from selling goods to franchise stores from 2022 to 2024.
But people on the same ship can develop different intentions.
"For brands, the more stores, the better," Zhang Zhang explained. If only one store opens in a region, it earns 600,000 yuan a year; with three stores, per-store profit drops to 300,000 yuan, but total profit reaches 900,000 yuan, benefiting the brand.
Indeed, Wanchen Group and Mingming Henmang have both entered the "ten-thousand-store era," with even brand-owned stores directly competing by "inserting" stores.
As for franchisees with shrinking wallets, "they just need to ensure they don't die," Zhang Zhang said. For instance, when other brands engage in price wars, headquarters may subsidize the difference to keep stores afloat; but when same-brand stores compete, headquarters stays indifferent.
If franchising big brands is stressful, small brand franchisees face even harsher conditions.
Xiao Liang initially felt lucky to "snag a bargain" with a 500,000 yuan transfer fee and the previous owner's reluctance, complaining, "If I didn't have to go home to take care of my grandson, I wouldn't transfer."
But within three months, things took a turn for the worse: "As if coordinated, five similar stores opened within 2 kilometers on my street," she fumed. With increasing store density, price wars intensified.
As a small brand franchisee, Xiao Liang had no headquarters subsidies to fall back on, and "the brand is even less resilient than me," she said in exasperation.
Amid industry-wide involution, the brand's product range quickly shrank from over a thousand to a few hundred, and eventually, the supply chain broke down and switched suppliers.
The new supply costs were much higher, leaving no room for price competition. Watching her store edge toward closure, Xiao Liang finally realized, "The previous owner wasn't going home to take care of his grandson; he was clearly fleeing to avoid risk."
Xiao Liang isn't the only one left holding the bag. According to Li Xi's statistics, last year, an average of about a dozen snack store owners sought his help with transfers each month; this year, it's 30, with many being second-time transfers.
But these stores won't stay vacant for long; slightly better locations are snapped up within half a day.
The snack industry, like the restaurant business, is a cycle of reinvention, "and everyone believes they'll be the lucky one laughing last," Li Xi said pointedly.


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## Citation metadata

- Publisher: New Distribution
- Author: 洞见数据研究院
- Published: 2025-05-30
- Canonical: https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/the-first-wave-of-snack-store-owners-cashing-out-with-millions-3739d77a/
- Original source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/bgOaLw58IjNzP5R87TkZGw

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