---
title: "Northeast Big Board: The Reverse of Zhong Xue Gao"
description: "When Harbin went viral at the start of the year, free Northeast Big Board ice creams were handed out, puzzling locals who had never heard of it. Despite its nostalgic name, the brand only launched in 2013, first in Beijing and Shanghai, and its rise can be seen as the antithesis of Zhong Xue Gao's downfall."
author: "IC实验室"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
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published: "2024-06-18"
language: "en"
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---

# Northeast Big Board: The Reverse of Zhong Xue Gao

> When Harbin went viral at the start of the year, free Northeast Big Board ice creams were handed out, puzzling locals who had never heard of it. Despite its nostalgic name, the brand only launched in 2013, first in Beijing and Shanghai, and its rise can be seen as the antithesis of Zhong Xue Gao's downfall.

When Harbin went viral at the start of the year, a batch of Northeast Big Board ice creams was given out for free. Many Harbin residents were puzzled: Why have I never eaten Northeast Big Board? According to my Northeastern friends, when we were kids, we ate Zhongjie Daguo, Madier, and Meidenggao, but never Northeast Big Board. That's not surprising, because Northeast Big Board sounds like a nostalgic old brand, but it only appeared in 2013. And despite its name, its first stops were actually Beijing and Shanghai. **If we ignore the timeline, I even think Northeast Big Board is a bit like the reverse of Zhong Xue Gao.**

**If Zhong Xue Gao sacrificed the entire company to personally demonstrate how badly you can die from pretending to be high-end, then the rise of Northeast Big Board vividly shows how playing dumb and developing stealthily works time and again in the business world.** Northeast Big Board's parent company is called Hongbaoshi, a cold drink brand founded in Daqing in 1992, with a notable presence in the Northeast market. Although it doesn't come from a big city like Madier or Zhongjie Daguo, nor has a long history or deep pockets, it has penetrated all county-level markets in the three northeastern provinces by using solid ingredients and a grassroots approach. **Yet this small company wanted to compete with Mengniu, Yili, and Unilever, aiming to conquer Beijing, Shanghai, and the whole country.** I'd call it the Northeast Akagi Takenori. Of course, you need to be strong yourself; Hongbaoshi indeed has some tricks up its sleeve. As early as 1997, the company received the "Green Food" certification from the National Quality Supervision Bureau, claiming to be the second in the country, obtaining the title at the same table as the boss of Yili. At least it shows their ingredients are solid and clean.

In the summer of 2013, Northeast Big Board was born. **Northeast Big Board can be called an ambitious work.** Think about it: if there were no ambition to conquer the country, and they only wanted to dominate in Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, why would they label themselves "Northeast"? This name is meant for people outside the three northeastern provinces, to give them a little Northeastern shock. **In the food and catering sector, the word "Northeast" is almost synonymous with cheap and generous portions.** Northeastern cuisine treats those who want too much; if you're not content and order more dishes, the restaurant will have you leaving with a doggy bag while holding your stomach. In short, "Northeast" is the antonym of "premium," the nemesis of consumerism, the lifelong enemy of light luxury, and the living father of omakase. Adding "Big Board" makes it even more down-to-earth. Northeast Big Board originally came in two types of packaging: strawberry, chocolate, and cream flavors used transparent plastic wrap, giving a sense of "what you see is what you get." The grassland milk flavor was even more direct, using wax paper that wasn't sealed at the ends, so you could tear it open with your hands. This packaging style perfectly replicates the childhood memories of consumers born in the 70s, 80s, and early 90s, reminding them of the innocent era when ice cream vendors pushed tricycles with foam boxes wrapped in quilts, selling sticks for one or two mao each.

As for price, it was 3 yuan when it first launched. In 2013, 3 yuan was mediocre in the Northeast; in a small shop, no one would give it a second glance. But it didn't focus on the Northeast; it prioritized first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai, where the price suddenly seemed attractive. Moreover, the classic grassland milk flavor is not an ordinary ice pop but a proper ice cream. If the ingredients aren't solid and the protein and fat content don't meet standards, you can't print "ice cream" on the packaging. With 3 yuan, in a super first-tier city, and being ice cream, these three conditions combined made Northeast Big Board seem like great value, resembling an old Northeastern cold drink brand. **At this point, Northeast Big Board's logic is fully closed.**

**Whether it's product design, packaging style, pricing, or brand name, it strives to appear simple, approachable, and very cost-effective.** This brings up a marketing concept called "performing cheapness." "Performing cheapness" is neither the "real cheapness" of cutting prices to no profit nor the "fake cheapness" of deceiving customers, but a marketing tactic that fully leverages the selling points of low-priced goods to maximize brand value. In plain terms, since I sell cheaper than others, I must make it known to everyone, even if it means putting on airs. Even if I'm only one yuan cheaper than competitors, I want consumers to feel they've saved ten yuan. **This approach is absolutely correct. Low price is the best weapon in market competition; quiet low prices only lead to thinner profits, while loud low prices bring market share expansion and overall revenue growth.** In this regard, Mixue Ice City is a master, but Northeast Big Board is no pushover either. **Consumers already have the mental imprint that Northeast equals value for money; what Northeast Big Board does is amplify this imprint to get more consumers to pay for its value.**

Now look at Zhong Xue Gao in contrast: Northeast Big Board does "performing cheapness," while Zhong Xue Gao does "performing expensiveness," not only selling at high prices but also with flashy marketing. Its main products average 10-20 yuan, yet it loudly marketed the Ecuadorian Pink Diamond flavor at over 60 yuan. If consumers don't resent you, who will they resent? **Another strength of Northeast Big Board is that it understood the essence of competition in the cold drink market.** The war in FMCG is ultimately a terminal war, competing on distribution coverage. Cold drinks are no exception, but more troublesome because they need to occupy not ordinary shelves but freezers. In terminal channels, freezers are more limited than shelves, can display fewer SKUs, and competition is fiercer. **Every generation of ice cream king in the Chinese market was the freezer king of its version.** The first-generation king, Wall's, as the son of a multinational giant like Unilever, not only had unlimited ammunition to throw at channels but also understood the freezer war earlier than peers. When Wall's first entered China, the first thing it did was invest heavily in placing freezers in major cities, with 13,000 freezers in Shanghai alone. As long as vendors promised to only stock Wall's products, the freezers were free. By placing freezers like dumplings, Wall's captured 18% of the domestic ice cream market in two years, becoming China's first-generation ice cream king. However, Wall's approach was basically unreplicable for domestic brands. When it entered China in 1994, there was no nationwide freezer channel, so Wall's had no choice but to build its own, and with Unilever's financial power, it could indeed create miracles with force.

The second-generation kings, Mengniu and Yili, used a different approach. Unlike Wall's, these two dairy giants were local enterprises with a deeper understanding of the domestic business environment. For example, Wall's freezer policy refused mixed placement; if they found other brands' ice cream in their freezers, they would take them back. But this strict policy worked in first- and second-tier cities but hindered expansion in lower-tier markets. Yili and Mengniu knew that in lower-tier markets, exclusive freezer policies were impossible; if vendors wanted to mix, you couldn't control it. Since they wanted market share, they could be flexible. They allowed vendors to place other brands, but with conditions. For instance, if you put a competitor's ice cream in a Yili freezer, you must also stock some Yili ice cream at the same price point, using the big brand's power to suppress competitors, minimizing the negative effects of mixing. **Through extensive penetration in lower-tier markets, Yili and Mengniu struck later and quickly captured market share, forming a four-way split with Wall's and Nestlé.**

Back to Northeast Big Board. With giants all around, a small local brand trying to survive in the cracks must find channels not yet covered by giants and exploit dividends the giants disdain. **Northeast Big Board indeed found a unique channel: newsstands and grocery stores.** It makes sense; ice cream consumption is impulsive, mostly "it's too hot, I'm craving something," with little planning. Since it's impulse buying, the best way to meet consumer needs is to have wide distribution so they can buy it around the corner. What channels meet this need? Besides convenience stores and small supermarkets, it's newsstands and grocery stores. The former are already occupied by cold drink giants, and supermarket entry fees are not cheap; competing with Nestlé and Wall's in supermarkets is suicide, so only the latter remains. But the latter has its own problem: most newsstands and grocery stores at most have a cooler for cold cola; small businesses can't afford a dedicated freezer for a product that only sells for one season. **Without a freezer, it's not a channel for ice cream brands.**

**To get these small vendors to sell ice cream, Northeast Big Board deployed a "three compensations" strategy: "compensate with goods, money, and people."** "Compensate with goods" meant giving vendors a free dedicated freezer, small in size, in red and green colors, which many readers have probably seen. The freezer cost about 1,600 to 1,800 yuan, provided free to these small shop owners. "Compensate with money" meant, besides the freezer, a monthly subsidy of 60 yuan for electricity. "Compensate with people" meant vendors didn't have to worry about ordering or restocking; channel distributors would come daily to check and restock, even bringing a rag to wipe the freezer clean. This made selling Northeast Big Board a hands-off, zero-investment business for vendors. More importantly, the 3-yuan Northeast Big Board had a wholesale price of 1.8 yuan, giving vendors a profit of 1.2 yuan per stick, much better than the few mao profit from a newspaper. Moreover, Northeast Big Board didn't pressure vendors with minimum sales; if it sold well, continue; if not, they could end the partnership anytime with refunds for remaining stock. For micro-profit businesses like newsstands, Northeast Big Board's policy seemed like "foolish money coming fast." With this approach, Northeast Big Board managed to place tens of thousands of freezers in a year, opening a new battlefield outside the strongholds of cold drink giants.

**Northeast Big Board's heavy bet on channels is the complete opposite of Zhong Xue Gao.** Many readers might remember the origin of the term "ice cream assassin." Ice cream in freezers often doesn't have price tags; unsuspecting consumers open the freezer, see a novel brand, grab one, and only at checkout realize it costs nearly 20 yuan. It's strange that Zhong Xue Gao, so noble and culturally rich, was mixed with ordinary ice cream in supermarket freezers, without a dedicated freezer like Häagen-Dazs. As a result, Zhong Xue Gao, which neglected channel building, eventually faced a major brand crisis due to channel mistakes, ultimately leading to the company's demise. **From this perspective, Northeast Big Board truly deserves the title of "reverse Zhong Xue Gao."**

At this point, you might ask: how can the parent company behind Northeast Big Board afford to spend so much on channels? Is this financial strength really that of an ordinary local enterprise? **In fact, the money spent on channels was saved elsewhere.** For example, traditional ice cream brands spend heavily on advertising in summer; brands like Cornetto and Qiaolezi have supported countless celebrities. But Northeast Big Board doesn't advertise at all, doesn't do marketing campaigns, and focuses solely on channel distribution. As long as it maintains a strong presence in newsstands and grocery stores, with exclusive freezers, it can effectively intercept consumers at the terminal, making competitors' ads useless. Additionally, in its early days, Northeast Big Board only covered Beijing and Shanghai, not rushing to expand nationwide. Without expansion, there was no need for distributors or agents; the factory could directly connect with terminal channels. By cutting out middlemen, profits increased. Combined with the plain packaging, a large amount of money was saved, which could be used for channel building and ensuring reasonable profits in the low-margin ice cream market.

**By the way, not advertising doesn't mean Northeast Big Board has no marketing; on the contrary, it has internalized marketing into its strategic approach.** For instance, selling only in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, though the population is smaller than the vast lower-tier markets, has far greater influence on public opinion. Breaking through Beijing and Shanghai is equivalent to breaking through half of China's market in terms of brand communication, so when expanding nationwide later, brand awareness doesn't start from zero. Another example: although Northeast Big Board doesn't do offline ads, placing tens of thousands of exclusive freezers is like installing tens of thousands of ad spaces. Considering the cost of ad spaces at Beijing and Shanghai subway and bus stops, a single billboard costs hundreds or even thousands per day, so the freezer cost of under 2,000 yuan suddenly seems very affordable.

Let's criticize Zhong Xue Gao again. **Northeast Big Board's marketing pursues maximum effect with minimal effort, while Zhong Xue Gao's marketing pursues cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.** Instead of focusing on taste, Zhong Xue Gao spent money on intangible things. For example, making ice cream in the shape of roof tiles with a back pattern. For this inexplicable innovation, Zhong Xue Gao couldn't use ordinary OEM production lines; production equipment had to be independently designed and purchased, costing hundreds of millions extra. Another example: Zhong Xue Gao initially sold through e-commerce channels, spending money on Taobao and livestream hosts. Because shipping might melt, to satisfy consumers, Zhong Xue Gao used SF cold chain delivery, dry ice at -78°C, and a melt-replacement policy, sparing no expense to ensure consumers received rock-hard ice cream. Was the user experience good? Yes. Was the cost high? Yes. Did it benefit the company? Not at all.

**If Northeast Big Board is extreme pragmatism, then Zhong Xue Gao is extreme idealism.** Ironically, the pragmatic company not only became popular but also earned a good reputation. The idealistic company, which sought fame as the "Hermès of cold drinks" and "model of Chinese ice cream," instead earned the label "ice cream assassin." And when it realized it should deepen channels and build internal strength, following the path and pitfalls of traditional cold drink giants, the tide had turned against it. Consumers stopped buying, competitors guarded against it, and some big brands even imposed "either-or" policies on supermarkets: if they stocked Zhong Xue Gao, the big brand would withdraw. At that point, Zhong Xue Gao's defeat was sealed. In April this year, Zhong Xue Gao's headquarters were empty. After two years, the ice cream assassin finally went cold, colder than its ice cream, with even the founder imitating Luo Yonghao by selling sweet potatoes on livestream. That shows how cold it got.

Back to Northeast Big Board: in 2024, it's been 10 years since it first went viral. It's not as popular as before, but it's still selling, and people still buy it, with occasional new flavors. It hasn't become another new giant in China's ice cream industry, but it hasn't been blown away like Zhong Xue Gao, nor like Moutai ice cream, which last year dared to sell at 60 yuan per box but this year can only clear inventory at 10 yuan per box. **In the business world, there is never a shortage of momentary heroes, just as each of us has had our moments of glory.** **But what matters most is never the moment of glory, but how we get along with our true selves after the glory fades.** Lucky ones like Mengniu, Yili, and Wall's, backed by giants, can stay at center stage. Unlucky ones like Zhong Xue Gao, lifted by short-term capital trends, mistook the era's dividends for their own ability, striving to prolong the hero moment, unaware of their own mediocrity, and tragically unable to reconcile with it until it was too late. Northeast Big Board is clear-headed. The online arena can change flags, but the offline landscape is not so easily altered. Moreover, newsstands and small vendors are themselves declining and disappearing, and the ice cream industry is being squeezed by freshly made ice cream and tea drinks. When the time and situation are not in your favor, even with ambition, you should know that many things cannot be forced. From this perspective, it resembles another group of people. They have ability, but not enough to change the whole environment. They had glory, but it was fleeting. So they chose a more pragmatic path, recognizing their simplicity, choosing a long-term survival state, not making rash moves, but not stopping doing the right things. **In this world, there aren't that many satisfying stories of stealthy development leading to a comeback; most choose stealthy development and continue that way.** **But sometimes, surviving is the meaning of living.**

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**Recommended Reading**


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