---
title: "Liquid Money Printer: The New and Old Kings of Bottled Water"
description: "In most countries outside China and the US, consumer goods have consistently been the industry with the highest density of billionaires. In China, bottled water has produced more than two billionaires, alongside internet and real estate. This article explores why bottled water is such a profitable business, examining the marketing tactics, barriers to entry, market oligopoly, and the perfect business model behind it."
author: "李墨天"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
telephone: "+8615854817671"
published: "2021-06-02"
language: "en"
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---

# Liquid Money Printer: The New and Old Kings of Bottled Water

> In most countries outside China and the US, consumer goods have consistently been the industry with the highest density of billionaires. In China, bottled water has produced more than two billionaires, alongside internet and real estate. This article explores why bottled water is such a profitable business, examining the marketing tactics, barriers to entry, market oligopoly, and the perfect business model behind it.

**In most countries outside China and the US, consumer goods have consistently been the industry with the highest density of billionaires.**
Uniqlo founder Tadashi Yanai is Japan's richest person, LVMH boss Bernard Arnault is France's richest, the Ferrero family (chocolate) are frequent occupants of Italy's top spot, Brazil's richest Jorge Lemann's 3G Capital owns Anheuser-Busch InBev, Burger King, and Heinz, while Zara founder Amancio Ortega once became the world's richest person.
Due to different stages of development, China's richest person has been more diverse, with cold industries like machinery (Liang Wengen), papermaking (Zhang Yin), and feed (Liu Yonghao) all producing billionaires. However, statistics show only three industries have produced more than two billionaires: the two major industries of internet and real estate, and the "small industry" of bottled water.
In 2010, Wahaha founder Zong Qinghou became China's richest person. That year, Wahaha held a quarter of the beverage market, netting a small target every three days on average, with annual profits exceeding 10 billion yuan. Ten years later, in 2020, Zong's former subordinate Zhong Shanshan, riding on Nongfu Spring's IPO, also became the richest person, with a personal fortune once exceeding $60 billion.
Why can the unremarkable bottled water industry be compared to the giants of real estate and internet?
Clearly, selling water is not a simple business. Opening the financial reports, you'll find Nongfu Spring's gross margin is nearly 60%, and net margin as high as 23%—for every two-yuan bottle of water a Chinese person drinks, billionaire Zhong earns 4.6 mao. In comparison, beer maker Tsingtao's gross margin is just over 40%, milk producer Yili only 36%, and peanut oil maker Arawana only 15%.
Why is the so-called "nature's porter" so profitable? Why can bottled water become a liquid money printer? To understand these questions, you need to know the following four basic facts:
**01\. The Mystique: Tricks in the Bottled Water Business**
**02\. Barriers: Why Moving Water is a Technical Job**
**03\. Oligopoly: New and Old Kings Dividing the Market**
**04\. The Code: The Perfect Business Behind Magic Water**
This article will address these four questions. Below is the main text.
****-01-****
**The Mystique: Tricks in the Bottled Water Business**
Frankly, every bottle of water on supermarket shelves today is filled with **tricks and mystique.**
Compared to juices and tea drinks, bottled water is notably different: **the differences in taste and flavor between products are very small, making differentiation difficult, hence the product life cycle is extremely long, much more stable than trendy beverages.** Beverages like AD calcium milk, Nutrition Express, and iced black tea, which were once extremely popular, cannot escape the fate of the life cycle, but bottled water can go over a decade without major packaging changes.
In the early days, the market was dominated by Wahaha and Robust. Wahaha was born in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, and Robust in Zhongshan, Guangdong. Both companies were established in the late 1980s, initially making children's drinks, and later entered the bottled water field. In the rough-and-tumble 1990s, they, along with Taiwan-backed Master Kong, were called the "old three kings" of bottled water.
The characteristics of bottled water make the industry structure very stable. For new players to get a share, they either encounter a once-in-a-decade technological iteration—like LED lights replacing incandescent bulbs—or create a new track—like lululemon's "long johns worn outside" market. So, Nongfu Spring used one move to pry open the "old three kings'" wall:
**Redefining what is "healthy water."**
At that time, most of what Wahaha and others sold was purified water. So-called purified water is water that has been treated, purified, and cleaned through multiple processes, with its "raw material" mostly coming from municipal tap water. Chinese people had already gotten used to it, but in 2000, Zhong Shanshan, who came from a journalism background, made a big news: **Nongfu Spring would no longer produce purified water.**
At the press conference, Nongfu Spring released a promotional video consisting of three experiments. In one experiment, several white rats were fed purified water and "Nongfu Spring natural water containing trace elements like potassium, sodium, calcium, and magnesium." After six days, only 20% of the rats drinking purified water survived, while 40% of those drinking natural water survived. The implication was clear.
At the subsequent press conference, a sentence that sparked endless controversy was born: **"Scientific research proves that long-term consumption of purified water is not beneficial to health."**
Although Zhong Shanshan also explained that this sentence only meant natural water is healthier than purified water, the words "not beneficial to health" were too damaging. Moreover, in the press release Nongfu Spring later sent to media, it used the example of tetracycline toothpaste to imply natural water is healthier[1], with an even more explosive headline: **"Worried about delaying a generation, Nongfu Spring stops producing purified water."**
The theme of that press conference was actually to announce Nongfu Spring's investment of 350 million yuan in a bottled water production base in Qiandao Lake, Chun'an, Zhejiang, to produce (or rather, transport) natural water from Qiandao Lake. At that time, over 90% of the domestic bottled water market was purified water, with only a small portion of high-priced natural water, such as Evian, which claimed to be "filtered from Alpine glaciers."
Natural water must indicate the source on the packaging.
**Whether natural water is truly healthy, and whether Nongfu Spring is really sweet, are both relatively mystical topics.** But the emergence of natural water still made the purified water giants feel threatened.
One month after Nongfu Spring's press conference, 69 companies including Wahaha and Robust formed an alliance to denounce Nongfu Spring, claiming its natural water was actually reservoir water, "easily subject to various pollution." A few days later, Wahaha sued Nongfu Spring for "unfair competition," and Nongfu Spring also sued Wahaha on the same grounds, demanding 30 million yuan in compensation.
Later, when media interviewed Zhong Shanshan, his response had a bit of the style of the former Jia Yueting: **"I think we are a bit like Copernicus."**
Zhong Shanshan, who had been a media teacher, a general agent for Wahaha, and sold health products, knew well that consumers' biggest demand for bottled water was undoubtedly safety and health. Although this "water war of the century" ended with the official media taking a neutral stance and Nongfu Spring being fined 200,000 yuan, the idea that natural water is healthier than purified water took root in people's minds with Nongfu Spring's advertising slogan.
After the water war, Nongfu Spring firmly established itself in big cities, prying a piece of the market from the giants.
With the emergence of Nongfu Spring, the bottled water market structure that had been stable for nearly a decade began to become chaotic. Compared to Wahaha and Robust, which were still "holding on," Master Kong was flexible and followed suit—since Nongfu Spring was doing "natural water," it would create a new category. In 2006, Master Kong launched "mineral water" priced at one yuan.
This water claimed to have added various minerals, and with Master Kong's existing channels, it spread quickly. The advertising slogan "a little more is healthier" was also thought-provoking. After that, Wahaha and Nongfu Spring were once beaten to the point of being unable to cope. In 2008, Master Kong added the description "high-quality water source" in a new promotional video, directly hitting Nongfu Spring's vital point.
Master Kong's classic big product "mineral water"
The counterattack was carried out in secret. In August of the same year, an article titled "Master Kong: Where is Your High-Quality Water Source?" began to spread wildly online. The author claimed to have "infiltrated" Master Kong's Hangzhou water plant and found that the "high-quality water source" Master Kong claimed was actually tap water, just with artificially added minerals.
Subsequently, Nongfu Spring, on one hand, accused Master Kong's mineral water of being "fake health," and on the other hand, sent salespeople to convenience stores to distribute newspapers reporting on the "water source gate"[7]. Zhong Shanshan also personally came forward, saying he opposed adding artificial minerals to water. **As for why he opposed purified water without additives eight years ago, and opposed mineral water with additives eight years later, that's also a mystery.**
After a month of controversy, Master Kong's senior management team collectively apologized: "high-quality water source" was indeed tap water. Master Kong's brand image suffered a heavy blow.
Master Kong's strategy of imitating failed, and sales declined thereafter. In the 2008 annual report, all of Master Kong's businesses except mineral water grew significantly, so much so that the annual report's lines revealed grief and indignation: **"Mineral water in 2008 suffered an anonymous, planned ambush on the internet, with a harsh competitive environment."**
Wahaha and Robust also had a hard time. Wahaha lost its industry-leading position in 2006, and in 2013 was squeezed out of the top three, gradually retreating to third- and fourth-tier cities and below. Robust's fate was even more lamentable: first acquired by Danone, its bottled water and tea beverage businesses gradually collapsed, and in 2016 it was sold by Danone to a Shenzhen company.
So the question arises: **Since being a "nature's porter" can make big money, why don't others do it?**
****-02-****
**Barriers: Why Moving Water is a Technical Job?**
In January 2020, Nongfu Spring made another big news: it used large excavators to take water from Wuyi Mountain National Park, damaging trees. Nongfu Spring immediately provided evidence to clarify that it had always taken water in accordance with laws and regulations, and that it was a local tourism company in Wuyi Mountain that maliciously reported it for private interests. When the incident came out, netizens sighed: **Nongfu Spring really is natural water.**
Although Nongfu Spring's advertisement "We are just nature's porter" is full of marketing flavor, its water is indeed moved from nature.
**First, moving water is a technical job:** In 2000, Nongfu Spring discovered a water source in Emei Mountain. For the next two years, professional surveyors continuously tracked water quality, temperature, flow, and other indicators, taking weekly samples and tracking tests, until 2008 when it finally decided to build a factory in Huangpogang, Emei. Because the factory was built on the mountain, construction was difficult, and it was not completed and put into operation until 2014.
**Second, water cannot be moved just because you want to:** Currently, the extraction of natural water is governed by the 2015 "Water Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan." To move water from nature, you first need to obtain extraction qualifications, which usually takes three to five years. Zhou Jingliang, founder of Ganten, once told the media that completing the process for a mining license requires more than 60 stamps and a wait of five years.
After obtaining the license, you also need to apply to the Ministry of Finance for a competitive auction for the license and annual water intake, and participate in the auction. In 2014, a prospecting right for Baijiang Spring at the foot of Changbai Mountain was publicly auctioned. After 777 rounds of fierce bidding, the winning bid was a record 156.77 million yuan. After the factory is put into operation, it also needs to pay 4% of revenue annually as a "water resource compensation fee."
The difficulty of exploration plus policy thresholds determine the scarcity of natural water sources. Since the pure extraction cost of water is very low, the marginal cost of production is almost zero, and the larger the output, the more significant the scale advantage. **Zhong Shanshan's constant attacks on water sources are mainly because Nongfu Spring has accumulated 10 such sources (2 natural mineral water sources and 8 natural water sources).**
Water source locations of major bottled water brands, Guosheng Securities
Another advantage of early layout is the "500-kilometer transportation radius" theory in the bottled water industry. Because the most costly part of the entire bottled water chain is transportation, and in the 1-2 yuan price range, once the sales location is more than 500 kilometers from the production site, transportation costs squeeze profits, and the company can't make money, only working for highway toll stations and gas stations.
Nongfu Spring's 10 water sources basically cover the main consumer markets across the country evenly, so even selling at two yuan is profitable. Ganten, which also produces natural water, has only 4 sources, all in East and South China, while Evergrande Spring, Tibet 5100, and Kunlun Mountain each have only one source. This means that if other brands want to do both national market and make money, the only way is to raise prices and go high-end.
That is indeed the case: Kunlun Mountain and Tibet 5100's water sources are both on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, with transportation costs too high, so they simply positioned themselves as high-end, focusing on the price range above 5 yuan. Evergrande Spring, after obtaining the right to move water from Changbai Mountain, shouted the slogan "one source for the world," but consumers did not accept the high price, and costs could not be reduced, so a huge loss of 4 billion yuan was inevitable.
There are also some who play wild tricks, such as Kunlun Mountain's "snow mountain mineral water moisturizing spray" and Bloomage Biotech's "hyaluronic acid mineral water" for face washing, all centered on premium pricing. Only Nongfu Spring can rely on its nationwide water source layout to make water a low-priced mass consumer product, sealing off the 2-yuan price range.
In the 3-yuan price range, Ganten created a "noble among waters" called Ganten, which is "natural mineral water," leaving Zhong Shanshan, who opposes both no additives and artificial additives, speechless. On its website, Ganten also ran an ad implying Nongfu Spring is reservoir water. In response, Nongfu Spring also launched a sub-brand "Changbaixue," also priced at 3 yuan.
Screenshot from Ganten's official website, clearly confrontational
To promote its Changbai Mountain water source, Nongfu Spring also invited Gavin Thurston, the director who shot "Human Planet" and "Planet Earth" for the BBC, to film a series of ads called "What kind of water source nurtures what kind of life." This reminds people of Nongfu Spring's earlier experiment with narcissus, claiming that narcissus grew better in "natural water."
Zong Qinghou was furious when he saw Nongfu Spring's experiment[9]: **If narcissus grows better in manure water, does that mean manure water is better?**
Zong's anger was useless. After 2016, Nongfu Spring gradually secured the top position in the bottled water market, and Ganten in the 3-yuan price range also squeezed into the top three. The power transition among these new and old players was mainly driven by the "binding of natural water with health." Setting aside the scientific basis, this was clearly an epic marketing victory.
Did natural water later drive purified water to extinction? No. Interestingly, the only purified water brand that Nongfu Spring and others failed to defeat is actually a state-owned enterprise: **C'estbon under China Resources.**
****-03-****
**Oligopoly: New and Old Kings Dividing the Market**
Compared to Nongfu Spring, C'estbon is a genuine veteran.
In 1990, when Zong Qinghou was still selling children's oral liquid, C'estbon's predecessor, China Longhuan Beverage (Shekou) Company, produced bottled water under the C'estbon brand. The first general manager, Zhou Jingliang, specially went to Hong Kong to find a designer and adopted the French word C'estbon as the brand name, meaning "supreme." In 1996, C'estbon was acquired by the red-and-special China Resources.
But at the beginning of the century, China Resources' beverage business focus was on beer, and C'estbon was once used as a bargaining chip to exchange for Danone's beer assets, but the deal ultimately fell through. Before starting its national strategy in 2007, C'estbon's approach was always "small market, big share," relying on "all-out street warfare" to concentrate on the Guangdong market, occupying 50% of Guangdong's bottled water share.
In 2007, tired of being the king of Guangdong, C'estbon launched its national expansion strategy. That year, it entered the Beijing water market, which had been occupied by Danone and local Yanjing, starting with barreled water. In 2010, C'estbon's share of the bottled water market was only 6.7%, but by 2013, C'estbon had surpassed Coca-Cola's Ice Dew and was getting closer to Nongfu Spring.
Subsequently, the two companies engaged in a series of hardcore and dramatic "water wars."
For example, in March 2013, Nongfu Spring held a promotional event at Carrefour in Guangzhou. Consumers who purchased Nongfu Spring products worth 15 yuan or more received a gift package, which surprisingly contained a bottle of C'estbon purified water and a book called "Water and Health," with a single page and two pH test strips inside. The page read: **Is the water you drink healthy?**
At the Carrefour store entrance, Nongfu Spring's promoters took the initiative, using Nongfu Spring and C'estbon with labels torn off to conduct pH tests on the spot, "educating" customers that C'estbon water is weakly acidic, while Nongfu Spring is weakly alkaline and healthier. Nongfu Spring's official Weibo also supported, using the old trick: **C'estbon's water source is tap water.**
In 2013, Beijing Times challenged Nongfu Spring's press conference
Facing Nongfu Spring's direct attack on its home base, C'estbon chose to complain directly to the Guangzhou Administration for Industry and Commerce, but the complaint avoided the acidity or alkalinity of the water, instead claiming that Nongfu Spring "denigrated competitors through comparison." The bureau leaders were sharp: Nongfu Spring's promoters only tore off the bottle labels, but the bottle caps still bore the C'estbon trademark, clearly targeting C'estbon, and fined 100,000 yuan.
Subsequently, Nongfu Spring refused to accept the penalty and appealed to the Guangzhou court. Just after losing the case, Nongfu Spring said on Weibo that it "lost the lawsuit but not the facts," and again sent three soul-searching questions to C'estbon: Are all your factories and OEM factories using tap water to produce purified water? Is the purified water you produce acidic? Is the mineral content of C'estbon purified water almost zero?
Nongfu Spring has conducted several "pH test" activities
What Nongfu Spring said is actually not wrong. **C'estbon purified water is not much different from Wahaha's purified water in terms of water source; both are filtered, distilled, and purified from tap water.** The fact that C'estbon can compete with Nongfu Spring in the 2-yuan price range despite its water source disadvantage is largely due to the experience China Resources accumulated in the "Snow Beer" counterattack.
Beer also has a "transportation radius." Due to beer bottle limitations, the sales radius of a typical brewery is only 150-200 kilometers. Therefore, China Resources acquired breweries nationwide, replaced equipment, improved quality, concentrated resources to expand market share within the factory's radiation range, then extended to surrounding areas, with regions supporting each other.
When the time was ripe, independent regions could be connected into a whole, and market share expanded rapidly. While Tsingtao and Yanjing were locked in a fierce battle, China Resources Snow quickly entered the top three in China's beer industry.
C'estbon's strategy is slightly different: it finds local OEM factories in different regions, and on the sales side, uses the inherited "all-out street warfare" approach to break through in individual regions, achieving "small market, big share," and finally connecting individual regional markets into one. **Moreover, of C'estbon's 43 factories, 34 are OEM factories, while Nongfu Spring has only 10 factories. Whoever has a higher factory density has advantages in transportation efficiency and cost.**
This market expansion method is called the "mushroom strategy" within China Resources, but a more appropriate name would be the "money can do anything strategy."
In 2008, C'estbon was included in China Resources' first-level profit center, receiving greater resource support, and raised the price of bottled water from 1 yuan to 2 yuan, on one hand to cover OEM costs, and on the other to give channels more profit space. In 2015, C'estbon's packaged water sales exceeded 10 billion yuan, with a market share of 20.8%, surpassing Nongfu Spring for the first time.
Channel profit space of Nongfu Spring and C'estbon, data source: Guosheng Securities
After 2015, the bottled water market structure gradually stabilized. Nongfu Spring and C'estbon together took over 40% of the market share. Although the aristocratic drink Ganten ranked third, it could also claim "first in natural mineral water market share." Whether it was Master Kong with its "high-quality water source" or Ice Dew, whose bottle was more famous than the water, they are now hard to find.
Historical market share of bottled water, Nielsen
Wahaha, the former king of bottled water, last made headlines when Zong Fuli removed Wang Leehom, who had endorsed Wahaha for 20 years, citing "he's too old."
****-04-****
**The Code: The Perfect Business Behind Magic Water**
The ancient East has four magic waters: **Moutai, Haitian Soy Sauce, Arawana, and Nongfu Spring.**
These four magic waters are behemoths in the capital market: Moutai's market cap is 2.56 trillion yuan, Haitian 550 billion, Arawana 4300 billion, and Nongfu Spring 3800 billion (RMB), totaling $600 billion, lower than Tencent but higher than Alibaba. Apart from Moutai, which even Hou Liangping loves, the other three are common mass consumer products.
From an investment perspective, Haitian Soy Sauce, Arawana, and Nongfu Spring can all be considered "perfect consumer products" in some sense.
**1) Ultra-strong rigid demand.** Cooking always requires soy sauce and cooking oil, and water is essential for survival. However, because Chinese people have the habit of boiling water before drinking, the penetration rate of bottled water is only one-third of that in Europe and the US. Cooking oil is price-controlled, so Arawana's net margin is only 6%, while Haitian Soy Sauce, without price controls, has a net margin as high as 28%.
Cooking oil companies have been "greeted" multiple times, asked to control price increases, but soy sauce typically raises prices every 2-3 years. Moreover, because Haitian has an extremely obvious capacity advantage, other companies don't even have the capital to fight a price war. In other words, Haitian Soy Sauce is an extremely rare company that can become a tax-like product in a fully marketized industry.
**2) Ultra-long life cycle.** Compared to Moore's Law in the consumer electronics industry, consumer goods often boast "ancestral craftsmanship" or "ancestral brewing methods," precisely because the processes, technologies, and demands of consumer goods are often extremely stable, making it easy to produce big products with ultra-long life cycles, such as Laoganma and Fuling Zhacai. The three magic waters also have rigid demand, further extending the product life cycle.
In 2004, Zhong Shanshan attended a corporate forum and said with some pride: **"I chose an industry that never sets. You will always need to drink water; it's impossible not to."**
**3) Channel scenario reuse.** For many consumer goods, once a channel is established, every new product launched is almost pure profit. The three magic waters not only have reusable channels but also very similar consumption scenarios. For example, Nongfu Spring has more than 4,000 distributors nationwide, selling not only 2-yuan bottled water but also 4-yuan Oriental Leaf and 6-yuan Chabi.
Take Haitian Soy Sauce as an example: to achieve the same 800 million yuan in single-product sales, soy sauce took 8 years, oyster sauce 5 years, and sauce only 3 years, getting faster and faster because soy sauce, oyster sauce, and sauce are all in one consumption scenario, and people might just pick them up. In contrast, going to a Xiaomi store to buy a phone and also carrying home a Xiaomi air conditioner is relatively rare.
Most mass consumer products, including the three magic waters, have relied on China's huge population base for their rise over the past few decades. There are 114 cities with a population of over one million in North America and the EU combined, while China alone has 113. The astonishing purchasing power of this population base has allowed Chinese consumer brands to create one miracle after another of "exchanging scale for profit."
But the consumer goods landscape is also "solidifying." Currently, in almost every segment of the soft drink market, there is an oligarch leading: **natural water is Nongfu Spring, purified water is C'estbon, tea drinks are Master Kong, carbonated drinks are Coca-Cola, and energy drinks are Red Bull.** This means that with a stable structure, new players can only overtake by creating new categories.
And the birth of new categories often becomes an opportunity to nurture new oligarchs. Of course, there is no shortage of mystique and tricks.
For example, still in the bottled water industry, after Nongfu Spring, C'estbon, and Ganten took the lead in their respective segments, companies continue to "invent" new varieties, such as the marketing-flavored "boiled water/ripe water"—first Jinmailang launched "Liangbaikai," then Master Kong followed suit with "He Kaishui," reportedly popular among middle-aged and elderly consumers.
Marketing-flavored "new categories"
For battle-hardened veterans like Nongfu Spring, C'estbon, and Ganten, this level of "innovation" poses no threat, and they have enough "means" to deal with it. But as long as the business attributes of bottled water continue to attract new players, there will be a steady stream of "new water types" invented, trying to replicate the counterattack script of "natural water" back then.
In other words, as long as the "water wars" continue, the shelves selling water in Chinese supermarkets will continue to be filled with tricks and mystique.
****-05-****
**Epilogue: The One That Defeats Water Will Not Be Another Water**
If you look at history, you'll find that Coca-Cola, the beverage with the longest life cycle in history, also once made a big mistake.
In 1985, under pressure from Pepsi, then-CEO Roberto Goizueta made a major decision: the company would stop producing old Coca-Cola and switch to a new formula. The new product would be named "New Coke." This new Coke was "smoother, rounder, and more harmonious."
But this new product ultimately became a disaster: some people hoarded old Coke at home, and some protested outside the company. Two months after the launch of New Coke, Coca-Cola's consumer hotline received an average of 1,500 complaint calls per day. Finally, in August 1985, Coca-Cola brought back the old Coke, and "New Coke" was discontinued in July 2002.
"New Coke" launched by Coca-Cola in 1985
Compared to the various beverages that have disappeared in the long river of history, Coca-Cola has had almost no major product iterations in its century of existence and has continued to sell well globally. As the only water that can make otaku happy, Coca-Cola's only enemy is consumers' pursuit of health.
In 1982, Coca-Cola launched a sugar-free cola product, Diet Coke, which captured nearly 20% of the US diet beverage market within a year. However, in the eyes of many male consumers, Diet Coke's silver packaging and the word "Diet" were a bit too effeminate. So in 2005, Coca-Cola launched another sugar-free cola closer to the original taste: **Coke Zero with black packaging.**
In 2017, Coca-Cola announced that Coke Zero would gradually disappear from shelves, replaced by Coke Zero Sugar, which has the same ingredients as Coke Zero. Coca-Cola explained that this was to simplify choices for picky cola fans: **either with sugar or without sugar.**
Similarly, in 2011, Nongfu Spring launched "Oriental Leaf," a tea drink made only with tea leaves and no sugar, positioned as healthy and natural, but the downside was that it was too hard to drink, even being listed alongside Laoshan Snake Grass White Flower Water as one of the "five hardest-to-drink beverages in China."
Later, Nongfu Spring, after painful reflection, launched its second tea drink, "Chabi," a fruit-flavored tea that created sales of over 1.6 billion yuan in its first year.
As consumers' health awareness increases, beverage companies have gradually understood a truth: although everyone says they want to be healthy and reduce sugar intake, they actually still like the taste of "sweet," which is a deep-rooted human nature. This also explains why the soda water and sparkling water market can never grow big: **more expensive than plain water, not as sweet as sugary drinks.**
In April this year, Genki Forest, once criticized as "fake Japanese style," completed a new round of financing with a post-investment valuation of $6 billion, surpassing Bright Dairy. Whether it's the rise of "sugar-free sugar water" like Genki Forest, or the negative growth of fruit juice and carbonated drinks in the past two years, it reflects consumers' psychology: **love for sweetness + fear of sugar.**
The essence of beverages is actually the replacement of water. Whoever can replace water to the greatest extent will have a longer life cycle and be more likely to become the next new oligarch.
Source: Yuanchen Research Institute (ID: caijingyanjiu)


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