---
title: "Jianlibao's Many Woes: A Tragic Battle Between 'Biological Mother' and 'Wet Nurses'"
description: "Jianlibao, once a beverage giant that overshadowed Coca-Cola and Pepsi in China, fell into tragedy as its 'founder' Li Jingwei failed in restructuring and died with grievances, and after several changes of ownership, the company was left in tatters, staging a tragic battle between the 'biological mother' and 'wet nurses'."
author: "金梅"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
telephone: "+8615854817671"
published: "2018-06-07"
language: "en"
canonical: "https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/jianlibao-s-many-woes-a-tragic-battle-between-biological-mother-and-wet-d4c1aada/"
markdown: "https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/jianlibao-s-many-woes-a-tragic-battle-between-biological-mother-and-wet-d4c1aada.md"
original_source: "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_T66x2PCj2acUso1hrgKIw"
translation: "https://xinjignxiao.com/zh/articles/%E5%81%A5%E5%8A%9B%E5%AE%9D%E5%8D%83%E7%96%AE%E7%99%BE%E5%AD%94-%E4%B8%80%E5%9C%BA-%E4%BA%B2%E5%A6%88-%E4%B8%8E-%E5%A5%B6%E5%A6%88-%E4%BB%AC%E7%9A%84%E6%B7%B7%E6%88%98%E6%82%B2%E5%89%A7-d4c1aada.md"
attribution: "New Distribution — https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/jianlibao-s-many-woes-a-tragic-battle-between-biological-mother-and-wet-d4c1aada/"
usage_policy: "https://xinjignxiao.com/ai-policy.txt"
---

# Jianlibao's Many Woes: A Tragic Battle Between 'Biological Mother' and 'Wet Nurses'

> Jianlibao, once a beverage giant that overshadowed Coca-Cola and Pepsi in China, fell into tragedy as its 'founder' Li Jingwei failed in restructuring and died with grievances, and after several changes of ownership, the company was left in tatters, staging a tragic battle between the 'biological mother' and 'wet nurses'.

Introduction:
Jianlibao, a beverage company that once overshadowed Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the Chinese market, ultimately fell to the point where its 'founder' Li Jingwei died with grievances after failing to restructure the company. After several changes of ownership, the company was left in tatters, staging a tragic battle between the 'biological mother' and 'wet nurses'.
**Known as 'China's Magic Water,' Jianlibao once made Zong Qinghou's Wahaha dare not challenge it, and it overshadowed Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the Chinese market.**
In addition to opening an office in New York, Jianlibao also bought a floor of office space in the Empire State Building. The International Astronomical Union named an asteroid 'Sanshui Jianlibao Star,' the first planet named after a company name, showing Jianlibao's high spirits at the time.
However, in an instant, its founder was convicted and died with resentment, the second acquirer was imprisoned, and the third acquirer was 'expelled'... After several changes of ownership, Jianlibao was left in tatters, staging a tragic battle between the 'biological mother' and 'wet nurses.' **The 'first brand of national beverages,' Jianlibao, fell from its pedestal, its glory gone.**
1. Li Jingwei and the Jianlibao Myth
**Li Jingwei played a huge role in the birth and development of Jianlibao, but 'founder' Li Jingwei was only the operator, not the owner; the major shareholder of state-controlled Jianlibao was Sanshui County Government.** The government delegated considerable authority to Jianlibao in the early days, giving Li Jingwei ample room to operate, resulting in impressive performance. For Jianlibao, Li Jingwei was an excellent 'wet nurse,' but not the 'biological mother.'
**In 1983, Li Jingwei, then factory director of Sanshui County Sanshui Winery, obtained a functional beverage formula from a research institution, which is today's Jianlibao.** At that time, there were over 2,000 beverage companies in China. As the first beverage in China to add alkaline electrolytes, Jianlibao introduced the differentiated concept of sports drinks to the Chinese people.
To build the brand, in an era when domestic companies knew nothing about sports marketing, Sanshui Winery, with annual profits of only tens of thousands of yuan, invested 250,000 yuan to sponsor the Chinese Olympic delegation. Lacking a production line, Sanshui Winery asked Shenzhen's Pepsi to produce 200 cases of canned Jianlibao. Thus, Jianlibao appeared at the opening ceremony of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, shining as 'China's Magic Water,' **becoming the earliest and most classic sports marketing case.**
Subsequently, Li Jingwei was sent to Germany for study. Upon his return, he said he wanted to separate Jianlibao from Sanshui Winery to focus on developing sports drinks. As a famous 'red hat' enterprise, with coordination from local government, the research institution gave up its share of a few cents per bottle, and Jianlibao bought the formula for only 50,000 yuan, with annual fees of tens of thousands of yuan, freeing itself.
At the 1987 National Games, with a sponsorship of 2.5 million yuan plus 100,000 yuan in products, Guangzhou Tianhe Sports Center was covered with Jianlibao advertisements. **Especially at the closing ceremony, over 200 staff members wore Jianlibao advertising sportswear, and each of the 80,000 spectators entering received a bottle of Jianlibao, turning the entire Tianhe Sports Center into a sea of orange-red.** After the Sixth National Games, orders were explosive; the following year, Jianlibao sales reached 270 million yuan and it appeared on CCTV advertisements. In 1989, Jianlibao's advertising investment was 10 million yuan, with output value approaching 500 million yuan.
In 1991, a canned drink prize activity continued to boost sales. 'The First Lady drinks Jianlibao' was another manifestation of Li Jingwei's entrepreneurial wisdom. Li Jingwei cleverly utilized the First Lady's campaign activities during the U.S. presidential election, making the American First Lady a spokesperson for Jianlibao. This skillful marketing technique and superb marketing wisdom were incomparable to those who only threw money at CCTV and crazily competed for the 'bid king' title.
**Jianlibao's success inspired a group of beverage manufacturers, and Apollo and Wahaha soon emerged. However, they did not become Jianlibao's competitors.** These brands dominated second- and third-tier cities, while Jianlibao's strong brand effect and the high cost of cans allowed it to have the best performance for 10 consecutive years, dominating the market. In 1994, Jianlibao's sales exceeded 1.8 billion yuan, defeating multinational giant Coca-Cola.
**In 1994, the health products industry boomed, and Apollo, Robust, Sanzhu Oral Liquid, and Wahaha had enough strength to compete with Jianlibao for market share.** The public relations story of a bedridden old man recovering miraculously after drinking Jianlibao shows the fierce market competition at the time and Jianlibao's wavering between functional drinks and health products. But it braked in time, not joining the advertising war and false efficacy propaganda, which spared Jianlibao when the health products market collapsed in 1997. Wahaha was equally rational and fortunate.
In 1996, Jianlibao sold 7 billion tons, while Coca-Cola and Pepsi, which only operated in central cities and had not yet started national markets, sold only 5 billion tons. However, a crisis quietly emerged. Despite Coca-Cola-like confidence, the American First Lady's endorsement, and entry into the United Nations, becoming a national pride brand, Jianlibao failed to truly penetrate the U.S. market, **and its market share in China was gradually lost.**
2. Crisis Descends on Jianlibao After Prosperity
Jianlibao never completed modern corporate organizational structure construction; its main executives were always the veterans who followed Li Jingwei in starting the business. The cultivation of subsequent teams, especially middle management, was lacking, which was related to Jianlibao's backward marketing and market promotion in the later period.
After 1996, more and more excellent companies emerged in China's beverage industry. Companies like Wahaha, Robust, Master Kong, and Uni-President all began to develop significantly at that time. New products such as carbonated drinks, tea drinks, and fruit juices were constantly emerging, and the beverage market was no longer an era where Jianlibao could increase sales several times by sponsoring a competition.
**In 1997, the purified water market exploded. Wahaha, Robust, Uni-President, Nongfu Spring, and Master Kong entered the market to compete, producing mineral water and low-concentration fruit juices.** Having only carbonated drinks was no longer enough to support brand growth. Coca-Cola gradually began investing in purified water, fruit juices, and tea drinks, while Jianlibao's lack of a complete beverage product line became its fatal flaw. Later, the beverage industry saw eight core categories: water, herbal tea, plant protein, coffee, fruit juice, functional drinks, milk-containing drinks, and yogurt. Jianlibao had products in these categories, but they did not form a significant presence.
Beverages are typical emotional purchase products, requiring repeated emotional reminders. Although Jianlibao was the first to use sports marketing, compared to Coca-Cola and Pepsi's later youthful and idolized brand endorsements, it lagged far behind, so the brand inevitably became marginalized. **Its channel strategy lagged behind Coca-Cola and Pepsi, failing to grasp modern supermarket channels and failing to develop and utilize street paper cup retail points, thus fading from people's sight prematurely in terms of channels.**
With little success in product lines, Jianlibao began a series of diversified investments, including real estate, pharmaceuticals, fast food, sports apparel, auto repair, hotels, securities, tourism, media, and also the 1 billion yuan Jianlibao Building. None of these projects succeeded, leaving the Jianlibao Group exhausted on an overly long front. The outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 affected Jianlibao, sales began to decline, and the construction of the Jianlibao Building led to tight funds, unpaid employee wages, and banks pressing for debt repayment.
3. Government-Enterprise Relations: Jianlibao's Fatal Weakness
Government-enterprise relations were an almost well-known secret on Jianlibao's road to ruin and were the fatal weakness of its decline. The major shareholder of Jianlibao was Sanshui County Government. While corporate performance was important, social stability and political achievements were also important political tasks. Under different interest demands, some policies indeed bound the hands and feet of enterprise development. For example, to meet employment rates, the government required that Sanshui people account for 45% of Jianlibao's employees.
Unlike other entrepreneurs, Li Jingwei was only an operator, not an owner. At the age of 59, during the assessment of state-owned enterprise cadres, a crisis came, cutting off his political life at Jianlibao. The founder longed to gain recognition of his own value through restructuring and preferably continue to lead the enterprise. At the threshold of 60, he faced two choices: **either become the owner of the enterprise's property rights and share in the long-term benefits, or retire at the appointed time and leave empty-handed.**
In the mid-to-late 1990s, under the 'state retreats, private advances' enterprise reform plan, Midea was sold to its founder, giving Li Jingwei hope in enterprise property rights reform, leading to two strategic decisions: 'listing in Hong Kong and relocating headquarters.' Under certain circumstances, curbing enterprise development became a favorable condition for promoting Li Jingwei's acquisition. **Therefore, the later profit decline had both natural and man-made causes.**
As the founder of the enterprise, Li Jingwei should have found it difficult to position himself as a 'wet nurse.' But reality was cruel; the 'wet nurse' indeed worked hard and achieved much, but trying to snatch the 'child' from the 'biological mother' inevitably led to a bad outcome. At the investment promotion meeting, Li Jingwei's seating was higher than that of local officials. When the crisis emerged, he did not proactively communicate with the central government, gradually intensifying the conflict. Although he thwarted the acquisition plans of the Singapore company and Zong Qinghou, the more obvious his 'power seizure' posture and attitude, the faster he died.
In 1997, the 38-story Guangzhou Jianlibao Building was completed, and the conflict between Jianlibao and the government erupted. Previously, the local government could turn a blind eye to the establishment of factories in various places. Jianlibao was an important source of tax revenue and employment for Sanshui. After the headquarters relocation, Sanshui would become a production base, which would be a devastating blow to this poor place in terms of finance and social stability. **This was like a cooked duck flying away, so the Sanshui government tightened financial control; every new product developed by Jianlibao had to be approved by the government and go through the government's fiscal budget.**
Jianlibao's listing in Hong Kong was rejected, and in 1998, Sanshui City's control over Jianlibao strengthened. Subsequently, Jianlibao proposed an employee stock cooperative system within the company, where management would raise funds to buy the government's shares. Li Jingwei's offer was 450 million yuan, to be paid in installments over three years. The Sanshui government flatly refused. Later, a Shenzhen consulting company designed a new plan where Li Jingwei's team would hold 75% of shares, exactly the same as the later acquirer Zhang Hai's plan, but it was also rejected by the government.
**With declining turnover year after year, Jianlibao was inevitably sold.** In July 2001, the Sanshui City Government held a joint meeting on Jianlibao's restructuring, and 90% of attendees advocated selling Jianlibao, and not to Li Jingwei's team. For Sanshui, this logic is not hard to understand: even if they replaced with a slightly worse 'wet nurse,' it was more reliable than finding a highly skilled one who might 'steal the child' at any time. Therefore, Li Jingwei's defeat was inevitable.
**Guangdong is at the forefront of reform and opening up, leading the trend.** But the concept of special protection for state-owned assets is equally strong. From Jianlibao to Wanglaoji, Guangdong has produced many corporate tragedies. Although we can seemingly objectively blame both sides, there is no doubt that Li Jingwei was a respectable business leader of his generation. He made great contributions to the creation of the 'Li Ning' and 'Jianlibao' brands. Besides making Jianlibao popular worldwide, the Li Ning brand, with his help, established the first brand in China's sports industry named after an athlete.
**In the standoff between the Sanshui City Government and Li Jingwei, not only did both sides gain nothing, but they also sold Jianlibao to a fraudster 'Qigong master.'** In January 2002, shortly after attending the Jianlibao transfer signing ceremony, Li Jingwei was hospitalized with a sudden cerebral hemorrhage. He was later imprisoned for corruption and eventually died of illness in Sanshui District, Foshan City, with lifelong regret, at the age of 74. From then on, Jianlibao began its next chapter of instability.
4. Several Changes of Ownership Leave Jianlibao in Tatters
As one can imagine, a fraudster who only understood capital operations was neither capable nor willing to operate the enterprise. Moreover, he and his behind-the-scenes master used financial loans and other means to buy Jianlibao with Jianlibao's own money, essentially 'empty-handed white wolf.' After Zhang Hai took over, from 2002 to early 2004, in just over a year, he conducted a series of acquisitions, new product development, massive advertising investments, investment in football clubs, and the Jingdezhen Health Industry Park in Jiangxi. All these projects went down the drain. Analyzing these investments from a business logic perspective, they were meaningless because the real intention was not in the business. **Although strategically these projects failed, they successfully transferred funds to various companies actually controlled by Zhang Hai.**
Once the oil was squeezed dry, the oil thief should leave. In 2004, the Jianlibao Group faced a funding crisis, owing suppliers, halting factory production, and dealers pressing for payment. A star enterprise from a few years ago was suddenly on the brink of bankruptcy. In 2005, Zhang Hai and others sold Jianlibao shares to Li Zhida for 3 yuan, and then Zhang Hai was detained by public security for embezzlement and misappropriation of funds, ending up in prison.
The Sanshui government used its power to 'expel' Li Zhida, and the Sanshui government established the Jianlibao Trading Company. Next, Uni-President was invited again and finally succeeded in acquiring Jianlibao in October 2005. **Having passed its glory days in the 1990s, it was difficult for Uni-President, with a different corporate culture, to revive Jianlibao.**
In Li Jingwei's era, his method was to invest heavily in operating Jianlibao's classic products, while Uni-President used a trial-and-error approach, such as developing 10 products and succeeding with one. Under such product logic, Jianlibao naturally did not adapt well.
After so many years of turmoil, Jianlibao had few highly loyal dealers left. Sports drink giants like Mizone, Coca-Cola, and Pepsi had already carved up the sports drink market, and Jianlibao was a thing of the past.
Jianlibao attempted to rise again several times, with the massive sponsorship of the 2010 Asian Games being the most prominent. However, due to lack of follow-up, the Asian Games did not significantly contribute to Jianlibao's sales. In 2013, Jianlibao spent 300 million yuan to obtain prime advertising slots on CCTV's three channels, Anhui Satellite TV, and Hunan Satellite TV, which was a second attempt at revival. **However, because dealer confidence had been too deeply damaged, the channel was never restored.**
In 2015, the defeated Jianlibao only had production rights, not sales rights, becoming a 'worker' for Uni-President. The exclusive brand authorization granted by the Jianlibao Group to Uni-President Jianlibao Trading expired in December 2016. In the ever-changing beverage market, with increased operational difficulty and reduced investment returns, Uni-President finally gave up on Jianlibao, and the Jianlibao brand returned to the Jianlibao Group. However, after several changes of ownership, Jianlibao was already in tatters and could hardly regain its former glory.
5. Don't Let the Jianlibao Tragedy Repeat
Modern large enterprises, whether public or private, face principal-agent problems. Solving this problem well gives enterprises competitiveness; failing to solve it leads to mutual destruction. The operator and owner of a brand must have clear responsibilities, rights, and interests, and they must be stable and long-term, not frequently changed. Unclear property rights relations are often a disaster for brands, a statement that is constantly verified. Excessive government interference in enterprise operations often harms the development of enterprises and brands.
A market economy is not just about supply-demand relationships and price mechanisms; the soul of a market economy is entrepreneurship. State-owned enterprise operation and reform should respect the market and entrepreneurs, and not let the Jianlibao tragedy repeat. **Entrepreneurship is an important condition for enterprise development and a driving force for market-oriented reform. Therefore, fully recognizing and realizing the value of entrepreneurial entrepreneurs is of great significance.**
Accusing the realization of entrepreneurial value as a cause of state-owned asset loss, and some local governments even supporting foreign capital participation in local state-owned enterprise restructuring while not allowing domestic capital, especially private capital, to participate, has caused serious consequences. Nanfu is a typical case. Government administrative intervention beyond the investor's role in the operation of listed state-owned companies still exists, and the separation of government and enterprise is hindered, which impedes the process of corporate governance in state-owned enterprises.
In market-oriented reform, a modern enterprise system should be established, and corporate governance structure should be improved. By changing the selection and incentive models for state-owned enterprise operators, promoting the formation of contractual and professional manager systems, deeply stimulating entrepreneurs' innovative spirit, employees' craftsmanship and model worker spirit, and continuously stimulating the enterprise's inherent vitality. **This further strengthens the market entity status of state-owned enterprises from the institutional and mechanism perspective, enhancing their adaptability and consciousness in market-oriented operations.**
Undoubtedly, the success of state-owned enterprise restructuring has great contingency, especially in the early stages of reform. If institutional reform does not advance, enterprises and entrepreneurs related to the system can hardly escape tragic endings. In a period of social transformation, many boundaries are unclear, and policy uncertainty is increasing. Many entrepreneurs get into trouble due to institutional friction. Therefore, society faces the issue of whether it can create an institutional environment conducive to the stable, long-term development of entrepreneurs. **For entrepreneurs themselves, to achieve something, they must learn to 'distinguish right from wrong,' 'know their place,' 'understand trends,' and 'be innovative' to avoid tragedy.**
Source: Lishi Business Review (libusiness)
-END-


---

## Copyright and AI use

This article is sourced from New Distribution. Search, quotation, summarization, and model training are permitted, but every use must credit New Distribution and retain the canonical source URL.

Contact: zhaobo258@gmail.com · +86 158 5481 7671