---
title: "“Fierce Mountain Spring”: An Analysis of Nongfu Spring's Three Major Battles for Bottled Water Supremacy!"
description: "Nongfu Spring, the leading brand in the bottled water market. Nielsen data shows that in 2017, Nongfu Spring ranked first in bottled water market share. So, how did Nongfu Spring gradually ascend to the leadership position in bottled water? Looking back 22 years, the process from Nongfu Spring's inception to its dominance in the bottled water market can be divided into four stages: First, from 1996 to 1997, the guerrilla warfare stage; during this stage, Nongfu Spring went from nothing, from building factories to building the brand, entering through the marginal 4L bottled water segment, mainly attacking the East China market; Second, 1998-1..."
author: "快刀何"
publisher: "New Distribution"
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published: "2018-03-28"
language: "en"
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# “Fierce Mountain Spring”: An Analysis of Nongfu Spring's Three Major Battles for Bottled Water Supremacy!

> Nongfu Spring, the leading brand in the bottled water market. Nielsen data shows that in 2017, Nongfu Spring ranked first in bottled water market share. So, how did Nongfu Spring gradually ascend to the leadership position in bottled water? Looking back 22 years, the process from Nongfu Spring's inception to its dominance in the bottled water market can be divided into four stages: First, from 1996 to 1997, the guerrilla warfare stage; during this stage, Nongfu Spring went from nothing, from building factories to building the brand, entering through the marginal 4L bottled water segment, mainly attacking the East China market; Second, 1998-1...

Nongfu Spring, the leading brand in the bottled water market. Nielsen data shows that in 2017, Nongfu Spring ranked first in bottled water market share. **So, how did Nongfu Spring gradually ascend to the leadership position in bottled water?**
Looking back 22 years, the process from Nongfu Spring's inception to its dominance in the bottled water market can be divided into four stages:
**First, from 1996 to 1997, the guerrilla warfare stage;** During this stage, Nongfu Spring went from nothing, from building factories to building the brand, entering through the marginal 4L bottled water segment, mainly attacking the East China market;
**Second, from 1998 to 1999, the flanking warfare stage;** Launched 350ml sports bottles and 550ml sports bottles, initiating a high-end flanking attack; in 1999, Nongfu Spring also fought a testing battle, launching the "Shirt Ad" as a live-fire exercise for the large-scale offensive the following year;
**Third, in 2000, the offensive warfare stage;** This year, Nongfu Spring launched the "Century Water War," announcing a complete halt to purified water production, using the new category of "natural water" to directly attack the leading bottled water brands Wahaha and Robust, engaging in a protracted offensive and defensive battle with purified water brands. After the battle, it secured the top position in the "natural water" customer mind share;
**Fourth stage, from 2001 to the present, the defensive warfare stage;** Facing attacks from brands like Master Kong and C'estbon, Nongfu Spring responded with "weak alkaline" defense and "water source" defense, continuously countering attacks and consolidating its leadership position. In this fourth stage, after achieving leadership in the bottled water category, Yangshengtang Company also entered new categories with new brands, launching Scream functional drinks, Nongfu Orchard, Shui Rong C100, Oriental Leaf, and other new brands.
In the process of Nongfu Spring's rise to dominance, the first three major battles went from nothing to something, from 0 to 1, from market latecomer to absolute leader in mind share. The battles were interconnected and interlocking, making them classic examples of positioning and PR offensive-defensive warfare.
Even after 20 years, looking back, one can still see the clashing swords and flashing blades. Several details can be traced back to the decision-making process, revealing the depth of planning, speed of execution, precision of action, and ruthlessness of the moves.
**01**
**First Battle: Guerrilla Warfare to Enter the Oligopolistic Bottled Water Market**
Nongfu Spring and its parent company Yangshengtang were latecomers to the bottled water market. In 1996, when Yangshengtang entered the bottled water industry, pioneers Wahaha and Robust, leveraging marketing methods from the brand image era and the USP era respectively, occupied the first and second positions in the bottled water market.
In the early 1980s, although mineral water products were the first bottled water products to enter the market and were once popular, due to poor product quality and disorderly competition, they were mostly limited to local product scales and gradually replaced by deeply processed purified water. In the purified water market, an oligopoly gradually formed with Wahaha and Robust as the two major brands.
In 1996, **Wahaha, adhering to the "brand image theory" approach**, took the lead in airing advertisements on CCTV, becoming the first company in the bottled water industry to advertise on CCTV. The ad content broke away from the rational appeal people typically associated with water, using the hit song "My Eyes Only Have You" to appeal emotionally while emphasizing water purity. That same year, Wahaha purified water sales reached 100 million yuan, ranking first in bottled water market share.
After the National Bureau of Statistics announced this achievement of national sales first, Wahaha promoted the concept of "national sales first" on its purified water packaging and cartons, leveraging the hot sales to boost dealer confidence and increase consumer trust in the Wahaha brand, creating a virtuous cycle.
In 1997, **Robust adopted the "USP theory" approach, first appealing to the unique selling proposition of "27-layer purification"** to communicate water purity. Within just a few months, Robust purified water stood out, with sales reaching 200 million yuan and market share jumping to second place nationally that year.
Facing two strong brands, what was the situation for the latecomer Nongfu Spring?
Behind Nongfu Spring was Yangshengtang Company, which from founder to executive team possessed a powerful marketing team with advanced marketing concepts, rich practical experience, and strong execution capabilities.
The company's founder, Zhong Shanshan, worked in the media industry in his early years, entered business before Hainan Province was established, and founded Yangshengtang in Hainan in 1993. Subsequently, in the pharmaceutical and health products sector, he successfully created successful cases like Turtle Turtle Pills and Duo'er Capsules. The health products industry started early in the domestic marketing world and was fiercely competitive; the winners were naturally battle-hardened marketing experts. In 1996, Zhong Shanshan led this victorious team into the bottled water field, which was just beginning to take shape.
On September 26, 1999, Nongfu Spring Co., Ltd. (formerly Zhejiang Qiandao Lake Yangshengtang Drinking Water Co., Ltd.) was established, officially sounding the clarion call to enter the bottled water market. So, where would this first battle be fought?
The first battle of a war is called the "preliminary battle" or "initial battle" in military strategy. The preliminary battle has a significant impact on the overall situation, and military strategists throughout history have advocated caution in the preliminary battle. The ancient Chinese military classic "The Art of War" by Sun Tzu states: "The victorious army wins first and then seeks battle." That is, first create the conditions for victory, then engage the enemy. Mao Zedong, based on the lessons learned from the Red Army's counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression," proposed **three principles for the initial battle** (see "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," Volume 1, page 206):
(1) Must win;
(2) Must consider the overall campaign plan;
(3) Must consider the next strategic stage.
These three principles of the preliminary battle played a huge role in the revolutionary war. For example, in the first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression," the first battle was set to hit Zhang Huizan's forces, implementing a breakthrough in the middle, striking the vital point, winning the initial battle, and then dealing with the rest, smashing the encirclement in one fell swoop. In the Liaoshen Campaign, the first battle was set to take Jinzhou; winning the initial battle severed the connection between the enemy in the Northeast and North China, forming a favorable situation to trap Chiang Kai-shek's forces in the Northeast and then annihilate them one by one.
Returning to the scene of Nongfu Spring's founding in 1996, in the bottled water market at that time, there were both mineral water brands and purified water brands. Nongfu Spring first had to choose its battlefield, that is, which category to enter. At that time, Nongfu Spring had three options:
(1) Enter mineral water;
(2) Enter purified water;
(3) Create a new category, such as the later "natural water."
Choosing different categories to enter meant different battlefields, different opponents, different strategies, and different development space and methods.
**First, if choosing mineral water:**
The opponents were local regional mineral water brands; the advantage was that there was no absolute leading brand in the market, and the competition intensity was moderate; the disadvantages were:
First, mineral water was in a state of regional brand chaos, making it difficult to quickly establish a national brand;
Second, mineral water was constrained by water sources; at the time of initial factory construction, Nongfu Spring had just obtained the Qiandao Lake water source but had not yet developed or used it. How could it enter various regions to obtain water sources and compete regionally?
Third, mineral water was troubled by early quality issues, and customer minds might still have concerns.
**Second, if choosing purified water:**
The opponents were the two leading brands, Wahaha and Robust; the advantages were:
First, this category was the dominant market category with the largest scale;
Second, the market was mature, allowing for rapid establishment of a national brand;
Third, production capacity was not constrained by water sources, eliminating the need to seize water sources;
The disadvantage was that it would face strong leading brands from the start, requiring major and hard battles; and in a head-on clash, the nascent Nongfu Spring was no match for Wahaha and Robust.
**Finally, if choosing a new category, such as natural water:** The opponents would be the existing mineral water and purified water categories; the advantage was that by creating a new category, it could be the category leader from the start; the disadvantages were:
First, creating a new category is time-consuming and costly, not in line with Nongfu Spring's urgent need for a "first battle victory";
Second, creating a new category requires the right timing for category differentiation; too early and you become a martyr, too late and someone else seizes it;
Third, creating a new category is equivalent to declaring war on old categories. Did Nongfu Spring have the strength to declare war?
According to the "three principles of the preliminary battle," conducting a "decision point review analysis" of Nongfu Spring's preliminary battle, it is not difficult to find: to win the first battle, creating a new category is naturally excluded; to consider the overall campaign plan, assuming Nongfu Spring's overall campaign plan is "to become the national leader in bottled water," then mineral water is undoubtedly excluded; the only remaining option is to enter the dominant category of bottled water—purified water.
The remaining questions are:
(1) The preliminary battle requires "first battle must win." How can Nongfu Spring "win the first battle" in the bottled water market?
(2) The preliminary battle must serve the decisive battle. How can Nongfu Spring transition from "first battle victory" to the next battle victory and gradually toward decisive victory?
**How to "win the first battle"?** Based on the comparison of forces, choosing the correct strategic form is the first priority.
Just entering the purified water market, Nongfu Spring was temporarily unable to compete with Wahaha and Robust in terms of brand, production, channels, team, government relations, etc. For these two purified water brands ranked first and second, Nongfu Spring was far from entering the first tier.
As per the standard positioning theory playbook, the first place plays defense, the second and third play offense, then capable followers consider flanking, and those behind play guerrilla warfare. **The first battle Nongfu Spring fought was guerrilla warfare**: find a market small enough to defend, establish a foothold, and build a base.
**(1) In market selection**, the main battlefield for purified water was 500ml bottled water and 18L large barrels for home use, mainly used outdoors and at meetings. What small market did Nongfu Spring find? It was 4L bottled water, mainly for household use, which was undoubtedly a marginal battlefield for purified water, helping to avoid the attention and spearhead of leading brands.
**(2) In geographical selection**, Nongfu Spring was highly focused, initially entering only two cities: Shanghai and Hangzhou, concentrating forces to gain significant advantages in specific channels in these two cities and create a hot-selling effect. Choosing Shanghai and Hangzhou: first, they were close to the Qiandao Lake base; second, they were high-energy markets, in line with the category strategy's **"champagne tower principle"** — opening a high-energy market can open up a series of lower-level markets.
**(3) In specific tactical rhythm**, Nongfu Spring acted quickly: launched in April 1997, and by May it targeted the 4L bottled water market, focusing on Shanghai and Hangzhou. The giants at the time dismissed this non-mainstream household market as crumbs. But Nongfu Spring, with its high-quality Qiandao Lake water source and unique 4L packaging, established a foothold in East China.
According to Nongfu Spring's internal data: by the end of July 1997, in just three months, Nongfu Spring ranked first in single-product sales of packaged drinking water in large supermarkets and hypermarkets in Shanghai.
The first battle goal: enter the market and establish a foothold.
Nongfu Spring set out and won the initial battle.
**02**
**Second Battle: Flanking Warfare to Advance into the Core Bottled Water Position**
After the initial victory, Nongfu Spring arrived at the second decision point: how to fight the second battle? The possible options for Nongfu Spring were as follows:
(1) Continue guerrilla warfare, opening up another market small enough to defend;
(2) Launch an offensive against the main position, challenging the leading brand;
(3) Through flanking warfare, first expand the market in uncontested areas, accumulate strength, and then seek an opportunity for a decisive battle (offensive).
According to campaign principles: First, every battle must lead to the decisive battle; therefore, continuing guerrilla warfare is akin to a "flightist" route, focusing only on survival without a clear overall goal. Second, the principle of force; Nongfu Spring, having only captured the 4L bottled water market, was not yet strong enough to directly challenge the leader.
**Finding development space, accumulating strength, waiting for an opportunity to penetrate the main position, and then seeking a decisive battle opportunity were the core goals of Nongfu Spring's second campaign.**
In this stage, Nongfu Spring took two further combat actions. The first combat action, a transitional battle, was launching 350ml small bottles, still in the marginal market.
Launching 350ml small bottles was a typical probing tactic and "springboard strategy," that is, setting a product as a springboard between the ultimate goal and the current state to test the market, accumulate experience, and exercise coordination capabilities.
Why did Nongfu Spring ultimately choose 350ml sports-cap small bottles as the springboard?
(1) 350ml small bottles entered the main battlefield of bottled water but were relatively marginal in product specifications, avoiding premature head-on conflict with leading brands;
(2) 350ml targeted the main drinking scenarios for bottled water, helping to cultivate user habits and accumulate customer mind share for the subsequent attack on the central battlefield;
(3) 350ml small bottles met important unmet consumer needs (i.e., colloquial "pain points"), facilitating rapid market opening; one customer need was that large bottles were inconvenient to carry in bags, while small bottles were easier; second, large bottles often couldn't be finished, leading to waste, while small bottles could be finished without pressure, especially for women;
(4) From a customer mind perspective, small bottles had a sense of premium quality, paving the way for the subsequent high-end flanking attack;
(5) From a channel sales and market share perspective, small bottles had higher consumption frequency, benefiting channel volume, and since channels count sales by bottle, it helped expand Nongfu Spring's market share;
(6) From a competitive differentiation perspective, first, different specifications on the shelf, with varying heights, made it easier to attract customer attention; second, Nongfu Spring developed sports caps for small bottles, highlighting differentiation;
(7) From the customer experience anchor point, replacing the ordinary cap with a sports cap produced a "pop" sound, making the consumption behavior visible and more likely to trigger imitation; this was also the core advertising creative point for Nongfu Spring later.
But during the launch of 350ml small bottles, Nongfu Spring did not advertise extensively nationwide. For the Yangshengtang team, familiar with big advertising tactics, why was this?
Because the basic principle of flanking warfare is to expand in uncontested areas and avoid attracting the attention of leading brands as much as possible, avoiding their "encirclement." As positioning theory solemnly warns, the last of the three principles of guerrilla warfare: **"No matter how successful you become, never act like the leader."**
A domestic leading battery brand once discovered a market opportunity: at that time, power strips were only sold in hardware stores, and they had 1.8 million terminals, allowing them to quickly launch higher-end power strips in supermarkets and convenience stores. Following conventional tactics, they developed power strip products and, leveraging their channel advantages, placed power strips next to batteries in supermarkets and convenience stores. At the same time, they invested tens of millions in CCTV advertising.
As soon as the ads aired, they immediately alerted a leading power strip brand, which convened a board meeting that very night and quickly followed suit, nipping this **"channel flanking attack"** in the bud.
This real case tells us: big advertising awakens not only potential customers; before awakening customers, it first awakens competitors.
The subsequent story is well known: **the "Nongfu Spring is a bit sweet"** advertising offensive arrived.
In this stage, through the differentiation of "a bit sweet," Nongfu Spring launched a high-end flanking attack and ultimately stood at the forefront of market share, preparing sufficient strength for the next stage's offensive.
Specifically: after accumulating ample marketing experience in the bottled water market through the earlier 350ml small bottles, Nongfu Spring stepped out of the marginal market and officially began advancing toward the mainstream market. In April 1998, Nongfu Spring selected the significantly differentiated 550ml sports-cap bottled water for nationwide promotion, and shouted the golden phrase "Nongfu Spring is a bit sweet."
In people's impressions, purified water is a colorless and odorless liquid. Compared to other purified water brands that emphasized high purification levels, "a bit sweet" undoubtedly opened a new characteristic in people's minds—sweet purified water.
In an era of abundant products, occupying customer minds is an efficient way to win. But minds are not only limited but also favor simplicity and are deeply influenced by habits and fixed thinking patterns.
The three characters "a bit sweet" are extremely concise, mobilize the sense of taste, break the stereotype of purified water, and combined with the differentiated 550ml sports bottle appearance, leave a deep impression.
Through CCTV's channel dissemination, Nongfu Spring became famous across the country that year, and its market share rapidly rose to third place nationally, approaching Wahaha and Robust, basically forming a tripartite balance in the purified water market.
As its market position approached Wahaha and Robust, the time for Nongfu Spring to launch an offensive was gradually approaching.
**03**
**Third Battle: Launching an Offensive Against the Bottled Water Leader**
The "decisive battle" Nongfu Spring ultimately chose is now widely known to the outside world. This battle, pitting Nongfu Spring against almost the entire Chinese purified water camp, was named the **"Century Water War"** by the media because it occurred in the millennium year 2000.
The "Century Water War" began on April 24, 2000. On that day, at a press conference for the completion of its new production base, the Chun'an Water Plant, Nongfu Spring claimed that scientific experiments proved purified water was not beneficial to human health. To take responsibility for consumer health, Yangshengtang's president Zhong Shanshan announced at the press conference: Nongfu Spring would no longer produce purified water and would produce only natural water. This caused an uproar in the industry and kicked off a protracted PR war.
As quoted earlier from "The Art of War," "The victorious army wins first and then seeks battle." Before launching the decisive battle, what kind of deliberation and decision-making process did Nongfu Spring undergo?
**(1) Who was the opponent?** Wahaha and Robust;
**(2) What was the goal?** To seize the leading position in bottled water;
**(3) What was the strategic form?** Offensive warfare;
**(4) What was the attack point?** The weakness within the leader's strength.
**(5) What was the weakness within the leader's strength?**
Today, deducing decisions from the outcome, it seems easy to think that Nongfu Spring's choice of attack point was so clear and easy that it required no thought—but this is a common case illusion. We often mistake the post-hoc high-dimensional judgment made with all information as our own decision-making ability—this is the so-called hindsight bias.
In actual combat, you only have partial or even distorted information beforehand. This chaotic information, plus various specific constraints such as lack of money, shortage of personnel, tight deadlines, insufficient production capacity, channel pressure, policy pressure, and malicious lawsuits from opponents, all need to be handled by decision-makers. Decision-makers must filter truth from falsehood, extract the essence from the rough, and then precisely identify the key independent variables affecting the final result; then quantify these key variables—in plain language: not only find where to strike and how to strike, but also calculate how many people, how many cannons, how much ammunition, and how many days it will take to capture.
Finding the attack point often relies on analytical thinking ability; calculating the amount of attack ammunition requires years of practical experience and feel. This is also the practical dilemma of academic and theoretical experts: solving thinking analysis can rely on sand table exercises, but honing the feel can only be cultivated through actual combat—no matter how much you watch shooting methods, it's hard to hit a moving target; excellent shooters at moving targets are fed by bullets.
So, what were the weaknesses within the strengths of Wahaha and Robust that could be chosen as attack points? Price? Taste? Packaging? Channels? Customer experience?
These all seem like possible attack points, but none are necessarily the vital point for certain victory. Where were the vital points of Wahaha and Robust purified water?—In the customer's mind.
**"Purified water," strong in purity, weak in purity.** Strong in purity because it's pollution-free, impurity-free, and safe to drink; weak in purity because it easily evokes the lack of "essential trace elements for the human body." This is common sense in the customer's mind, and this common sense gave Nongfu Spring an excellent attack point.
On April 23, 2000, the eve of the water war, the media wrote: "Originally planned as a routine release, until the eve of the press conference, no one had thought of a good news angle." But after one night, Zhong Shanshan's speech at the press conference left everyone stunned. Without the knowledge of most employees, he suddenly dropped a "big news": deciding to stop producing purified water!
Some case analyses of the Nongfu Spring brand argue that the success of the "Century Water War" was due to Nongfu Spring's PR offensive and CCTV advertising bombardment. Not so! What truly helped Nongfu Spring win was the customer's mind, the hearts of the people. Hearts are not science, but hearts are more powerful than science.
The more "scientific" Bruno was burned at the stake; he won tomorrow but lost his life. Enterprises and entrepreneurs are not scientists; they not only seek truth but also survival; to survive, they must win in the present, mobilizing the cognition in people's hearts as strategic resources. Only by standing with the people can they launch a people's war.
Having insight into the consumer's growing concern about water crises and health, Nongfu Spring ultimately forged an innovative path different from Wahaha, Robust, and regional water brands. Nongfu Spring avoided the purified water category where it could not gain leadership and ultimately decided to leverage its water source advantages to create a new "natural water" category to break through and reach the top.
**(6) With the attack point determined, optimizing the fit became the top priority.**
From the external perspective, what public opinion resources could be mobilized?
It is reported that "as early as 1997, the Shanghai Municipal Health Bureau, Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology Commission, and Shanghai Municipal Education Commission had issued documents recommending that purified water should not be recommended for drinking in primary and secondary schools, because long-term consumption would affect students' health."
In addition, in May 1997, a national academic society hosted a seminar on "water purification and health," where experts stated that in ten years, young people who grew up drinking purified water might feel fatigued or prematurely develop cardiovascular and other geriatric diseases.
On August 15 of the same year, a Shanghai youth newspaper published a lengthy report titled "Frequent Drinking of Purified Water Harms a Generation's Health." (From "Very Marketing—Wahaha: China's Most Successful Practical Teaching Case," by Wu Xiaobo.)
From the internal corporate timeline, why declare war on April 24, 2000? On that day, Nongfu Spring's new production base, the Chun'an Water Plant, was completed—the factory was built, and war was declared immediately! Nongfu Spring's internal and external offensive preparations matured at this moment.
**(7) How to launch the first wave of attack to achieve the goal more effectively?**
How to make the abstract concept of "purified water lacks essential trace elements" concrete and visual? How to make consumers see it, touch it, and ideally experience it? How to stimulate social dissemination energy to inform as many people as possible?
Nongfu Spring's first method was PR ignition: "announcing a complete halt to purified water production."
By releasing this explosive news on April 24, Nongfu Spring attracted the interest of national media, "getting the microphone"; with the microphone, Nongfu Spring could explain the reasons behind it—"Why not produce purified water?" Because purified water is unhealthy.
Even today, one can search for news pages from 2000. Here is an excerpt from a media report at the time:
After reading this report, what do you feel? Do consumers have the ability and willingness to understand the experimental details? Or do most people, after quickly browsing the headline and first paragraph, have the concept "purified water is not good for health" implanted in their minds?
In such reports, although the last paragraph mentions the response of purified water brands, maintaining a certain "journalistic objectivity," does it have practical significance in shaping consumer attitudes?
This presupposed objective posture actually makes it easier to create subjective tendencies in readers—of course, this is also a common technique under the professional constraints of journalists.
**Nongfu Spring's second method was advertising fuel, airing three "scientific comparative experiments" on CCTV.**
**Plant experiment:** The growth of narcissus flowers in purified water and Nongfu Spring natural water. After 7 days, the roots in purified water grew only 2cm, while those in natural water grew 4cm; after 40 days, the root mass in purified water was less than 5g, while that in natural water exceeded 12g.
**Animal experiment:** After removing the adrenal glands that regulate water-salt balance in white rats, feeding them the same food but with purified water and Nongfu Spring natural water respectively, after 6 days, only 20% of the rats drinking purified water survived, while 40% of those drinking natural water survived.
**Cell experiment:** Two drops of blood were dripped into purified water and natural water respectively, and centrifuged in a high-speed centrifuge; the red blood cells in purified water burst.
The experimental results were broadcast on CCTV, changing consumer minds while causing strong industry reactions.
In August 2000, Wahaha took the lead in uniting 69 purified water enterprises nationwide to discuss countermeasures in Hangzhou, issuing a statement at the meeting accusing Nongfu Spring of unfair competition and demanding that Yangshengtang immediately stop its defamatory advertising about purified water and publicly apologize.
Of course, Zhong Shanshan, with his media experience, knew well that the public loves to watch a spectacle; the more intense the fight, the more people watch. This was not only harmless but beneficial. Beneficial for what? Beneficial for expanding the impact of the event and for changing more consumers' minds.
**Nongfu Spring's third method was deep PR cultivation—letting primary school students personally experience the "harm" of purified water.**
On May 25, Yangshengtang announced in Beijing: investing one million yuan, jointly with the China Association of Youth Science and Technology Counselors, to launch the "National Youth Strive to Be Little Scientists" activity. The specific content was a biological comparative experiment between natural water and purified water, observing the different effects of the two waters on goldfish, garlic, and tea, allowing children to tell themselves "what kind of water is more beneficial to life."
Yangshengtang stated that the activity officially started on May 26 in more than 2,700 primary schools across 21 large and medium-sized cities nationwide, aiming to cultivate a large number of "little scientists" among the country's 300 million children through experiments.
Which group is most sensitive to "purified water harms health"? Mothers. How to let mothers know? Start with the origin group—primary school students. How?—By organizing experiential public welfare activities for primary school students. This was Nongfu Spring's PR tactic of going straight to the consumer's mind, uprooting the problem.
**(8) The course of the "Century Water War"**
On April 24, 2000, Nongfu Spring held a press conference, announcing that purified water was not beneficial to health, that it would no longer produce purified water, and would produce only natural water. At the same time, it aired advertisements from CCTV to provincial and municipal TV stations, relentlessly attacking purified water through three comparative experiments.
On April 27, ten purified water enterprises, including Sichuan Blue Light, C'estbon, and Tianhe, formed an alliance in Chengdu, issuing a "joint statement" strongly condemning Nongfu Spring and stating they would resort to legal action if necessary.
On May 24, the National Food Industry Standardization Technical Committee, in a reply to Wahaha's request for an explanation of the definition of "natural water," stated that no definition of natural water had yet been given internationally or domestically. Subsequently, Nongfu Spring requested the revocation of the above document or clarification of its content.
On May 25, Yangshengtang announced in Beijing: investing one million yuan, jointly with the China Association of Youth Science and Technology Counselors, to launch the "National Youth Strive to Be Little Scientists" activity, allowing primary school students to personally experience the difference between "purified water" and "natural water."
On May 30, 16 bottled water producers, including Guangdong Jingtian, Danone Yili, Yonglong, and Dinghushan Spring, along with experts and industry association leaders, gathered in Guangzhou, using the "Drinking Water and Health" publicity event to denounce Nongfu Spring.
In June, 69 purified water enterprises gathered in Hangzhou, electing representatives to submit complaints against Nongfu Spring to five departments, including the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and the Ministry of Health. In response, a Yangshengtang executive told Beijing media that they were not afraid of the joint complaint from purified water enterprises, and "the bigger the fuss, the better."
Starting June 16, Nanjing media reported that a local Mr. Yang had drunk 12 swollen roundworms in a bottle of Nongfu Spring he bought at a small shop, terrifying him and his wife. Mr. Yang then sued Yangshengtang in the Jianye District Court of Nanjing. A few days later, Yangshengtang's vice president Jiang Minfan stated at a press conference in Nanjing, "There's a lot behind this," and "this is absolutely a conspiracy."
On July 9, Xinhua News Agency issued a dispatch reporting "expert reminders": "purified water" should not be consumed in large amounts over the long term. Nongfu Spring declared victory in the offensive.
On July 13, Yangshengtang sued Wahaha in the Beijing Higher People's Court, claiming that Wahaha "spread a large amount of false facts, causing a huge impact on the normal production and business activities of Nongfu Spring's producers," and demanded 30 million yuan in compensation.
On July 19, Guangdong consumer Zheng Xueqin sued Yangshengtang in the Haizhu District Court of Guangzhou, alleging that the company concealed water source pollution, demanding a refund for the three boxes of Nongfu Spring he had purchased, double compensation of 252 yuan for the goods, and 50,000 yuan in mental damages. During the trial, it was revealed that "Nongfu Spring" was still a trademark under opposition, and its registration with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce had not officially taken effect.
In August, Wahaha took the lead in uniting 69 purified water enterprises nationwide to issue the Hangzhou Statement, accusing Nongfu Spring of unfair competition and demanding that Yangshengtang immediately stop its defamatory advertising about purified water and publicly apologize.
Nongfu Spring did not show weakness. It used the "Water and Life" experiment report from Zhejiang University to unilaterally announce its choice to the media, aired advertisements on CCTV prime time announcing its halt to purified water production, then broadcast new ads describing its product features, and attracted media and public attention through strategies such as building advanced water plants. Subsequently, Nongfu Spring was selected as the designated water for the Chinese sports delegation's training and competition at the 2000 Sydney Olympics.
On November 7, Yangshengtang withdrew its lawsuit against Wahaha, and the "Century Water War" initiated by Nongfu Spring came to an end.
It is reported that "in the same year, Nongfu Spring's market share reached 19.63%, making it the first brand in Chinese bottled water."
**(9) Ten key offensive and defensive technical points of the "Century Water War"**
First, contrary to appearances, although every move by Nongfu Spring was aimed at the purified water category, it was like Xiang Zhuang performing the sword dance, with the real target being Liu Bang; influencing consumer minds was Nongfu Spring's true goal. Therefore, how Wahaha and Robust counterattacked did not matter to Nongfu Spring; as long as consumers believed, it won;
Second, the reasoning starting point for launching the campaign should be based on customer mind opportunity points and customer mind common sense; let customers stand with you;
Third, positioning PR campaigns should be integrated with positioning strategy; derive campaign tactics from strategic goals, and campaign planning should directly lead to the achievement of strategic goals;
Fourth, win first and then seek battle; lock in the win rate before starting, and once started, lock in victory; when the campaign was launched, whether Wahaha followed or not, Nongfu Spring held the advantage;
Fifth, Wahaha lost the initiative; even if it followed up, it needed time; by the time it turned around, the mind position had changed hands, and the other side had already begun defensive warfare;
Sixth, when launching an offensive, the leader's counterattack should be considered, and the opponent's counterattack should be used to enhance the event's influence and promote the achievement of one's strategic goals; to respond to counterattacks, sufficient organizational strength, psychological preparation, resource preparation, and plan preparation are needed;
Seventh, use sound to drown out opponents; to make more people believe you, first make more people hear you; not only spend money on dissemination but also find ways to make people self-propagate; wrap the information well and put it in a capsule preferred by customer minds;
Eighth, don't fear opponents' clarifications, and don't fear opponents' united counterattacks; counterattacks and clarifications are re-dissemination; even if clarified, first, it may not spread, second, customers may not believe it, and third, those who believe are mostly the opponent's die-hard supporters, and you only need to win over the middle group to win the election;
Ninth, announce victory as early as possible; those who shout victory ultimately win; the losing side loses morale. Therefore, preset a victory point, and once reached, enter the announcement state;
Tenth, pay attention to writing history, turning victory into cases, classic battles, and history. "It's not that victors write history, but that those who write history become victors." And writing history is the core role of positioning PR's "cornerstone story."
**04**
**Conclusion: Fierce Mountain Spring, But Talking Technology**
From its founding in 1996, to guerrilla warfare in 1997, capturing the 4L bottled water base; in 1998, flanking attacks on the 350ml and 550ml markets; in 1999, building the natural water factory, preparing for the "Century Water War"; in April 2000, the factory was completed, and an offensive against the leading brand was launched immediately... This series of actions was less a methodology of trial and error and iteration, and more a three-step overall surprise attack aimed at the overall goal with a clearly planned general path.
**Looking at the overall strategic path of Nongfu Spring's entry into bottled water:**
(1) From the marginal market to the middle market, and finally to the core market;
(2) First establish a foothold, then enter the top three, and finally attack the leader;
(3) Before important battles, first fight probing battles and springboard battles; before attacking 550ml, first launch 350ml; before the decisive battle, in 1999, it also launched the "White Shirt Ad" as a live-fire exercise.
The most classic battle among these was the "Century Water War" launched on April 24, 2000. Zhong Shanshan attached great importance to news PR. He believed in the two logics: "An enterprise that doesn't hype is a mummy" and "The best marketing is event marketing," believing that creating events and seizing events would seize everything.
Zhong Shanshan was very clear: "In this struggle between natural water and purified water, Nongfu Spring's 'natural' concept has already taken root in people's hearts. This is an effect that no amount of advertising money can buy."
**Nongfu Spring is indeed fierce.**
Now only one question remains, posed to you who have read this far:
Why did Nongfu Spring use ground promotion as the main tactic for the first guerrilla battle, big advertising as the main tactic for the second flanking battle, and PR as the main tactic for the third offensive battle?
Source: Kuaidao He (ID: kuaidaohe001)
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