---
title: "China's Supermarkets Are in a Bloody Fight!"
description: "As traditional supermarkets face declining profits and intense competition, they are turning to private label products as a key strategy. Retail giants like JD.com, Meituan, and Alibaba are also entering the fray, while successful examples like Pangdonglai, Sam's Club, and ALDI show that private labels can drive differentiation and customer loyalty. However, many supermarkets fail because they treat private labels as mere labeling exercises, lacking the full supply chain capabilities and long-term commitment needed. The future of retail lies in winning consumer trust through quality and value, not just low prices."
author: "豆汁儿"
publisher: "New Distribution"
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published: "2025-10-10"
categories: "Retail Formats"
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---

# China's Supermarkets Are in a Bloody Fight!

> As traditional supermarkets face declining profits and intense competition, they are turning to private label products as a key strategy. Retail giants like JD.com, Meituan, and Alibaba are also entering the fray, while successful examples like Pangdonglai, Sam's Club, and ALDI show that private labels can drive differentiation and customer loyalty. However, many supermarkets fail because they treat private labels as mere labeling exercises, lacking the full supply chain capabilities and long-term commitment needed. The future of retail lies in winning consumer trust through quality and value, not just low prices.

### **Source** | Zhenghedao **ID** | zhenghedao Author | Douzhier
Some say that any single Pangdonglai product with annual sales of several hundred million yuan could save a mid-sized listed company.
Yonghui took this to heart.
After several consecutive years of losses, in May 2024, Yonghui invited the "Pangdonglai assistance team" and decided to bet on private label products—planning to develop 500 private label SKUs within five years, aiming for them to account for 40% of total sales.
Shortly after, Sam's Club was criticized by members on social media for quietly replacing some Member's Mark items with market staples like Orion and Weilong, and quickly apologized, removed the items, and reverted.
A silent war has already begun.
On one side, traditional supermarkets are doubling down; on the other, retail giants are entering the fray—JD.com, Meituan, and Alibaba are all active, and they all hold the same card: private label.
Is it following the trend or survival? Is it a fire pit or the future?
Is it an old routine or a new game?
Actually, supermarkets doing private label is not a new concept.
In the mid-to-late 1990s, foreign retail giants like Carrefour, Walmart, and Metro entered China one after another. With bright environments, complete categories, and efficient management, they quickly reshaped Chinese people's perception of "shopping."
In 1996, Germany's Metro opened its first store in Shanghai, and its warehouse business model was like a thunderclap, filling a gap in the Chinese market.
Similar to Sam's Club, Metro proposed the concept of "We are the customer's warehouse," where the store is the warehouse, and site selection favored standalone buildings with parking lots, away from shopping centers.
More importantly, its private label penetration rate exceeds 70%. "Metro Premium" targets mid-to-high-end quality, while "Yike" focuses on high-cost-performance daily necessities, maintaining double-digit growth for five consecutive years, with plans to launch 200-300 new products in 2025.
To date, Metro operates 86 stores in 58 cities across China, and from 2022 to 2024, it has consistently ranked among the top in member store satisfaction for three consecutive years.
In the same year, Sam's Club landed in Shenzhen with its private label Member's Mark, using a 260 yuan annual fee to filter middle-to-high-income families. With only about 4,000 SKUs, private label accounts for over 30%. Star items like Swiss rolls, roast chicken, and beef rolls remain favorites among middle-class members.
Sam's Club (Beijing Shijingshan store)
Costco only entered China in 2019 but quickly established itself with its private label Kirkland Signature—which contributes one-third of its annual revenue and is often called the "king of cost performance."
It can be said that the development of private labels in China cannot be separated from the enlightenment of these foreign retailers.
Domestic supermarkets have also tried.
In 1996, Shanghai Hualian Supermarket registered the "Qinjian" brand; later, China Resources launched "Runzhijia," RT-Mart directly used "RT-Mart," and Wumart had "Geinisheng"... Unfortunately, many private labels remained lukewarm and didn't gain traction.
For a long time, these private labels lacked systematic R&D, quality control, and supply chain support, remaining at the "OEM labeling" stage without forming true product power or consumer recognition.
The turning point came in recent years.
The 2022 "China Private Label Blue Ocean Strategy White Paper" shows that 90% of consumers know about private labels, 50% can accurately name them, and 35% have purchased them in the past six months.
Consumers' awareness and acceptance of private labels have significantly improved, providing a market foundation for supermarkets to develop private labels.
**Giants Enter the Fray**
"If you don't do private labels, you'll be embarrassed to attend industry conferences," lamented a retail business operator.
What exactly has made all supermarkets suddenly chase private labels?
1. **More Profit, Keep the Margin Yourself**
Zhuang Shuai, founder of Bailian Consulting, pointed out a key: "The biggest advantage of private labels is saving on brand promotion and channel development costs."
Traditional supermarkets often act like "selling shelves"—charging entry fees, display fees, and barcode fees, making money on a "rent" logic. Private labels, on the other hand, are truly from factory to shelf, with fewer intermediate links and greater gross margin space.
Once volume picks up, private label costs can be 20%-30% lower than externally sourced products.
So, against the backdrop of online traffic peaking and offline transformation difficulties, giants are betting on large discount supermarkets and going all-in on private labels—Alibaba launched "Chaosuan NB" with 60% private label products; JD.com's first hard discount store has about 20% private label, and Qixian Supermarket reaches 60%; Meituan's "Happy Monkey" debuted at the end of August with 25% private label, targeting 60%.
Meituan's discount supermarket "Happy Monkey." Source: Meituan App
The core barrier for hard discount is precisely the R&D and supply chain capability of private labels. Meituan, JD.com, and Alibaba, with their earlier accumulation from Xiaoxiang Supermarket, Qixian, and Hema, already have the foundation to run discount stores.
2. **Differentiation, Make Me Remember You**
Have you ever fallen in love with a store because of a product?
It might be Sam's Club's mochi bread, Pangdonglai's oatmeal crisps, or Hema's MAX beer.
These things are not available elsewhere, so you have to go to that store.
This is the "scarcity" brought by private labels. Bakery, fresh produce, daily necessities (paper products, disposables, etc.), and prepared foods—these high-frequency, essential, and reputation-building categories have become the best entry points for supermarkets to develop private labels.
Scarcity always has value, and private labels make it easier to create differentiation and exclusivity from competitors.
In 2024, the explosive popularity of Sam's Club, Pangdonglai, and ALDI, which is rapidly expanding in Shanghai, all without exception grasped "product power."
These three have different business models—Sam's is a large-format membership store, Pangdonglai emphasizes experience and service, and ALDI is an upgraded convenience store—but their private label shares are 40%, 30%, and 90%, respectively.
They collectively indicate a trend: "wide SPU, narrow SKU" will become mainstream, meaning rich categories but only 1-2 premium products per category.
3. **From "Moving Goods" to "Making Goods"**
In the past, supermarkets were "porters" for brands, selling whatever brand manufacturers provided.
Now, they are increasingly realizing: they must return to a user perspective—what do consumers really need? Can I make it?
Retail expert Bao Yuezhong said directly: "Many brand products are overpriced and not worth the premium; consumers are no longer willing to pay for it. Private labels are key to rebuilding trust."
The traditional business model of supermarkets is gradually failing.
In an era of scarcity, supermarkets were about location; as long as you opened a store, customers would come, and goods would sell.
Essentially, they were "landlords" or "sub-landlords," not making money by selling goods but by "collecting rent."
But now, goods are no longer scarce, and the store is no longer the only option.
Consumers can go online, go to membership stores, or go to discount supermarkets. Why must they come to you?
The answer is only one: goods.
Only goods that you have, that are better, and that are more valuable.
So accordingly, supermarket procurement has shifted from selecting and managing manufacturers to selecting and managing products.
Originally, it was a B2B business: whatever the manufacturer had, I sold; now, it must return to a user perspective: what do users really need.
Brand manufacturers rarely develop products specifically for one channel unless the scale is large enough. But private labels are more extreme.
So private labels have become the key to breaking the deadlock.
Pangdonglai, Sam's Club, ALDI: What Did They Do Right?
But not all private labels succeed.
The truly famous ones can be counted on one hand: Pangdonglai's "DL," Sam's Club's "Member's Mark," Costco's "Kirkland," ALDI's "Super Value" series...
They don't just slap a label on products.
**Pangdonglai: Extreme Quality Control, Extreme Care**
In Xuchang, Henan, Pangdonglai accounts for nearly 20% of the city's total consumption (excluding big-ticket items like cars). Its products aren't the cheapest, but people trust it.
Why?
Because it takes quality control to the extreme.
From supplier screening to production line spot checks, it even investigates a factory's profitability over several years—"unprofitable factories may compromise on quality."
It uses direct sourcing from the source, with strong bargaining power and controllable quality; it emphasizes bakery and prepared foods, building its own central kitchen—these are things that top global retailers have been doing for decades.
Sam's Club, Costco, Whole Foods, ALDI, Coop, Migros... almost all retail giants do this.
**Sam's Club: Extremely Narrow SKU, Extremely Strong Hit Products**
A traditional supermarket has about 10,000-20,000 SKUs, but Sam's has only about 4,000, with only 1-3 premium products per category.
Its private label Member's Mark, although only 25%-30% of product count, contributes about 40% of turnover, creating many internet-famous hit products.
Behind this is Sam's cooperation with factories to customize production lines, such as using robotic arms instead of manual egg washing to reduce the price of Member's Mark egg yolk pastries.
These are not superficial efforts but systematic capabilities that coordinate the whole and strive for excellence.
**ALDI: 90% Private Label! Dare to Break Prices**
ALDI from Germany has a very down-to-earth name in China—"poor people's supermarket." Private label share is as high as 90%, with SKUs strictly controlled within 2,000.
ALDI supermarket. Source: ALDI official website
"Is ALDI's 9.9 yuan German liquor good?" "99 yuan for 6 bottles of imported wine, a win" "The king of value, ALDI, you know bread"... This supermarket, which makes aunties queue at 5 a.m. to sweep shelves and even scares Walmart, is best at using "price-breaking products" to attack the market.
Although many products are not very profitable, they quickly establish a "high cost-performance" image.
Contrary to rival Walmart's tens of thousands of SKUs, ALDI prefers fewer SKUs, following a private hit product route.
First, it selects hit products that are low-priced and high-quality from numerous suppliers.
Each category cooperates with only one core factory and establishes a triple mechanism of "supplier self-inspection, enterprise quality inspection, and third-party sampling."
A single product may take a year from listing to market.
Just this point alone already beats a large number of retail companies.
Then it precisely pushes the big single product to consumers, triggering large-scale panic buying. If it sells well, it in turn gains bargaining power with upstream suppliers.
Product prices are lowered, quality is good, no wonder aunties are crazy about it.
Additionally, ALDI's private label share is frighteningly high—90%.
The benefits of private labels have been explained above, so I won't repeat them here.
**How Well Is Yonghui Learning from Pangdonglai?**
When private labels become a new trend, what is the actual effect? Can traditional supermarkets land safely?
With this question, the author visited Beijing's first "Pangyonghui"—Yonghui Shijingshan Xilongduo store, one of the first stores remodeled to learn from Pangdonglai's model.
11 months ago, on the first day after remodeling, the queue stretched to the road, and some said, "You'd think it was the Forbidden City."
11 months later, perhaps due to a weekday afternoon, it was much quieter.
But traces of "Pangdonglai" are still visible in the details:
"Happiness" slogans are everywhere inside and outside the store; humanized reminders are throughout the fruit cutting, meat, and bakery areas, such as "Fruit cuts 20% off at 4 hours, 40% off at 6 hours, removed at 8 hours," and color-coded sugar levels; and if you come in the evening, it's said to be a true "poor ghost meal"—the fresh food area clears inventory every night, basically with discounts.
The bakery area is also lively, with walnut cream cheese bread and salad pork floss slices, mostly under 20 yuan. There's also a 9.9 yuan "quality and value" series: fresh meat mooncakes, black sesame mochi, fresh milk rice cake...
The service is genuinely good. When buying bread, the staff will proactively cut it for you and enthusiastically introduce: "Our pork floss is a full jin (500g)"; in the deli area, if you want 10 yuan of sweet sausage, the staff weighs out 9 yuan and asks with a smile: "Is this enough?"—breaking my stereotype that merchants only over-weigh, not under-weigh, and instantly boosting my好感度.
Photo: Douzhier
It is reported that Yonghui once set "learning Pangdonglai's culture" as a long-term goal, and after the remodeling, employee salaries increased by 20%-50%, with Beijing stores rising from over 4,000 to over 6,000.
But after nearly a year of learning, Yonghui quietly adjusted its strategy in April this year: continue learning products and supply chain, but not force "service."
Why? Because costs are unsustainable—to maintain Pangdonglai-style service, each store needs one-third more staff, costing millions of yuan extra per year.
Under the premise of cost reduction while maintaining good service, it seems the "happiness" logo is indeed playing a role.
Going straight in from the beverage area, you find Pangdonglai's presence. There is a wall with light-colored packaging products, which is Pangdonglai's private label section, with the most prominent being the internet-famous oatmeal.
In Ye Guofu's plan, Yonghui should learn Pangdonglai's model, not replicate it 100%. In reality, after Miniso's investment, Yonghui first learned to "de-Pangdonglai-ize."
So Pangdonglai's own products only occupy two shelves, including yogurt fruit oatmeal crisps, juice and other snacks, as well as canvas tote bags, paper cups, cleansing wipes, laundry beads, towels, and other daily necessities.
The packaging colors are harmonious and prices moderate. For many consumers outside Henan, Pangdonglai is mysterious and attractive, but at this moment, few people stop to buy.
Yonghui's private labels mainly appear in co-branded forms, such as tomato sauce with Heinz and sesame oil with Yanzhuang, as well as sub-brands like "Yonghui Farm" and "Yousong," with over 1,000 SKUs.
Photo: Douzhier
Yonghui Vice President Wang Shoucheng revealed that private label sales currently account for 5%-15%.
He emphasized that Yonghui's private labels are not simple OEM labeling but co-development with suppliers to pursue differentiated advantages. "We treat brand products and private label products equally, and promote whichever is better."
Some retail experts believe that selling OEM Yonghui private label products is accumulating user trust in Yonghui's channel brand. As a "traffic master," Pangdonglai has high user trust, so in the short term, it must sell its products. Yonghui can share the supply chain, and once trust is high enough, it can switch to its own products, growing with Pangdonglai's support and achieving solo flight.
From the scene, Yonghui has a rich variety, fresh ingredients, moderate prices, and a clean environment, but customers are mostly concentrated in the deli, fruit and vegetable, and tasting areas, with private label sales average.
Reflected in the financial report, it's stark: the 2025 semi-annual report shows Yonghui's revenue fell 20.73% year-on-year, with a net loss of 241 million yuan.
The remodeling brought attention but not yet profitability.
An industry insider said: after implementing "naked price direct procurement," service income fell sharply by 40%, and gross margin pressure is obvious. So Yonghui, which hasn't completed supply chain reform, is in pain.
**Just Labeling Is Useless**
Some say 2025 is the first year of private labels. But the reality is that few have succeeded systematically.
Why do most fail?
A very important point is: many supermarkets' understanding of private labels is still at the "just slap a label on it" stage.
The result: severe product homogenization, unstable quality, and no price advantage—so consumers naturally don't buy.
An industry insider with 25 years of retail experience pointed out: "Many supermarkets doing private labels still use the old logic of supplier advance payment and label swapping. Even with cash procurement, the primary assessment indicator is still gross margin, resulting in pricing close to brand products, failing to leverage cost advantages or build brand image."
True private labels are a test of full-chain capabilities from design, R&D, production, quality control to logistics.
It requires retail enterprises to: establish professional teams, not part-time procurement; go deep into factories, not wait for goods to arrive; strictly control quality, not just label and put on shelves; dare to break prices, use hit products to drive traffic; persist long-term, not just short-term trials.
ALDI may take a year from R&D to shelf for a product; Pangdonglai even inspects factories down to employee canteens and dormitories—it is these details that bring success to private labels.
For retail enterprises, private labels mean shifting from "channel merchant" to "retail manufacturer," requiring upstream extension and hands-on involvement. Startup capital is large, professional requirements are high, and return cycles are long.
But many supermarkets lack R&D, quality control, and differentiation, eventually falling into homogenized low-price competition.
Especially, many retail enterprises, in pursuit of low prices, often have OEM factories substitute inferior goods, and supermarkets cannot effectively detect it. Once quality issues arise, it damages their own reputation.
Without scale advantages, cold chain support, or direct sourcing capabilities, the so-called "low price" can only be achieved by squeezing suppliers or reducing quality.
Moreover, private labels are a "slow business," requiring continuous investment, repeated testing, and slowly building reputation.
Data shows that among 65 large and medium-sized supermarkets in China, 39 sell private labels, but they only contribute 4% of sales—using 10% of resources for 4% of sales requires long-term strategic patience, but many companies want "quick returns."
Additionally, in the traditional model, hypermarkets have been "selling shelves," selecting products based on quality and advertising fees, with opaque charges at every step.
Originally, good shelf positions were sold, and supermarkets were porters for brands, helping them put products on shelves. So supermarkets were not selling products but selling shelves.
Long-term playing the "landlord" role has led to the degradation of traditional supermarkets' operational capabilities, and it's not uncommon for private labels to sell poorly after being listed.
So, are private labels a lifeline or a fire pit?
The answer may be: both, and neither.
Calling it a lifeline is because, in today's e-commerce impact and severe homogenization, traditional supermarkets really need to find new growth engines.
Private labels can bring higher gross margins, stronger differentiation, and more stable repeat purchases.
Calling it a fire pit is because if done blindly, without full-chain capabilities, and only wanting quick money, private labels can easily become inventory burdens, reputation disasters, and even drag the company into a deeper crisis.
The private label sales share of China's TOP100 supermarkets was only about 5% in 2022, while Sam's Club and Hema have exceeded 30%. In the US market, this figure is 29%, and ALDI is as high as 80%.
The gap is obvious.
Therefore, private labels are good but a double-edged sword: used well, they are invincible; used poorly, they can hurt oneself.
Not buying cheap goods, but **selling good goods cheaply**
In the end, private label competition is ultimately competition in product power.
Consumers are becoming more rational, but rationality doesn't mean only seeking cheapness.
According to the "2023 McKinsey China Consumer Report," consumers want both cost performance and quality and functionality. So what they really want is "quality-price ratio"—choosing a better price at the same quality, or pursuing better quality at the same price.
Ernst & Young's consumer report also points out: 34% of consumers no longer prioritize traditional brands, and 88% believe brand information is disconnected from real needs. 81% of global consumers regard quality-price ratio as the most critical factor.
During consumption upgrading, the middle class is willing to pay for high-end, unique, and fresh; during rational consumption, high-cost-performance quality products are more popular.
People don't want to buy junk; they want to buy good products, and at a more worthwhile price.
In China, Gen Z is the main driver of this trend. About 37% are willing to try cross-category private labels, and "pingti" (affordable alternative) consumption has become a symbol of wisdom and frugality.
Those supermarkets that do well are precisely targeting this "refined frugality" and intelligent consumption trend.
Consumers choose channels based on different needs: buy imported fresh food at Hema, buy high-quality goods at Sam's Club, and save money with Pinduoduo.
Sam's Club (Beijing Shijingshan store) Photo: Douzhier
So for private labels to succeed, they cannot rely solely on low prices; they should truly focus on "goods." It's not just a "pingti card" but also a "high-configuration card."
Excellent private labels precisely meet this: no brand premium, no middleman markup, but uncompromised quality.
Supermarkets are also following the trend, moving toward hard discounts and private labels.
Hema and ALDI are building factories with local suppliers and going deep into the supply chain; Pangdonglai and Sam's Club strictly control quality and standards; Yonghui and Wumart are trying to remodel and test self-operated... all are exploring the same path: how to sell good goods cheaply.
Fighting a "value war" rather than a "price war" is the way out.
The "2023 China Supermarket Private Label Case Report" shows that although TOP100 supermarkets' private label sales share is only 5%, the well-performing supermarkets have significant proportions: Sam's Club about 30%, Hema 35%.
And this is also the general trend. Retailers, through private labels, are becoming powerful alternatives to traditional brands. They are closer to consumers, better able to discern needs, and better able to control costs and quality.
Whether it's streamlining SKUs or doing private labels, supply chain support is indispensable.
Hema promotes the "de-KA (key account) model," abandoning the "rent collection" model of hypermarkets and shifting to a user-demand-centered supply chain model; Yonghui cut 50% of its suppliers and implemented naked price direct procurement... all to restructure cost structures.
But currently, domestic private label competition is not yet mature. 42% of private label managers believe corporate strategy is vague; many retail enterprises simply do OEM labeling, with different packaging but identical content, lacking true product power.
The "China Private Label Development Research Report (2021)" points out that private labels from multiple retail enterprises actually come from the same supplier, not truly starting from consumer needs.
So in the future, the road is long and arduous.
What Will Future Supermarkets Compete On?
To break through, one must understand: competition in retail is no longer about "goods" and "place," but about "people."
Consumers have changed. They are more rational, smarter, more focused on quality-price ratio, and more eager to be treated sincerely.
They no longer blindly pay for brand premiums but look at real value: is it a good product? Is there good service? Is it worth the price?
So private labels are essentially a business about "trust."
Will I be willing to try the product you recommend? Can I trust the quality you promise? Do I think the price you set is fair?
Once trust is established, consumers will vote with their feet and return repeatedly. Each generation has its own marketplace, and each generation has its own trust.
Including, private labels are important because they force supermarkets to return to the fundamentals of business: who do you exist for?
Will you continue to be a "rent-collecting" sub-landlord, or transform into a "producing" retailer? Will you continue to sell others' goods, or start creating your own?
Private labels are not a shortcut but a heavier, slower path.
It requires supermarkets to shift from "rent-collecting" to "operating," from "selling shelves" to "selling products," from "selecting manufacturers" to "managing products."
Successful ones like ALDI, Costco, Sam's Club, and Pangdonglai have been exploring for many years and have mature systems. But most domestic supermarkets are still in the primary stage of OEM labeling.
But the trend is clear.
So whether it's private labels or hard discounts, they are just appearances. For retail enterprises to go far, they must ultimately return to a simple proposition: re-understand people.
Anthropologist Xiang Biao said: even if the virtual world is convenient, people still need to gain a sense of belonging through the "nearby." The "joy of shopping" provided by small shops, wet markets, and supermarkets is also a force from the nearby.
And this is precisely the blind spot of many traditional supermarkets. They often blindly pursue "goods" and "place," forgetting "people."
It wasn't until Pangdonglai became popular with its "people-oriented" approach that the industry gradually realized: emotion, preference, and experience are the keys to purchase decisions.
Pangdonglai Angel City store. Source: Pangdonglai official website.
Pangdonglai's success is not because its shelves are fuller or prices lower, but because it makes employees happy, moves customers, and rebuilds the warmth of the "nearby."
The success of Sam's Club and ALDI lies not in doing private labels, but in using private labels to regain consumer trust.
And trust comes from strict screening behind every product, sincere attitude in every service, and perception of cost performance in every transaction.
China's supermarket industry is undergoing a brutal elimination and rebirth.
Private labels are not a panacea, but they are a mirror, showing who is seriously doing retail and who is just coping with the times.
In the end, those that survive are not the fiercest beasts but the species most adaptable to the environment.
And for each of us ordinary people, business matters may be complex, but life is simple: "Whoever has good service, good products, and fair prices, I'll go to them."
Perhaps, whether private labels can succeed and whether supermarket transformation can succeed, the answer lies not in financial reports or conference tables, but in each consumer's shopping bag.
Next time you go to the supermarket, pay attention: will you casually pick up a private label product? Will you like the store more because of it?
That answer might be the future of Chinese retail.
Private labels are not the end, but one of the paths to "better retail."
And this path has just begun.
References: [1]. "Yonghui 'Slims Down' After Four Years of Losses, Retail Transformation Undercurrents: Where Is the Profit Turning Point | Financial Report Anomaly Perspective", Huaxia Times
[2]. "After More Than a Year of 'Pang Reform,' Why Is Yonghui Still Losing Over 200 Million?", Beijing News
[3]. "Pangdonglai 'Radically Reforms' Yonghui: A Win-Win Experiment Under the Spotlight", Southern Weekly
[4]. "Pangdonglai Universe", LatePost
[5]. "JD.com, Alibaba, Meituan 'Ecological Positioning' Discount Supermarkets: Private Labels Become Core Threshold", National Business Daily
[6]. "Another Giant Joins the Battle with Hema and Sam's Club", DT Business Observation
[7]. "Supermarket Industry Differentiation Accelerates: Who Will Rise, Who Will Be Eliminated?", 21st Century Business Herald
[8]. "Big Supermarkets Selling Everything Are Being Squeezed Out of City Centers?", New Weekly
[9]. "Are Private Labels a 'Trap'?", Retail Circle
[10]. "Three Revolutions in Chinese Supermarkets: Naked Procurement, Private Labels, Wide Categories Narrow Products", Retail Circle
[11]. "Private Labels Are Pushing Traditional Supermarkets into a 'Fire Pit'", Dao Zong You Li
[12]. "90% of Private Labels Fail Due to Blind Imitation", New Distribution
[13]. "Retail Outlook | Retailer Private Labels Become Consumer First Choice", WWD International Fashion Special


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## Citation metadata

- Publisher: New Distribution
- Author: 豆汁儿
- Published: 2025-10-10
- Canonical: https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/china-s-supermarkets-are-in-a-bloody-fight-07d3d7e1/
- Original source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/C1G8v5GewJiaFlJTri8e_g

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