---
title: "Can 'Jisu Da' Rescue Douyin E-commerce Trapped in Logistics?"
description: "Douyin E-commerce is testing a new delivery service called 'Jisu Da' (Extreme Speed Delivery) to achieve same-day delivery within the same city and next-day delivery in neighboring cities, partnering with major couriers like SF Express, JD, and ZTO. This move underscores Douyin's intensified efforts in logistics, as it faces challenges in both traditional express delivery and instant delivery, competing with platforms like Meituan."
author: "商隐社"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
telephone: "+8615854817671"
published: "2022-07-23"
language: "en"
canonical: "https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/can-jisu-da-rescue-douyin-e-commerce-trapped-in-logistics-712e87d8/"
markdown: "https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/can-jisu-da-rescue-douyin-e-commerce-trapped-in-logistics-712e87d8.md"
original_source: "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/9VpgVNxs2DOixbsG_GAziw"
translation: "https://xinjignxiao.com/zh/articles/%E5%9B%B0%E5%9C%A8%E7%89%A9%E6%B5%81%E9%87%8C%E7%9A%84%E6%8A%96%E9%9F%B3%E7%94%B5%E5%95%86-%E8%83%BD%E8%A2%AB-%E6%9E%81%E9%80%9F%E8%BE%BE-%E8%A7%A3%E6%95%91%E5%90%97-712e87d8.md"
attribution: "New Distribution — https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/can-jisu-da-rescue-douyin-e-commerce-trapped-in-logistics-712e87d8/"
usage_policy: "https://xinjignxiao.com/ai-policy.txt"
---

# Can 'Jisu Da' Rescue Douyin E-commerce Trapped in Logistics?

> Douyin E-commerce is testing a new delivery service called 'Jisu Da' (Extreme Speed Delivery) to achieve same-day delivery within the same city and next-day delivery in neighboring cities, partnering with major couriers like SF Express, JD, and ZTO. This move underscores Douyin's intensified efforts in logistics, as it faces challenges in both traditional express delivery and instant delivery, competing with platforms like Meituan.

********Click to read the original article for details********
**01**
**Douyin E-commerce's Logistics Journey**
Recently, media reported that Douyin E-commerce is testing a new delivery service called "Jisu Da" (Extreme Speed Delivery), aimed at achieving same-day delivery within the same city and next-day delivery in neighboring cities.
Currently, "Jisu Da" has partnered with mainstream couriers such as SF Express, JD, Tongda System (ZTO, YTO, STO, Yunda), and J&T Express, but only a few whitelisted merchants can activate it.
This indicates that Douyin is further intensifying its efforts in delivery experience and logistics management.
In fact, this is not the first time Douyin has invested in logistics. As early as two years ago, there were signs of Douyin entering the logistics sector.
Since 2020, Douyin has successively recruited executives and R&D personnel from logistics companies such as SF Express, JD, and Cainiao, including Wang Wei (who left Alibaba), Ou Liyong (responsible for Alibaba's New Retail Supply Chain Platform), and He Chuan (supply chain operations), all high-level employees.
In early 2021, media reported that Douyin E-commerce was laying out warehousing, acquiring land to build warehouses in multiple regions including Guangdong, Yunnan, Zhejiang, and Henan.
However, Kang Zeyu, President of Douyin E-commerce, later denied this, saying, "Currently, Douyin E-commerce is not engaged in warehousing or logistics, nor does it plan to build its own warehousing or logistics."
But two events a few months later proved Kang's denial false.
First, in July 2021, Douyin established a food delivery business team and quietly conducted business tests within the Douyin app, named "Xindong Waimai" (Heartbeat Delivery), with the slogan "Heartbeat Delivery, Eat What You Love," focusing on instant delivery.
Second, in August 2021, Douyin successively established two companies related to logistics and supply chain: Shanghai Daoqu Yuewu Logistics Technology Co., Ltd. and Shanghai Xingchen Yuedong Supply Chain Management Co., Ltd. The latter has cooperated with Yunda Cloud Warehouse to set up origin warehouses. This is focusing on traditional express delivery.
Douyin's foray into logistics did not stop there.
In January this year, to reduce return rates caused by logistics issues and increase user repurchase rates, Douyin E-commerce tested the express service "Yinzunda," cooperating with ZTO, YTO, Yunda, etc., to solve problems like delivery to door and priority delivery at the end.
However, reports suggest that "Yinzunda" did not promote well; due to complex assessments and low delivery fees, many outlets voluntarily shut down the feature.
After contacting Douyin, Shangyin She received a reply: "Yinzunda" might cause significant losses for merchants, so it is not recommended for merchants to activate it.
"Yinzunda" failed at its first attempt. In mid-to-early June this year, Douyin was exposed to be starting a self-operated business similar to JD Super, called "Dou Super Delivery to Door," piloting in cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou.
Douyin's self-operated project team hopes that "Dou Super Delivery to Door" can penetrate the young, high-income group in first- and second-tier cities to increase the frequency of users using Douyin E-commerce, initially testing two main categories: alcohol and fresh food.
Less than a month later, Douyin launched the "Jisu Da" service, even promising "same-day delivery within the same city, next-day delivery in neighboring cities."
It is easy to see that Douyin is simultaneously intensifying efforts in both "national express delivery" and "instant delivery."
Why does Douyin want to do logistics so much?
**02**
**E-commerce Ultimately Competes on Logistics**
In fact, it's not just Douyin that wants to do logistics; all e-commerce platforms have to get involved in logistics. **Logistics is the final battlefield for all e-commerce.**
Alibaba initially did not do logistics, which was determined by its early business model.
Taobao's goal was to attract merchants to solve the problem of insufficient supply, then stimulate the platform's openness and activity through a series of advertising and promotions, increase effective demand, and ultimately achieve scale benefits for the trading platform.
In other words, Taobao did not participate in product transactions in its early days; it only provided a large-scale platform, and product supply resources were provided by third-party sellers, so logistics was not its top priority.
But by 2012, the national express delivery service business volume above designated size reached 5.69 billion parcels. Ma Yun said 3.7 billion of those were done by Alibaba. On the day of "Double 11" that year, the parcel volume exceeded 78 million, and no single or several logistics companies could digest Alibaba's huge logistics demand.
Moreover, at that time, Tmall and Taobao had become socialized trading platforms, requiring socialized logistics to match. This led to the establishment of Cainiao Network in 2013, jointly formed by Alibaba and "Three Tong and One Da" (ZTO, YTO, STO, Yunda).
Unlike Alibaba, JD took a completely different path from the start: self-built logistics.
Taobao started with C2C, while JD started with B2C. The biggest difference between C2C and B2C is that the former mainly sells traffic, while the latter mainly sells services. Traffic and services are also the moats for their respective growth. For JD, if it didn't even control logistics, its goods sent from its platform would be lost in the ocean of express delivery, with no differentiation, so how could it talk about service?
Behind such a choice, there was also some helplessness.
Initially, before JD built its own logistics, it relied on "Four Tong and One Da" for transportation. At that time, "Four Tong and One Da" were still in a stage of crazy development, making it difficult to control delivery quality.
But JD started by selling 3C digital products, which are valuable. Theft and damage during express delivery occurred frequently. JD could not bear such losses, and logistics directly determined whether 3C online shopping could proceed smoothly. Taking control of logistics became an important step.
After Pinduoduo's rise, e-commerce had developed relatively maturely. On the logistics front, JD's self-operated logistics was thriving, and Alibaba's Cainiao Network was also quite effective. What did Pinduoduo do?
Pinduoduo initially favored an "asset-light" logistics model. Founder Huang Zheng once publicly stated:
"We will not do procurement, nor touch logistics and delivery. Alibaba has done well, why should we do it?"
But later, with the massive orders brought by the rapidly growing GMV on Pinduoduo's platform and the rapidly increasing user base, Pinduoduo's logistics ambitions could no longer be hidden.
In August 2019, Huang Zheng stated at an earnings call that Pinduoduo was developing a "New Logistics" technology platform, which would adopt an asset-light, open model, focusing on providing solutions for merchants and users through technology.
Simply put, it uses AI route planning, IoT devices, automated warehouse risk control, real-time positioning, and other technologies to further optimize the overall efficiency of the logistics industry.
This seems similar to what Cainiao Network initially did. But unlike Cainiao, Pinduoduo focuses more on agriculture—the "New Logistics" platform will remain open to solve existing logistics and supply chain challenges, including dispersed and inefficient agricultural product transportation.
After Chen Lei succeeded Huang Zheng as chairman, he further intensified efforts in agricultural product logistics.
**From traditional e-commerce to social e-commerce, whether Taobao, JD, or Pinduoduo, all have experienced logistics pains, and Douyin is no exception.**
Since 2018, Douyin has made moves in e-commerce, launching the "Shopping Cart" button, cooperating with Taobao to jump to Taobao's product pages for shopping, making its initial e-commerce attempt.
Two years later, on the day of the 618 shopping festival, Douyin established an independent e-commerce department, began rapid iteration, and successively launched Douyin Shop, Douyin Pay, and Douyin Mall, inviting various brands to settle in and signing Luo Yonghao for live-streaming sales.
By October last year, Douyin completely broke up with Taobao, and all products were directly transacted through Douyin Shop in a closed loop, without jumping to third parties.
Douyin E-commerce's GMV for the full year 2020 exceeded 500 billion yuan, more than tripling from 2019. Analysts estimate its 2021 GMV exceeded 800 billion yuan, approaching one trillion.
What does a trillion GMV mean?
To achieve this number, Alibaba took 9 years, JD took 14 years, and Pinduoduo took 4 years.
Currently, Douyin is undoubtedly the fourth-largest e-commerce platform. But it must also be admitted that logistics is one of the bottlenecks restricting Douyin E-commerce's development.
Douyin's e-commerce positioning has always been clear—interest e-commerce.
Interest e-commerce is a type of e-commerce based on people's yearning for a better life, satisfying users' potential shopping interests, and improving consumers' quality of life.
Traditional e-commerce is characterized by "people looking for goods," "search logic," and "shelf scenarios"; interest e-commerce is characterized by "goods looking for people," "recommendation logic," and "information flow scenarios."
In traditional e-commerce, users have existing needs, actively search for goods, and then place orders. In interest e-commerce, users have no purchase intention initially, but through short videos and live streams, their pain points are raised, stimulating interest in products, leading to purchases.
But the question is, is interest enough to complete a transaction?
After all, there is no natural, direct connection between interest and shopping; it is just a small step before people initiate a purchase. According to the "AIMDIA" model, there are many steps between interest and purchase.
The so-called AIMDIA (Attention, Interest, Memory, Desire, Impulse, Action) refers to six stages: attention, interest, memory, desire, impulse, and purchase. That is, to achieve "purchase due to interest," it is necessary to continuously stimulate through short videos and live streams, strengthen cognition of the product through interest, and generate purchase impulses through repeated exposure and inducement.
If Douyin wants to complete such a closed loop, AIMDIA is just a model, a superstructure, and its foundation must be "trust." Without trust, users, even if interested, will go to platforms they trust more to buy.
Achieving trust requires doing well in the key elements of e-commerce: "products, traffic, payment, and logistics."
Currently, Douyin has sufficient overall traffic, and the payment link has been connected, but the variety of products still lags behind Taobao and JD. Through the development of the e-commerce ecosystem, more merchants and brands will gradually settle in.
Among the four elements, only logistics has not formed a closed loop, which is Douyin's real pain point. Currently, the process from short video/live-streaming sales to user orders, shopping cart, and payment has been connected, but warehouses, express delivery, and delivery links have not been effectively connected.
In addition to the poor logistics delivery experience mentioned above, Douyin's logistics also has its unique problems, arising from live-streaming sales, which account for a large portion of Douyin's GMV.
For example, a user may place multiple orders in the same live room, generating multiple orders with the same address that cannot be combined. This fundamentally increases the workload for express delivery.
Moreover, live-streaming sales models vary, generally divided into three types: individual live streaming cooperating with manufacturers, manufacturers selling directly through live streaming, and MCN professional live-streaming teams. Each model requires different personalized logistics services.
In recent years, the e-commerce industry has gradually seen diminishing dividends and entered a stage of stock competition. Coupled with the uncertainty brought by repeated epidemics, providing high-quality services and ensuring order fulfillment capabilities has become the theme of the second half of e-commerce competition.
Therefore, for Douyin to do e-commerce, it needs reliable logistics.
**03**
**Competition with Meituan in Instant Delivery**
**In addition to far-field e-commerce, Douyin is also laying out local life services, a type of near-field e-commerce. Correspondingly, it is not only involved in traditional express delivery but also instant delivery.**
Since 2018, Douyin has frequently made moves in the local life sector.
Douyin formed a luxurious POI team, hoping to use POI to carry rich forms of grass-planting videos and snatch some local life merchants from Meituan.
The so-called POI is Point Of Interest. Simply put, it is the link between short videos and stores. Users clicking on the POI in a video can enter the store information page, get the store address, business hours, and other information, and also directly receive brand coupons/activity coupons.
In April 2019, Douyin also launched a feature-rich "Merchant" page. Through the merchant page, users can see various promotional and discount information at a glance.
The efforts of the previous two years did not stir up much of a splash, but the unexpected "black swan" event brought a turning point.
The sudden epidemic made local life the most impacted industry. Everyone was trapped at home, so new ways like "cloud rave" and "cloud shopping" emerged, bringing a wave of traffic and activity.
Various small and medium merchants came to grab Douyin as a "lifeline," and the number of enterprise accounts rose rapidly.
Douyin made a concerted effort, launching a series of actions around local life, such as group buying, hotel booking, ticket booking, and establishing "local direct operation centers."
While Douyin's local life was developing in full swing, the problem of instant delivery was also exposed.
Earlier, it was rumored that Douyin had a food delivery business. Actually, it was not a food delivery business; it was due to the epidemic that users' group buying could not be consumed offline, so they had to verify online, with third-party delivery platforms or merchants delivering themselves.
Without its own delivery platform or cooperation with third-party platforms, the shortcomings of instant delivery will inevitably cause trouble for users and merchants.
From this perspective, Douyin's entry into the instant delivery field is also an inevitable trend.
Corresponding to Douyin's dual approach in "interest e-commerce" and "local life," Douyin has to simultaneously intensify efforts in both "national express delivery" and "instant delivery." The currently hotly discussed "Jisu Da" is an attempt by Douyin to improve logistics efficiency.
When it comes to same-day and next-day delivery, we might first think of JD Logistics and SF Express.
As of the end of 2021, JD Logistics operated over 1,300 warehouses and more than 1,700 cloud warehouses, with a total area of 24 million square meters. It burned cash in the early stage and used the "storage instead of transportation" model to achieve same-day delivery.
SF Express focuses on aviation to achieve same-day delivery. As of the end of 2020, SF Express had 75 all-cargo aircraft and obtained belly space resources for over 2,000 routes from airlines, shipping 1.67 million tons annually. In aviation logistics, it can be said that SF Express has an absolute advantage.
How can Douyin promise same-day delivery without its own logistics system?
In fact, Douyin's "same-day delivery" is completely different from JD and SF's. It is just a symbolic promise that merchants can choose. It is a label for products that can guarantee same-day delivery to promote user orders; products that cannot guarantee same-day or next-day delivery do not choose this service.
The Douyin E-commerce Academy Learning Center clearly states the activation steps for "Jisu Da": enter warehouse code, warehouse name, and warehouse address to create a warehouse; select the delivery area range for the warehouse; select the delivery time promise that can be committed.
**In the end, Douyin relies on third-party logistics, labeling areas that can meet same-day delivery with the same-day delivery label. Although this method can stimulate user orders and meet user psychological expectations, it is obviously a temporary solution, not a fundamental one.**
Small fixes like "Jisu Da" and "Yinzunda" cannot realize Douyin's logistics dream; deep involvement in logistics may be the only way.
**04**
**Is Douyin Too Late to Enter Logistics?**
In the traditional express industry, the franchise-based "Tongda System" has dominated for decades, while the direct-operated JD and SF Express take the high-end route. In the instant delivery field, Meituan Fast Delivery and Ele.me's Fengniao Delivery directly occupy 70% of the market share. Does Douyin still have a chance to enter now?
**As the saying goes, the best time to plant a tree was ten years ago; the second best time is now.**
Unexpected things have repeatedly happened in history. Everyone thought the national express delivery industry pattern was set, but J&T Express emerged suddenly; everyone thought the world of "Four Tong and One Da" was stable, but Best Express cooled down.
First, let's talk about traditional express delivery.
Currently, the national express delivery models are mainly divided into direct-operated and franchise. Self-operated logistics means that the ownership and management rights of all logistics links are controlled by the enterprise itself. This allows all nodes in the network to provide non-differentiated high-standard operations, improving logistics efficiency and experience.
The problem is that this is costly. JD's self-built logistics lost money for over a decade, and Douyin, facing sluggish advertising revenue growth and increasing anxiety, obviously cannot afford to build its own logistics.
Franchise logistics shares the ownership and management rights of outlets. The company headquarters directly controls the transfer centers, then sets up outlets in various cities by region, recruiting franchisees for outlets. Franchisees need to fund and operate the outlet, delivering goods from the transfer center.
So, in this model, the express company and the terminal outlets are in a cooperative relationship. The franchise model allows express companies to expand rapidly, so the Tongda System quickly secured its position. But this also brings a series of drawbacks.
For example, the company headquarters has loose management over outlets and cannot provide high-quality services. We often see in the news chaos such as violent sorting, severe delays, forcing users to sign before inspection, customer information leaks, and franchisees absconding with funds.
Because of the inherent drawbacks of franchise logistics, there is room for Cainiao Network to integrate.
Cainiao first made some "unifications."
It developed electronic waybills to unify the format of express waybill numbers, giving the industry a consistent standard format for easy management and tracking.
It also developed a backend system responsible for intelligent warehousing and intelligent delivery, providing backend support to these partners, thereby greatly improving their efficiency and reducing costs.
In addition, like JD, Cainiao also built warehousing and terminal networks, building warehouses at key nodes or integrating idle warehousing resources as forward warehouses to improve delivery efficiency; in the "last mile" delivery link, it built a network of Cainiao Stations and self-pickup cabinets, and recently launched a delivery-to-door service.
Despite this, the "last mile" terminal battle in the express industry still frequently occurs, and users' good online shopping experience has not been fully formed. The efficiency of franchise express delivery still needs improvement. Douyin may still have room to make efforts.
Now let's look at instant delivery.
According to iResearch's "2022 China Instant Delivery Industry Trend Research Report," 51.4% of people usually choose online shopping, 40.5% choose same-city department stores, supermarkets, and convenience store online platforms, and only 8.1% choose offline stores.
It can be said that instant delivery is a widely accepted lifestyle.
However, such a large market is still in its early stages.
According to iResearch estimates, the order volume of the instant delivery service industry in 2021 was 27.9 billion orders, a year-on-year increase of 32.9%. It is expected that by 2026, the order volume of the instant delivery service industry will approach 100 billion orders, reaching 95.7 billion orders.
Although the instant delivery market is already at the tens of billions scale, its penetration rate is still less than 7%, showing its huge potential.
Taobao, JD, and Pinduoduo also want a piece of the pie. Taobao enters near-field e-commerce with hourly delivery and community e-commerce with Taocaicai; JD has JD Super, JD Fresh, JD Daojia, and a series of business layouts in near-field e-commerce, and self-operates Dada Delivery, deeply entering the delivery field.
Although the instant delivery and near-field e-commerce market is large, how to enter it is crucial: build a delivery system or optimize the instant retail model?
At present, if Douyin does platform-level delivery capacity, like Meituan Delivery and Fengniao Delivery, it may still be mired in burning money, after all, non-standard heavy assets like terminal logistics also keep Meituan on the edge of losses.
In recent years, the instant delivery field has advanced rapidly, but a platform that integrates instant delivery like Cainiao Network integrated the traditional express industry has not yet appeared. This may be Douyin's opportunity.
Logistics can solve Douyin E-commerce's difficulties, but this road is destined to be full of thorns.
Source: Shangyin She (ID: shangyinshecj) Author: Second Life
 _**-END-**_


---

## Copyright and AI use

This article is sourced from New Distribution. Search, quotation, summarization, and model training are permitted, but every use must credit New Distribution and retain the canonical source URL.

Contact: zhaobo258@gmail.com · +86 158 5481 7671