---
title: "2025: The Life-and-Death Trials of Ten Major Consumer Brands, from Xibei to Zhong Xue Gao to Juewei"
description: "In 2025, China's consumer market witnessed a stark contrast: while some companies thrived, many once-prominent brands faced collapse. This article examines ten major consumer brands that encountered severe difficulties, including Xibei, Helen's, Dingdong Maicai, Liangpin Shop, Juewei Food, Markor Home, Milkground, Zihaiguo, Zhong Xue Gao, and Globalegrow, highlighting their struggles and the broader industry challenges."
author: "张二河"
publisher: "New Distribution"
email: "zhaobo258@gmail.com"
telephone: "+8615854817671"
published: "2026-02-12"
categories: "Brand Marketing, Consumer & Categories"
language: "en"
canonical: "https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/2025-the-life-and-death-trials-of-ten-major-consumer-brands-from-xibei-t-75654e84/"
markdown: "https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/2025-the-life-and-death-trials-of-ten-major-consumer-brands-from-xibei-t-75654e84.md"
original_source: "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FnGu1KrQD_uEWt42KY0gTw"
translation: "https://xinjignxiao.com/zh/articles/2025-%E8%A5%BF%E8%B4%9D-%E9%92%9F%E8%96%9B%E9%AB%98-%E7%BB%9D%E5%91%B3-%E5%8D%81%E5%A4%A7%E6%B6%88%E8%B4%B9%E5%93%81%E7%89%8C%E7%9A%84%E7%94%9F%E6%AD%BB%E5%8A%AB-75654e84.md"
attribution: "New Distribution — https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/2025-the-life-and-death-trials-of-ten-major-consumer-brands-from-xibei-t-75654e84/"
citation: "张二河. “2025: The Life-and-Death Trials of Ten Major Consumer Brands, from Xibei to Zhong Xue Gao to Juewei.” New Distribution, 2026-02-12. https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/2025-the-life-and-death-trials-of-ten-major-consumer-brands-from-xibei-t-75654e84/"
usage_policy: "https://xinjignxiao.com/ai-policy.txt"
---

# 2025: The Life-and-Death Trials of Ten Major Consumer Brands, from Xibei to Zhong Xue Gao to Juewei

> In 2025, China's consumer market witnessed a stark contrast: while some companies thrived, many once-prominent brands faced collapse. This article examines ten major consumer brands that encountered severe difficulties, including Xibei, Helen's, Dingdong Maicai, Liangpin Shop, Juewei Food, Markor Home, Milkground, Zihaiguo, Zhong Xue Gao, and Globalegrow, highlighting their struggles and the broader industry challenges.

**Source** | Blue Shark Consumer
Zhang Erhe: A Song of Ice and Fire
Looking back at 2025 from the starting point of 2026, China's consumer market presents an unprecedented "Song of Ice and Fire" scene.
If you only look at the A-side, this seems to be "the best of times." The gong at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange rang repeatedly as new tea drink giants rushed to the secondary market. The stock prices of Mixue Ice City, Pop Mart, and Laopu Gold followed a soaring curve that even tech stocks would envy.
However, turning to the B-side, 2025 was a brutal "great elimination." Former "unicorns" collapsed one after another, from the final liquidation of "ice cream assassin" Zhong Xue Gao to the complete exit of "first bakery stock" Christine, and countless internet-famous restaurant brands that had raised over 100 million yuan closed stores, owed wages, and went bankrupt in the cold wind of 2025.
Moreover, traditional industries such as baijiu, which had been booming, also underwent deep adjustment. Under the intertwined forces of policy regulation, consumption iteration, and oversupply, challenges such as production overcapacity, weakening consumption momentum, and intensified channel conflicts erupted in 2025, giving the baijiu industry a clear cyclical downturn.
In 2025, which companies encountered difficulties on the road to dawn?
** _The Collapse of Ten Major Consumer Brands_**
**1. Xibei: The Boss Who "Refuses to Admit Defeat"**
If anyone was at the center of the storm in 2025, Xibei might be one. This veteran restaurant group, which has weathered over 30 years of ups and downs, suddenly fell into a trust crisis in 2025.
The turning point occurred on September 10, 2025. Well-known figure Luo Yonghao publicly voiced on social media that he and colleagues found "almost all pre-made dishes" when dining at Xibei, and bluntly stated that the dishes were overpriced. He further called for legislation to mandate that merchants label the use of pre-made dishes, quickly pushing Xibei into the public eye.
Facing a wave of skepticism, Jia Guolong adopted a tough response strategy. Not only did he film videos at stores, vowing "I would rather not do business than not sue Luo Yonghao to the end," he even mobilized 18,000 employees to participate in "fighting against online trolls."
To prove his innocence, Xibei opened its kitchens nationwide for media visits. However, the bagged chicken soup, frozen fish, and broccoli with a two-year shelf life shown in the livestream contradicted Jia Guolong's claim of "not a single pre-made dish."
Under continuous operational pressure, Xibei was forced to initiate self-rescue. The founder "went silent," significantly cut prices and concessions, and launched kitchen transparency reforms, which brought some short-term results. However, as Jia Guolong confirmed the closure of 102 stores nationwide and again "opened fire" on Luo Yonghao, another wave of public opinion about Xibei's "pre-made dishes" surged.
Boss Jia's "refusal to admit defeat" led to repeated exposure of the contradiction between Xibei's "handmade fresh cooking" promotion and its central kitchen reheating model, causing the long-established trust foundation to collapse.
It is worth noting that over the past decade, Xibei has invested heavily in incubating new brands but with little success. From Oat Workshop, Maixiang Village, and Super Roujiamo to Kung Fu Cuisine and Jia Guolong Chinese Burger, none successfully established a second growth curve.
**2. Helen's: Market Value Down 97%**
The halo of "first stock of small pubs" is increasingly distant from Helen's. In 2021, hours after listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Helen's market value surged past 30 billion yuan. But now, Helen's market value is only 1.126 billion Hong Kong dollars, down 97% from its first day of listing.
Helen's difficulties were already apparent during its aggressive expansion in previous years. When Helen's store count surged from 351 in 2020 to 782, costs for raw materials, labor, and rent all soared. In 2021, Helen's net loss reached 230 million yuan.
When offline operations completely "halted" in 2022, Helen's path of exchanging scale for profit also stalled. In 2022, Helen's opened 179 new pubs and closed 194. The closure of 194 stores resulted in one-time asset impairment losses and disposal losses of over 800 million yuan.
In subsequent days, Helen's tried opening barbecue restaurants; tried focusing on lower-tier markets, continuing to attract small-town youth with cost-effectiveness; and shifted from a heavy-asset model dominated by direct operations to one leaning toward franchising... but the actual results remained minimal.
Taking the focus on lower-tier markets as an example, in the first half of 2025, Helen's store count in third-tier and below cities increased to 402, accounting for nearly 70% of total stores, a significant increase from 323 in the same period of 2024. However, profitability in lower-tier markets is concerning. In the first half of 2025, average daily sales per store in lower-tier markets were only 7,700 yuan, a slight improvement from 7,200 yuan in the same period last year, but growth momentum was clearly insufficient.
Over-reliance on a single business model and low-price strategy is Helen's core problem. Low-priced alcoholic drinks reduce the social cost for young people but also bring ongoing cost management challenges. At the same time, Helen's mainly sells its own brand beer and beverages. In today's market where consumers seek diverse and personalized tipsy experiences, product innovation is insufficient.
**3. Dingdong Maicai Under Siege by Giants**
In November 2025, Dingdong Maicai released its third-quarter earnings, achieving Non-GAAP profitability for twelve consecutive quarters. However, Wall Street reacted coldly. Its stock price has plummeted over 90% from its early listing high of nearly $46, with market value hovering below $500 million.
Dingdong Maicai's story was once a rhapsody about scale. In 2021, its front-warehouse count approached 1,400, covering 37 large and medium-sized cities across the country, and it was known as one of the "two front-warehouse heroes" alongside Miss Fresh. When Miss Fresh suddenly collapsed in 2022 due to a broken capital chain, it poured icy water on the entire industry. Dingdong Maicai had to turn around and initiate a multi-year contraction.
Since 2022, it has successively withdrawn from Tianjin, Anhui, Hebei, Chengdu, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and other places. Now, its business has fully retreated to the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Shanghai region, shifting from "big and comprehensive" to forced "small and beautiful." This "cutting off the arm to survive" brought profitability but also completely extinguished capital market expectations for a national platform and high-speed growth.
What's more terrifying is the "dimensional reduction attack" from internet giants. In 2025, Meituan, Alibaba, and JD.com launched an instant retail war, investing tens of billions in subsidies. Their fresh produce order volumes grew significantly, severely diverting users and orders from vertical platforms.
As the instant retail war intensified, on February 5, 2026, it was revealed that Dingdong Maicai was sold to Meituan for $717 million (approximately 5 billion yuan). This may be its best ending.
**4. Liangpin Shop: Two Failed "Sell-Outs"**
On the evening of December 16, 2025, an announcement pushed Liangpin Shop into the spotlight again: Guangzhou Light Industry gave up taking control of Liangpin Shop, requested termination of the equity transfer agreement, and claimed 20.73 million yuan in compensation. This was another capital exit following the "withdrawal" of Changjiang International Trade under Wuhan State-owned Assets in October 2025.
Within a year, two failed "sell-outs" reflect the harsh reality behind Liangpin Shop: its stock price fell all year, store count decreased by over a thousand in two years, and performance fell into overall losses.
In the first three quarters of 2025, Liangpin Shop achieved revenue of 4.14 billion yuan, a sharp year-on-year decline of 24.45%; net profit attributable to the parent turned to a loss of 122 million yuan, down 730.83% year-on-year.
What's more concerning is cash flow and operational efficiency. Inventory turnover days in the first three quarters lengthened from 35.13 days in the same period last year to 45.97 days, an increase of over 10 days. This means the ability to monetize inventory has weakened, and the company may be facing product overstock.
The once-relied-upon extensive offline network is rapidly shrinking. As of the end of Q3 2025, Liangpin Shop had only 2,227 stores nationwide. This is a decrease of 1,117 stores from 3,344 at the end of Q3 2023.
The quality control risks brought by the OEM model also frequently appear. On the Black Cat Complaint platform, there are over a thousand complaints about Liangpin Shop, mostly involving foreign objects in food, mold, and deterioration.
This once industry benchmark representing "premium snacks" seems to have not yet found its lifebuoy in the wave of consumption trends shifting toward extreme cost-effectiveness.
**5. The "Duck Neck King" Gets a Special Treatment Label**
On September 23, 2025, the stock abbreviation of Juewei Food, the former "duck neck king," was changed to "ST Juewei," officially receiving the "other risk warning" label. The stock hit the limit down on the opening that day. From the high point of a market value exceeding 63.5 billion yuan in 2021 to now shrinking by over 80%, with the stock price down over 85% from its peak, Juewei's fall is clear and cruel.
The direct reason for the label is five years of financial "distortion"—between 2017 and 2021, the company failed to recognize revenue from franchise store decoration business, resulting in understated revenue in annual reports, and was eventually fined 8.5 million yuan by regulators.
The regulatory sword only tore open a corner of this ten-thousand-store giant's predicament. In the first three quarters of 2025, Juewei Food delivered its toughest report card since listing—revenue was 4.26 billion yuan, down 15.04% year-on-year; net profit attributable to the parent was 280 million yuan, a sharp decline of 36.07%. This is the second consecutive year the company has faced a "double decline in revenue and profit."
The accelerated departure of franchisees became Juewei's most glaring wound in 2025. Data shows that as of early October 2025, Juewei had only about 10,600 stores in operation. This means that in less than a year, its total store count decreased by over 5,000. The batch closures directly led to a reduction of nearly 700 million yuan in core marinated food sales revenue in the first three quarters of 2025.
As leisure snack brands like Three Squirrels and Wangxiaolu continue to erode the traditional marinated snack market share through portable packaging and online marketing, Juewei's long-term reliance on old products like duck neck and duck feet appears outdated in the face of emerging new products like tiger-skin chicken feet and hot-marinated mixed noodles.
**6. "First Stock of High-End Home Furnishings" with Losses Exceeding 1.6 Billion Yuan**
On the evening of December 17, 2025, Markor Home, the former "first stock of high-end home furnishings," announced plans for a cross-industry acquisition of control of a Shenzhen high-speed copper cable leader. This seemingly ordinary business announcement is actually the last lifeline thrown by a veteran home furnishing company with cumulative losses exceeding 1.6 billion yuan, mired in wage arrears, store closures, and debt crisis, toward a completely unfamiliar technology field.
Markor Home's financial data tells a story of successive defeats. From 2022 to 2024, the company accumulated losses exceeding 1.6 billion yuan, with losses expanding year by year. In the first three quarters of 2025, the situation did not improve; revenue continued to decline, and although net profit attributable to the parent narrowed losses by 50.04% year-on-year, it still lost 220 million yuan.
As a high-end brand centered on "Markor Home" direct-operated stores, stores were once the lifeline for brand image and sales. However, data shows that its domestic direct-operated store count decreased from 141 in 2023 to 111 in 2024, closing 30 stores in one year. In the first half of 2025, another 4 inefficient stores were closed. Franchise stores contracted even more severely, from 293 to 216.
Continuous losses and channel contraction pushed Markor Home into a serious capital chain crisis. As of the end of June 2025, the company's monetary funds were only 156 million yuan. But during the same period, short-term borrowings and non-current liabilities due within one year totaled as high as 1.83 billion yuan. This means the company's cash reserves are far from sufficient to cover upcoming debts.
The broken capital chain directly triggered a social crisis. In 2025, Markor Home and its core brand "Markor Home" were exposed for large-scale wage arrears involving over 200 employees, with total arrears exceeding 10 million yuan. Some employees had been delayed pay since 2024, with arrears lasting several months. Dozens of suppliers' payments were delayed. Tianyancha data shows that Markor Home had far more new court announcements in 2025 than in previous years, mostly involving labor disputes and contract disputes.
Entering early 2026, Markor Home's adjustments became more drastic. The company disclosed that its two wholly-owned subsidiaries have suspended production since January 1, 2026. These two factories mainly serve internal customers, but in recent years, capacity utilization averaged less than 20%, with combined losses of 68 million yuan in the first three quarters of 2025.
**7. Milkground: Founder Ousted**
As a company that once had a market value exceeding 30 billion yuan, Milkground saw its founder "invited" out of the board by capital at the start of 2026.
In terms of performance, Milkground is not "inferior." In the first three quarters of 2025, Milkground achieved revenue of 3.957 billion yuan and net profit of 176 million yuan, with the latter soaring 106.88% year-on-year.
However, the "improvement" in performance did not come from enhanced market competitiveness but relied on unsustainable cost dividends and expense reductions.
Since 2023, the company has significantly cut marketing expenses. But this practice of "sacrificing long-term brand building for short-term profits" has begun to affect market share—in the first half of 2025, the company's cheese category market share fell from 28% to 24%, gradually eroded by competitors.
Nearly 70% of Milkground's revenue depends on cheese stick products, and about 70% of China's cheese market is also supported by "children's cheese sticks." However, with the collective entry of dairy giants, the former blue ocean market has become a red ocean of fierce competition, and the average price of cheese sticks has also declined year-on-year.
It is worth noting that founder Chai Xiu once set an ambitious "military order": from 2025 to 2027, the company's cumulative revenue target is no less than 19.9 billion yuan. This means the company needs to maintain a revenue growth rate of no less than 16% per year.
But from actual operating data, this target is almost impossible to achieve. In the first half of 2025, Milkground achieved revenue of 2.567 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of only 7.98%, less than half of the target growth rate. In the third quarter of 2025, the company's revenue was 1.39 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 14.22%, and its core cheese business revenue in Q3 was 1.166 billion yuan, up 22% year-on-year. Despite the improvement, there is still a gap from the target growth rate.
This may be one of the reasons for Chai Xiu's ouster. But it is worth noting that on the same day the founder was dismissed, another announcement from Milkground revealed that due to debt issues related to the M&A fund, Chai Xiu had not fulfilled her previous compensation commitment, and the company had filed for arbitration.
The announcement stated that because Shanghai Xiangmin Equity Investment Fund Partnership (Limited Partnership) (referred to as the "M&A Fund"), in which the company holds a stake, and its subordinate entities guaranteed Jilin Yaohu Economic and Trade Co., Ltd., which failed to repay its debt to Inner Mongolia Mengniu Dairy (Group) Co., Ltd. (referred to as "Inner Mongolia Mengniu"), Inner Mongolia Mengniu has obtained arbitration support and has the right to priority repayment from the realization of the relevant guaranteed equity.
Milkground stated that Chai Xiu had previously provided a written explanation and promised that if Milkground suffered losses due to the M&A fund guarantee, she would provide full compensation to ensure the company suffered no losses. But to date, Chai Xiu has neither fulfilled this compensation commitment nor provided a clear performance plan.
If this debt default of up to 700 million yuan cannot be recovered, Milkground's profit level will hit its lowest point since listing. This may be the most direct reason for Chai Xiu's ouster.
**8. Zihaiguo: The Collapse of a 7.5 Billion Yuan "Top Internet Celebrity"**
Zihaiguo, the former "top internet celebrity," is on the brink of bankruptcy.
Currently, Zihaiguo's related company Hangzhou Jinlingyang has 6 pieces of information as a person subject to enforcement, with enforced amounts exceeding 140 million yuan; historical enforcement information totals 16 items, with cumulative amounts exceeding 320 million yuan; there are also 9 pieces of information on dishonest persons subject to enforcement, involving amounts over 58.79 million yuan, and 26 pieces of equity freeze information.
Once, as a synonym for the "eating alone" scenario, Zihaiguo set multiple industry records: its Tmall flagship store exceeded 100 million yuan in sales in 21 minutes and sold 5 million products in 10 minutes.
Between 2018 and 2021, Hangzhou Jinlingyang completed five rounds of financing, with total financing exceeding 550 million yuan. Driven by the market and capital, Zihaiguo's valuation reached as high as $500 million in 2020, and in 2021 it was claimed to exceed $1 billion (approximately 7.5 billion yuan).
Beneath the surface prosperity, undercurrents were already stirring. Zihaiguo emphasized marketing over products, with a fragile moat. In 2021, Zihaiguo's brand promotion expenses reached 156 million yuan, and operational promotion expenses were 89.57 million yuan, together accounting for nearly 25% of revenue. But product complaints were continuous, with over 600 complaints on the Black Cat platform. Additionally, a box of Zihaiguo typically sold for 30-40 yuan. At this price, one could order a decent malatang takeout in a first-tier city. Consumers began to calculate: "Is it really worth spending 40 yuan on a bunch of seasoning packs and vermicelli?"
When social life returned to normal in 2022 and takeout became convenient again, consumer demand for "stockpiling" and "self-heating" plummeted, and the market's growth rate fell off a cliff.
To compete for market share, brands fell into a brutal price war. The average price of self-heating hot pot fell from 17.28 yuan in Q1 2023 to 15.42 yuan in Q4 2024; self-heating rice fell from 13.49 yuan to less than 12 yuan.
At the same time, white-label products on platforms like Pinduoduo and Douyin, leveraging extreme cost-effectiveness (average price less than 7 yuan), rose rapidly, delivering a "dimensional reduction attack" on brands like Zihaiguo.
The collapse of Zihaiguo in 2025 is like a mirror reflecting the common predicament in the new consumption wave.
**9. Zhong Xue Gao: Heading Toward Bankruptcy**
In July 2025, the Shanghai Third Intermediate People's Court issued an announcement that, due to inability to repay due debts and assets insufficient to cover all debts, Zhong Xue Gao Food (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. was applied for bankruptcy by creditors. This internet-famous brand, once hailed as the "Hermès of ice cream," went from its founding in 2018 to bankruptcy in 2025, taking only seven years.
Once, Zhong Xue Gao's iconic tile-shaped ice cream was available across online and offline channels, with sales exceeding 1 billion yuan in 2021. But after the "won't melt when burned" and "ice cream assassin" public opinion storms in 2022, the company quickly fell into trouble.
Zhong Xue Gao's difficulties first stemmed from a serious disconnect between its price positioning and product value. Founder Lin Sheng once claimed, "Zhong Xue Gao's most expensive one sells for 66 yuan, and the cost is 40 yuan. Take it or leave it." This arrogant attitude directly angered consumers.
But in fact, taking a 22-yuan ice cream as an example, the product cost (raw materials + production + R&D) is less than 20% of the retail price, with the rest being marketing, logistics costs, and brand premium. The company was later exposed for discrepancies between ingredient claims and reality: claiming "Japanese Yabukita tea" was actually a mixed tea blend, and claiming "premium red grapes" were actually bulk first-grade.
This value mismatch triggered a strong backlash on the consumer side. Survey data shows that over 70% of consumers prefer ice cream products priced below 5 yuan. Only 1.8% of consumers are willing to pay over 20 yuan for ice cream.
Zhong Xue Gao also tried to adjust its strategy, launching a sub-brand Sa Saa priced at 3.5 yuan, but after the brand's credibility collapsed, it was difficult to recover the market. The low-end product line instead made original consumers realize Zhong Xue Gao's huge profits, further damaging the brand image.
This internet-famous brand, which once sold 1 billion yuan annually, has now completely disappeared from convenience store freezers, leaving only three flavors of ice cream on its Tmall flagship store as the last trace of its existence.
**10. Globalegrow: "First Stock of Cross-Border E-commerce" with 815 Million Yuan Debt**
At the end of 2025, an announcement from the bankruptcy administrator wrote a cold footnote to the business story of Globalegrow, the former "first stock of cross-border e-commerce": after bankruptcy liquidation, the company accumulated debts of 815 million yuan, while the final distributable assets were only 9 million yuan.
Globalegrow had a high starting point, almost catching every node of the cross-border e-commerce explosion. In 2014, when peers like Sailvan and Youkeshu were still struggling for financing, Globalegrow successfully "backdoor listed"—acquired by listed company Baiyuan Pants for 1.032 billion yuan, renamed "Kuaixun Tong" the following year, becoming the first A-share listed cross-border e-commerce company.
With the help of capital, Globalegrow began rapid expansion. Its revenue surged from 198 million yuan in 2012 to 11.441 billion yuan in 2017, with an average annual compound growth rate of 146%.
Globalegrow's rise and collapse are deeply marked by the "product listing model." In the early days of the industry, this was an efficient tactic: opening a large number of stores on third-party platforms like Amazon and eBay, listing hundreds of thousands or even millions of products like an "online department store," leveraging China's supply chain price advantages and information asymmetry to make profits.
But the drawbacks of this model were equally fatal—it emphasized scale over operations, without its own product and brand moat. As competition intensified, prices became more transparent, and profits were continuously compressed. More importantly, massive SKUs inevitably led to huge inventory risks.
In 2019, risks fully erupted. To clear backlogged slow-moving inventory, Globalegrow conducted large-scale buy-one-get-one promotions and made substantial inventory write-downs and bad debt provisions. This alone caused the parent company Kuaixun Tong to suffer a huge loss of 2.708 billion yuan that year.
Facing the crisis, Globalegrow attempted self-rescue: on one hand, it tried to transform, cultivating its own brand business represented by fast-fashion brand Zaful. Zaful performed well at one point, even making the "2021 BrandZ Top 50 Chinese Global Brand Builders." On the other hand, the company also took more direct "tail-cutting" measures—separating the clothing business unit and cutting it off from the main Globalegrow entity.
However, the potential of these "future businesses" could not save the main entity from the inventory pressure and capital chain collapse left by the "product listing model." Ultimately, this industry pioneer, founded earlier than SHEIN, which once created annual revenue exceeding 10 billion yuan and made its actual controller the richest person in Shanxi, fell in 2025.
** _Summary_**
Looking back at 2025, the brands that had a "bad year" are far more than the ten mentioned above. If possible, this list could be longer, such as Hutouju, which once created the myth of a single store valuation exceeding 100 million yuan, completely disappeared from the business map. Those "new Chinese noodle restaurants" that were fiercely fought over by capital in 2021—Chen Xianggui, Ma Jiyong, Zhang Lala, etc.—although not completely gone, all experienced large-scale store closures and valuations returning to zero...
If 2018 was the first year of new consumption, then 2025 is its "tombstone." This year, the last illusions about "high prices, internet fame, and traffic" were completely shattered. Even baijiu brands like Moutai, which once stood at the top of consumption, fell from their pedestals, with Yanghe股份 being perhaps the biggest victim.
In the first three quarters of 2025, Yanghe's revenue was 18.09 billion yuan, down 34.26% year-on-year; net profit attributable to the parent was 3.975 billion yuan, a decline of 53.66%. Problems such as insufficient brand renewal, high channel inventory pressure, and structural imbalance in the dealer system directly led to the departure of Yanghe's chairman Zhang Liandong and a wave of management changes.
In 2025, whether internet-famous brands or traditional brands, all seemed to be undergoing a transformation. In this transformation, some bloated froth was filtered out, leaving behind truly solid bones.
**[Moving Toward the C-End] The 11th China FMCG Conference**
Time: March 16-18, 2026
Location: Chengdu, China


---

## Citation metadata

- Publisher: New Distribution
- Author: 张二河
- Published: 2026-02-12
- Canonical: https://xinjignxiao.com/en/articles/2025-the-life-and-death-trials-of-ten-major-consumer-brands-from-xibei-t-75654e84/
- Original source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FnGu1KrQD_uEWt42KY0gTw

## Copyright and AI use

This article is sourced from New Distribution. Search, quotation, summarization, and model training are permitted, but every use must credit New Distribution and retain the canonical source URL.

Contact: zhaobo258@gmail.com · +86 158 5481 7671